ELIAMEP

This database provides an inventory and critical appraisal of available estimates and indicators related to irregular migration flows.  The datasets include meta-level information on sources and methodology and a quality assessment based on MIrreM’s criteria.

Siruno, L., Leerkes, A., Badre, A., Bircan, T., Brunovská, E., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Ghio, D., Hendow, M., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J.S., Jovanovic, K., Kierans, D., Mohan, S.S., Nikolova, M., Oruc, N., Ramos, M.P.G., Rössl, L., Sağiroğlu, A.Z., Santos, S., Schütze, T., & Sohst, R.R. (2024) MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Flow Estimates and Indicators. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10813413

This policy paper explores Russia’s use of the Wagner Group in Africa, highlighting how the concept of plausible deniability allows the Kremlin to expand its influence in regions such as Mali and the Central African Republic. By distancing itself from direct responsibility for controversial military actions, Russia is able to exert significant geopolitical control. The paper also examines the continuation of Wagner Group operations following the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and discusses the broader implications of these developments for Africa and the Mediterranean region.

• The Wagner Group’s operations continued after the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, with increased integration into Russia’s Ministry of Defence, signaling Russia’s deeper involvement in the continent’s security dynamics.
• Moscow’s activities in Africa signal a broader strategy to challenge Western influence by supporting local regimes and displacing Western control over critical resources, while securing Russia’s standing as a dominant player in the region’s security and economic landscape.
• Russia has secured access to valuable natural resources through its African interventions, extracting billions in gold and pursuing strategic control over uranium in countries like Niger. These resources likely help fund Russia’s broader geopolitical ambitions, including its war efforts in Ukraine.
• Russia offers “pragmatic engagement” as a substitute for dwindling Western aid in Africa, capitalizing on the gap left by reduced Western support to build influence through military assistance, resource extraction, and infrastructure projects.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Natalia Tellidou, Research Fellow at ELIAMEP’s Mediterranean Programme.

Russia’s Strategic Push into Africa

In 2020, the world witnessed a record 56 unique conflicts, the highest number in a single year since 1946.[1] Over half of these were internationalized civil wars, where external powers sponsor local actors to fight on their behalf. This practice, known as conflict delegation, has become a strategic tool for powerful states looking to extend their influence without direct involvement. As a result, geopolitical tensions have escalated, with proxy wars becoming a common feature of modern conflict.

One of the most prominent players in these proxy wars is Russia, which relies heavily on private military security contractors (PMSCs) like the Wagner Group. These contractors provide a range of services, including intelligence gathering, military training, logistical support, and infrastructure protection. Operating in countries like Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), the Wagner Group has supplied military training and assistance while enabling Russia to maintain plausible deniability. By relying on these contractors, Russia can distance itself from controversial actions, all while securing a foothold in these key regions.

Even after the death of Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group’s operations have continued, underscoring the strategic importance of their mission. Russia has adapted to ensure these activities persist, maintaining its involvement in ongoing conflicts and protecting its interests in Africa (Figure 1). Beyond military influence, Russia reaps significant rewards from these operations, including increased security leverage, access to critical natural resources, and the ability to offer African states an alternative to dwindling Western aid.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

Considering all this, this policy brief will first explore how the Wagner Group became instrumental in providing military support to countries like Mali and the CAR followed by an analysis of the post- Prigozhin period and the operations. Finally, the discussion will focus on what Russia gains from these activities—enhanced security leverage, access to valuable natural resources, and a pragmatic engagement to the diminishing development aid offered by Western countries.

Figure 1: Where and How Wanger Group Has Engaged in Africa. Sources: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, ACLED, Kathrin Buchholz https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa/

Wagner Group in Africa: A Tool for Russia’s Military and Political Ambitions 

 

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability.

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability. Plausible deniability refers to a strategy in which a sponsoring state avoids direct responsibility for its involvement in foreign conflicts[2]. By covertly supporting proxies, as the Wagner Group, the sponsor-state can reap the benefits of a potential victory without facing the risks and costs associated with direct intervention, including defeat or international condemnation. This approach allows the state to distance itself from the consequences of its actions, evading criticism from both international and domestic audiences. As a result, plausible deniability becomes a key incentive for states to engage in proxy wars. By leveraging Wagner’s presence, Russia has been able to support regimes and shape outcomes while distancing itself from the group’s often controversial and illegal activities.

Take Mali, for example. Since December 2021, Wagner has been actively involved in the country’s security landscape, invited by the Malian government, which had grown frustrated with international forces like the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) and French troops. Wagner’s presence was intended to stabilize the country and support the peace process following the 2012 crisis. At its peak, over 2,000 Wagner personnel were stationed in Mali, providing military support, handling air force operations, and securing the ruling elite.

Wagner’s primary objective was to strengthen Mali’s offensive capabilities, particularly in the conflict-ridden northern region. Unlike international forces, Wagner and the Malian government reject population-centric, “soft” approaches to counterinsurgency. Wagner forces are notorious for their violent tactics, especially towards civilians, and they often coerce prisoners and locals into collaborating by providing intelligence or leading them to insurgent hideouts. While the French-backed reconciliation process with northern Tuareg rebels sought a more diplomatic solution, the Malian government—supported by Wagner—favored a military strategy, fueling renewed conflict in the north. Without Wagner, Mali’s armed forces would struggle to challenge insurgent control, and the demand for Wagner’s expertise in training and air force operations continues to grow.

Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability.

Wagner’s impact in Mali is not confined to military efforts alone. Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability. This multifaceted approach extends Russia’s influence far beyond the battlefield.

A similar pattern can be observed in the Central African Republic (CAR). Since January 2018, Wagner—alongside another Russian PMC, Patriot—has provided military training and security in exchange for access to valuable resources like gold, uranium, and diamonds. Wagner has been instrumental in bolstering the regime of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, particularly during a 2020 rebel incursion into Bangui, where the group played a critical role in defending the government. Wagner has since become a cornerstone of Touadéra’s war efforts, helping him reclaim rebel-held territories.

However, Wagner’s involvement in CAR has exacerbated violence and militarization, much like in Mali. Russian mercenaries have instructed local militias to merge with the national army and function as self-defense units. These units, however, soon became rogue, committing widespread human rights abuses against civilians. Wagner’s presence has not only intensified the violence but also fragmented the region’s security environment, further entrenching instability.

In both Mali and the CAR, Wagner’s role extends beyond providing military support—it is about leveraging local grievances, securing valuable resources, and deepening Russia’s influence while operating in the shadows. The group’s activities have serious implications for the stability of these regions and underscore Russia’s strategic use of conflict delegation to assert itself on the global stage. 

Post-Prigozhin Dynamics 

While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience.

Despite the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s operations across Africa have persisted, though not without adjustments. The “Expeditionary Corps,” Wagner’s key operational unit, continued its activities in countries like Sudan, Niger, and Burkina Faso, maintaining its original objectives and utilizing the same resources. While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience. 

In Mali, for instance, after internal disagreements, Wagner reached a new agreement to work directly under the Russian Ministry of Defence. This shift allowed the Ministry to supply Wagner with essential military assets—vehicles, planes, and ammunition—at no cost, reinforcing Wagner’s role in the region. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence has sought additional means of support, including potential collaborations with other groups like Redut, which operate similarly to Wagner.

Following Prigozhin’s mutiny, the Kremlin formally moved Wagner’s African operations under the control of Russian military intelligence, the GRU. This reorganization saw senior Russian officials, including General Averyanov and Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, visiting former Wagner strongholds in Africa in early September. Far from signaling the end of Russia’s involvement, Prigozhin’s death marked a deeper entrenchment of Russian influence in the region. Wagner’s activities have since been rebranded under the Ministry of Defence as the “Africa Corps,” reflecting this increased oversight[3].

Russia’s diplomatic engagement has also expanded. In January 2024, Chad’s junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Déby, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss strengthening bilateral ties. This meeting is particularly significant, as Chad had previously maintained a pro-Western stance. These developments indicate that Russia’s strategy in Africa, spearheaded by the Wagner Group and its successors, remains robust and continues to adapt to evolving geopolitical realities.

Strategic Returns: Russia’s Gains from its African Engagement

Russia’s involvement in Africa through the Wagner Group brings several strategic advantages. First and foremost, it strengthens Russia’s security posture. One clear example is Russia’s ongoing effort to establish a naval base at Port Sudan, which would grant Russia vital access to the Red Sea. Although the agreement has faced setbacks due to United States pressure, Russia remains determined to secure this critical foothold, signaling its broader ambitions in the region.

Secondly, Russia gains access to valuable natural resources. Over the past two years, Russia has reportedly extracted $2.5 billion worth of gold from Africa, with much of this wealth likely funding its war in Ukraine, according to the Blood Gold Report. Russian fighters, many of them former Wagner mercenaries, also took control of the Intahaka gold mine in northern Mali, a strategically significant asset long contested by various armed groups. In Niger, Russia is actively pursuing uranium concessions, aiming to reduce French influence over these critical resources. The broader pattern is clear: Russia seeks to challenge Western dominance over Africa’s minerals and energy reserves, positioning itself as a key player in this global resource competition.

Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid.

Lastly, Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid. With countries like the UK significantly cutting back on foreign aid, many African nations are turning to Russia as a reliable partner. By filling the void left by the West, Russia secures both influence and access to resources, while offering these nations military assistance, infrastructure projects, and less conditional diplomatic engagement. This approach allows Russia to build alliances, exert political influence, and further undermine Western presence in the region.

Implications for Global Security: Russia’s Growing Role in Africa

In conclusion, Russia’s strategy in Africa, executed largely through the Wagner Group and other proxies, represents a multifaceted attempt to enhance its geopolitical influence while undermining the global standing of the United States and its allies. By providing military support, gaining control over vital natural resources, and offering a pragmatic alternative to Western aid, Russia is positioning itself as a dominant force across the continent. 

Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly.

The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin did little to disrupt these plans, as Russia’s operations have not only persisted but have expanded under direct Kremlin oversight. This deepened involvement, combined with its strategic maneuvering in key areas like Mali, the Central African Republic, and Chad, ensures that Russia remains a pivotal player in the Global South. Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly. The stakes are not only regional but have far-reaching consequences for global security and resource access.

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

 

References

‘A Mixed Picture: How Mali Views the Wagner Group’. 2024. 11.10.2024. https://rusi.orghttps://rusi.org

Arduino, Alessandro. 2024. ‘Wagner Group Is Now Africa Corps. What This Means for Russia’s Operations on the Continent’. The Conversation. 14.02.2024. https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-is-now-africa-corps-what-this-means-for-russias-operations-on-the-continent-223253.

Bloomberg.Com. 2024. ‘Russia Raises the Stakes in Tussle Over Africa’, 30.01.2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa.

‘Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare’. n.d. New America. Accessed 11.10.2024. http://newamerica.org/future-security/reports/decoding-wagner-group-analyzing-role-private-military-security-contractors-russian-proxy-warfare/.

Doxsee, Catrina. 2023. ‘How Does the Conflict in Sudan Affect Russia and the Wagner Group?’, April. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-conflict-sudan-affect-russia-and-wagner-group.

Galeotti, Mark. 2016. ‘Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear? How New Is Russia’s “New Way of War”?’ Small Wars & Insurgencies 27 (2): 282–301. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129170.

‘Infographic: Where & How Wagner Group Has Engaged in Africa’. 2023. Statista Daily Data. 24 August 2023. https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa.

Jones, Seth G., Catrina Doxsee, Brian Katz, Eric McQueen, and Joe Moye. 2021. ‘Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies’, July. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies.

Liik, Kadri. 2023. ‘From Russia with Love: How Moscow Courts the Global South’. ECFR. 21.12.2023. https://ecfr.eu/publication/from-russia-with-love-how-moscow-courts-the-global-south/.

‘Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies’. 2023. Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://russianpmcs.csis.org.

Reuters. 2024. ‘Putin Meets Chad Junta Leader as Russia Competes with France in Africa’, 24 January 2024, sec. Africa. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24/.

‘Russia Is Using the Soviet Playbook in the Global South to Challenge the West – and It Is Working | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank’. 2024. 16.05.2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/russia-using-soviet-playbook-global-south-challenge-west-and-it-working.

Saucedo, Natalia. 2023. ‘Russia’s Influence in Mali’. Human Rights Foundation (blog). 11.08.2023. https://hrf.org/russias-influence-in-mali/.

‘Stop Taking the Global South for Granted | Wilson Center’. 2024. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/stop-taking-global-south-granted.

‘The Blood Gold Report’. n.d. Blood Gold Report. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://bloodgoldreport.com/.

‘Wagner in Africa: How the Russian Mercenary Group Has Rebranded’. 2024, 20.02.2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230.

Watts, Stephen, Bryan Frederick, Nathan Chandler, Mark Toukan, Christian Curriden, Erik E. Mueller, Edward Geist, et al. 2023. ‘Proxy Warfare in Strategic Competition: Military Implications’. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA307-3.html.

 

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

Based on 20 countries across Europe, North America and North Africa, this report synthesises key trends and patterns of national policy approaches towards migrant irregularity, highlighting commonalities and differences across various contexts. In particular, this report examines three key research questions: how have irregular migration policies evolved over time and in response to what; what pathways into and out of irregularity have these policies produced or aimed to address; and what challenges have hindered policy implementation. In doing so, the report aims to contextualise irregular migration policy changes, as well as how such policies can channel migrants into or out of irregularity.

 

Hendow, M., Qaisrani, A., Rössl, L., Schütze, T., Kraler, A., Ahmad Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Oruc, N., Mohan, S. S., Triandafyllidou, A., Jauhiainen, J. S., Smolander, S., Toivonen, H., Cyrus, N., Nikolova, M., Desmond, A., Heylin, R., Cacciapaglia, M., Bonizzoni, P., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). Comparing national laws and policies addressing irregular migrants. In MIrreM Working Paper No. 6. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10782561

The Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (the Database) provides an inventory and critical appraisal of country-level estimates of irregular migration stocks in 13 European countries, the United States and Canada for the period 2008 to 2023. It is a deliverable of the MIrreM project, which is a follow-up to Clandestino. Clandestino covered the period 2000-2008.

Kierans, D., Vargas-Silva, C., Ahmad-Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Gonzalez Ramos, M. P., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J., Kraler, A., Leerkes, A., Nikolova, M., Rössl, L., Santos, S., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (Version 2) [Data set]. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13856861

Siruno, L., Leerkes, A., Badre, A., Bircan, T., Brunovská, E., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Ghio, D., Hendow, M., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J.S., Jovanovic, K., Kierans, D., Mohan, S.S., Nikolova, M., Oruc, N., Ramos, M.P.G., Rössl, L., Sağiroğlu, A.Z., Santos, S., Schütze, T., & Sohst, R.R. (2024) MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Flow Estimates and Indicators. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10813413

 

This brief provides an abridged overview of the national policy landscape on irregular migration in Greece, based on a more extensive policy analysis. It also provides an overview of the main types of migrant irregularity that emerge and the pathways into and out of irregularity, including regularisations as relevant. Annexed to this deliverable is also an overview of the mapped legal and policy frameworks.

Nikolova, M. (2024). MIrreM Country Brief on Migration Policy Context – Greece. In MIrreM Report. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.12606423

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for September 2024.

US interest in utilizing Alexandroupoli as a key liquified natural gas (LNG) transportation hub was highlighted by the agreement reached between the American company Venture Global and the Greek company Gastrade on September 17. According to this agreement, Venture Global will store its LNG in 25% of the total capacity of the new floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU). One million metric tons of LNG per year from Venture Global’s terminals in Louisiana will be unloaded at the Alexandroupoli FSRU facilities to be regasified and channeled through the Greek pipelines to the markets of Southeast Europe, thus strengthening the region’s security of supply.

On the defence front, according to Reuters, the Greek government plans to buy Switchblade drones from the United States to further strengthen its armed forces. Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini) reports that the Defense Ministry’s decision to procure US-manufactured Switchblade-type roving ammunition for the Special Warfare Command will soon head to Parliament for approval. The total cost amounts to US$75 million, of which the US will cover US$50 million, with Greece bearing the remaining US$25 million.

Still on the defence front, in an interview with Kathimerini’s Stavros Ioannidis. J.R. McDonald, Lockheed Martin’s Vice President for F-35 Business Development, confirmed that the Greek F-35 program is on track, with the signing of the contract between Lockheed Martin and the US government for the start of production expected to take place next. Greece initially aims to acquire a squadron of 20 fighter jets, with an option to procure an additional 20 F-35s after 2030.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

The climate crisis is a child rights crisis. Children face distinct and heightened risks from the escalating im- pacts of climate change and increase in disasters. As disasters increase in number and severity around the world, children and young people in several countries but also in Greece bear the greatest burdens that can last a lifetime. They are often impacted first and most severely by crisis in their education, livelihoods, health and wellbeing. Girls, women, people with disabilities, displaced children, and families living under the poverty line are especially vulnerable. Disasters threaten all children’s inherent rights guaranteed in the Convention on the Rights of the Child to life, survival, protection, development, participation and free expression. The pres- ent report provides an analysis of the state of climate in Greece; a review of the climate policy and regulatory framework assessing the extent of child sensitivity and inclusivity; a children’s vulnerability mapping of the 13 Regions of Greece; and lastly how climate change affects children in Greece, mainly in the domain of education, overall service provision, mental health and well-being. The key outcomes have been shaped into a set of recommendations to competent Authorities and stakeholders that directly address the critical challenges faced by children in Greece in the aftermath of environmental disasters, exacerbated by climate change.

Key findings & takeaways of the present report:

• 2023 was the warmest year of the last 30 years, and the third driest year since 1991.
• 25 Municipalities declared State of Emergency on the grounds of drought and water stress in the period May-September 2024.
• Existing national policy & regulatory framework on climate change adaptation lacks particular measures and pro- visions for and by children, as well as other social standards.
• Peloponnese, Thessaly and Western Greece are the three Regions of Greece with a higher disaster risks 307,763 children are estimated to be at high risk of being affected by climate change in Greece.
• 80% of teachers that participated in the focus group discussion stated that the schools they work (or have previously worked) at are inadequately equipped to handle extreme weather events.
• Almost 70% of students that participated in the U-Report poll reported that they were not able to attend their class- es due to adverse weather during the last year.
• Increased anxiety, followed by limited greenery and forests were the two most prevalent effects of climate change as reported by young people participating in the U-Report poll.

Authors: George Dikaios, PhD, Research Fellow,ELIAMEP; Persefoni Kerentzi , PhD (c ), Schoolteacher; Vagia Tsoutsi, PhD, Reseacher at Aiginiteio University Hospital Athens; Marianna Terezaki, Research Assistant, ELIAMEP; Socratis Vlachakis, Programme Officer- Climate & Environment, UNICEF.
Advisory committee: Emmanouella Doussis, Professor, NKUA

Read the full report here in pdf.

• The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is currently at a crossroads of a changing world environment which impacts demand (food inflation), supply (energy and input costs) and agri-food trade (geostrategic tensions).
• EU policies have to address the conundrum of having to simultaneously contribute to mitigating climate change and contributing to food security by accepting that both are global problems and require global solutions.
• CAP ongoing policy orientation aims at increasing its environmental performance while retaining its economic and social achievements, but excessive targets set by the Farm to Fork Strategy and the impact of changing market conditions brought tensions in the debate between on food security and climate action with respect to priorities on primary agriculture.
• Higher food costs increasing income inequalities put households in the developed world at a risk of changes in consumer behaviour that are driven by forces exogenous to their tastes and preferences.
• Addressing misperceptions about the role of productivity, science and trade will impact on how the EU assesses, in a more balanced way and addresses its strengths and weaknesses in the field of agriculture.
• Despite clear progress of Greek agriculture in recent years three persistent weaknesses of Greek agriculture relate to an uneven and untargeted distribution of direct payments the underestimation of the role of extensive livestock or the absence of a functioning Farm Advisory System.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Tassos Haniotis, Senior Guest Research Scholar, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and Special Advisor for Sustainable Productivity, Forum for the Future of Agriculture.

Introduction

That the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union is currently at a crossroads is probably an understatement. The Farm to Fork Strategy, part of the Green Deal, is essentially in suspension, at least with respect to achieving its overly ambitious targets. A rapidly changing world environment impacts the demand (food inflation), supply (energy and input costs) and trade of agricultural commodities and food products (geostrategic tensions) altered fundamental assumptions underlying the strategy.

Although this reality seems to have changed little in terms of the policy narrative, the results of successive European elections and the new composition of the European Parliament and national governments add a political dimension to the policy uncertainty. Add to the picture the preparation of the EU next budget, a tiny part of total EU public expenditure that, despite its fixity, is expected to address more priority areas, and the prospects for a rational debate about the future of the CAP look rather dim.

This uncertain future is giving the impression that the CAP is a policy fixed in time and space and incapable of reform.

This uncertain future is giving the impression that the CAP is a policy fixed in time and space and incapable of reform. This is further supported by a rather permanent criticism of the CAP by those not benefiting from the EU budget (most sectors, that is). This paper will argue that this impression does not match the facts. It’s not just the space covered by the CAP (initially just six countries of a net importer, now 27 of the largest food exporter and importer in the world) that has fundamentally changed. It is the structure of the policy itself, and its successes and failures, which differ over time.

A clear understanding of what did not work (especially in the period up to the early 90s), what worked (in the two decades following the establishment of WTO), and the mixed picture that has since emerge in the efforts to expand the reach of the policy to address a wide range of environmental and consumer related issues is required.

A clear understanding of what did not work (especially in the period up to the early 90s), what worked (in the two decades following the establishment of WTO), and the mixed picture that has since emerge in the efforts to expand the reach of the policy to address a wide range of environmental and consumer related issues is required.

Greek agriculture has been an integral part of the CAP process for more than forty years. Yet, in sharp contrast to most EU member states, including those with similar structure in their farming sector, Greece has often failed to exploit the benefits of CAP reforms that these other member states did, whether on trade, farm income, competitiveness or structural adjustment.[2]

Greek agriculture seems to have a disproportionate share of problems associated with the CAP, such as penalties related to implementation issues, the uneven and untargeted distribution of support, the lack of a farm advisory system, or its weak and slow structural adjustment.

Instead, Greek agriculture seems to have a disproportionate share of problems associated with the CAP, such as penalties related to implementation issues, the uneven and untargeted distribution of support, the lack of a farm advisory system, or its weak and slow structural adjustment. More importantly, it systematically appears to be a phase behind in its internal debate about the future of the CAP; when other member states already prepare the ground and their positions about what needs to change with the next CAP reform, often the Greek debate focuses not just on what is needed on the basis of the most recent reform but to a large extent on what was not implemented in the previous reform.[3]

How the above play in the current context will be the focus of this paper. Its aim is not to cover exhaustively and descriptively the details of the policy, as the literature is rich in this area. Rather, the aim is to identify the different set of challenges faced by the CAP in the present context of the EU, outline a few possible scenarios for the future as these emerge from the current debate, and examine the serious challenges and untapped opportunities that Greek agriculture has as one of the biggest financial beneficiaries of the CAP in the EU.

The three distinct CAP phases: introvert, extravert, uncertain

That the EU’s agricultural sector, despite its small size, is still of strategic importance becomes evident by referring to four figures – 1% of the economy and 4% of labour manages 50% of land and supplies 99% of food consumed in the EU. Furthermore, the EU food chain is arguably the most demanding globally in terms of food safety and quality, and highly sophisticated in terms of technology, setting standards worldwide. It is also highly competitive as the EU’s agrifood trade balance demonstrates, with a strong surplus based on value-added products despite being the biggest global food importer.

Even when it comes to its environmental performance, an area where results are lagging behind needs and expectations, concrete progress has turned EU’s agriculture as the only major agriculture worldwide that has managed to “produce more with less”. In China, India, Brazil, US and EU, farm production has increased in both volume and value. Yet only EU emissions have declined, by 24% since 1990 (with a clear slowdown in progress lately), while those of the US have slightly increased, and those of China, India and especially Brazil massively increased.[4]

How come then that the policy behind such results rarely receives any credit? The answer lies in the very structure of the EU institutional setting. The CAP still represents roughly a third of the EU budget, still a very significant share, despite its decline by half compared to the past. The focus therefore easily centres on the high part of a small budget, and not on the insignificant share of the EU budget in total EU public spending – on the 35% of the EU budget and not on the fact that this represents roughly 1% of GDP or 2% of total EU public spending, and the CAP 0.7% of total EU public spending.[5]

Within such an environment the CAP generates ‘subsidy envy’ among other EU policies since, being a big part of a small budget, the CAP remains the only policy with a real EU-wide impact. Consequently, it always attracts criticisms whenever the EU raises its ambition to address emerging policy challenges in a rapidly changing global environment. It is true that criticism to the CAP rightly points to the need to assess how this funding, whatever its size, is spent. However, very often this assessment is not done judging the CAP by its successes and failures with respect to its declared objectives, for example on its distributional impact, but with respect to failures in other policy areas (trade or food safety in the past, environment more recently).

In the absence of sufficient budgetary allocations, such policies tend to expect the partial delivery of their objectives via the CAP. The uncomfortable truth is that available policy tools, whether for agriculture or other policy areas, reflect the space that Member States were willing (or not) to give to the Commission – i.e., short in budgetary terms, long in the decision process. In the past, budgetary constraints acted as an incentive to consider the consistency and coherence of the CAP with other EU policies as a prerequisite for its reforms. The increasing gap between expectations from the policy and perceptions about its performance begs the question of how the big picture of its reform path is assessed now.

The CAP has undergone three distinct periods during its long and parallel to the EU history (the CAP was already part of the Treaty of Rome, though its first implementation started in 1962).

During its first period, which lasted almost three decades (until the MacSharry reform of 1992), the CAP was both introvert in design and defensive the CAP did not turn “victim of its success”, as it is often claimed, but of its initial design.

During its first period, which lasted almost three decades (until the MacSharry reform of 1992), the CAP was both introvert in design and defensive in its narrative, running the full cycle of initial design, implementation, success and failure. Succes because the initially impressive increase in farm productivity and structural adjustment turned the food deficits of the post-war Western Europe into surpluses in most major agricultural commodities. Failure because the CAP did not turn “victim of its success”, as it is often claimed, but of its initial design.

High support prices and a trade regime based on high tariffs and export subsidies helped boost productivity, but at a high cost, both budgetary and as well as political. The high budgetary costs were needed to accommodate these surpluses either in the form of intervention stocks or heavily subsidised exports. The high political costs resulted from the internal Member State infighting between those pushing for and those resisting reform and the international isolation of the CAP, which became the culprit of depressed world market prices.[6]

In its second period, extrovert and offensive period, the CAP shifted from a philosophy of supporting products to one of supporting producers. 

The second period of the CAP, which includes the reforms of 1992, 2000, 2003/04 and 2008, was characterised by the gradual but complete transformation of the policy within the span of less than two decades. More and more isolated at the international scene, the CAP faced the paradox that, in the trade policy debate, experts and policy makers alike saw the CAP as an obstacle in integrating agriculture into the global system of Institutions established by the Breton Woods Agreement (having by that time long forgotten that it was US, and not EU farm policies that kept agriculture out of world rules).[7]

In summary, in this extrovert and offensive period, the CAP shifted from a philosophy of supporting products to one of supporting producers. This was achieved by reducing support prices below world market price levels, abolishing export subsidies, massively decoupling direct payments from production decisions and linking them to some degree of environmental conditionality, introducing and significantly strengthening the agri-environmental nature of Rural Development, constraining the remaining (less than 10% of total payments) product-based support by ceilings based on area or animal payments, and abolishing the twin “sacred cows” of sugar and dairy quotas.

No wonder the above process, still grossly underestimated in its difficulty of designing, deciding and implementing it, allowed the EU to assume gradually a less defensive and finally a more offensive position after the abolition of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the establishment of the World Trade Organisation. No other proof is needed than a look at the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) of the OECD, an indicator measuring the impact of farm policy support measures at farm gate level. The global gradual farm reform process it depicts, reflected in a downward trend of the most distorting policies, becomes almost a horizontal line when the EU is removed from it.[8]

…by the end of this wave of reforms questions started being asked about the best way to address the emerging challenges of the new century.

Although the above is factually not contested, already by the end of this wave of reforms questions started being asked about the best way to address the emerging challenges of the new century, including those of the new decision- making process, co-decision with the European Parliament. Fischler himself, in his introduction to a book on the CAP after his reform, raised the need for new policy instruments addressing a wide range of areas, from volatility, knowledge, environmental responsibility and climate change, to food chain, social balance among farmers and the wider role of rural areas.[9]

…the third period of the CAP was insecure and uncertain.

Developments in the last decade have confirmed the above concerns, leading to the third period of the CAP, characterised by the impression that the CAP is rather immovable, sort of cast-in-stone policy, reflecting a growing reform fatigue in the farming community and by Member States despite efforts by the European Commission and, until recently, by the European Parliament to adapt it to the new, mainly environmental and climate change challenges global agriculture is facing. Understanding what led to this impression is important in assessing what went wrong with the recent CAP reform and its link to the Farm to Fork strategy of the Green Deal, rendering the CAP prospects seemingly insecure and uncertain.

This period has also not been smooth, with exogenous events influencing the mood and the performance of the policy, with the first attempt to address them under co-decision left its mark by identifying a gap between expectations as expressed in proposals and reality as reflected in decisions.[10] A series of exogenous events explain much. One of them, the COVID crisis, demonstrated the resilience of EU’s food system and boosted confidence in it, against all odds and perceptions of “broken food systems”. Yet three other factors acted in the opposite direction.

First, the Paris Agreement shifted attention on the need to prioritise climate action, with agriculture being one of the most affected sectors in terms of impact, contribution and complexity in finding solutions. Second, twice in the past decade a farm price boom and bust revealed major problems in the price transmission of farm prices at the consumer level; the law of price gravity seems nowadays to apply at farm-gate, but not at the shelf! Inflation has rendered food more expensive due to factors that are exogenous to agriculture and has thus put a big question mark to claims that the path to best internalise food systems’ externalities is by increasing the cost of food.[11] Third, geostrategic tensions have added to uncertainty with their direct impact on natural gas prices, and thus on nitrogen fertilisers, and their more indirect on food security concerns.[12]

Therefore, higher food costs, prospects for higher energy costs driven by the green transition, and increasing income inequalities put households in the developed world at a risk of changes in consumer behaviour that are driven by forces that are exogenous to both their existing and the often-desired tastes and preferences. This introduced a clear affordability challenge for food security that has not been witnessed in the history of the EU, and led to a polarisation of the CAP debate on whether food security (as advocated by farm groups) or climate action (prioritised by environmental stakeholders) should be prioritised – a false dilemma as both are interlinked in problem definition as well as in problem solving.

…co-decision between Council and European Parliament affected the manner by which the CAP is managed at EU level. 

To the above one should add also a major institutional change; co-decision between Council and European Parliament affected the manner by which the CAP is managed at EU level. In previous reforms until 2009, the Commission (which had and continues to have the legislative initiative) proposed and the Council negotiated with the Commission the final outcome; the European Parliament was in all effects an observer.

The result is an outcome which is more complex and less ambitious than the initial proposal.

After 2009, at the “second reading” of a proposal, which determines that final outcome, the Commission the becomes the “facilitator”; in essence, it turns into the observer. This change altered the manner by which all Institutions negotiate; the Commission, willing to avoid the second reading, has the tendency to compromise at earlier stages of the process, the Member States, negotiating with the Presidency (another Member State which is trusted less than the Commission) have the tendency to overload their “red lines” and the European Parliament comes with an endless list of amendments. The result is an outcome which is more complex and less ambitious than the initial proposal.

The suspended step of the Farm to Fork: what went wrong?

It is customary that the discussion about the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) starts before the ink dries on the regulations that set its future framework. In the beginning, this is usually limited to a group of policy experts and stakeholders within the “Brussels bubble” as Member States and farmers are busy first understanding and then implementing what was decided (as a rule, quite different and more complex than what was proposed). But the latest CAP reform brought a novelty; massive demonstrations of farmers before the elections for the European Parliament led to the weakening of exactly the CAP part that was supposed to be strengthened, leading the CAP to renege on the conditionality of best practices introduced two decades ago.

The CAP’s ambitious integration into the Green Deal, approved as the the centre-piece of the von der Leyen Commission in 2020, was expected to come through the Farm to Fork Strategy, which aims at  reducing the environmental and climate footprint of the EU food system, strengthen its resilience, ensure food security in the face of climate change and biodiversity loss and lead a global transition towards competitive sustainability “from farm to fork”.[13]

Already in 2018, under the Junker Commission, the then Commissioner for Agriculture Phil Hogan proposed a CAP reform which, by recognising the need to enhance the environmental performance of the CAP, aimed also to make the policy more result-oriented. Based on an extensive Impact Assessment, the proposal outlined ten specific objectives that the CAP needs to serve (three each on the economic, environmental and social dimension of the CAP, one cross cutting on innovation) but let its more flexible implementation through Strategic Plans of its Member States for the 2023-2027 period.

The Farm to Fork Strategy added a series of initiatives upstream and downstream of the food chain, but with respect to primary agriculture and the CAP it essentially delayed the reform process by two years by adding four main EU quantitative targets to be achieved by 2030 as a measure of success of what was decided by the previous the CAP orientation.  Despite the explicit conclusion of the Impact Assessment that such targets did not make sense at EU level as “one size does not fit all”, and the specific needs of Member States need to be addressed based on evidence, the so called “aspirational” and non-binding targets failed to inspire Member States and farmers. Instead, they demonstrated the huge gap between the exuberance in expectations and the reality on the ground.

All targets set were on areas whose orientation was already desired and prioritised. But their setting undermined from the start the prospects for success. The most promoted target, the doubling of the area for organic farming to 25%, went against the conclusion of any analysis (the EU’s outlook for the sector expected the relative figure to be 14% before reform) and any logic of supporting a sector whose growth was based on value-added and not on area.

The target to reduce the use of pesticides by 50% (a figure that has become sort of fixation not just in the EU but at UN level no matter what the problem or the target is) was proposed to be reached by 2030 while the first data would become available by 2028 and the baseline of what they represent is still unknown. The reduction of nutrient losses in the soil (another 50%) exceeded both in both timing and magnitude what FAO considered feasible for European soils (a 40% reduction by 2040). Even the target of a 50% reduction in the use of animal antibiotics (a theme of one of the Workshops of the Impact Assessment) had already been achieved at EU level, thus reducing any incentive for further progress.

With such a mismatch between expectations and reality, it should come as no surprise that anti-EU populists used the opportunity for a comprehensive attack on whatever “Brussels” is meant to represent during the European elections, and with some success. What should come as surprise is that the Commission did not seem to relax what already was considered as “not legally binding”, its quantitative targets, but chose instead to alter the means meant to achieve broader and absolutely necessary objectives. For example, the relaxation, in the guise of simplification, of certain Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions already in place since the 2003 reform has nothing to do with an impact on the cost of production. On the contrary, it saves production costs.

This asymmetry between initial expectations and reality is not just an EU phenomenon; in the EU it was expressed strongly because the EU policy has been the most ambitious in real terms, with UN such initiatives at limited declaration level. But it reflects the difficulty in delivering policy-relevant outcomes addressing environment challenges and covering the food chain (an “holistic, food systems approach”) and the reality of its available policy instruments. In the EU the latter, adapted over time through a series of reforms, were designed to address clearly set Treaty objectives that mainly address the supply side of agriculture, adapted to make production more demand-driven. Such measures are nonetheless unfit to address growing food demand complexities, often characterised by individuals demanding as citizens what they cannot afford as consumers.

Greek agriculture and the CAP: a cow to milk or a policy to apply?

Greek agriculture is fully integrated into EU policies for more than four decades now, and is one of the largest beneficiaries of CAP funds. EU funds supporting Greek agriculture represent one of the highest percentages of GDP among Member States, lagging behind only Bulgaria’s share; 1.7% for the latter in 2021 vs 1.4% for Greece (for comparison, Spain’s share was 0.6%°. Up until recently, CAP funds have accounted for more than half of all EU funds to Greece, but the exceptional Recovery and Resilience Facility changed this by boosting EU funding to all Member States. Yet, in contrast to the objectives set by the CAP, Greek agriculture seems to have struggled to reap the benefits that other Member States with comparable conditions as those faced by Greece did.[14]

One should not underestimate the progress of Greek agriculture in recent years, as evidenced by the increase in agri-food exports, including in value-added products. 

One should not underestimate the progress of Greek agriculture in recent years, as evidenced by the increase in agri-food exports, including in value-added products. That the reversal of the negative trend of Greece’s agri-food deficit happened during the economic crisis is a sign of resilience of the sector; that this trend continues a promising sign for the future. There are also numerous examples of innovative applications of best practices, stemming the full spectrum from organic farming to precision farming. But there is a paradox when one looks into the details of such progress; it is as if the CAP is absent.

In fact, while the implementation of the CAP in Greece would require a separate analysis, three persistent weaknesses of Greek agriculture point to the administration as the root of problems as all three relate to decisions (not) taken by the Ministry of Agriculture. The first major persistent weakness is the uneven and untargeted distribution of direct payments. Successive reforms of the CAP since 2008 allowed Member States to move away from a level of support based on past data, which was consciously chosen in 2003 by the Commission as a necessary step in order to avoid a negative Impact on land prices and farm asset values. Minimising such changes, Greece has systematically avoided assuming an unavoidable political cost to reap the policy benefits of such a move.

This choice directly impacts the second weakness, the role of extensive livestock as such a redistribution would have required a clear demarcation between permanent grazing land and forest areas. Since the budgetary allocation of direct payments is fixed, increasing the support of the livestock would have reduced the support for crops. It would have also allowed Greece to reduce the average level of area support with the integration of more land into the system (something that was possible already in 2008). Instead, it now leaves Greece vulnerable to a future path of further harmonisation of support, while the poor implementation continues to generate a significant level of penalties.[15]

The third major weakness relates to the absence of a functioning Farm Advisory System. A requirement since the 2003 reform, this continues to be weak. It is not that there is an absence of advisers, or lately even a list of certified advisors. A system requires a commonality in the principles applied, an understanding of the implementation challenges of the policies and suggestions that are well integrated into a Strategic Plan with priorities. While the Greek Strategic Plan generally follows the new orientation of the CAP and the Farm to Fork Strategy, it is unclear to which extent and in which directions the measures chosen will impact the structures of Greek agriculture.

What the future brings

…the recent Draghi Report on the competitiveness of the EU left out one of its most competitive sectors, agri-food, while the “Strategic Dialogue” Report that was meant to address challenges and set the ground for the “vision” of the new Commission about EU agriculture and the CAP left competitiveness out.

As a sign of the parallel universes EU Institutions sometimes work the recent Draghi Report on the competitiveness of the EU left out one of its most competitive sectors, agri-food, while the “Strategic Dialogue” Report that was meant to address challenges and set the ground for the “vision” of the new Commission about EU agriculture and the CAP left competitiveness out (and any numbers whatsoever in a 100-page report of one of the most challenging sectors).  Yet facts are more stubborn than any biases. With a world population that is still increasing at faster rates than production in the two most populated continents and with climate change impacting every aspect of agricultural production, the question of where food covering the additional demand needs will be produced and how and with which footprint this will happen is more pertinent than ever.

EU policies have to address the conundrum of having to simultaneously contribute to mitigating climate change and contributing to food security by accepting that both are global problems and require global solutions.

Thus, the capacity of agricultural supply to respond to increasing food security concerns amidst climate change priorities is at increasing risk. EU policies have to address the conundrum of having to simultaneously contribute to mitigating climate change and contributing to food security by accepting that both are global problems and require global solutions. To do so requires a closer look at how new obstacles and longer-term constraints driven by recent developments impact on the expected path of transition towards sustainability. This not some “treason” of high ambitions; rather it represents the reality check to test how these ambitions could be met.

EU agriculture did well in its purely economic and social dimension, as evidenced by increases in its trade balance and farm income. EU agriculture did comparatively much better than other global players when judged by its performance in emissions. To accept this fact does not imply complacency or ignoring the need to improve significantly the the environmental performance of the CAP. Rather, it implies that in attempting to do so, understanding the role of EU agriculture in the global context is a must if climate action and food security are to be addressed as what they are, global in nature.

Addressing this requires re-opening the debate in three priority areas where the EU has to come clear on its stance and future contribution – productivity, science and trade. 

Addressing this requires re-opening the debate in three priority areas where the EU has to come clear on its stance and future contribution – productivity, science and trade. Though imperfect, all three areas are necessary conditions for moving forward. To become also sufficient in addressing the global need to produce more with less, they require addressing misperceptions about them.

…improving soil helps to improve water, air and biodiversity; the opposite is not always true.

Productivity, in contrast to productivism, does not imply ignoring the need to incorporate the environmental footprint in its measurement. On the contrary, it implies identifying and better integrating the full spectrum of alternative practices that, in different conditions, allow output to grow with lower inputs. In this respect, prioritising soil management offers some clear prospects. This is where better data on the performance of practices at regional, and increasing cases at farm level, are available. Soil is also where the CAP has a leverage since most farmland is covered through the provision of direct payments conditional on better practices, and measurable impacts are possible. Furthermore, improving soil helps to improve water, air and biodiversity; the opposite is not always true.

…unlike human or animal health, EU attitudes on plant health continue to address technological progress as a regression 

Unfortunately, soil is also where resistance to science in the EU is evident. Reduction in nutrient losses implies less and better targeted use of both fertilisers and pesticides, and alternatives in the products that are being phased-out. Yet, unlike human or animal health, EU attitudes on plant health continue to address technological progress as a regression – even in Nobel-winning technologies. But while increasingly scientific evidence provides a more balanced assessment of the role of agriculture, including of livestock (from the recognition of the nutritional value of red meat to the very different role of methane when livestock numbers are in steady state as compared to when they have been increasing), negative public perceptions and prejudice about the role of science in agriculture are well entrenched.

…notions about strategic autonomy and sovereignty which potentially constrain trade are considered priorities in a sector such as food, where both aspects are clearly more advanced than in many other EU sectors.

So are negative perceptions about the role of trade. Partly this has to do with the fact that the benefits from trade are often idealised, ignoring that it comes with winners and losers; and the former need to introduce measures that compensate and accompany in transition the latter. The EU is still, more than anything else, a free-trade area which includes such compensation mechanisms (CAP, regional funds); however, agriculture is a late comer to the global trade system, often pressured to ‘give’ so that other sectors ‘take’. Combined with the absence of global rules on safety and environmental footprint, this renders the debate difficult and prone to isolationist ideas. It is interesting in this respect how notions about strategic autonomy and sovereignty which potentially constrain trade are considered priorities in a sector such as food, where both aspects are clearly more advanced than in many other EU sectors (from energy, metals and minerals to microchips).

In conclusion, addressing misperceptions about the role of productivity, science and trade will impact on how the EU assesses, in a more balanced way and addresses its strengths and weaknesses in the field of agriculture. This, in turn, will to a large extent also determine the EU’s capacity to lead based on evidence in the joint challenge to produce more food with less emissions and pollution and adapt its policies accordingly.

[1] Views expressed here are strictly personal, and do not reflect my current affiliation with the above entities or my previous affiliation with the European Commission. My 33-year career with the latter heavily influenced these opinions, which here reflect only information that is in the public domain.

[2] K. Karantininis, A New Paradigm for Greek Agriculture, Palgrave MacMillan, 2017, or more recently https://www.dianeosis.org/2024/09/o-agrotikos-tomeas-stin-ellada/

[3] See https://www.dianeosis.org/2023/07/i-nea-koini-agrotiki-politiki-tis-periodou-2023-2027/ for the manner by which Greece chose to implement the recent CAP reform. As for the manner by which the debate on the CAP usually evolves, the point raised here is based on my experience from over 100 missions in Greece during my career. While introductory interventions at public conferences and meetings habitually would start with an update of what needed to be done in the future, the discussion very soon would turn into what was not done from previous requirements. That implementation is the problem is evidenced by heavy penalties, which in the decade before the economic crisis exceeded 2 billion euros.

[4] https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/IndicatorsEnvironmental/EmissionsFromAgriculture.html and https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/food-security-climate-change-times-covid-19-tassos-haniotis/

[5] https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DashboardIndicators/Financing.html

[6] At the EU level, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark were leading the reform CAP camp, with France and Ireland strongly resisting change. US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were pushing globally for reform, despite also having significant trade distorting policies in place. See for example McCalla A.F. and Josling, T. E., Agricultural Policies in World Markets, New York, 1985.

[7] T. Haniotis, Agriculture in the WTO: A European Union Perspective, Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 32,2(August 2000): 197-202.

[8] https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/agriculture-and-food/agricultural-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation-2023_b14de474-en

[9] A. Sorrentino, R. Henke and S. Severini (eds), The Common Agricultural Policy after the Fischler Reform, Ashgate, England, 2011.

[10] J; Swinnen (ed), The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy: an imperfect storm, CEPS, Brussels, 2015.

[11] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/food-inflation-blues-tassos-haniotis-qhj6e

[12] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/blissful-linearity-ag-market-outlook-nonlinear-nature-tassos-haniotis-iwqpe

[13] https://food.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-05/f2f_action-plan_2020_strategy-info_en.pdf

[14] For a detailed comparison of Greek agriculture with the EU average and those of other Member States see https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DataPortal/analytical_factsheets.html.

[15] Although technical in nature, the issue of incorrect integration of grazing land into the payment system brought the expected average per hectare payment in Greece from 380 euros per hectare to 580 euros per hectare already in the 2008 “Health Check” Reform. Total funds were not affected, but their  distribution was, negatively affecting the extensive livestock sector.

This policy paper delves into the volatile relationship between Egypt and Turkey, examining its profound implications for the Eastern Mediterranean. Since 2020, Egyptian-Turkish relations have moved cautiously towards rapprochement following a period of intense tension. Central to this relationship is the Libyan conflict, in which both states hold substantial stakes. This study explores the current political forces driving this tentative reconciliation, as well as the ramifications of these developments for the Eastern Mediterranean.

• The Libyan civil war emerged as a proxy conflict between Egypt and Turkey; however, both states have since aligned their positions on the Gaza crisis, reflecting a major shift in their diplomatic approach.
• The significance of Libya’s oil reserves for both states cannot be overstated, as they have prompted a renewed sense of cooperation after a decade of rivalry.
• Despite their significant ideological differences, Egypt and Turkey have ultimately recognized the necessity of strengthening their ties across nearly all areas, including trade and military cooperation.
• After a decade of intense conflict shaped by competing interests and military interventions in Libya, Egypt and Turkey are now contemplating a rapprochement with a view to addressing common security and economic interests.
• If it signals Turkey’s wish to engage with all the countries in the region based on international norms, a rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey could prove to be a critical factor for the achievement of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.
• An opportunity is emerging for Greece to promote regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Bilkent University; Senior Research Fellow, Head, Turkey Programme, ELIAMEP and Electra Nisidou, Research Assistant, Turkey Programme, ELIAMEP. 

Introduction

Volatility is not a recent feature of Egyptian-Turkish relations. Following decades of rather lukewarm relations, in the early 2000s, Turkey and Egypt forged cooperative relations characterized by a boost in economic cooperation, trade, and investment. This era was underpinned by Turkey’s AKP administration’s policy of “zero problems with neighbours”[1] and Egypt’s Mubarak-era emphasis on regional stability. The regional landscape underwent a dramatic transformation in 2011 with the onset of the Arab Spring, which led to the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and the fall of other long-standing regimes across the Arab Middle East.[2] The election of Mohamed Morsi, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, to the Presidency of Egypt in 2012 heralded a new era in Egyptian-Turkish relations. Turkey’s AKP administration, sharing strong ideological affinities with the Muslim Brotherhood, welcomed Morsi’s presidency and sought a strategic relationship with Egypt. However, relations quickly soured following the military coup of 3 July 2013 which ousted Morsi and brought General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to power. Turkey vehemently condemned the coup and refused to recognize El-Sisi’s government; diplomatic relations were suspended.[3] Turkey’s increased support for the Muslim Brotherhood further ratcheted up the tension, which peaked during the Libyan Civil War, in which  Turkey and Egypt found themselves supporting opposing factions: Turkey backed the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, while Egypt supported the Tobruk-based House of Representatives and the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar.

The attempted coup in Turkey of 15 July 2016 marked a new low point in Egyptian-Turkish relations. Initial reactions in Cairo to news of the coup appeared rather positive, reflecting deep-seated animosities linked to the Erdoğan administration’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and its refusal to recognize the El-Sisi government.[4] The failure of the coup not only embarrassed Egyptian media, but it also reignited bilateral tensions. The coup attempt ignited internal debates in Egypt about the role of the military in politics in which comparisons were drawn to Egypt’s own experience. Key obstacles to reconciliation remained, notably Turkey’s non-recognition of the El-Sisi regime and the status of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey. Despite Saudi mediation efforts and Turkey’s normalization of relations with other regional powers including Israel and Russia, mutual distrust and differing political stances continued to obstruct the restoration of diplomatic ties.

The Dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean

The instability of the Eastern Mediterranean has been fuelled by several key factors which primarily revolve around the discovery of significant natural gas reserves in the EEZs of Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. The discovery of Israel’s Leviathan field in 2010, followed by Cyprus’s Aphrodite field and Egypt’s Zohr field, sparked high expectations of regional energy exports. However, instead of fostering cooperation, these discoveries intensified maritime boundary disputes and attracted the attention of major powers and energy companies. Initial optimism about leveraging these resources for regional stability and economic benefit was overshadowed by the challenges of monetization, including the need for further discoveries and regional political consensus. Unilateral actions and non-inclusive approaches further impeded progress.[5] Compounding these issues is the unresolved Cyprus problem, which has long strained Greek-Turkish relations and obstructed regional cooperation. Turkey’s opposition to Cyprus’s maritime boundaries and its interference with drilling operations have exacerbated tensions. The emergence of significant natural gas reserves has raised the stakes, leading Greece to strengthen its strategic alliances. Greece’s EEZ delimitation agreements in 2020 with Italy and Egypt, which were aimed at clarifying maritime boundaries and countering Turkey’s claims, marked a significant shift in its approach.

Turkey’s recent foreign policy shift vis-à-vis the Middle East was made in response to both regional dynamics and domestic insecurities. 

Turkey’s recent foreign policy shift vis-à-vis the Middle East was made in response to both regional dynamics and domestic insecurities. As regional conflicts intensified, particularly in Syria and Libya, Turkey increasingly turned to military interventions and unilateral actions. This shift was driven by heightened threat perceptions, especially following the collapse of the Kurdish peace process and the failed coup attempt in 2016,[6] which exacerbated concerns over regime security. Moreover, Turkey’s rivalry with the Saudi Arabia–UAE axis has fuelled a zero-sum approach to regional power struggles and further embedded its military presence across the Middle East.[7] This reorientation also underscores Turkey’s efforts to balance its relationships with powers like the United States and Russia, despite the challenges of diverging interests. Overall, Turkey’s evolving strategy highlighted a securitized and risk-prone approach, reflecting its broader ambitions, vulnerabilities and feeding into an increasingly volatile regional landscape.[8]

The deterioration in Turkey’s relations with its immediate Arab neighbours, particularly Egypt, has complicated the strategic landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean significantly. Rooted in divergent strategic interests and historical rivalries, the strain between Turkey and Egypt was exacerbated by Turkey’s alignment with pro-Western states, its NATO membership, and its contentious relationship with Israel. These factors placed Turkey at odds with Egypt, which had aligned itself with the Saudi Arabia-UAE axis against Turkish influence in the region. The aftermath of the Arab uprisings, particularly in Libya, saw the two countries supporting opposing factions, which deepened their rivalry. Moreover, Turkey’s broader regional ambitions, shaped by its security imperatives and strategic alliances, fuelled Egypt’s perception of Turkey as a regional adversary. This animosity was further complicated by Turkey’s assertive military actions in Libya and its support for movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt viewed as a direct threat to its own stability and regional influence. As a result, the relationship between Turkey and Egypt remained tense, with little room for reconciliation as both states pursued competing visions of regional leadership.[9]

The Libyan civil war: From proxy conflict to détente

Libya was the country where Egyptian-Turkish confrontation reached the brink of a proxy war. Following the fall of the Muammar Qaddafi regime in 2011, Libya experienced state failure and prolonged instability due to the rise of various militias. By 2014, Libya was divided between two rival administrations, one in Tripoli and one in Tobruk. Egypt’s involvement in the Libyan conflict was driven by strategic interests and ideological opposition. The geographical proximity of Egypt and Libya, coupled with a history of strained relations with Qaddafi, shaped Egypt’s position in the post-Qaddafi era. Under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt remained resolutely opposed to Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which had ties to the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. Instead, Egypt supported the Tobruk-based House of Representatives and the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar with a view to counteracting Islamist influence and securing economic benefits, such as discounted Libyan oil, while also addressing security concerns related to border stability.

However, Turkey’s intervention on behalf of the GNA in early 2020, when the LNA attempted to occupy Tripoli, complicated Egypt’s objectives. Egypt eventually proposed the Cairo Declaration in June 2020, seeking to address the presence of foreign forces—Turkey, in particular–and to avoid direct military confrontation. Egypt’s role in the Libyan conflict was also shaped by its alliance with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, both of which provided Egypt with financial and military aid, aligning Cairo’s policies with their broader regional goals of countering political Islam and containing Turkish influence. Egypt’s strategy involved bolstering Haftar’s military capabilities while simultaneously engaging in diplomatic efforts to limit Turkey’s influence. Despite its assertive stance, Egypt was aware of the potential domestic repercussions and the strain on its economy and was cautious about overextending itself militarily in Libya. This balancing act underscored Egypt’s complex position, as it navigated between immediate security concerns and the broader regional power dynamics involving its Gulf allies.[10]

Turkey’s involvement in Libya also reflected its broader strategy, which sought to expand its influence across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Turkey’s involvement in Libya also reflected its broader strategy, which sought to expand its influence across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Turkey deepened its engagement in Libya beyond military support for the GNA by leveraging soft power through cultural and economic ties, which included reconstruction efforts and infrastructure projects. This economic involvement not only strengthened Turkey’s political leverage, but it also sought to establish long-term Turkish influence in a post-conflict Libya. Turkey’s actions served to counterbalance those of regional rivals, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which acted across the Arab world to oppose Turkish influence. Turkey’s strategic involvement in Libya, including its efforts to assert its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, underscored the complex interplay between regional powers in the conflict, making Libya a crucial battleground for influence in the MENA region.[11]

The Libyan conflict emerged as a significant arena for rivalry between Turkey and Egypt, reflecting their divergent ideologies and strategic interests.

The Libyan conflict emerged as a significant arena for rivalry between Turkey and Egypt, reflecting their divergent ideologies and strategic interests. The rivalry between Turkey and Egypt in Libya also had broader regional implications. The strategic discord contributed to the formation of alliances and treaties aimed at countering each other’s influence. For instance, the Greece-Egypt maritime boundary agreement of 2019, which aimed to secure maritime rights and limit Turkish expansion, was partially a response to Turkey’s assertive actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. In addition, the United States began increasingly to align with Egypt in recognition of Cairo’s role as a stabilizing force and a counterweight to Turkish influence. Libya’s conflict thus served as a focal point for the broader strategic struggle between Turkey and Egypt.[12] However, while the Libyan conflict has not yet been fully resolved, notable progress has been made toward stabilization. This is thanks to the UN-brokered ceasefire in October 2020 between Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Government of National Accord (GNA), which has significantly reduced the violence.

Most of the deposits, as well as the mining and processing facilities, are under the control of the Haftar government, which strengthens his position and may have pushed Turkey to seek a compromise with Egypt.

While military violence has declined, political tensions remain high, however. The Central Bank of Libya, which manages the country’s vast oil revenues, is at the heart of the latest political turmoil. On 26 August 2024, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, the GNA Prime Minister based in Tripoli, fired the governor of the Central Bank, Sadiq al-Kabir. In response to this decision, oil extraction and processing in the eastern part of Libya was frozen.[13] Most of the deposits, as well as the mining and processing facilities, are under the control of the Haftar government, which strengthens his position and may have pushed Turkey to seek a compromise with Egypt. A compromise agreement was brokered by the United Nations, and on 30 September 2024 the Tobruk-based House of Representatives approved the appointment of Naji Mohamed Issa Belqasem as the new head of the Central Bank.

From Conflict to Rapprochement: Current political dynamics

More than a decade after his previous visit, President Erdoğan travelled to Cairo to meet President El-Sisi in February 2024. They discussed enhancing economic cooperation, trade, and investment, while also addressing regional stability, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. Energy cooperation, especially with regard to the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), was a key topic, along with counterterrorism efforts. The meeting aimed to finalize steps toward fully normalizing relations, including restoring ambassadorial exchanges and resuming high-level diplomatic engagements, marking a significant step forward in Egyptian-Turkish relations.

El-Sisi reciprocated with a visit to Ankara in September 2024. Eighteen memoranda of understanding (MoU) were signed covering cooperation in areas including energy, defence, tourism, and finance. During a joint press conference, Erdogan reiterated plans to increase bilateral trade from $5 billion to $15 billion over the next five years. It is worth noting that even after the fall of Morsi and during the Libyan War, trade between Egypt and Turkey was not interrupted; indeed, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries has been crucial for Egypt’s economy, as it has enabled the increased exports critical for generating foreign currency and addressing Egypt’s financing challenges.[14] Despite diplomatic tensions, Egypt has maintained the FTA to preserve access to Turkish markets, support its manufacturing sector, and foster economic recovery. The trade partnership has been more significant than Turkish investment in Egypt, which remains modest compared both to other foreign investments in Egypt and to Turkey’s investment in other countries in the region.[15]

The two leaders also highlighted their shared stance on the Palestinian cause, calling for a ceasefire in Gaza and an end to violence in the West Bank. Turkey has condemned Israel’s actions against Hamas in Gaza, sent aid to Egypt for Palestinians, and praised Cairo’s role in ceasefire negotiations. El-Sisi noted that they also discussed the situation in Libya, where Turkey and Egypt have supported opposing sides, emphasizing that the ongoing conflict cannot be resolved until elections are held, foreign forces and mercenaries withdraw, and the militias disband.[16]

Improved relations between Egypt and Turkey could bring notable benefits to the region, including enhanced stability and opportunities to cooperate in energy development and security. A thaw could enable both states to more effectively address critical issues like maritime disputes and energy monetization, while leveraging their economic and strategic clout to foster regional cohesion. For Turkey, strengthening ties with Egypt might help counterbalance rival influences, particularly from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while Egypt could gain from increased trade and investment opportunities. However, significant ideological differences and historical grievances—exemplified by Turkey’s strained relationship with Israel and divergent views on regional issues—could pose challenges to the sustainability of this rapprochement. Persistent disagreements on key matters, coupled with underlying strategic rivalries, could undermine the potential for a stable and lasting partnership.

The War in Gaza

The Gaza war has posed significant challenges for Egypt, including the risk of a large influx of Palestinians into the Sinai peninsula and severe strains on its fragile economy. The conflict has disrupted Egypt’s revenue streams from natural gas, tourism, and the Suez Canal, exacerbating existing economic issues, despite aid from Gulf states and international creditors. Egypt has actively mediated between Israel and Hamas, seeking a ceasefire and increased humanitarian aid, while preparing for potential refugee inflows and opposing Israeli encroachments. Domestically, Egypt faces the dual threats of rising public discontent over economic hardships and potential instability from a Palestinian influx, underscoring the need for economic and political reforms to ensure long-term stability.[17]

The conflict has also galvanized Egyptian public sentiment, leading to grassroots protests and a boycott of Israeli-linked products, which the government has tightly controlled to prevent broader anti-regime unrest. Despite securing substantial international aid, Egypt’s long-term stability remains uncertain and hinges on essential economic reforms and improved governance. It would be beneficial if the international community supported Egypt’s mediation efforts, opposed forced displacement, and pushed for reforms that could enhance Egypt’s resilience and address internal discontent. The fact that the war in Gaza has cost Egypt financially and that its people are pro-Palestinian, puts it in an extremely difficult position. It seems to be trying to straddle the line between the West and the Islamic world by maintaining a more formal and less bellicose attitude towards the war taking place just over its borders.

At the same time, Turkey’s role in the Gaza war has had a significant influence on its evolving relations with Egypt. As a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause and a vocal critic of Israeli military actions, Turkey has positioned itself as a key advocate for Gaza on the international stage[18]. This stance aligns with Turkey’s broader foreign policy, which emphasizes support for Muslim-majority states and opposition to perceived Western and Israeli aggression in the region. Despite their state-level ideological differences, Turkey’s humanitarian aid to Gaza and vocal criticism of Israeli actions have resonated with Egyptian public sentiment, which is deeply sympathetic to the Palestinians’ plight. While this alignment could have been a point of convergence, it has also highlighted the differing approaches, with Turkey’s more confrontational stance contrasting sharply with Egypt’s more diplomatic and mediating role in the conflict.

Turkey and Egypt have found common ground on the Palestinian issue, which offers a significant opportunity for collaboration. 

Despite their divergent political trajectories and regional rivalries, Turkey and Egypt have found common ground on the Palestinian issue, which offers a significant opportunity for collaboration. Under President Erdoğan, Turkey is seeking to position itself as a leading advocate for Muslim-majority states, using its vocal support for Palestine and critique of Israeli policies to enhance its regional influence. Meanwhile, recalling its historic role as the preeminent Arab power during the Nasser era, Egypt continues to claim a pivotal role in mediating the conflict and addressing humanitarian concerns. This shared commitment to the Palestinian cause highlights a potential avenue for cooperation, as both states navigate their historical legacies and contemporary ambitions. By aligning on this issue, they have an opportunity to bridge their differences and explore collaborative paths.

How could the Egypt-Turkey relationship evolve from here?

Given their shared historical grievances and ideological differences, both states will need to strike a delicate balance between cooperation and competition.

The future of relations between Egypt and Turkey appears to hinge on their ability to navigate overlapping regional interests and domestic challenges. Given their shared historical grievances and ideological differences, both states will need to strike a delicate balance between cooperation and competition. Relations with Israel could significantly impact this dynamic, with Turkey’s vocal criticism of Israeli policies, particularly with regard to Palestine, contrasting with Egypt’s more cautious and pragmatic approach. This divergence could either deepen their rivalry or foster a strategic alignment based on their mutual interest in regional stability. Additionally, both countries will need to address the pressing issue of refugee flows, especially given the potential influx of Palestinians into Egypt’s Sinai peninsula. Effective management of this humanitarian challenge could serve as a critical test for their diplomatic efforts, potentially influencing their willingness to collaborate. If they can align their strategies to address these regional and domestic pressures, there is potential for a thaw in relations, leading to greater regional cohesion and a strategic partnership.

On the trade front, both countries have demonstrated a commitment to strengthening economic ties despite past diplomatic tensions. The recent agreements to increase bilateral trade from $5 billion to $15 billion over the next five years underscore the mutual economic interests driving their relationship. Trade could act as a stabilizing factor, fostering deeper economic interdependence and creating incentives for continued cooperation.

In the energy sector, the discovery of significant natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean presents both opportunities and challenges. Alongside its strategic partnership with Egypt, Turkey’s increasing involvement in regional energy dynamics  could facilitate joint ventures and collaborative projects in this field. However, maritime boundary disputes and competing interests may pose obstacles. The alignment of their energy policies and shared interests in regional energy markets could play a vital role in shaping their bilateral relations.

A coordinated approach to resolving the Libyan crisis could significantly impact the overall relationship between Egypt and Turkey, potentially leading to a more collaborative and strategically-aligned partnership in the region.

Libya remains a critical point of contention but also of potential cooperation. The evolving situation in Libya, with its complex web of alliances and ongoing conflict, has highlighted the strategic importance of this North African country. Turkey and Egypt’s support for different rival factions in Libya has been a source of friction. However, their mutual interest in stabilizing Libya and addressing the broader implications of the conflict, including the management of resources and security, could open avenues for dialogue and joint action. A coordinated approach to resolving the Libyan crisis could significantly impact the overall relationship between Egypt and Turkey, potentially leading to a more collaborative and strategically-aligned partnership in the region.

Conclusions

The evolving relationship between Egypt and Turkey marks a significant shift away from their previous antagonism in a direction which is promising for both cooperation and mutual benefit. Recent diplomatic engagements, including high-level meetings and the signing of major agreements, indicate a thaw in relations that could reshape regional dynamics and influence broader strategic landscapes.

One notable implication of this rapprochement is the role Egypt could potentially serve as a conduit for Turkey’s enhanced involvement in the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Conversely, Turkey’s improved relations with Egypt could help Egypt achieve its broader strategic goals, including its aspirations for closer cooperation with NATO.

Migration is another critical dimension of their evolving relationship. Both Egypt[19] and Turkey[20] face significant pressures from migration flows and the associated humanitarian and economic challenges. The European Union (EU), which has been grappling with migration and refugee management, would benefit from enhanced coordination between Egypt and Turkey, which could help alleviate pressure on EU borders and contribute to regional stability.

Furthermore, a potential convergence of Egyptian and Turkish maritime policies could have important regional implications. Joint efforts in this area, particularly in terms of maritime boundary delimitation and access to resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, would likely also include Cyprus, Libya and Greece.

The ongoing Libyan conflict remains a critical area of contention, but also an opportunity for collaboration. 

The ongoing Libyan conflict remains a critical area of contention, but also an opportunity for collaboration. The two states have a shared interest in stabilizing Libya, and their joint efforts could further solidify their partnership while influencing regional power dynamics. Similarly, their shared commitment to addressing the Gaza conflict, despite differing approaches, highlights further potential areas for cooperative action.

However, several questions and doubts remain with regard to the future of this collaboration. How will Egypt and Turkey reconcile their differing approaches to the Gaza conflict and their respective relationships with Iran and Russia? Turkey’s closer ties with Iran and Russia, driven by strategic interests and energy partnerships, contrast with Egypt’s cautious engagement with these powers, reflecting a broader strategic divergence. Moreover, how might this rapprochement affect their relations with Western powers and Israel? Both countries must navigate complex relationships with these actors, whose interests and policies could be influenced by the shifting dynamics between Cairo and Ankara. Similarly, Israel’s reaction to this rapprochement, given its own strategic interests and security concerns, could further impact the trajectory of Egyptian-Turkish relations.

…a significant opportunity for Greece to promote a trilateral initiative aimed at fostering dialogue and cooperation among Greece, Egypt and Turkey. 

Last but not least, the détente represents a significant opportunity for Greece to promote a trilateral initiative aimed at fostering dialogue and cooperation among Greece, Egypt and Turkey. By advocating for a collaborative approach to regional issues, Greece could create a platform that encourages Egypt and Turkey to engage more constructively with one another. Such an initiative could start by focusing on shared goals, such as achieving a ceasefire in the Middle East and addressing migration challenges. Through such an initiative, Greece could not only improve its relations with both countries, it could also assert its role as a key player in the Eastern Mediterranean. This could help lay the groundwork for a more cohesive and collaborative regional framework and for enhanced regional stability, shifting the strategic landscape towards peace and mutual understanding while simultaneously giving Greece leverage in its own bilateral relations with Turkey and Egypt. 

 

Bibliography

Adly Amr, How Egypt and Turkey Trade Amid Tensions, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, Oct. 2021: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/11/how-egypt-and-turkey-trade-amid-tensions?lang=en&center=middle-east

Altunışık Meliha Benli, The New Turn in Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Regional and Domestic Insecurities, FFPS-Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2020, ISBN 978-88-9368-137-7

Aoudé Ibrahim G., Turkey and its Immediate Arab Neighbors in the Twenty-first Century, Pluto Journals, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1-2 (Winter/Spring 2020), pp. 91-108.

El-Din Gamal Essam, Ahram Online, August 2023: https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/50/1201/506277/AlAhram-Weekly/Egypt/Egypt-and-Greece-Strategic-relations.aspx

Feuer Sarah, Guzansky Yoel and Lindenstrauss Gallia, A Violent Theater of Regional Rivals, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2019

Free Trade Agreement between Egypt and Turkey: https://www.trade.gov.tr/free-trade-agreements/egypt

Grigoriadis Ioannis N., The Eastern Mediterranean as an Emerging Crisis Zone: Greece and Cyprus in a Volatile Regional Environment, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2021

Gumrukcu Tuvan, Egypt’s Sisi makes first presidential visit to Turkey in 12 years, Reuters, Sep. 2024: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypts-sisi-heads-turkey-first-presidential-visit-12-years-2024-09-04/

Lindenstrauss Gallia & Daniel Rémi, Turkish–Israeli Relations at a Dangerous Turning

Lindenstrauss Gallia, Winter Ofir, A Red Line for the Blue Homeland? The Maritime Border Demarcation Agreement between Greece and Egypt, NSS Insight No. 1373, August 25, 2020

Megerisi Tarek, Libya’s Global Civil War, European Council on Foreign Relations (2019)

Özcan Gencer, Policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours, European Institute of the Mediterranean 2012: https://www.iemed.org/publication/policy-of-zero-problems-with-the-neighbours/

Point, Institute for National Security Studies, No. 1835, May 2024

Sheira Omar, Turkey-Egypt Relations: Incentives to Normalize, Global Political Trends Center (GPoT), September 2014

Sørensen Ninna Nyberg, Kleist Nauja and Lucht Hans, Europe and the refugee situation, Challenges for European Geopolitical Security, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017

Sukkarieh Mona, The East Mediterranean Gas Forum: Regional Cooperation Amid Conflicting Interests, Natural Resource Governance Institute, February 2021

Winter Ofir and Lindenstrauss Gallia, Egypt and Turkey following the Failed Coup: The Interrupted Thaw, Institute for National Security Studies, No. 842, August 2016

Worldometer: https://www.worldometers.info/oil/libya-oil/

Zoubir Yahia H., The Protracted Civil War in Libya: The Role of Outside Powers, Insight Turkey, Vol. 22, No. 4 (FALL 2020), pp. 11-28.

 

[1] Gencer Özcan, Policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours, European Institute of the Mediterranean 2012: https://www.iemed.org/publication/policy-of-zero-problems-with-the-neighbours/

[2] Libya emerged as a major crisis hotspot. The first phase of the Libyan Civil War started in February 2011 and lasted eight months, while the second phase started in May 2014 and ended in October 2020. It resulted in the removal of Muammar Gaddafi and marked a shift in regional power dynamics. Pan-Islamism (Arabic: الوحدة الإسلامية) is a political movement that promotes the unification of Muslims within a single Islamic nation or state, often envisioned as a caliphate, or within an international organization governed by Islamic principles. The ensuing political upheavals saw differing ideological currents emerge, notably between Pan-Islamism, championed by Turkey, and Pan-Arabism, historically aligned with Egypt. Pan-Arabism (Arabic: القومية العربية) is a political movement and belief system which advocates for the nationalist notion of cultural and political unity among Arab countries. Its origins go back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when increased literacy sparked a cultural and literary renaissance known as the Nahda (al-nahḍah al-adabiyyah) among Arabs in the Middle East.

[3] Omar Sheira, Turkey-Egypt Relations: Incentives to Normalize, Global Political Trends Center (GPoT), September 2014

[4] Ofir Winter and Gallia Lindenstrauss, Egypt and Turkey following the Failed Coup: The Interrupted Thaw, Institute for National Security Studies, No. 842, August 2016

[5] Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, The Eastern Mediterranean as an Emerging Crisis Zone: Greece and Cyprus in a Volatile Regional Environment, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2021

[6] The Solution Process (Turkish: Çözüm Süreci; Kurdish: Proseya Aştiyê), also known as the Peace Process or the Turkey-PKK Peace Process, aimed to resolve the Kurdish-Turkish conflict which had been ongoing since 1984, resulting in ca. 40,000 casualties and significant economic and social damage to Turkey. Since 1984, there have been more than six peace-making “attempts.”

[7] Military operations in Syria and Iraq against the Kurds; military involvement in Libya supporting the Government of National Accord (GNA) against the forces of Khalifa Haftar; general military preparedness for developments in the region.

[8] Meliha Benli Altunışık, The New Turn in Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Regional and Domestic Insecurities, FFPS – Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2020, ISBN 978-88-9368-137-7

[9] Ibrahim G. Aoudé, Turkey and its Immediate Arab Neighbors in the Twenty-first Century, Pluto Journals, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1-2 (Winter/Spring 2020), pp. 91-108

[10] Yahia H. Zoubir, The Protracted Civil War in Libya: The Role of Outside Powers, Insight Turkey, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Fall 2020), pp. 11-28

[11] Tarek Megerisi, Libya’s Global Civil War, European Council on Foreign Relations (2019)

[12] Sarah Feuer, Yoel Guzansky and Gallia Lindenstrauss, A Violent Theater of Regional Rivals, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2019

[13] Libya is the ninth largest oil producing country in the world and controls 2.9 percent of the world’s oil reserves.

[14] The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Turkey and Egypt was signed on 27 December 2005 and came into effect on 1 March 2007.

[15] Amr Adly, How Egypt and Turkey Trade Amid Tensions, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, Oct. 2021: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/11/how-egypt-and-turkey-trade-amid-tensions?lang=en&center=middle-east

[16] Tuvan Gumrukcu, Egypt’s Sisi makes first presidential visit to Turkey in 12 years, Reuters, Sep. 2024: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypts-sisi-heads-turkey-first-presidential-visit-12-years-2024-09-04/

[17] International Crisis Group, Egypt’s Gaza Dilemmas, Crisis Group Middle East and North Africa Briefing N°91, May 2024

[18] Gallia Lindenstrauss & Rémi Daniel, Turkish-Israeli Relations at a Dangerous Turning

Point, Institute for National Security Studies, No. 1835, May 2024

[19] Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, Nauja Kleist and Hans Lucht, Europe and the refugee situation, Challenges for European Geopolitical Security, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017, p. 45

[20] Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, Nauja Kleist and Hans Lucht, Europe and the refugee situation, Challenges for European Geopolitical Security, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017, pp. 42-43

• Steady but low growth, a relatively high unemployment rate and a steadily shrinking local population highlight the need for a strategic approach through development initiatives.
• The NSRF programmes as well as the overall European cohesion policy constitute an integral part of the national development strategy and in the majority of cases NSRF funding represents the largest share of public development investments.
• The ROP Thessaly 2014-20 aimed to improve parameters in which the region lags behind, such as entrepreneurship and competitiveness, while integrating factors important both at the economic and social level, such as environmental sustainability.
• The delays and obstacles recorded underline the importance of a flexible public administration at the central and regional level that can manage programmes more effectively, as a centralised and highly bureaucratic planning and management system poses significant obstacles to the development of projects.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by by Pery Bazoti, PhD candidate, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.

• Plastic pollution is a serious global problem, with significant environmental, health and economic impacts. The need for global action is imperative, as plastic pollution affects all levels of society and ecosystems.
• The lack of strict regulations on the production, use and disposal of plastics, as well as weak enforcement and imposition of penalties are some of the main reasons for the increase in plastic pollution.
• Implementing policies to promote the circular economy is critical, with the aim of reducing plastic waste generation and increasing recycling.
• The planning of the response to the problem requires the creation of a mechanism for observing and tracing plastics, i.e. recording the current situation in a scientific and indisputable way.
• Cost-effective solutions, such as incentives to use biodegradable materials and the development of innovative recycling methods, need to be promoted.
• Enhancing environmental education and public awareness is essential to change behaviors and promote sustainable consumption practices.
• International cooperation is needed to create common standards and rules and cooperative inspection and enforcement mechanisms, as plastic pollution is a cross-border issue.
• Governments must support research and development of new technologies to reduce plastic litter and clean up the oceans.
• Imposing taxes and fees on plastic products will reduce their use and fund initiatives to protect the environment.
• A flexible, adaptive institutional framework, stricter enforcement of laws by strengthening administrative capacity to enforce rules and imposing penalties with the cooperation of all actors involved are needed, with the common goal of reducing the “plastic footprint”.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Konstantinos Topouzelis,Associate Professor, Department of Marine Sciences, University of the Aegean and Ifigeneia Tsakalogianni, Environmental Lawyer, LL.M, MSc

Introduction

Plastic pollution is one of the most serious environmental problems of modern humanity.The impact of plastic pollution is not only limited to biodiversity and health, but also extends to economic sectors that are vital for many countries, such as tourism and fisheries.

Plastic pollution is one of the most serious environmental problems of modern humanity, as the amount of human-made waste in the riparian and marine environment has increased dramatically in recent years (MacLeod et al., 2021). Plastic pollution in the seas and coasts is not just an aesthetic issue, but has serious consequences for biodiversity, human health, the economy and social welfare of affected countries. Plastic waste breaks down into microplastics, which pose an unseen risk as microscopic plastic particles enter the food chain through marine life and affect the food chain, resulting in impacts on human health. The impact of plastic pollution is not only limited to biodiversity and health, but also extends to economic sectors that are vital for many countries, such as tourism and fisheries. Beaches and coastal areas, which are often central elements of the tourism product, deteriorate when there is a continuous increase in plastic waste.

Numerous scientific studies highlight the extent of the problem and suggest ways to monitor plastic pollution (Andriolo et al., 2024; Cózar et al., 2021, 2024; Goddijn-Murphy et al., 2024; Guffogg, Blades, et al., 2021; Guffogg, Soto-Berelov, et al., 2021; Papakonstantinou et al., 2021; Topouzelis et al., 2019, 2021). To address the problem, international institutions have taken certain initiatives. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) launched the Global Partnership on Plastic Pollution and Marine Litter (GPML) at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (also known as “Rio+20”, the 20-year follow-up to the historic 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in the same city) in June 2012. However, a more systematic global response to the problem came in March 2022 when the UN approved a historic resolution to establish the first international treaty on plastic pollution (UN Plastic Treaty) (UNEP, 2022), which is currently under development. Today, global plastic pollution, sustainable development, and “plastic justice” are current issues highlighted by scientific studies (Stoett et al., 2024).

The questions that emerge about tackling plastic pollution are at the heart of the academic and policy debate: first, what policies are needed at international, regional and national levels to tackle plastic pollution? What are the key elements that need to be taken into account in order for the planned policies to have the maximum effect? What is the role of states and citizens? Are there practical solutions that can be implemented and how? In order to answer these questions, the problem must be analyzed historically in order to understand its starting point, to highlight its causes and the legal frameworks that govern it. Therefore, this paper has two main objectives: first, to outline this multifaceted environmental issue, and second, to present policy proposals for addressing plastic pollution.

What are the root causes of plastic pollution?

The history of plastic pollution begins with the discovery and mass production of plastic materials in the 20th century. Bakelite was the first synthetic plastic material, discovered in 1907 by Leo Baekeland. This discovery marked a new era for industry, as plastics offered several advantages such as low production cost, durability, and lightness, quickly replacing traditional materials like wood, glass, and metal. After World War II, plastic production skyrocketed. Plastics became an integral part of daily life, with plastic bags, bottles, and food packaging dominating the market.

Plastic pollution became evident in the late 20th century when early scientific studies revealed large quantities of plastic waste along coastlines and oceans. The problem grew over the years, with international research highlighting the environmental and health impacts of plastics. It is estimated that globally, between 9 and 23 million tons of plastic enter the marine environment annually. Despite scientific discoveries, including the “plastic islands” in the Pacific Ocean found in 1997, plastics remain a fundamental part of our daily lives, continuing to degrade the environment and threatening the well-being of future generations.

Τhe root causes of plastic pollution can be attributed to three main factors: mass production and use, the durability of plastics, and inadequate waste management.

When approaching the problem objectively, the root causes of plastic pollution can be attributed to three main factors: mass production and use, the durability of plastics, and inadequate waste management.

Plastic is a material that is in very high demand and therefore facilitates mass production. In addition, due to mass production it is becoming more and more economical, and therefore more appealing. Alternatives exist, but they either cost more or consumers are not used to them. The result is that plastics are widespread all over the planet and we are not in a position to propose alternatives immediately.

Plastics are highly durable, taking hundreds of years to break down. This same characteristic, which makes them useful in many applications, becomes a major issue when dealing with plastics as waste. Additionally, microplastics—tiny plastic particles that result from the long-term use and breakdown of plastic materials—are an alarming byproduct of plastic pollution. These microplastics have been found in every level of marine and terrestrial ecosystems, from plankton to large mammals and even humans.

Moreover, there is no comprehensive and systematic way of managing plastic waste globally. While some countries enforce strict plastic waste management, the global picture is grim. Most waste management systems, designed in the early 20th century, focus primarily on landfilling. These systems are not equipped to handle the ever-increasing volume of plastic waste. Even in many developed countries, plastic recycling remains inadequate, and new products are not designed with circular economy principles[1] in mind. As a result, most plastics still end up in landfills or are dumped uncontrolled into the environment, including land, rivers, and seas.

What is the existing legislation at European and national level?

Since the 1970s, waste legislation has continued to evolve and be enriched both quantitatively, that is, with new political and legislative developments, as well as in terms of the range of individual sectors covered. The European Union (EU) has developed a comprehensive legal framework to tackle waste management, with a particular focus on plastics. This framework aims to reduce the environmental impact of waste and promote recycling and the circular economy. Legal measures implemented at EU level form the backbone of national waste policies in all Member States, providing a coherent approach to managing plastic waste and promoting sustainability.

Key EU legislation and policy on waste management and plastics

Τhe following order should be followed when regulating waste generation and management: (a) prevention; (b) preparation for re-use; (c) recycling, (d) recovery (e.g. energy recovery) and (e) disposal.

Reducing the environmental impact of waste generation and management was one of the first elements of European environmental policy, as already in the mid-1970s the reduction of the environmental footprint of waste was identified as a key priority at EU level, with the publication of the Waste Framework Directive (WFD)[2]. The WFD is the cornerstone of EU waste legislation, establishing the basic concepts and definitions related to waste management, including the principle of waste hierarchy: in summary, the following order should be followed when regulating waste generation and management: (a) prevention; (b) preparation for re-use; (c) recycling, (d) recovery (e.g. energy recovery) and (e) disposal[3]. Essentially, adherence to the waste hierarchy principles means that any natural and legal person who generates waste should exhaust prevention and reuse as primary principles before a product becomes waste, and then, if this is not feasible, proceed to apply the principles of recycling (preferable) and then the recovery for energy production and disposal; i.e. the discharge into water, soil, etc. of products that are now considered waste (the final stage).

The Directive also sets out two key principles: the “polluter pays” principle, which argues that the polluter should bear the costs of remediation and environmental damage, and “Extended Producer Responsibility”, which requires producers to bear the costs of managing the waste stage of the life cycle their products. For plastics, the WFD mandates Member States to adopt waste management plans and waste prevention programmes, focusing on reducing plastic waste generation and boosting recycling rates. The Directive also includes provisions on hazardous waste and separate collection of waste, with the aim of ensuring effective sorting and treatment of plastics.

The Landfill Directive 1999/31/EC[4] aims to reduce the environmental impact of landfilling waste by setting strict operational and technical requirements and restrictions on the types of waste that can be landfilled. For plastics, the Directive encourages their diversion from landfills through measures promoting recycling and recovery. Directive 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging waste[5] aims to reduce packaging waste and promote sustainable solutions, while setting specific targets for the recycling and recovery of packaging materials, including plastics. According to the Directive, Member States must put in place systems for the return, collection and recovery of used packaging to meet recycling targets, while encouraging producers to design packaging that is easier to recycle and has a lower environmental impact. Indeed, amendments to the Directive in recent years have introduced stricter recycling targets for plastic packaging, aiming to have 55% of all plastic packaging waste recycled by 2030.

Directive 2019/904/EU[6] (a.k.a., the Single-Use Plastics Directive) targets the ten single-use plastic items most commonly found on European beaches, which account for 70% of all marine litter in the EU, by introducing a ban on certain single-use plastic products (such as cutlery, plates, straws and stirrers), and sets consumption reduction targets for others (such as plastic food containers and cups).  In addition, the Directive includes measures on product design requirements and labelling and ways to cover the costs of waste management, cleaning and awareness-raising measures to mitigate the environmental impact of products by plastic producers. In addition, Regulation 1907/2006, known as REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals[7]), has gradually introduced various restrictions on concentrations of substances found in plastics, such as cadmium[8], toxic phthalates[9] and lead[10].

Τhe Circular Economy Action Plan, as published in March 2020, is a structural component of the European Green Deal, aiming, among others and through a series of legal and non-legal measures it introduces, to make the circular economy the norm in the EU.

In the policy field, the European Commission published its Circular Economy Action Plan in 2015[11], defining this concept, in which “the value of products, materials and resources remains in the economy as long as possible, and waste generation is kept to a minimum[12]“, and sets targets for waste generation and management, also giving priority to plastics. The Plastics Strategy[13] was announced in 2018 and set targets for the recycling of all plastic packaging by 2030, while the Circular Economy Action Plan, as published in March 2020[14], is a structural component of the European Green Deal, aiming, among others and through a series of legal and non-legal measures it introduces, to make the circular economy the norm in the EU. In this context, the new Regulation 2023/2055 introduced strict restrictions on harmful microplastics[15].

National legislation on plastics

In Greece, plastics legislation mainly includes the transposition of European legislation into national law. Law 2939/2001 on packaging and alternative management of packaging and other products (car tires, vehicles, waste electrical and electronic equipment, excavation, construction and demolition waste, etc.) introduces the “Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)” in practice, with mandatory participation of producers of products in “Alternative Management Systems” (AMS). The role of the Systems is to organize the collection work after sorting, shipment, temporary storage and recovery, and for each waste stream quantitative targets are set for the separate collection of the waste and for its recovery. The operation of AMS is supervised by the Hellenic Recycling Agency (EOAN, in Greek).

Also, a new strategy in waste management is defined with the implementation of Law 4042/2012, with the main objective of moving to a “European Recycling Society”. In this context, appropriate measures shall be taken to promote product reuse and preparation for re-use activities, in particular by encouraging the establishment and support of re-use and repair networks; the use of economic instruments; procurement criteria and quantitative targets, while according to article 84 of Law 4819/21 specific persons are designated as responsible for the organization and operation of AMS specifically for packaging.

The National Action Plan for the Circular Economy (2021) sets out the strategies and measures for the transition to a circular economy, constituting a roadmap with a four-year duration (2021-2025) and including promotional actions for circularity in production and consumption.

Law 4736/2020 incorporates Directive 2019/904/EU and prohibits the placing on the market of certain single-use plastic products and provides for measures to reduce the use of plastic cups and food containers, while the National Action Plan for the Circular Economy (2021) sets out the strategies and measures for the transition to a circular economy, constituting a roadmap with a four-year duration (2021-2025) and including promotional actions for circularity in production and consumption.

As shown above, the transition to a circular economy is a key priority at EU level and a constantly evolving and multifaceted policy area. The European Commission has implemented a dense set of policy and legislative initiatives that aspire to contribute towards systemic change of existing “linear” models and drastic reduction of waste. The process is dynamic and complex, while its legal aspects as well as its interaction with EU climate objectives and the national legal framework of Member States will be at the heart of EU policy in the coming years.

What kind of policies are needed?

Plastic as a material is not responsible for the environmental degradation, but rather its use

The policies that need to be implemented to further combat plastic pollution should take into account five key elements. The first is that plastic as a material is not responsible for the environmental degradation, but rather its use. Policies should aim to correct the logic of improper use by the user-consumer and consider legislative initiatives that would make the use of plastic unprofitable unless certain environmental conditions are met. Additionally, policies should consider the state’s responsibility for waste collection and management, ensuring the proper removal of plastics from the environment.

 Plastic is a highly durable material with many properties that make it appealing, and there is no large-scale, reliable alternative.

The second element is that plastic is a highly durable material with many properties that make it appealing, and there is no large-scale, reliable alternative. The most significant advantage of plastic in the modern world is its cost, as it is the cheapest material used in a wide range of products. Therefore, the economic dimension of plastic use makes it more appealing compared to many other solutions. Addressing plastic pollution could be achieved if the material’s cost were higher than that of alternatives or if alternatives provided greater value to the product. For example, if the environmental impact cost, as well as the costs of collection, reuse, or disposal, were added to the material, its main advantage would vanish. Moreover, innovative solutions, often developed by small and emerging businesses, should be considered. These businesses tend to directly address the problem but require substantial funding to scale their projects.

The exact amount of plastic (in metric tons) produced by industries each year is not clearly defined.

The third element concerns the lack of precise and scientific information about plastic pollution on a global scale. In other words, we do not truly know the extent of the problem that needs to be addressed. The exact amount of plastic (in metric tons) produced by industries each year is not clearly defined, as there is no mandatory recording of the quantities and products created annually. As a result, tracing these plastics is not possible. The quantities of plastic collected, recycled, and reused are also based on estimates, which are often far from reality. Therefore, current policies aim to “significantly reduce” plastic pollution, but they lack measurable goals. The consequence of this information gap is the inability to assess the effectiveness of the legislation. Essentially, we are creating policies without being able to determine whether they are solving the problem or to what extent.

This brings us to the fourth element, which concerns the rigidity and complexity of the legislative framework, as well as its ineffective implementation. Despite positive initiatives at the European level, inconsistent application of waste management regulations—such as in Greece, which has been before the European Court of Justice numerous times over waste-related cases (Pouikli et al., 2024)—and differing approaches between countries make it difficult to develop a unified strategy to address the problem holistically. On an international level, the ability to regulate the global flow of plastic waste is drastically reduced due to significant gaps and inefficiencies in enforcement, as well as the inability to impose penalties severe enough to prevent environmental crimes particularly in regions with less stringent regulations, such as parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. On the other hand, the complexity of mechanisms, constant amendments to the legal framework, over-regulation, and bureaucracy lead to the opposite of the desired outcome.

The ability to regulate the global flow of plastic waste is drastically reduced due to significant gaps and inefficiencies in enforcement, as well as the inability to impose penalties severe enough to prevent environmental crimes.

The fifth element is the widespread belief that combating plastic pollution is an issue that does not directly concern the individual and that its management is exclusively a state matter. This perception creates a gap in responsibility, where citizens tend to forego their own contribution to reducing plastic pollution, assuming that the measures and policies implemented by governments are sufficient enough to solve the problem. However, this approach overlooks the crucial role of individual action in the overall effort to address the issue. Citizen participation is essential for the success of national and international initiatives. Reducing plastic use, promoting recycling, avoiding plastic waste disposal, and supporting sustainable practices and products should all be individual actions. At the same time, individual actions will amplify social pressure for stricter legislative measures and the implementation of more ambitious environmental policies. Therefore, addressing plastic pollution requires a coordinated effort that integrates individual responsibility with collective actions at both the national and global levels.

How should we tackle the problem of plastic pollution on a practical level?

On a practical level, tackling plastic pollution is complex. It must be based on the following three-pronged approach: first, we reduce plastic use to the greatest extent possible; second, we inform and educate citizens about alternatives; and third, we establish a system for monitoring plastic pollution.

On a practical level, tackling plastic pollution is complex. It must be based on the following three-pronged approach: first, we reduce plastic use to the greatest extent possible; second, we inform and educate citizens about alternatives; and third, we establish a system for monitoring plastic pollution.

A comprehensive strategy to tackle the problem includes five pillars – objectives that must be developed simultaneously and equally:

1. Limit the creation of new plastic products and restrict the use of existing products,
2. Universal design of new products containing plastics in the context of the circular economy,
3. Collection, reuse, recycling and, exceptionally, if all the previous possibilities are not possible, landfilling (or, under strict conditions, incineration) of existing plastics on the basis of waste management principles,
4. Information and education on plastic pollution; and
5. Establishment of a mechanism for the observation and tracking of plastics.

The policy mix to be implemented varies from country to country depending on its level of awareness and level of organization.

It is a fact that limiting the production of new plastic products is the most important factor in addressing the problem. If we want to tackle the issue at its root, we must address it at the source. The first practical step is to limit or even eliminate plastics that cause environmental problems at their source. The universal ban on the use of plastics in production theoretically solves the problem immediately, at least for future generations. In the hypothetical scenario where international legislation bans the creation of new plastic products, this would mean that plastic pollution production stops suddenly, but a series of new problems may arise, potentially greater than the ones we are trying to solve. The most recent example is the use of masks during the COVID-19 pandemic, which saved millions of lives. In reality, we cannot immediately and safely replace products that use plastic as a raw material, as it is a widespread material with multiple benefits. However, we must implement policies that reduce the problem, specifically by industry category, by providing financial incentives to companies that do not use plastics in their products or design them in a way that the plastics used can be reused. Additionally, the cost of creating plastic products should include a tax burden (e.g., per metric ton) that accounts for the lifecycle costs of plastic products, including tracking, collection, reuse, transport, or disposal (landfill), and certainly the environmental costs they impose.

New products must first demonstrate that they are based on the principles of the circular economy to be licensed and released in the market.

The second practical step in a comprehensive policy to tackle plastic pollution is the universal design of new products containing plastics within the framework of the circular economy. The circular economy, as mentioned earlier, is an economic model aimed at sustainable resource management and minimizing waste. Unlike the traditional linear economic model (“produce, consume, discard”), the circular economy promotes recycling, reuse, repair, and refurbishment of products to keep them in the economy as long as possible. Designing plastic products with their environmental footprint in mind throughout their entire life cycle is essential and relatively easy to implement. Legislators must define the goals to be applied throughout the product’s life cycle, and businesses must design their products in ways that do not burden the environment or future generations. New products must first demonstrate that they are based on the principles of the circular economy to be licensed and released in the market. Then, through a monitoring mechanism, any deviations will be flagged, and industries will bear the cost of bringing their products back into compliance with the original goals. The circular economy model adds value to combating plastic pollution and clearly indicates the responsibility of the product manufacturers toward the environment.

Cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning are being used to improve recycling processes and monitor the flow of plastic pollution.

In order to tackle plastic pollution, particular mention should be made of the need for innovation by new technologies (“disrupted technologies”) which play a crucial role. These technologies disrupt traditional methods and practices and introduce innovative materials and processes that can reduce or even eliminate the need for conventional plastics. A prime example is the development of biodegradable materials produced from plant raw materials, which offer a sustainable alternative to traditional plastics. At the same time, cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning are being used to improve recycling processes and monitor the flow of plastic pollution. Through advanced algorithms, recycling facilities can improve material separation and increase recovery rates, while allowing accurate mapping of pollution globally. The use of these technologies is very important to address the problem and the need to adopt such solutions is imperative.

The first two practical measures to tackle plastic pollution address the problem for generations to come. They follow the basic principle of reducing the amount of plastic entering the environment at its source. They aim to reduce the quantities of plastics that we will have to manage in the future, but they do not address the problem directly, i.e. in its current state. However, addressing the problem in its current state in practice requires measures related to the “classical” environmental theory of reusing, recycling, collecting and, if all the previous possibilities are not possible, disposing (or, under strict conditions, incinerating) existing plastics. The rationale for approaching the problem in this case is to reduce the environmental impact of plastics, usually through government structures.

The third practical measure to address plastic pollution is twofold: initially, it involves the creation of structures that facilitate the practical handling of the problem, and, secondly, it shifts the cost of implementing services from local governments to the businesses that produce the plastics.

The third practical measure to address plastic pollution is twofold: initially, it involves the creation of structures that facilitate the practical handling of the problem, and, secondly, it shifts the cost of implementing services from local governments to the businesses that produce the plastics. The creation of structures for recycling and reuse is extremely important and relatively simple. One can look at Northern European countries as an example, where the problem has been addressed through specific waste streams and businesses whose business models are based on the reuse of materials. The implementation of these systems, even on a national level, is purely a matter of planning and resources. The limiting factor is resources, which, for the most part, come from government funding. In other words, the state is called upon to cover the environmental burden caused by plastic products within its territory. The policy response should be the creation of recycling and/or reuse structures by the creators/owners of the pollution sources or the companies that use plastic products. The primary responsibility here lies with the large or very large companies that dominate the market and are responsible for the largest amounts of plastic being circulated in each country. A policy of mandatory tracking and recycling mechanisms for these companies’ products is essential and is expected to bring about structural changes in addressing plastic pollution. For example, a soft drink (or cosmetics or car tire) company would be required to track its waste and create recycling mechanisms.

For the immediate handling of the problem, in addition to recycling and reuse, there remains the question of what to do with the existing plastics that cannot be recycled or reused. The answer is straightforward: landfill or (under strict conditions) incineration. Both solutions have advantages and disadvantages. The policy of using either method depends entirely on scientific knowledge and expertise. In cases where the conditions for incineration are fully met and the environmental impacts (e.g., air pollution) are minimized, the benefit of reducing the volume of waste is a significant factor that should be taken seriously. Burial and incineration are the final stages of the plastic pollution management chain. However, perhaps the most important unanswered aspect is the collection of existing plastics, which requires a unique mix of policies.

Plastic collection follows the logic of waste collection. In many countries, separate waste streams (e.g., paper, glass, aluminum, and plastic) exist. The policy of separating waste streams at the source, i.e., at the consumer level, has proven to be the most cost-effective and environmentally friendly. Therefore, the design of regular plastic waste collection on a national level is deemed most appropriate. However, a major problem exists with the collection of plastic waste that is not easily accessible, such as plastics on beaches, on the surface, and at the bottom of the sea. The problem in these cases is that plastic waste is not concentrated in one location, making it difficult to collect, and it is often fragmented into many small pieces, further complicating the process. These types of plastic waste result from incorrect disposal by users and create the greatest environmental problem highlighted in recent years.

Addressing the collection of such plastics is extremely difficult as it requires significant human resources and logistical infrastructure. The proper approach starts with identifying problem areas and then collecting the waste.

Addressing the collection of such plastics is extremely difficult as it requires significant human resources and logistical infrastructure. The proper approach starts with identifying problem areas and then collecting the waste. For example, in a country like Greece, with over 16,000 kilometers of coastline, it is imperative to know the areas where cleanup efforts should be focused. At the same time, the issue of plastic waste at the bottom of the sea requires specialized planning to predict the areas with large amounts of plastic waste and specialized equipment to collect it. The cost of collecting this plastic is very high and requires specialized knowledge. Tackling this dimension of the problem requires national collection policies based on specific goals, such as identifying and collecting x tons of plastic in each municipality, along with adequate funding. All relevant stakeholders, particularly at the local level—such as regional authorities, local governments, businesses, NGOs, and active citizens—can participate in the collection. This measure is especially valuable when combined with the fifth pillar, namely the system for recording and monitoring plastic pollution.

For effectively tackling plastic pollution, the fourth practical measure involves widespread public awareness and education. It is essential to inform citizens about the consequences of plastic pollution and the practices they can adopt to reduce it. A comprehensive and multi-level policy approach is needed, based on education and awareness programs in schools, national public campaigns through mass media and social networks, educational programs for adults, rewards for and promotion of alternative solutions and good practices, and collaboration between NGOs, environmental organizations, and scientific bodies specializing in environmental education and awareness. These programs should have specific performance indicators and follow a continuous evaluation and updating process to ensure their effectiveness and adaptability to evolving needs. New technologies and communication media, such as mobile apps, virtual reality, and online courses, should be incorporated to inform the public. A policy of an integrated approach to awareness and education against plastic pollution will create a strong foundation for educating the public, leading to a demand for fundamental changes in consumer, business, and government behaviors and practices.

A policy of an integrated approach to awareness and education against plastic pollution will create a strong foundation for educating the public, leading to a demand for fundamental changes in consumer, business, and government behaviors and practices.

For effectively tackling plastic pollution, the fourth practical measure involves widespread public awareness and education. It is essential to inform citizens about the consequences of plastic pollution and the practices they can adopt to reduce it. A comprehensive and multi-level policy approach is needed, based on education and awareness programs in schools, national public campaigns through mass media and social networks, educational programs for adults, rewards for and promotion of alternative solutions and good practices, and collaboration between NGOs, environmental organizations, and scientific bodies specializing in environmental education and awareness. These programs should have specific performance indicators and follow a continuous evaluation and updating process to ensure their effectiveness and adaptability to evolving needs. New technologies and communication media, such as mobile apps, virtual reality, and online courses, should be incorporated to inform the public. A policy of an integrated approach to awareness and education against plastic pollution will create a strong foundation for educating the public, leading to a demand for fundamental changes in consumer, business, and government behaviors and practices.

Finally, the fifth practical measure relates to the creation of a national mechanism for observing and tracking plastics. None of the above measures will be of much value if we do not know their effectiveness. This means that planning to address the problem starts with recording the current situation in a scientific and indisputable manner so that we understand the extent of the problem. This is followed by goal-setting, i.e., setting the target we want to achieve and the time frame estimated for its achievement. Then, the aforementioned measures follow, which are continuously evaluated to determine their level of effectiveness. The information collected and recorded should be available to the general public, free of charge, easily, and immediately. The measure of creating a mechanism for monitoring plastic pollution, especially in problematic areas such as beaches and the seabed, requires high expertise and a combination of multiple data sources. The scientific community, along with companies specializing in the field, should meet this need to record the extent of plastic pollution in its current state and monitor it adequately in the future. The combination of multiple reliable measurements and new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, “smart” recording cameras, aerial photography observation, or underwater sensors, are undoubtedly tools that must be used in this direction.

The tracing of plastics, i.e. the mechanism by which the origin of plastics can be identified is one of the most important actions to tackle plastic pollution.

The tracing of plastics, i.e. the mechanism by which the origin of plastics can be identified (and therefore the materials of which they are composed, their additional substances, the year and country of origin, the manufacturing company and the respective products) is one of the most important actions to tackle plastic pollution. However, for the industry, it is a groundbreaking endeavor with high costs and business risks. By tracking plastic pollutants, we will be able to recognize their origin and therefore link a company’s product to the pollutants it produces. Despite the seemingly negative attitude of industries to comply with such a measure, it is the only path to monitor plastics and quantitatively assess pollution by industry category. This information is extremely useful for understanding the journey of plastics, evaluating the implementation of measures (e.g., recycling, reuse, collection), quantifying failures, gaps, and the complexity of legislation, and redesigning the process with measurable goals. The tracking information should not have a negative connotation for companies, nor should it serve as a basis for fines. On the contrary, it should be used by the companies themselves, within the framework of the circular economy, to examine the fate of their products and take measures for their better future use. The combination of a plastic pollution observatory and plastic product tracking is certain to bring about a significant change in the perception of the problem and, consequently, in its resolution.

Why Greece has an advantage in tackling plastic pollution

 All scientific studies show that Greece is a country threatened by plastic pollution and is certainly not exempt from this problem. Plastics are found in abundance on the country’s coasts and seabed and constitute a significant environmental pressure that affects the well-being of both its citizens and visitors. The extent of the problem is clearly illustrated by multiple reports, studies and measurements in Greece. The Hellenic Centre for Marine Research (HCMR) systematically monitors and records plastic pollution according to the relevant EU monitoring guide, and the number of plastic pollutants it records far exceeds the international limits of good condition of beaches. At the same time, the “Typhoon” program of the A. C. Laskaridis Public Benefit Foundation, which uses a 72-meter ship to clean up the country’s remote coasts, has cleaned more than 3,240 beaches and removed more than 580 tons of litter for the period 2019-2023. Similarly, the Coastal Zone Marine Litter Observatory, first developed at the Department of Oceanography and Marine Sciences of the University of the Aegean and which uses aerial photographs and artificial intelligence to detect and monitor coastal pollution in the country, has recorded over 90 km of Greek coastline with increased plastic pollutants throughout the observation area.

Greece holds a significant advantage in tackling plastic pollution.

However, Greece holds a significant advantage in tackling plastic pollution. The country can implement the aforementioned policies on small, remote islands, which, due to their size and environmental awareness, can adapt to the required changes. There are already examples of “green” islands in Greece that are successfully addressing environmental challenges. Some islands have also piloted many of these measures, with immediate results in combating plastic pollution. One prominent example is the European LIFE DEBAG program (2015-2019) (https://www.lifedebag.eu/), where plastic bag pollution on the island of Syros was significantly reduced through targeted actions and interventions, guided by the University of Patras.

This ease of implementation stems from a key factor: the issue of plastic pollution becomes personal to the local citizens, rather than being seen as a general societal problem.

Addressing the progressive increase in plastic waste through these policies becomes much easier when the area of implementation is small, such as on an island with a defined population. This ease of implementation stems from a key factor: the issue of plastic pollution becomes personal to the local citizens, rather than being seen as a general societal problem. The residents stop relying solely on state policies to tackle the issue and begin taking personal measures to contribute to the solution. In other words, the mindset of the inhabitants changes, and the problem becomes personalized—owned by each individual. For instance, people reduce their use of plastics to the greatest extent possible, purchase products that incorporate the principles of the circular economy in their design and production, and maximize the reuse and recycling of plastics. At the same time, informational events and campaigns are organized, and local plastic pollution is more easily identified. The adoption of good practices becomes a matter of time for neighboring regions, creating a framework for regional pollution control, which will gradually lead to a national strategy for addressing the problem.

Conclusions

Policies to combat plastic pollution can be thus summarized in five key assumptions:

• The environmental degradation caused is not due to plastic as a material itself, but rather its usage.
• There is no reliable large-scale alternative, as plastic is a highly durable material with multiple appealing properties.
• There is a global lack of precise and scientific information regarding the scale of plastic pollution.
• Legal hurdles, the complexity of the legislative framework, inefficient implementation, weak enforcement of penalties, and differing approaches between countries hinder the formation of a unified regulatory strategy for waste management.
• The prevailing belief is that plastic pollution is not an issue that directly concerns every individual but should be managed at the state level.

Legislative adjustments to keep pace with the rapid growth of the plastics market are necessary, as clear and binding rules.

In this context, it is clear that the problem of plastic waste management is multifaceted and requires cooperation at all levels of society, from individual citizens to the state and lawmakers. Greece serves as a characteristic example where, despite the proper adoption of EU environmental legislation (albeit often delayed), its implementation faces shortcomings. The complexity of the legal framework, lack of resources, and slow administrative processes hinder effective waste management, particularly for plastics, allowing issues like illegal landfills and plastic dumping into the sea to proliferate. Additionally, economic pressures and a lack of reliable monitoring mechanisms often lead to bypassing the legal (but bureaucratic) administrative processes. The fines from the European Court of Justice for violations of environmental waste directives are frequent, while the issue is further exacerbated by the reluctance of citizens to participate in recycling and responsible waste management. Despite legislative reforms, practical application remains a challenge, and public awareness is deemed crucial to solving the problem.

Alongside the gradual establishment of mandatory environmental “safety nets” and technical specifications that promote the circular economy. Incentives (mainly of financial nature) should also be introduced.

A comprehensive strategy to address this issue includes, as previously mentioned, five specific pillars—objectives that must be developed simultaneously and equally, involving several practical measures: a) limiting the creation of new plastic products and the use of existing ones, b) designing new plastic products within the framework of the circular economy, c) organized collection, reuse, recycling, and—under strict conditions—landfilling or incineration of existing plastics, d) public education and awareness campaigns, and e) the establishment of a mechanism for tracking and monitoring plastics.

However, without the swift adaptation of the legal framework to technological requirements, appropriate responses to cross-sectoral policy proposals, and strengthening of the administrative system with trained personnel, these objectives cannot be achieved as urgently as the current situation demands. The regulatory framework plays a critical role in shaping a stable and clear structure for managing plastic pollution, ensuring the compliance of all stakeholders, from producers to consumers. Legislative adjustments to keep pace with the rapid growth of the plastics market are necessary, as clear and binding rules for limiting plastic production and use are required, alongside the gradual establishment of mandatory environmental “safety nets” and technical specifications that promote the circular economy. Incentives (mainly of financial nature) for recycling and reusing plastics should also be introduced.

The solution is neither simple nor obvious; it requires systematic cooperation between citizens, the state, lawmakers, and the private sector

It is essential for the institutional framework to become more flexible and adaptive, incorporating tracking and monitoring technologies for plastics, as proposed in the five pillars. At the same time, an effective solution to plastic pollution requires strengthening regulatory measures by introducing the concept of the “life cycle” of plastic—tracking costs, collection, reuse, transport, or disposal (landfill)—to clearly demonstrate the highly burdensome nature of this material, both economically and environmentally. Stricter limits could be established for the production of new plastic products, with incentives for using alternative, more environmentally friendly materials. Furthermore, stricter enforcement of laws, including systematic penalties and fines for violators, is necessary to deter frequent non-compliance. The creation of a robust central regulatory body with regional branches and the speeding up of penalties will enhance the effectiveness of regulations and serve as a deterrent for those who do not comply, contributing to a significant reduction in plastic pollution. This combination of factors can improve the effectiveness of policies against plastic pollution, ensuring that targets set are not just theoretical but implemented in practice.

Ultimately, the solution is neither simple nor obvious; it requires systematic cooperation between citizens, the state, lawmakers, and the private sector, with an emphasis on public awareness, active participation, and the realization of the broader benefits that will arise from reducing the “plastic footprint” in Greece

 

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Portz, L., Manzolli, R. P., Villate-Daza, D. A., & Fontán-Bouzas, Á. (2022). Where does marine litter hide? The Providencia and Santa Catalina Island problem, SEAFLOWER Reserve (Colombia). Science of the Total Environment, 813. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.151878

Pouikli, K., Tsoukala, A., Tsakalogianni, I. (2024) Mapping the (in)Effective Enforcement of EU Environmental Law in Greece: Lessons from the EU and Domestic Courts. Ecological Civilization 2024, 1 (3), 10005; https://doi.org/10.35534/ecolciviliz.2024.10005

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Topouzelis, K., Papageorgiou, D., Suaria, G., & Aliani, S. (2021). Floating marine litter detection algorithms and techniques using optical remote sensing data: A review. Marine Pollution Bulletin, 170, 112675. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2021.112675

Topouzelis, K., Papakonstantinou, A., & Garaba, S. P. (2019). Int J Appl Earth Obs Geoinformation Detection of floating plastics from satellite and unmanned aerial systems (Plastic Litter Project 2018). Int J Appl  Earth Obs Geoinformation, 79(March), 175–183. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jag.2019.03.011

UNEP. (2022). UNEA Resolution 5/14 entitled “End plastic pollution: Towards an international legally binding instrument.” https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/39812/OEWG_PP_1_INF_1_UNEA%20resolution.pdf

 

 

 

[1] In short, the circular economy is understood as an economic model in which waste is reduced and resources are reused by keeping products and resources in use for as long as possible. Achieving a circular economy requires structural changes in modern production and consumption patterns. See below for the definition of the concept in the European context.

[2] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Closing the loop – An EU action plan for the Circular Economy, Brussels, 2/12/2015, COM(2015) 614 final.

[3] Ibid. p. 2.

[4] A European Strategy for Plastics in a Circular Economy, COM/2018/028 final.

[5] A new Circular Economy Action Plan, For a cleaner and more competitive Europe, COM/2020/98 final.

[6] Regulation (EU) 2023/2055 of 25 September 2023 amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

[7] Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives

[8]  Para. 1 of Art. 4 WFD.

[9] Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste.

[10] Directive 94/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste.

[11] Directive 2019/904/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the reduction of the impact of certain plastic products on the environment.

[12] Regulation 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH Regulation) and establishing the European Chemicals Agency.

[13] Commission Regulation (EC) No 494/2011 of 20 May 2011 amending Regulation (EU) No 494/2011; Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

[14] Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/2005 of 17 December 2018 amending Annex XVII to Regulation (EC) No …/… Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

[15] Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/923 of 3 May 2023 amending Annex XVII to Regulation (EC) No …/… Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• In the 2019 local elections, the AKP lost both Istanbul and Ankara to the chief opposition party, the CHP. While this was heralded by some as the beginning of the end for AKP rule, President Erdoğan and his party proved resilient and went on to win the 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections.
• In the 2024 local elections, the AKP lost nearly every major metropolitan municipality to the CHP; for the first time in its history, the party had fallen into second place nationally. This scenario, so unfamiliar for both the AKP and Erdoğan, closely mirrored the political narrative they themselves had written 30 years before.
• Üsküdar mayor Sinem Dedetaş has transformed communication, a crucial tool in the art of politics, into a positive instrument rather than a source of complaint or negativity. This approach differentiates Dedetaş from other mayors.
• The mayor of Aydın, Özlem Çerçioğlu, addresses governance challenges and administrative obstacles by means of practical solutions based in participatory democracy.
• The mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavaş, prefers to avoid creating noise and using controversy to remain in the spotlight. Instead, he focuses on quietly defending the rule of law and safeguarding the rights of Turkey’s capital city.
• One of the key strategies employed by Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu has been to focus on creative grassroots projects which directly affect people’s lives in areas such as social assistance, free transportation for students, and water discounts aimed at improving the life quality of Istanbul residents. Such initiatives have allowed İmamoğlu to win public trust, despite the obstacles placed in his way by central government, and to continue in office.
• The ability of CHP municipalities to consistently meet public expectations and deliver efficient governance, despite the obstacles placed in their way by the AKP administration, could be critical in shaping future electoral outcomes. Much as in the 1990s, where changes in local government became the precursor to national shifts, CHP-led municipalities may once again serve as the catalyst for political change in Turkey.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Ioannis Ν. Grigoriadis, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Bilkent University; Senior Research Fellow, Head, Turkey Programme, ELIAMEP and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, Associate Professor, London Metropolitan University; Marie Sklodowska Curie Fellow, Coventry University and GIGA; Non-Resident Scholar, Turkey Programme, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

While history never fully repeats itself, there are striking similarities with a grassroots movement in Turkey’s leading municipalities today, which is this time challenging the AKP administration and its head.

Many studies addressing recent political developments in Turkey point to how winning major municipalities in the 1990s paved the way for the political hegemony of Turkish political Islam since the early 2000s (Oktem 2021; Ozbudun 2006). In the 1994 local elections, the victory of “Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP)” candidates in leading cities such as Istanbul and Ankara proved to be a harbinger of political change. The municipalities hosted a grassroots movement that challenged the state elites and sought to transform Turkey. It was this movement that first brought the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) to power, before morphing into what the AKP would later brand the “new Turkey” (Baser and Ozturk 2017; Grigoriadis 2014). While history never fully repeats itself, there are striking similarities with a grassroots movement in Turkey’s leading municipalities today, which is this time challenging the AKP administration and its head.

…financial, legal, and administrative instruments have been employed to portray CHP-supported mayors as incapable of running their municipalities and the CHP as unable to govern Turkey.

In the 2019 local elections, the AKP lost both Istanbul and Ankara to the chief opposition party, the CHP. While this was heralded by some as the beginning of the end for AKP rule, the party and President Erdoğan proved resilient and went on to win the 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections (Yavuz and Ozturk 2023). However, this did not serve to consolidate the hegemony of the AKP. In the 2024 local elections, the AKP lost nearly every major metropolitan municipality to the CHP; for the first time in its history, the party had fallen into second place nationally. This scenario, so unfamiliar for both the AKP and Erdoğan, closely mirrored the political narrative they themselves had written 30 years before. In response, they have sought to prevent the CHP-led municipalities from replicating their own success story. In so doing, their approach has not been very different from that taken by Turkish governments in response to the rise of political Islam in the 1990s: they have used bureaucratic and judicial channels to obstruct the municipalities in question. Hence, financial, legal, and administrative instruments have been employed to portray CHP-supported mayors as incapable of running their municipalities and the CHP as unable to govern Turkey.

Against this backdrop, this study aims to explore how the heads of four different CHP municipalities have responded to these government policies and to draw meaningful conclusions from their responses. The mayors interviewed are Sinem Dedetaş, the mayor of Üsküdar; Özlem Çerçioğlu, the metropolitan mayor of Aydın; Mansur Yavaş, the metropolitan mayor of Ankara; and Ekrem İmamoğlu, the metropolitan mayor of Istanbul. All four of the mayors selected have displayed strong perfomance. Sinem Dedetaş is the first female mayor of Üsküdar, a rather conservative Istanbul borough, while Özlem Çerçioğlu, the female mayor of Aydın, has won three consecutive terms, increasing her votes each time. Both Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş are considered leading political figures on the national level, as well as potential candidates in the next presidential elections. Their differing governance styles have led them to adopt various strategies in response to the AKP’s restrictive policies. An additional interview was conducted with Özgür Özel, the head of the CHP, regarding the range of views within his party on municipal mobilization. This is significant, as the CHP-run municipalities will be seen as a bellwether for its credibility as a viable alternative to the AKP in central government.[1]

Sinem Dedetaş: The Power of Effective Communication

Dedetaş’ electoral success was reinforced by her governance style and practices pointing towards reinforcing participatory democracy. 

At the age of 43, Sinem Dedetaş, the recently elected Mayor of Üsküdar, is a relatively new and young actor in Turkish politics. A naval engineer by training, she served between 2019 and 2023 as the general manager of Istanbul Ferry Lines (İstanbul Şehir Hatları) within the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. When she ran for the position of mayor of Üsküdar in the March 2023 elections, many doubted her potential for success in a conservative municipality where President Erdoğan maintains his Istanbul residence. Dedetaş’ electoral success was reinforced by her governance style and practices pointing towards reinforcing participatory democracy. Since entering office, the weekly public neighbourhood meetings, projects relating to women’s health and social security, forgiving debts owed to previous administrations, scholarships for students, and the rectification of certain legal issues have all contributed to her positive public image. When asked about her visibility, she attributed it to one of the most crucial tools in politics: communication:

I cannot claim to be ambitious regarding politics and my career. The only answer I can give about my next goal is this: a more liveable Üsküdar whose residents are happier. I can only achieve this by establishing effective communication with the people of Üsküdar. Look, Üsküdar is a large and diverse living space. In this regard, I communicate voluntarily with both those in the most economically challenging situations and some of Turkey’s wealthiest individuals, solely for the benefit of Üsküdar. I believe that effective communication, truly listening to people and utilizing resources efficiently, is one of my most important duties as a local administrator.

The year 2024, when Dedetaş assumed the mayorship, was marked by economic hardship in Turkey; this included decrees imposing strict austerity measures on the public sector. Given these circumstances, municipalities faced difficulties carrying out certain activities. Dedetaş’ solution to this issue also relied on successful communication.

If I say that the austerity measures are not a challenge, I would not be telling you the truth. Moreover, we unfortunately inherited a municipality with a significant amount of debt. In this context, we sometimes struggle to do things that are essential in these times, such as acquiring new computers. However, I believe that if you hold the office of mayor, you and your team must find solutions, regardless of the circumstances. Just as we are communicate with the people of Üsküdar, so we are also in contact with the private sector, civil society, and organizations that provide us with resources. We have a single criterion here: everything done must be for the benefit and happiness of the people of Üsküdar.

According to Dedetaş, CHP municipalities provide an alternative for Turks who feel overwhelmed after so many years of AKP rule She argues that the neglect of many activities which municipalities are supposed to undertake has led to the unfortunate downgrading of true municipal governance in Turkey. In this context, Dedetaş emphasizes that combating the machinations of the AKP administration requires the practice of genuine municipal governance. She continually highlights the importance of effectively and accurately communicating her efforts. Dedetaş has managed to transform communication, a crucial tool in the art of politics, into a positive instrument rather than a source of complaint or acrimony.

Özlem Çerçioğlu: Participatory Governance

Of the four mayors interviewed for this study, Özlem Çerçioğlu is the most experienced. She was elected as a CHP Member of Parliament for Aydın in the 3 November 2002 parliamentary elections and served in Parliament until 2009, when she first assumed the role of metropolitan mayor of Aydın. Having a strong professional background in the private sector, she has applied a hands-on and practical mindset to municipal governance. She has engaged in social projects such as supporting education, combating drug addiction, rehabilitating street children, upholding Turkish republican principles, and encouraging population planning. When asked whether she faced challenges from the AKP government, she replied:

“Of course, they are attempting to challenge us, but they overlook two things. The first is the extensive experience of my team and myself. The second is their misconception that they are obstructing Özlem Çerçioğlu alone. Because they are also trying to hinder Aydın and its people, which makes their efforts futile. Since 2009, I have increased my votes on each occasion I have been re-elected mayor. Local government is neither a personal enterprise nor a separate entity. It is an intermediary organization which exists to serve the people of Aydın. We manage Aydın with the people of Aydın.”

Çerçioğlu believes that the government is imposing both direct and indirect costs on municipalities due to the adverse economic conditions facing the country. However, she addresses these challenges by leveraging the advantages of her private sector background.

While these comments may seem like typical political statements, Çerçioğlu goes on to provide numerous examples. The Aydın Metropolitan Municipality is known for conducting small-scale local referendums. Even the shape and colour of a sidewalk tile are decided by public votes. This approach allows the public to perceive themselves as a fundamental element in local governance, as in advanced participatory democracies. This conveys the message that political participation is not confined to election periods. It seems that in Aydın, the public is invited to be involve itself continuously in decision-making processes. Çerçioğlu believes that the government is imposing both direct and indirect costs on municipalities due to the adverse economic conditions facing the country. However, she addresses these challenges by leveraging the advantages of her private sector background:

“Frankly, I cannot say that we are facing direct obstruction, but the economic austerity measures are challenging us, and we are aware that we are faced with greater penalties for even minor mistakes. So, what do we do? We always strive to find alternative solutions. We work to create resources with our limited means. For example, if we are told that we cannot open a day-care centre, we rename it and open similar facilities, because they are essential for the development and empowerment of our children and women. Another example concerns green spaces. If we are not permitted to create new green spaces, we naturally develop our existing ones, thereby adding value for the people of Aydın. I have a principle: if there’s a problem, find a solution instead of complaining.”

In a nutshell, Çerçioğlu addresses governance challenges and administrative obstacles by applying democratic and practical solutions, thereby boosting citizen participation in municipal affairs.

Mansur Yavaş: Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and the Rule of Law

Since assuming office in 2019, Yavaş has emphasized concepts such as “transparent, social, accountable, and productive municipality,” and has worked to spread the “Mansur Yavaş municipality” model across the country. 

Mansur Yavaş, a lawyer by training from the town of Beypazarı, west of Ankara, began his political career in the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP) but moved to the CHP due to discord within his former party. After a highly controversial defeat in the 2014 municipal elections, Yavaş was elected as the metropolitan mayor of Ankara in the 2019 local elections; he won re-election by a landslide margin of almost 30 percent in 2024. Since assuming office in 2019, Yavaş has emphasized concepts such as “transparent, social, accountable, and productive municipality,” and has worked to spread the “Mansur Yavaş municipality” model across the country. During his tenure, Yavaş has pioneered several initiatives, including live streaming municipal council meetings and tender procedures, installing cameras on snowploughs with a license plate tracking system accessible to the public via digital platforms, establishing the Başkent Kart (Capital Card) system that allows low-income families to make purchases based on their needs while prioritizing local tradespeople. He has also discontinued the distribution of aid packages in social assistance programs, a practice traditionally linked to political clientelism.

Yavaş is a popular political figure in Ankara but also throughout Turkey. He is therefore considered a potential opposition candidate for future presidential elections. This, coupled with his role in running Turkey’s capital city, has exposed him to increased pressure from the central government. This makes the case of Yavaş distinct from those of Dedetaş and Çerçioğlu. When asked whether he faces obstacles and how he feels about them, Yavaş responds as follows:

“Of course, they attempt to obstruct me. Beyond obstruction, they also try to defame me. However, what they fail to see is that they are not obstructing Mansur Yavaş. They are obstructing the provision of services to the people of Ankara. But both the people of Ankara and the citizens of the Republic of Turkey recognize this, as evidenced by the record vote that re-elected me, and my approval ratings in Turkey are consistently high.”

As noted, Ankara, being the capital and a potential presidential candidate’s city, is targeted more frequently by the central government than any other city, with the exception of Istanbul. Consequently, Yavaş has to be very cautious about his political initiatives. A lawyer by profession, he stresses that he chooses to adhere to legal principles while managing the affairs of the city of Ankara:

“Are there pressures? Of course, there are. However, I do not find it appropriate to make a fuss or complain about the central government to the people of Ankara. Instead, I use the law and file lawsuits to assert my rights. Although the judiciary in Turkey today is not independent, I believe it is crucial to prioritize the law. Moreover, I must protect Ankara and its importance and capital identity. For example, if the government wants to move the central bank to Istanbul, I will fight in every legal way to protect the capital of the Republic of Turkey.”

To sum up, Yavaş prefers to avoid creating noise and using controversy to remain in the spotlight. Instead, he focuses on quietly defending transparency, accountability and the rule of law, and on safeguarding the rights of Turkey’s capital city.

Ekrem İmamoğlu: Opposition Through Creativity and Grassroots Work

Ekrem İmamoğlu, the metropolitan mayor of Istanbul, has emerged as one of the most prominent figures in Turkish politics, second only to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Starting his political career as the mayor of Beylikdüzü, a city in the western outskirts of Istanbul, to which post he was elected in the local elections of 30 March 2014, İmamoğlu was catapulted onto the main stage of Turkish politics by his election as metropolitan mayor of Istanbul on 31 March, and then again on 23 June, 2019. Five years later, in the local elections of 31 March 2024, he secured re-election with a triumphant 51.14% of the vote, winning a majority on the municipal council on this occasion, too. Meanwhile, İmamoğlu has faced systematic obstruction from the government, including a lawsuit to ban him from politics on spurious grounds. How does he feel about this?

“I am saddened, deeply saddened. Istanbul is not the jewel of Turkey alone; it belongs to the world. It is a mega-city with opportunities and challenges, and serving this city is a sacred duty. Every time we try to make progress, we encounter an obstacle, which saddens me greatly. If we could use the energy, we expend overcoming these obstacles to address Istanbul’s problems in collaboration with those creating the obstacles, we could make this city a place to which the whole world looks. We have lost our collective wisdom under the current administration, and I am very saddened by that.”

In Istanbul, a city which faces major traffic problems and potential earthquake risks, solving problems clearly requires both considerable organization and creativity. İmamoğlu states that “obstacles make us more creative” and highlights that the difficulties have forced them to seek alternatives solely to serve the people of Istanbul. Furthermore, İmamoğlu has been saddled with a substantial debt burden since he took office and faced unprecedented restrictions on financial resources from the central government. He has confronted issues such as delayed approvals for foreign loans and funding applications. However, İmamoğlu has sought to strengthen the financial structure of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and secure funding for projects by establishing direct relationships with international financial institutions, engaging with foreign investors, and working to attract investment to Istanbul.

One of İmamoğlu’s key strategies has been to focus on projects which directly affect people’s lives in areas such as social assistance, free transportation for students, and water discounts aimed at improving the life quality of Istanbul residents.

Many Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality infrastructure projects have been delayed or blocked while awaiting approval from the central government. This issue has become particularly acute in critical areas such as transportation and green space development. İmamoğlu has attempted to finance these projects using local resources and to garner support for his projects by communicating directly with the public. Despite enjoying broad social support in Istanbul, İmamoğlu has faced intense criticism from media outlets controlled by the AKP. To address this, he has made effective use of social media and digital communication tools to interact with the public directly. He also keeps the public continuously updated through municipal social media accounts and digital platforms, thereby maintaining a transparent approach to governance. İmamoğlu frequently emphasizes “I am moving forward with the people, supported by the people”. He has also highlighted his inclusive management approach by means of the slogan “the voice of 16 million Istanbulites”. He has sought to overcome political obstacles by garnering support from different segments of society. One of İmamoğlu’s key strategies has been to focus on projects which directly affect people’s lives in areas such as social assistance, free transportation for students, and water discounts aimed at improving the life quality of Istanbul residents. Such initiatives have allowed İmamoğlu to win public trust, despite the obstacles placed in his way by central government, and to continue in office. His response to government obstructionism has thus been to get creative to promote grassroots work aiming at improving citizens’ day-to-day lives.

Özgür Özel: Promoting Public Services and Interparty Cooperation as a Path to Victory

Özel aims to showcase these success stories across the country to demonstrate that local governments can work for the people not against them, showcasing the CHP as a party that has continued to provide services despite the obstacles placed in their municipalities’ way by the AKP administration.

While the views of the four mayors provide powerful insights into the position in which the CHP finds itself in the aftermath of the local elections, it is also important to listen to the party leader. CHP chairperson Özgür Özel believes the success the party achieved in the local elections can be sustained in the upcoming national elections. He aims to win public support by demonstrating that the services provided by CHP-run municipalities are more effective than the practices of the AKP-run central government. Özel supports the development of projects aimed at increasing public satisfaction in the major cities under CHP control, and in particular in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. He aims to showcase these success stories across the country to demonstrate that local governments can work for the people not against them, showcasing the CHP as a party that has continued to provide services despite the obstacles placed in their municipalities’ way by the AKP administration.

Özel highlights that the pressure the AKP administration has put opposition municipalities under, and the restrictions they have placed on their municipal resources, frequently make life harder for citizens. By doing so, he both underscores the challenges faced by the CHP and explains how they have produced solutions despite these pressures. This situation implies that the CHP is resilient in the face of the central government’s obstacles and could provide better services if it comes to power. Özel places importance on sharing the CHP’s municipal services directly with the public through social media and local community meetings. Turkey’s CHP-supported mayors strive to overcome the central government’s obstacles by keeping the public informed, particularly with regard to social assistance, education, and infrastructure projects. His strategy seeks to strengthen the public’s connection with local government.

Özel advocates for solidarity not only among CHP municipalities but also with municipalities led by other parties within the former “Nation Alliance (Millet Ittifakı)” opposition coalition. This fosters the sharing of experiences and successes in local governance and helps develop a unified opposition strategy. Municipalities that achieve success at the local level can serve as powerful proof in future presidential and parliamentary elections of the CHP’s readiness to rule the country.

Conclusion

This study delves into the strategic responses devised by key municipalities run by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in Turkey, specifically in the face of challenges posed by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The AKP administration has placed a series of financial, legal, and bureaucratic barriers on local government, with a marked focus on those led by the CHP. These hurdles are part of a broader strategy designed to constrain the ability of these local governments to deliver services, illustrating the AKP’s ongoing efforts to preserve its political supremacy.

CHP municipalities have employed several key strategies which include: effective political communication that reaches and resonates with diverse demographics; participatory governance that invites local communities to take part in the decision-making process; committing to transparency and accountability, bolstering public trust; upholding transparency, accountability and the rule of law, ensuring fairness in governance; creativity in service delivery, addressing local needs through unconventional means; grassroots engagement, fostering a deeper connection with local populations.

However, despite these constraints, this research reveals that CHP municipalities have managed not just to sustain but actually to enhance service delivery across their regions through a combination of innovative, creative and practical solution-driven approaches. These municipalities have implemented various methods to gain and retain the trust of their constituents while showcasing effective governance, despite the significant pressure from the central government. CHP municipalities have employed several key strategies which include: effective political communication that reaches and resonates with diverse demographics; participatory governance that invites local communities to take part in the decision-making process; committing to transparency and accountability, bolstering public trust; upholding transparency, accountability and the rule of law, ensuring fairness in governance; creativity in service delivery, addressing local needs through unconventional means; grassroots engagement, fostering a deeper connection with local populations. These tactics have enabled CHP mayors to extend their influence on even conservative voters, who traditionally fall outside the CHP’s core electoral base. Despite the AKP’s efforts to stymie these local governments, their attempts have not succeeded in halting the growing strength of the CHP at the national level.

The study highlights the fact that the success of CHP-led municipalities could play a pivotal role in shaping the dynamics of Turkey’s national politics. The CHP’s victories in major Turkish cities in the 2024 local elections are emblematic of a growing desire for change, signalling unhappiness with the AKP’s prolonged hegemony. These local successes, achieved despite intense pressure from the AKP, have reinforced the CHP’s standing locally, but also as part of a broader national political strategy. In this context, the proven ability of CHP municipalities to consistently meet public expectations and deliver efficient governance, despite the obstacles put in their way by the AKP administration, could be critical in shaping future electoral outcomes. Much as in the 1990s, where changes in local government became the precursor to national shifts, CHP-led municipalities may once again serve as the catalyst for political change in Turkey.

References

Baser, Bahar, and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk. Authoritarian Politics in Turkey: Elections, Resistance and the AKP. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017.

Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. “The Turkish Presidential Elections of 10 August 2014”. Mediterranean Politics 20, no. 1 (2015): 105-110.

Öktem, Kerem. “Dilemmas of Subnational Democracy under Authoritarianism: Istanbul’s Metropolitan Municipality”. Social Research: An International Quarterly 88, no. 2 (2021): 501-537.

Özbudun, Ergun. “From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: the Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey”. South European Society & Politics 11, no. 3-4 (2006): 543-557.

Yavuz, M. Hakan, and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the New Republican People’s Party in Turkey. Palgrave Macmillan, 2023. 

[1] All interviews were conducted face-to-face in the offices of the political actors in July and August 2024.

 

Fair MusE is pleased to announce the release of its report titled “Origins, goals and effects of EU law and policy in the online music sector”. The report focuses on ‘fairness’ which has become a central concern for a variety of actors and stakeholders in the music industry. It studies the distinct ways in which ‘fairness’ has been diachronically conceptualised as a term in the EU policy related to the music sector, seeking to understand the emergence and evolution of the concept ‘fairness’, against the backdrop of the governance of digitisation and online platforms in Europe. The research is based on documents covering a period of more than 30 years issued by the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, as well as the European Parliament and the Council as colegislators.

The analysis illustrates that the issue of ‘fairness’ in the EU regulatory framework of copyright, and especially the ‘fair’ remuneration of rightholders, have been predominant topics of discussion over time. However, due to the process of platformisation, copyright regulation – and the debate around the economic and cultural sets of values that should underpin it – progressively became part of a broader legal and policy framework dealing with the governance of digital platforms. From this perspective, what platformisation did was to make EU policy for the music sector go beyond copyright, and the legal and policy debate that surrounds it.

The report is authored by Antonios Vlassis (ULIEGE), Dealan Riga (ULIEGE), Evangelia Psychogiopoulou (ELIAMEP), Apostolos Samaras (ELIAMEP) and Anna Kandyla (ELIAMEP).

You can access the report here.

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for August 2024.

Athens has extended the agreement with Washington to station American MQ-9 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) at the Larissa Air Base (110th Fighter Wing) until July 2025. The UAVs have been stationed there for the last five years, and since the fall of 2022 have been in Larissa on a permanent basis. As Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini) mentions, the extension is seen as a clear indication of the continued importance the US attaches to maintaining a base in Greece, for surveillance missions that cover Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.

On August 5, Kamala Harris became the official nominee of the Democratic Party for President of the United States. As California’s Lieutenant Governor, Eleni Kounalakis, has stated to Petros Kasfikis (To Vima), regarding Harris’ relationship with the Greek Prime, Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis: “I know that they already share a very close bond and a personal relationship and that when she wins will carry forward in the bilateral relationship between Greece and the US”.

On August 21, US Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) met with members of the Greek American community in Chicago, on the sidelines of the Democratic National Convention. During this meeting, Van Hollen applauded Greece’s role in founding democracy and emphasized the importance of continuing to fight for it, urging support for Kamala Harris in the upcoming US election.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for July 2024.

On July 3, Lockheed Martin and the Hellenic Aerospace Industry (EAV) have delivered the 20th upgraded F-16 Viper fighter jet to the Hellenic Air Force. Furthermore, Lockheed Martin announced that with this upgrade, the Hellenic Air Force will be equipped with the “most advanced and cost-effective F-16 fleet in Europe.” In total, 84 F-16 fighter jets will be upgraded to the Viper configuration by 2027.

Furthermore, on July 8, the Hellenic Armed Forces refused to accept most of the military assistance from US stockpiles, part of the so-called Blinken package, due to high refurbishment costs. More specifically, the Hellenic Navy decided to decline the four LCS frigates offered by the US, as they were older versions and would require substantial resources to make operational. Similarly, the 164 Bradley IFVs from the US Army and BAE Systems stockpiles were rejected by the Hellenic Army due to the significant investments needed for refurbishment.

On July 16, the Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defense (KYSEA) approved the purchase of 20 F-35 advanced multirole aircraft from the United States. KYSEA also approved the acquisition of three Schiebel’s S-100 unmanned helicopters, which will be stationed in the three new Kimon class FDI frigates that Greece will acquire in 2025 and 2026. Following the approval by KYSEA, Athens officially signed a Letter of Acceptance (LOA) with Washington for the acquisition of F-35 fighter jets, as Defense Minister Nikos Dendias announced on July 25.

Lastly, the US Coast Guard has renewed Greece’s participation in the QUALSHIP 21 initiative for 2024-2025, acknowledging Greece as a Quality Flag State. The decision is based on the excellent performance of Greek-flagged vessels under US Coast Guard Port State Control over the past three years.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

The interview is available only in Greek here.

Source: Free Sunday

Commentary published in the newspaper “Filelevtheros” (available only in Greek here), which refers to the recently published report entitled “Structural Reforms in Greece during the Crisis: 2010-2014. Overview, Evaluation and Policy Proposals” edited by the Crisis Observatory

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) under the Mercator European Dialogue (MED) program, successfully organized the strategic  workshop on: “Threat perceptions and scenarios for EU security and defense” on the 10th of July.

European MPs and researchers attended the event, had the opportunity to exchange views on critical issues of the European Union. This exchange has been initiated under the framework of the Mercator European Dialogue, a project organised by the German Marshall Fund of the United States in cooperation with the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome, and the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy in Athens and is funded by Stiftung Mercator and since 2017 also by the King Baudouin Foundation.

    

 

A new report entitled “Structural Reforms in Greece during the Crisis: 2010-2014. Overview, Evaluation and Policy Proposals”, has just been published by the Crisis Observatory. The report is the outcome of the research programme “The Political Economy of Structural Reforms in Greece”, which was assigned to the Crisis Observatory by the Bank of Greece.

The report was coordinated and edited by Dimitris Katsikas (Head of the Crisis Observatory). The researchers that participated in the research programme and contributed to the report are: Dimitris Katsikas, Marianthi Anastasatou, Elisavet Nitsi, Athanasios Petralias, Kyriakos Filinis, Giannis Vintzileos and AlexandroGeorgakopoulos.

A printed version of the report will be presented in a special event, which will be announced by the website and the social media of the Crisis/ Observatory and ELIAMEP.

Sorry, this entry is only available in Greek.

The vigorous development of military technology has changed the way in which military operations are carried out, and at the same time the way and structure of the Administration. Countries with strong armed forces have broadly developed the so-called “Network-centric War”. The result was to gain a military advantage in the battlefield against the enemy. Regular benefits have arisen due to good image, immediate and timely transfer of information and, finally, effective destruction of hostile targets. Apart from the US, China and Turkey are two countries that are implementing Net Centric Warfare.

Working Paper 95/2018: Net Centric Warfare – NCW (in Greek)