European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Agnieszka Widuto,

The Just Transition Fund will support European Union (EU) regions relying on fossil fuels and high-emission industries in their green transition. Our animated infographic shows how it works.

What is the Just Transition Fund?

The Just Transition Fund is an EU funding tool for regions dependent on fossil fuels and high-emission industries. The aim is to help them prepare for the transition necessary to achieve at least a 55 % reduction in emissions by 2030, and climate neutrality by 2050.

The European Green Deal and EU climate policies aim to improve environmental quality, ensure clean air and reduce health risks for the population. To achieve this green transition, the EU will support carbon-intensive regions in diversifying their economies and creating new jobs. Activities supported by the Just Transition Fund will include investments in small and medium-sized enterprises, research and innovation, renewable energy, emissions reduction, clean energy technologies, site regeneration, circular economy, and upskilling and reskilling of workers. The Just Transition Fund is part of a broader Just Transition Mechanism, which also includes two other pillars: a scheme under InvestEU aimed at mobilising private investments and a public sector loan facility to generate public financing.

The introductory section of the infographic provides an overview of the most important details of the Just Transition Fund.

How much funding?

In January 2020, the European Commission proposed an allocation for the Just Transition Fund (JTF) amounting to €7.5 billion under the 2021‑2027 EU budget. In light of the coronavirus pandemic, the Commission increased this amount to €10 billion from the EU budget and added a top-up of €30 billion from the Next Generation EU instrument in May 2020. This brought the total JTF amount to €40 billion. It is expected that the EU budget amount will be complemented by national co-financing and transfers from the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund+. With additional funds generated through InvestEU and public sector loan facility, the Just Transition Mechanism is expected to mobilise at least €150 billion of investment.

Animated  infographic on Just Transition Fund

At the European Council meeting in July 2020, EU leaders proposed an allocation of €7.5 billion under the EU budget and €10 billion from Next Generation EU, reducing the total JTF budget to €17.5 billion. The European Parliament, in its amendments to the Commission proposal voted in September 2020, recommended raising the core budget amount of JTF to over €25 billion.

A section of the infographic called ‘Allocations’ shows a break-down of the amounts for each pillar of the Just Transition Mechanism, expected additional funding mobilised, and amounts proposed by each of the EU institutions during the negotiation process. By clicking on each respective EU institution, the infographic immediately shows the differences between their proposals.

Which regions will the JTF support?

Funding is available to all EU countries. The European Commission identified a preliminary list of eligible regions in each country.

The allocation method is based on the following socio-economic criteria: industrial emissions in regions with high carbon intensity; employment in industry in these regions; employment in coal and lignite mining; production of peat; production of oil shale and oil sands.

In the ‘JTF Allocation Method’ section, the infographic shows total JTF allocations by Member State and the aid intensity per inhabitant, according to the May 2020 Commission proposal. It explains the allocation method and provides graphs for each of the allocation components by Member State. Click on an individual country to see more detailed information on the allocations. The visualisation also takes the additional criteria mentioned in the proposal (minimum and maximum level of support and a prosperity criterion) into account.

The infographic was prepared by Sorina Ionescu and Frederik Scholaert. Each section of the infographic provides a link to Further reading materials, including an EPRS legislative briefing on the Just Transition Fund.

Written by Etienne Deschamps,

© European Parliament 2020

During the night of 9 to 10 November 1989, with absolutely no warning, the Berlin Wall opened at the same time as the communist government of the German Democratic Republic collapsed. For the first time in nearly 30 years, East Berliners could travel freely to the other side of the Iron Curtain: history was made, and the Cold War was coming to an end. A month later, the Brandenburg Gate officially opened, restoring free movement between the two German states. In less than a year, Germany regained both its unity and its sovereignty. This was a source of great satisfaction for the European Parliament, which was involved in the preparations for the reunification. Since 1990, the third day in October is celebrated as the Day of German Unity (‘Tag der deutschen Einheit’). Saturday 3 October 2020 marked the 30th anniversary of German unification, an event which profoundly changed the course of European integration.

This year, the European Parliament took the opportunity to pay tribute to this historic event, through an entirely virtual exhibition. The exhibition, entitled ‘It was 30 years ago: The European Parliament, the fall of the Berlin Wall and German reunification‘ is freely available in 24 languages on Europeana, the EU’s online library. The exhibition was launched in September by the Parliament’s liaison office in Berlin during the 2020 Berlin Lights Festival ‘Berlin leuchtet’, where the motto this year was ‘United’. The online exhibition aims to shed light on the important role played by the European Parliament and its increasing involvement in the process. It relates directly to the events that took place between 9 November 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell, and 3 October 1990, when Germany was reunified. However, the exhibition really begins in the middle of the Cold War, with the construction of the Berlin Wall, in August 1961, and illustrates the reaction of the then European Community. It also recalls that on numerous occasions from the 1960s to the 1980s, the European Parliament sought to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms in the world, particularly in countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

However, the archive photos, texts and documents reproduced in the exhibition – which in some cases have never been displayed in public – also demonstrate what the consequences of unification would be for the European Parliament. For several months, the European Parliament provided a forum for the European leaders tasked with preparing Germany’s unification. In response to the political, economic and institutional implications of this historic moment for the European Community, the Members of the European Parliament supported German unification, and increasingly called for democratisation and respect for human rights in Central and Eastern Europe. For the European Parliament, the prospect of German unification was an historic opportunity to overcome the division of Europe. However, it was also a chance to consolidate political balances, promote détente, and encourage peace processes, to stimulate cooperation among the peoples of Europe and strengthen democracy and pluralism throughout the continent. This explains why Parliament set up a temporary committee with the task of assessing the effects of German unification on the European Community. The exhibition also provides information regarding the issue of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) representatives’ participation in parliamentary work. What would their status be? How many of them would there be and how would they be appointed? Would they have voting rights? Not forgetting the logistical issues … In the end, they were given observer status. Some would later be elected Members of the European Parliament in the June 1994 European elections. Finally, the exhibition also shows that, despite the speed of events, the Parliament played a key role in the adoption of all the necessary legislation to integrate the ex-GDR, as part of the united Germany, into the Union.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Martin Russell,

Armenia and Azerbaijan are bitterly opposed over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-backed separatist territory that international law recognises as part of Azerbaijan. The fighting, which began in September 2020, is the worst since 1994, when a ceasefire ended a two-year bloody war. With Turkey openly backing Azerbaijan, there are fears that this could trigger conflict with Russia, Armenia’s main ally.

Historical background

Map – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh

Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan have mostly concerned Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous region inhabited by ethnic Armenians but recognised under international law as belonging to Azerbaijan. Part of Russia since the 19th century, Nagorno-Karabakh was incorporated by the Soviet Union into Azerbaijan in 1923. Under Soviet rule, tensions were mostly subdued, but as repression eased under Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s, Karabakh Armenians became increasingly resentful of what they saw as forced ‘Azerification’ of the region. This led to protests and, in 1988, demands for unification with Armenia. Clashes between Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijanis became increasingly violent. In 1990, Armenia declared independence from the Soviet Union, followed by Azerbaijan one year later, leading Nagorno-Karabakh in turn to secede from Azerbaijan. The result was a bloody war that lasted two years, killed between 20 000 and 30 000 people and displaced around one million more from their homes. By the time a Russian-mediated ceasefire took hold in May 1994, Karabakh forces backed by Armenia had repelled Azerbaijan’s much larger army from most of the territory, as well as capturing adjacent areas of Azerbaijan. Together with Nagorno-Karabakh, these areas amount to around one-sixth of Azerbaijani territory outside Baku’s control.

A frozen conflict

The situation since 1994 has been more or less frozen, periodically heating up due to border clashes. Armenia has not recognised Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence, but it provides the province – which it refers to as Artsakh – with military and economic support, contributing half of its budget. The Minsk Group, which was set up by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1992 to mediate between the two sides and is co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States, has not managed to find a political settlement. In 2007, it presented the six Madrid principles, revised in 2009, as a basis for negotiations. The main elements of these are: a guaranteed interim status for the region, pending a legally binding referendum on its final status; the return of all occupied territories outside Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control, with the exception of a corridor connecting to Armenia; and the right of all displaced persons to return to their former places of residence. However, Armenia and Azerbaijan have not been able to agree on these principles, or on how they would be implemented. Since 1994, hardly a year has gone by without violence along Armenia’s and Nagorno-Karabakh’s borders with Azerbaijan. The worst violence to date was in 2016, when a brief but intense episode claimed around 350 lives, according to a US estimate. In 2018, Nikol Pashinyan became prime minister of Armenia after a ‘Velvet Revolution’ toppled his predecessor Serzh Sargsyan. Pashinyan showed signs of willingness to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: after his first meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, the two leaders agreed to work on reducing tensions and to set up a direct hotline between them. However, since then Pashinyan’s rhetoric has hardened: in August 2019, he called for unification between Karabakh and Armenia.

The latest clashes

A July 2020 border skirmish triggered massive protests in Baku, with thousands of demonstrators calling for the country to go to war with Armenia. Renewed hostilities, which each of the two sides blames the other for starting, began on 27 September in Nagorno-Karabakh. As of 5 October, the official (probably understated) death toll had already reached nearly 250, the highest number since 2016. Fighting is also more intense than in previous clashes, with tanks, fighter planes, helicopters and heavy artillery. Civilian targets have come under fire in Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh. Although most of the fighting is in and around Karabakh, Azerbaijan claims that Armenian forces shelled Ganja, its second largest city, while Armenia says that it intercepted Azerbaijani drones close to Yerevan. Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh have all declared martial law and started to mobilise their troops.

Whereas Armenia has expressed willingness to engage in OSCE-led peace talks, Azerbaijan insists that a ceasefire is only possible once Armenia has withdrawn from Karabakh and all other occupied areas. Baku, which has a much larger and better equipped army, claims that it has already captured several villages, and may be hoping for further gains; however, the 1992-1994 war shows that significant advances against fierce Armenian resistance into Karabakh’s rugged terrain will be difficult.

International implications of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Although pipelines bringing Azerbaijani oil and gas to Europe pass not far from Armenia, analysts have downplayed the threat of disruption to energy markets. On the other hand, there is a more serious risk of the conflict embroiling the two main regional powers, Turkey and Russia. Russia is Armenia’s military ally (both countries are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, CSTO) and main weapons supplier; since the 2016 clash, deliveries of Russian weapons (which are sold to Yerevan at a discounted rate) have increased substantially. Armenia also hosts 3 300 Russian soldiers at a base less than 10 kilometres from the Turkish border. However, Moscow also exports weapons to Azerbaijan (which has purchased five times more than Armenia since 2010). Although Baku has resisted joining Russian-led structures such as the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union, good ties with Moscow are key to its efforts to build a balanced foreign policy. Traditionally, Russia has played the role of mediator, for example through the Minsk Group.

While Russia and practically the entire international community – including the United Nations Security Council – have called on the two sides to immediately stop fighting and return to the negotiating table, Turkey has fully aligned itself with Azerbaijan’s position that Armenia first needs to withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh. For nearly a century, Ankara’s relations with Yerevan have been poisoned by the Armenian genocide; on the other hand, Azerbaijan is close to Turkey as a Turkic-speaking nation, energy supplier and defence partner; in August 2020, the two countries held a major joint military drill. Turkey denies being directly involved in the conflict – for example, rejecting Yerevan’s claims that it downed an Armenian warplane – but it has also said that it will do ‘what is necessary’ to back Azerbaijan. There is evidence that Turkey may have sent Syrian rebel fighters to fight alongside Azerbaijani forces. According to French President Emmanuel Macron, who also denounced Ankara’s ‘warlike rhetoric’ as unacceptable, 300 jihadists transited Turkey on their way to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Nagorno-Karabakh has now become a third theatre of war – together with Syria and Libya – where Turkey and Russia back opposing sides. So far, the two countries have managed to compartmentalise their relations. For example, a February 2020 incident in which 33 Turkish soldiers were killed by Russia-backed Syrian government forces did not significantly strain ties. With Turkey looking to balance its increasingly difficult relations with the West, and Russia keen to broaden its influence in the Middle East, broader geopolitical interests still outweigh such differences in overall Turkey-Russia relations. However, that could change if the conflict escalates and Russia feels that its strategic interests are threatened by Turkey.

EU position: On 27 September, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President Josep Borrell called on the two sides to stop fighting immediately and return to negotiations within the Minsk Group. The High Representative is due to make a statement to the European Parliament on 7 October.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan on the brink of war‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

While the coronavirus crisis continues to strain Europe’s resilience to the very limit, there are nevertheless some positive outcomes. Many have come to question arrangements that previously seemed immutable – swapping the workplace for working from home, or recognising an opportunity to move towards greater strategic sovereignty for instance. Can the European Union harness such innovations to continue to make life better for Europeans? How can the European Union prepare to face such world-changing shocks in the future? Will we emerge stronger from the crisis?

EPRS analysts have taken advantage of the summer months to prepare a series of forward-looking Ideas Papers that seek to analyse how the coronavirus crisis has impacted various areas of EU policy and identify options for how those policies might be further developed in the future. These cover policy areas from public health to international trade, civil protection to the transport situation. A further set of Ideas Papers explore how the Union could develop greater resilience to withstand unexpected future shocks and strengthen its capacity for collective action.

Author Thinking about future EU policy Public health Gianluca QUAGLIO Social and employment Nora MILOTAY Food supply and food security Rachele ROSSI Civil protection capabilities Leopold SCHMERTZING European economic recovery Jerome SAULNIER Economic and Monetary Union Angelos DELIVORIAS Climate change and climate action Gregor ERBACH International Trade Jana TITIEVSKAIA Transport Jaan SOONE Towards a more resilient EU Democracy, freedom and the rule of law Wouter VAN BALLEGOOIJ Free movement within the EU Costica DUMBRAVA Linking the levels of governance Klemen ZUMER Strategic sovereignty for Europe Suzana ANGHEL Digital sovereignty for Europe Tambiama MADIEGA European interests and values Naja BENTZEN European competitiveness and global growth Stanislas DE FINANCE Future of multilateralism and strategic partnerships Elena LAZAROU

Written by Marcin Szczepański (1st edition),

© Richard Villalon / Adobe Stock

In May 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal on a Solvency Support Instrument. The aim is to support otherwise viable companies in the Union that face solvency difficulties as a result of the coronavirus crisis, and to mitigate possible distortions to the single market and its level playing field. Such distortions are to be expected given the differing degree to which the Member States are affected and the likely unevenness of their responses, which may depend on their fiscal capacity and level of debt. The Commission proposes to increase the guarantee provided to the European Investment Bank under the European Fund for Strategic Investments and to use it to support financial intermediaries, which will then select companies eligible for solvency help.

At the European Council meeting in July 2020, EU Heads of State or Government did not take up the idea of the solvency support instrument. Both the European Parliament and Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, have expressed regret at this. Continuing the examination of the proposal in Parliament, the co-rapporteurs have published a draft report in which they propose to widen the scope of eligible companies and ensure fair geographical distribution.

Versions

• Solvency Support Instrument

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 as regards creation of a Solvency Support Instrument Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)
Budgets (BUDG) jointly under Rule 58 COM(2020) 404
29.5.2020 Rapporteur: José Manuel Fernandes (EPP, Spain)
Irene Tinagli (S&D, Italy)
Nils Torvalds (Renew Europe, Finland) 2020/0106 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Frances Fitzgerald (EPP), Victor Negrescu (S&D), Billy Kelleher (Renew Europe), Gunnar Beck (ID), Hélène Laporte (ID), Claude Gruffat (Greens/EFA), Henrike Hahn (Greens/EFA), Bogdan Rzońca (ECR), Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR), José Gusmão (GUE/NGL), Dimitrios Papadimoulis (GUE/NGL) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Adoption of report in joint committee

Written by Ralf Drachenberg,

© Adobe Stock

At the special European Council meeting of 1-2 October 2020, Charles Michel, President of the European Council, presented a new Leaders’ Agenda outlining his view of ‘the key challenges confronting the Union’ and setting a timetable for the Heads of State or Government to address these issues at meetings between October 2020 and June 2021. The new Leaders’ Agenda puts strong focus on the ‘green transition and digital transformation’, as well as on ‘Europe’s role in the world’, two core priorities in the EU Strategic Agenda 2019-24. Mr Michel intends to structure the approach to external relations discussions, notably through a series of strategic debates on relations with key partners. A number of EU priority topics are however missing, notably migration, the rule of law and the Conference on the Future of Europe. Mr Michel has, however, stated that the Leaders’ Agenda is a flexible tool, which can be updated as circumstances require.

Meetings and topics of the Leaders’ Agenda 2020-21

As flagged up in the EPRS outlook for the special meeting of 1-2 October 2020, President Charles Michel set out his vision of the main issues to be dealt with by his institution in the coming year in the form of a Leaders’ Agenda 2020-21. Along the lines of the Leaders’ Agenda put forward by then-President Donald Tusk in October 2017, this document sets out a work programme for the European Council up to June 2021. Surprisingly, it only covers a period of nine months, as opposed to 18 months for the first Leaders’ Agenda. Eight European Council meetings (including the 1-2 October one) are planned up to June 2021, including two informal meetings, one on China and the other on the social impact of the digital and green transformation, as well as a special meeting due to address both health issues and European security and defence (see Table 1). The agenda also includes two Euro Summits, in November 2020 and in March 2021, and envisages a series of summits with third countries: an EU-African Union Summit, an EU leaders-Chinese President meeting, a Western Balkans Summit, an ASEM Summit and a possible EU-CELAC summit.

Table 1: Main issues to be discussed at EU leaders’ meetings, October 2020 – June 2021

Date Meeting type Main issues 2020 1-2 October Regular European Council Digital, single market and industrial policy, and external relations (Turkey, China) 15-16 October Regular European Council EU-UK negotiations, climate (orientation debate) and external relations (Africa)) 16 November Informal European Council (Berlin) China 10-11 December Regular European Council Climate, trade and external relations (Southern Neighbourhood) Meeting with the African Union Euro Summit meeting Banking union and capital markets union 2021 February Special European Council Health, and European security and defence February Eastern Partnership Summit 25-26 March Regular European Council Digital, including digital taxation, single market and industrial policy as well as external relations (Russia) Euro Summit meeting International role of the euro 7-8 May Informal European Council (Portugal) Social impact of the digital and green transformation EU-India leaders’ meeting 24-25 June Regular European Council Future of Schengen and external relations (UK)

Presented as ‘an ambitious European Council agenda covering the key challenges confronting the Union, the new Leaders’ Agenda puts particular emphasis on the green transition and digital transformation, as well as on making the EU a strong global player. It aims to push ahead with the policy priorities outlined by the European Council in its Strategic Agenda 2019-24: i) protecting citizens and freedoms; ii) developing a strong and vibrant economic base; iii) building a climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe; and iv) promoting European interests and values on the global stage.

As regards the fourth priority, Mr Michel aims at developing a more structured approach to dealing with the EU’s external relations. He has underlined that the ‘EU’s role in the world will be on every #EUCO agenda’, and indeed, all but one of the European Council meetings have a strategic discussion on a specific external relations topic. The exception is the planned informal meeting in May 2021, which will be dedicated to the ‘social impact of the digital and green transformation’, but will take place back-to-back with the EU-India meeting, which is not a European Council meeting. The Leaders’ Agenda notably includes a strategic discussion on Africa in October 2020 and one on Russia in March 2021. The last strategic discussion of the European Council on Russia was planned for 21-22 October 2016, but at that time, the European Council mainly discussed whether or not to introduce sanctions on Russia in relation to its involvement in the Syrian conflict. The new agenda confirms the recent trend to organise EU summits with third countries, such as the EU-Western Balkans summit, with the attendance of all or most EU Heads of State or Government, rather than just the presidents of the European Council and the Commission, the president-in-office of the Council, and the EU High Representative/Vice President.

The absence of a number of key issues from the Leaders’ Agenda is striking: next to the Conference on the Future of Europe, one of the four core priorities of the Strategic Agenda 2019-24, ‘protecting citizens and freedoms’ is barely included. Even though a discussion on the future of Schengen is planned for June 2021, sensitive topics such as migration and asylum, and the rule of law are missing.

Working method under the Leaders’ Agenda

Figure 1: Leaders’ Agenda decision-making process

The first Leaders’ Agenda was launched at the European Council meeting of 19-20 October 2017, in order to facilitate the finding of consensus among the EU leaders on otherwise intractable issues. It initiated a new working method for the European Council with the introduction of a special format of the European Council, Leaders’ Meetings, which were informal debates stimulated with ‘Leaders’ notes’ from the president, outlining the main challenges and sticking-points on the topic concerned. The aim was to help EU leaders reach agreement and enable them to approve conclusions at a subsequent, regular meeting of the European Council. The idea of only adopting conclusions at a later meeting has been kept in the new Leaders’ Agenda, which states that ‘where no immediate conclusions are drawn, the outcome of the debates will be reflected in later conclusions’. Whether special notes will be prepared or implementation reports drawn up remains to be seen. However, Mr Michel did mention the possibility of using smaller formats, with only some EU leaders, to prepare the discussions in the European Council itself.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘European Council Leaders’ Agenda 2020-21‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Suzana Anghel,

© Adobe Stock

The European Council meeting of 1-2 October 2020 was largely dedicated to external relations. EU leaders discussed a wide range of foreign policy issues, including relations with China, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Navalny poisoning attempt. Particular attention was paid to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, with EU leaders extending an offer to cooperate with Turkey – provided the current path to dialogue was maintained – while envisaging all options otherwise. On Belarus, the leaders agreed on restrictive measures against officials responsible for repression and election falsification. Also on the agenda were the single market, industrial policy and digital transformation, notably in the context of EU strategic autonomy. There was also an in-depth discussion on coordination of the coronavirus pandemic response. Finally, the President presented the new Leaders’ Agenda 2020-21, foreseeing the main topics for discussion up to June 2021.

1. European Council meeting: General aspects and new commitments

In accordance with Article 235(2) TFEU, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, addressed the European Council at the start of its proceedings. He referred notably to three topics not formally on the European Council agenda: migration, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the Conference on the Future of Europe. On the first topic, he stressed that the EU ‘must show the courage needed to reach agreement on a common immigration and asylum policy based on solidarity and responsibility’. On negotiations between co-legislators on the next MFF, President Sassoli stressed that the ‘delays are due to a lack of counter-proposals from the Council. Parliament has made many concessions to the Council. If there is a will, a political agreement can be reached quickly’. At the opening press conference, Charles Michel, President of the European Council, had briefly touched upon the recovery fund and the MFF, stressing that it was crucial to implement EU leaders’ decisions from July 2020 as soon as possible. Finally, on the planned Conference on the Future of Europe, Mr Sassoli invited EU Heads of State or Government ‘to take a decision at the next European Council which enables us to start the Conference in Strasbourg as soon as possible’.

The European Council welcomed the new Prime Minister of Belgium, Alexander De Croo. Swedish Prime Minster Stefan Löfven was unable to attend and was represented by the Finnish Prime Minister, Sanna Marrin. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, had to leave the meeting after the first day and was then represented by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel.

An important development regarding the work of the European Council was the presentation by Charles Michel of the Leaders’ Agenda 2020-21. Designed as a work programme for the European Council, it outlines the main meetings of the EU Heads of State or Government up to June 2021 and the topics to be discussed (see EPRS publication European Council Leaders’ Agenda 2020-21).

Table 1: New European Council commitments and requests with a specific time schedule

Policy area Action >Actor Schedule Coronavirus Come back to this issue regularly European Council 2020-21 Digital policy Develop a digital compass, setting out the EU’s digital ambitions for 2030 European Commission March 2021 Develop an EU-wide framework for secure public electronic identification (e-ID) European Commission Mid-2021 Single market, industrial policy and digital Return to the topics European Commission March 2021 External relations Return to the Navalny case European Council 15-16 October 2020 Eastern Mediterranean Monitor developments and compliance closely and return to this issue European Commission December 2020 2. European Council meeting: Main agenda points Coronavirus

The European Council held an in-depth discussion on the coordination of the response to the pandemic, and in its conclusions called on the Council and the Commission ‘to further step up the overall coordination effort and the work on the development and distribution of a vaccine at the EU level’. Michel stated that Covid-19 vaccines should be considered as ‘a common good’.

Main message of Parliament’s President: David Sassoli argued that the coronavirus crisis had ‘high­lighted the need to give the EU a far greater role in the area of health, and to seek more innovative digital solutions in this area. This should translate into an increased budget for the EU4Health programme’.

Single market, industrial policy and digital transition

‘Achieving strategic autonomy while preserving an open economy’ was set as an objective for the Union, confirming the EU’s willingness to address existing vulnerabilities, build a robust industrial base and continue to cooperate with partners. Increased convergence on the notion of ‘strategic autonomy’ could be observed since the coronavirus outbreak, although sensitivities may persist.

Single market and industrial policy

EU leaders stressed the need to return to a fully functional single market as soon as possible and to remove unjustified remaining barriers, with strict implementation of the single market enforcement action plan. The European Council also endorsed the Council conclusions of 21 September 2020 on a ‘deepened single market for a strong recovery and a competitive, sustainable Europe’.

The European Council restated its commitment to updating the EU competition framework to meet the challenges of the twin digital and green transitions, and adapt it to the evolving global context. Possible rules on the role and responsibilities of online platforms should be explored as well as rules for all economic operators in the digital sector. The Digital Services Act expected before the end of the year will aim to define concrete measures on these issues.

Regarding trade matters, EU leaders reiterated their call for a reformed system of global economic governance based on a free trade agenda with the WTO at its core, while protecting the EU from unfair and abusive practices and ensuring reciprocity. They also called for more progress on ongoing legislative initiatives such as the Enforcement Regulation and the International Procurement Instrument, while also developing instruments addressing the distortive effects of foreign subsidies.

At the same time, EU Heads of State or Government stressed the need to make European industry more sustainable, greener and more resilient so as to be able to compete in the global competition setting. To achieve this, the EU leaders called, more specifically, for action to ensure a level playing field, the development of new industrial alliances, increased assistance to overcome market failures and enable breakthrough innovation, and EU autonomy in the space sector.

Digital policy

EU leaders stressed that the coronavirus crisis had made digital transition even more pertinent and urgent, highlighting the political will to build a truly digital single market and make the EU digitally sovereign. They agreed to earmark at least 20 % of the recovery and resilience facility under the recovery package for digital transition, including for SMEs. EU leaders also took stock of recent developments and action with regard to the data economy, cloud services, 5G deployment and the building of a framework for secure, trustworthy and ethical artificial intelligence systems.

External relations Eastern Mediterranean

Noting the EU’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the eastern Mediterranean, EU leaders devoted much attention to the situation in the region, bringing to the table an offer of dialogue and cooperation with Turkey. While welcoming the recent de-escalation efforts and the renewal of dialogue between Greece and Turkey, the European Council reiterated its solidarity with Greece and Cyprus, stressing that their ‘sovereign rights’ needed to be respected. It also called for a swift resumption of talks under the auspices of the UN for the settlement of the Cyprus issue.

When it came to relations with Turkey, provided the latter pursued dialogue, EU leaders committed to ‘launch a positive political EU-Turkey agenda’ focused on ‘modernisation of the Customs Union’, trade, and cooperation in the field of migration on the basis of the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. The Presidents of the European Council and Commission, Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen, supported by the High Representative/Vice-President, Josep Borrell, were tasked with developing a proposal for a renewed EU-Turkey agenda. However, as underlined by the European Council, were the situation in the eastern Mediterranean to deteriorate again, the EU would use all available instruments, including restrictive measures (sanctions) and the reduction or interruption of economic relations and financial aid, in accordance with Article 215 TFEU. EU leaders also proposed to organise a multilateral conference on the eastern Mediterranean, but its framework and timetable have still to be determined.

Turkey has increasingly been using its key geo-strategic position in an assertive way, through active involvement in conflicts in its neighbourhood. This is currently the case in Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh. French President Emmanuel Macron stressed that the EU needed a neighbourhood policy able to address the challenges posed by both Turkey and Russia, and that EU leaders should continue to discuss and shape the EU’s strategic vision.

Main message of the Parliament’s President: David Sassoli expressed the Parliament’s solidarity with Greece and Cyprus and stressed that the ‘EU must uphold their sovereign rights’. He underlined that a ‘lasting settlement’ in the eastern Mediterranean could only be reached through dialogue.

EU-China relations

The debate on Turkey overshadowed the debate on China completely, reducing it to a stock-taking exercise. EU leaders were informed of the outcome of the 14 September 2020 quadrilateral meeting with China. Conclusions were, as confirmed by Mr Michel, adopted without debate. The European Council ‘welcomed’ the signing of the agreement on geographical indications and reaffirmed the goal of finalising negotiations on ‘an ambitious EU-China comprehensive investment agreement’ by the end of 2020, provided pending issues are overcome. EU leaders called on China to engage in ‘negotiations on industrial subsidies at the WTO’ and to support global efforts to respond to the pandemic. When it came to the fight against climate change, an area where the EU and China can cooperate closely, EU leaders ‘welcomed’ China’s commitment to increase its level of ambition so as to achieve climate neutrality by 2060. The conclusions stressed however that human rights abuses in China and the situation in Hong Kong remained a matter of serious concern. They also confirmed the EU’s attachment to the joint communication, ‘EU-China: A Strategic Outlook’, not formally endorsed by the EU leaders when first presented in March 2019. Recognising this communication as a common working tool is a first significant step towards a common approach on China, as called for by several EU leaders, including Emmanuel Macron, and the Prime Minister of Estonia, Jüri Ratas.

Main message of the Parliament’s President: David Sassoli expressed concern on human rights abuses and called for ‘a level playing-field for free and fair trade’.

Belarus

EU leaders once again converged in their assessment of the situation in Belarus and invited the Commission to prepare ‘a comprehensive plan of economic support for democratic Belarus’. They gave the green light to restrictive measures against 40 individuals who have contributed to electoral fraud and post-election repression; the Council subsequently adopted the list by written procedure. The list does not yet include Alexander Lukashenko. French President Emmanuel Macron spoke of an ‘assumed choice’, which could open the path to mediation under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Main message of the Parliament’s President: David Sassoli urged the EU leaders to stand by EU values and to place sanctions on those responsible for electoral fraud and repression in Belarus.

Nagorno-Karabakh

EU leaders discussed the recent escalation of violence in Nagorno-Karabakh, inviting parties to cease hostilities and to work towards ‘the peaceful settlement of the conflict’. They expressed their support for the OSCE Minsk Group – comprising France, Russia and the US – which earlier in the day had called on Armenia and Azerbaijan to resume negotiations ‘in good faith’.

Main message of Parliament’s President: David Sassoli conveyed his condolences to the families of victims and called for the cessation of hostilities.

Alexei Navalny

The European Council condemned the attempt made to assassinate Alexei Navalny, as well as the use to that end of ‘a military chemical nerve agent from the “Novichok” group’. It pointed out that the use of chemical weapons constituted a breach of international law and called on Russia to cooperate fully with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. EU leaders agreed to return to the Navalny case at their upcoming summit on 15 and 16 October.

Main message of the Parliament’s President: David Sassoli called for ‘impartial international investigation’ into Russia’s violations of the international chemical weapons regime.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the special European Council meeting, 1-2 October 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger,

© alexlmx / Adobe Stock

On 21 April 2018, the EU and Mexico reached an agreement in principle on a modernised trade pillar of the EU-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, also known as the Global Agreement, in force since 2000. On 28 April 2020, negotiations were formally concluded after the only outstanding item – EU access to sub‑federal public procurement contracts in Mexico – was agreed upon.

The trade pillar of the Global Agreement was the first trade liberalisation agreement the EU concluded with a Latin American country. It has contributed to a significant increase in EU‑Mexico trade in services and industrial goods. However, it has become outdated, as both parties have entered into a wide range of preferential trade agreements with state-of-the-art provisions reflecting new developments in trade and investment policies. Removing non-tariff barriers to trade, and further liberalising trade in agricultural goods would allow the EU and Mexico to enhance their competitive edge in each other’s markets.

After the trade pillar’s legal scrutiny and translation, it will become part of a three-pronged Global Agreement that will also contain revamped political dialogue and cooperation pillars and will be signed by the Council of the EU and its Mexican counterpart. The new Global Agreement will subsequently be submitted to the European Parliament for its consent.

Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part Committee responsible: International Trade (INTA) Rapporteur: Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D, Spain)

 

Written by Nicole Scholz (1st edition),

© Julien Eichinger / Adobe Stock

On 28 May 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation on a new health programme (EU4Health) for 2021 to 2027. Announced as part of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument, according to the Commission the EU4Health programme is intended to boost the EU’s preparedness for major cross-border health threats and improve health systems resilience.

Under the proposal, EU4Health would be a stand-alone, dedicated funding programme with a budget of €10.4 billion (in current prices). However, during the ongoing negotiations on the EU’s next multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the 2021-2027 period and NGEU, the budget for EU4Health has been reviewed downwards compared with what was originally proposed. According to the 21 July 2020 European Council conclusions, the programme will be allocated €1.7 billion.

Stakeholders broadly welcome the proposal, but generally regret the European Council’s reduction of the financial envelope allocated to it. In a July 2020 resolution on the European Council conclusions, Parliament criticised the proposed cuts to EU4Health. In Parliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) is responsible for the file. The rapporteur’s June 2020 draft report proposes several amendments to the Commission proposal. ENVI Members tabled further amendments in July. The committee is expected to vote on the report in October.

In the Council, the proposal is being examined at the level of the working party on public health.

Versions

• EU4Health programme

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of a Programme for the Union’s action in the field of health – for the period 2021-2027 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 282/2014 (‘EU4Health Programme’) Committee responsible: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) COM(2020) 405
28.5.2020 Rapporteur: Cristian-Silviu Buşoi (EPP, Romania) 2020/0102 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Sara Cerdas (S&D, Portugal)
Véronique Trillet-Lenoir (Renew Europe, France)
Luisa Regimenti (ID, Italy)
Michèle Rivasi (Greens/EFA, France)
Joanna Kopcińska (ECR, Poland)
Kateřina Konečná (GUE/NGL, Czechia) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Adoption of report in committee

Written by Christiaan van Lierop.

This year’s European Week of Regions and Cities will truly be like no other. Not only will the event be taking place online due to local Coronavirus restrictions but it will also extend over three consecutive weeks for the first time ever in the event’s history. Each week will focus on a different headline theme, covering in turn Empowering Citizens, Cohesion and Cooperation, and Green Europe, with EWRC 2020 expected to provide the usual rich forum for discussion and debate.

But of course it’s not just this year’s special circumstances that makes this event so unique. After all, the world’s largest annual gathering of regional movers and shakers is always going to attract attention, with some of the biggest names in regional policymaking joining the party this year, albeit from the comfort of their own living room. And while the only face-to-face meetings this year may be taking part through the prism of a computer screen, the discussions will be no less passionate for all that. Against the backdrop of the Coronavirus crisis and with negotiations on the post-2020 cohesion policy framework in full swing, there will certainly be no shortage of things for this year’s participants to talk about, with the event providing local and regional stakeholders with a unique opportunity to share their experiences on the front line.

As in the past, EPRS has also published a Topical Digest to tie in with the event. Prepared specially for the 2020 EWRC, the publication showcases a selection of briefings published by the European Parliament on many of the key topics up for debate at the EWRC, such as the Just Transition, cross-border regional healthcare or digital democracy among many others. And although our special information stand has gone virtual this year, visitors will still be able to visit it online to find out more about the EPRS’ research activities, and download a selection of our specialist publications on regional policy.

But there’s much more to our involvement in this year’s event than just counting clicks on our virtual stand. EPRS will once again be organising a workshop on research as part of the EURegions Week College, which replaces the Master Class of past years. Unlike previous years, however, this year’s workshop will be open to all not just to students and early career researchers – and we are thrilled to have the opportunity to present our work to a wider audience. The workshop will show participants how EPRS supports the work of the European Parliament during the policy making process, and consider how closer links may be established between researchers in the academic world and policy-makers in the EU institutions.

Far from talking to an empty computer screen, we will also be asking participants to get actively involved in the discussions. As ever, we want to hear what they have to say – so we too can learn from the event. At EPRS, we understand that ‘Empowering through knowledge’, far from being just our motto, is in reality a two-way process.

Written by Ionel Zamfir,

Seventy-five years after the 24 October 1945 ratification of the United Nations (UN) Charter, the UN remains at the heart of the multilateral system. However, multilateralism today faces some serious challenges. To take stock of the UN’s current role as well as to discuss the way forward and the EU’s role in the organisation, EPRS organised a discussion on 23 September 2020, gathering diverse viewpoints in a virtual event under the title ‘The United Nations at 75: What has the multilateral system achieved and where is it going?’

The event took place shortly after the 75th UN General Assembly Session opened in New York on 21 September, in an unusual setting marked by the coronavirus crisis, as vividly reported directly from New York by Alexandre Stutzmann, special adviser to the President of the UN General Assembly and former European Parliament official. This year, pre-recorded interventions replaced the usual live speeches given in New York by numerous Heads of State each year in September. A high-level event took place on 21 September to mark the UN 75th anniversary and a forward-looking political declaration was adopted.

Soraya Rodríguez Ramos (Renew, Spain), Member of the European Parliament and Rapporteur for the future EP report on EU priorities at the 75th UN General Assembly, opened the discussion, stressing the importance of multilateralism in today’s hostile environment. According to Rodríguez Ramos, the coronavirus crisis has shown that a unilateral response is not the way forward; global governance and international solidary and cooperation are more needed than ever before. It is necessary to revitalise multilateralism, with the UN at its core. We need to find common solutions to tackle the new challenges of today that include, first of all, climate change, but also biodiversity loss, as well as persistent problems that have become more acute because of coronavirus crisis: poverty and hunger, lack of drinking water, violence and discrimination against women and girls.

European Parliament Vice-President Fabio Massimo Castaldo (NI, Italy) highlighted that, in its 75 years of history, the UN has shaped the world for the better, but the growing challenges of today are different from those envisaged by UN founders. More international cooperation is needed to tackle climate change, migration, poverty, inequality, and cybersecurity threats. Castaldo urged the UN to go back to the people, considering that reports of multilateralism’s demise are greatly exaggerated. He also highlighted the EU’s role in the UN: The Union has been able to make a difference through diplomacy and mediation for example.

Alexandre Stutzmann gave a detailed picture of the UN actions to mark its anniversary, stressing the efforts to reach out to ordinary people and particularly to young persons. He talked about the specificity of this year’s UN General Assembly Session, with much needed direct diplomatic interaction severely curtailed by the crisis. He detailed the high-level event marking the UN anniversary, outlining the complexities of the intergovernmental drafting process that ushered in the political declaration adopted on that occasion.

Barbara Pesce-Monteiro, director of the UN/UN Development Programme office in Brussels, also talked about the UN public campaign organised on its 75th anniversary and its results, which will feed into potential reforms. Pesce‑Monteiro further stressed that the current health crisis, with growing inequality and a particularly hard impact on women, illustrates the need for global solidarity, as does the climate crisis. In response to this, she stressed the need to continue to implement the Sustainable Development Goals as the only effective approach to tackle today’s strongly interrelated challenges. In common with the other speakers, Pesce‑Monteiro also acknowledged that the UN has to change, and welcomed EU support for the organisation.

Professor Jan Wouters reaffirmed the need to reform the UN, particularly its Security Council, which is not prepared to deal with the challenges of the future – in the next 25 or even 75 years. He warned that the current outlook for such reforms does not look at all promising: real drivers of reform are weak, and the vested interests of the current permanent members are a serious obstacle. He described the current crisis as the first global crisis without global leadership (a ‘G0 crisis’). This is due to the United States’ retreat from the global scene – the country whose leadership has traditionally been vital for shaping global institutions. A reinvigorated EU leadership with cross-regional support from like-minded countries can help fill this vacuum. Finally, Wouters encouraged reflection on the intergovernmental nature of the UN system in today’s globalised world, in which non-state actors, including regional international organisations, such as the European Union, play an increasingly powerful role.

To conclude, Ionel Zamfir, policy analyst at the EPRS, presented the findings of a recently published analysis on the EU’s role in the United Nations system, according to which the EU can be considered a credible, coherent and active player in the UN system. Its involvement is multidimensional, going beyond its observer role, including the EU’s participation in multilateral treaties and in the negotiations leading to these, its financial contributions, as well as the long-term, complex and mutually beneficial partnerships it has established with various entities in the UN system. Zamfir warned that one of the biggest challenges facing the UN today is to remain faithful to its fundamental principles, such as those enshrined in its founding documents, particularly with respect to universal human rights, which are under increasing threat with the rise of the authoritarianism in the world.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© hanohiki / Adobe Stock

According to analysts and politicians, China’s increasingly autocratic domestic stance and assertive foreign policy are damaging its relations with the European Union. No substantial agreement was achieved at a virtual EU-China summit on 14 September, despite years of negotiations on many issues, not least on trade and investment. ‘For the EU, China is simultaneously (in different policy areas) a cooperation partner, a negotiation partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival,’ the EU External Action Service’s background paper says.

Formally, the EU and China have been strategic partners since 2003 – a partnership that was broadened five years ago by the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. However, more recently, EU officials and politicians have been expressing increasing concerns over China’s economic expansionism and human rights violations. The current coronavirus pandemic and developments in Hong Kong have had a marked negative impacted on EU-China relations.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks on China, its ties with the EU and related issues.

EU-China

Non-summit shows EU-China ties at new low
Bruegel, September 2020

Towards tougher bilateral relations between EU and China
Institut français des relations internationales, September 2020

The new China consensus: How Europe is growing wary of Beijing
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2020

The EU-China relationship
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, September 2020

Europe, the US and China: A love-hate triangle?
Centre for European Reform, September 2020

It’s time for NATO and the EU to have a serious conversation about China
Friends of Europe, September 2020

EU-China relations: State of the art and new perspectives
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2020

Relocating production from China to Central Europe? Not so fast!
Bruegel, September 2020

Europe’s manoeuvring on 5G technology: The case of Italy
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2020

The missing partnership: The United States, Europe, and China’s economic challenge
German Marshall Fund, September 2020

China and the EU in the Western Balkans A zero-sum game?
Clingendael, August 2020

Towards strategic autonomy: The role of the EU in the growing China-USA rivalry
Egmont, July 2020

EU-China trade and investment: Views from East and West
Friends of Europe, July 2020

Europe’s China problem: Investment screening and state aid
Bruegel, July 2020

The pandemic, power rivalries and the EU
Friends of Europe, July 2020

Europe’s digital sovereignty: From rulemaker to superpower in the age of US-China rivalry
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2020

The meaning of systemic rivalry: Europe and China beyond the pandemic
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2020

Hong Kong calls: Can Europe respond?
Carnegie Europe, May 2020

Other studies and commentaries

China’s ‘dual circulation’ plan is bad news for others’ exports
Bruegel, September 2020

The cacophony of powers: International politics in the 2020s
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2020

Europe’s global test
Carnegie Europe, September 2020

The race for critical minerals in an era of geopolitical realignments
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2020

How US-China tensions could hamper development efforts
Brookings Institution, September 2020

Lessons from the Trump administration’s policy experiment on China
Brookings Institution, September 2020

China’s structural power and the fate of the BCIM economic corridor
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2020

China’s system of oppression in Xinjiang: How it developed and how to curb it
Brookings Institution, September 2020

Will the U.S. stance on Chinese telecom equipment change?
European Centre for International Political Economy, September 2020

Returning to the shadows: China, Pakistan, and the fate of CPEC
German Marshall Fund, September 2020

An answer to aggression: How to push back against Beijing
German Marshall Fund, September 2020

The Sino-Russian normative partnership in action
European Union Institute for Security Studies, August 2020

US-China phase one tracker: China’s purchases of US goods
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2020

Differentiated cooperation in European Foreign Policy: The challenge of coherence
European Policy Centre, August 2020

Fewer Chinese investments in the US are raising national security concerns
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2020

Debunking the myth of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’: How recipient countries shape China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Chatham House, August 2020

Arms and influence? Chinese arms transfers to Africa in context
Peterson Institute for International Economics, July 2020

How ‘democratic security’ can protect Europe from a rising China
German Council on Foreign Relations, July 2020

Despite the rhetoric, US-China financial decoupling is not happening
Peterson Institute for International Economics, July 2020

Mask wars: China’s exports of medical goods in times of Covid-19
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, July 2020

Masks off: Chinese coronavirus assistance in Europe
German Marshall Fund, July 2020

Hong Kong: The second hand-over
Fondation pour l’innovation politique, July 2020

European fear of ‘missing out’ and narratives on China in Africa
European Think Tank Group, July 2020

China has blown its historic opportunity
Peterson Institute for International Economics, July 2020

China has an unfair advantage in the EU Market: What can be done to level the playing field?
Bruegel, July 2020

China’s targeted corporate shopping spree to continue, especially in Europe
Bruegel, July 2020

China and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: In or out?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2020

Australia’s strategic shift to the United States infuriates China
Carnegie Europe, June 2020

China’s focus remains firmly fixed on domestic problems
Chatham House, June 2020

East Asia decouples from the United States: Trade war, Covid-19, and East Asia’s new trade blocs
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2020

China’s Indian Ocean ambitions: Investment, influence, and military advantage
Brookings Institution, June 2020

Reading tea leaves from China’s two sessions: Large monetary and fiscal stimulus and still no growth guarantee
Bruegel, May 2020

How images frame China’s role in African development
Chatham House, May 2020

Read this briefing on ‘China: From partner to rival’ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

© Bernard Rouffignac / European Union, EP

Despite Parliament’s efforts to return to Strasbourg for its plenary sessions, the first session of October will again take place in Brussels, to avoid hundreds of people travelling to France during the coronavirus pandemic. The Covid‑19 emergency has also focused the agenda on efforts to ensure the health of the EU economy, particularly its financial markets.

A key moment in this session, however, will undoubtedly be the vote on Wednesday morning following the 2 October hearings concerning two changes in European Commission portfolios in a reorganisation made necessary following the former Trade Commissioner’s resignation. The International Trade Committee will hear Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis, nominated to take over the Trade portfolio, and the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) committee will hear Mairead McGuinness, Commissioner-designate for Financial Stability, Financial Services and the Capital Markets Union.

As reflected in the importance given to the financial portfolio, the vital health of the EU financial market is another focus of the session. Council and Commission will make statements on the role of the European Supervisory Authorities in the Wirecard scandal on Wednesday afternoon, followed by a joint debate on financial services. With the effects of coronavirus on the business world as a backdrop, Parliament will focus on proposals for further development of the capital markets union, particularly to offer small businesses and individual investors a wider range of investment options and help drive the recovery. As the potentially misleading statements Wirecard made to its investors illustrate, coordinated supervisory powers could help to protect smaller businesses and investors. The ECON committee report tabled proposes to remove barriers to investment; set up an EU framework for digital finance that provides high data protection and privacy standards (and challenges the dominance of large technology companies); promote financial literacy; and for the EU to consider equivalence decisions for suitable third-country markets. Reflecting the rapidly changing nature of the financial markets, Members will then debate an ECON committee legislative-initiative report with recommendations to the European Commission on regulating digital finance. The report takes a closer look at the emerging risks in crypto-assets and the regulatory and supervisory challenges. Fintech provides unprecedented opportunities for both a more efficient and transparent financial sector – and for financial criminals to escape detection. The ECON committee would like the European Commission to propose comprehensive supervisory measures to regulate crypto-assets, such as Bitcoin, to boost cyber-resilience in view of the vulnerability of such virtual assets to cyber-attack, as well as to improve the management of associated data. One new Fintech solution, crowdfunding, is a growing way for innovative small companies to obtain access to finance. The digital nature of crowdfunding service platforms also lends itself well to cross-border calls for finance, opening up the possibilities for investors and companies alike. However, the platforms also require careful EU-wide regulation to ensure they are managed prudently and that investors are protected. On Monday evening, Members will vote on ECON committee reports at second reading on a regulation on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business and related changes to the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II). The texts include measures to authorise, supervise and set operational and organisational requirements for crowdfunding platforms, and focus on protecting investors. The Commission will also make a statement on the fight against money laundering, following the release of the FinCEN files, on Thursday morning.

However, the need for careful husbandry of financial resources in such difficult times is also greatly reinforcing the desire for good financial management of EU funding. On Monday evening, Members will hear Council and Commission statements on a possible rule of law conditionality in the framework of the multiannual financial framework negotiations, to link EU funding more closely to the respect of common EU values and will debate a legislative-initiative report on establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights.

The coronavirus pandemic also continues to have financial consequences for EU policy, and while Parliament has proposed new resources to fund the recovery, the budget for existing EU activities requires some adjustment. On Monday evening, Members will vote on amending budget No 7/2020, which updates the revenue side of the current EU budget, in view of the negative impact of coronavirus on the EU economic outlook, as well as other technical issues. Although income from value added tax and gross national income is falling as a result of the economic climate, and negative exchange rates have also had an impact, more positively, the amounts available from paid-up fines and penalties has increased. An update of the coronavirus measures is also expected to feature during the postponed European Council meeting of 1‑2 October, the conclusions of which Members will debate on Tuesday morning, as well as preparation of the next meeting, currently scheduled for 15‑16 October 2020.

One file that remains blocked in Council is the proposed directive to ensure gender balance on company boards, agreed by Parliament in 2013. Proven to improve the health, value and transparency of companies, Parliament has long supported the measures and called for progress on the file as recently as January 2020. Members will discuss the current state of play on Monday evening.

Turning to the EU’s ambition to achieve EU climate neutrality by 2050, a debate on Tuesday afternoon will discuss the Commission’s proposal for a new European Climate Law. While the Commission is proposing a 55 % reduction in EU GHG emissions by 2030, Parliament’s Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee (ENVI) is calling for greater ambition with an increased reduction target of 60 %. The ENVI committee calls for net-zero emissions by 2050 at the latest in the EU and in each Member State, and negative emissions after 2050. The vote on this file will determine Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations once the Council adopts its position. A vital resource in the fight against climate change, for the European ecosystem and to rural economies, forests and woods cover almost half of the EU’s land surface. However, to date the EU has no policy on forests and the forestry sector, meaning that management of this precious resource is somewhat fragmented. Members will debate a report on Tuesday afternoon on the way forward for a European forest strategy. The strategy could pave the way for an ambitious approach to sustainable forest management that bridges the gap between national forest policies and EU objectives relating to forests, such as the European Green Deal and the 2030 biodiversity strategy

Written by Elena Lazarou and Tania Lațici,

© Rawf8 / Adobe Stock

Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) was launched in December 2017 with the participation of 25 EU Member States. It operates on the basis of concrete projects and binding commitments, several of which are geared towards strengthening the EU defence sector. PESCO members are committed to increasing national defence budgets and defence investment expenditure, and to investing more in defence research and technology. In addition, they have pledged to develop and provide ‘strategically relevant’ defence capabilities and to act jointly and make use of the financial and practical support provided by the European Defence Fund. Finally, they are committed to contributing to projects that boost the European defence industry and the European defence technological and industrial base.

Discussions on long-awaited rules on third-country participation in PESCO projects are ongoing in September 2020. A strategic review of PESCO should take place by the end of 2020. The review will assess PESCO’s strengths and weaknesses and it is expected to provide new information aimed at improving the implementation and development of new EU defence capabilities and capacities through PESCO. Critics argue that the end goal of PESCO projects has still to be contextualised within the wider debate on an EU strategic culture and a concrete vision about the ambition of EU security and defence policy. They also emphasise the need to align PESCO priorities with those identified by parallel EU defence initiatives, as well as with the capability needs of the EU.

The European Parliament is expected to vote on a resolution on PESCO in October 2020.

PESCO projects, participants and EDIDP funding

Read the complete briefing on ‘PESCO: Ahead of the strategic review‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘PESCO: Ahead of the strategic review’ on YouTube.

Written by Marie-Laure Augère-Granier,

© Simone van den Berg / Adobe Stock

The 150 million pigs reared across the EU represent the largest livestock category before that of bovines, and the EU pig meat sector alone accounts for nearly half of total EU meat production. Germany, Spain and France contribute more than half of the total amount of pig meat produced in the EU. The sector is highly diverse, with huge differences in rearing methods and farm sizes across the Member States: from backyard farming to industrial installations with thousands of animals.

Within the common agricultural policy (CAP), the pig meat sector is covered by the common organisation of markets regulating trade and providing support in the event of a sectoral crisis. Farmers can also receive rural development funding under the second pillar of the CAP, for example, to make necessary investments on their farms.

A large number of EU legislative acts apply to this sector, covering various aspects of pig farming: environmental protection, food safety and public health, organic production, animal health and welfare. However, evidence shows a lack of compliance with EU regulations on the welfare of pigs and the persistence of harmful routine practices. Another challenge is the air, soil and water pollution caused by intensive pig farming, which takes a heavy toll on the environment.

The EU is currently the world’s top exporter of pig meat products and its exports have been boosted by the fall in production in Asia, where African swine fever is decimating millions of animals. Increased demand for EU pork pushed prices to a peak in early 2020.

In the coming years, the pig production sector may be impacted by the evolution of the policy environment: negotiations on a new CAP are ongoing and the recently published Green Deal initiative and Farm to Fork strategy, both of which promote greener and more sustainable agriculture and food systems, mention the future revision of legislation relevant to the pig sector, including on animal welfare.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU pig meat sector‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘The EU pig meat sector’ on YouTube.

Written by Eric Pichon,

© Gilles Paire / Adobe Stock

The August 2020 coup in Mali has once again demonstrated the instability of the Sahel. The region is affected by climate change and rapid population growth. Rivalries over access to livelihoods exacerbate grievances against states. Struggling to provide basic services throughout their territory and security at their borders, governments are competing with armed groups that have emerged from the failed regimes of Central Africa, North Africa and the Middle East. The instability in this region has direct consequences for the security of the European Union’s neighbours and for the EU itself.

In 2011, to respond to the multiple factors of this instability, the EU adopted the Sahel security and development strategy: the first comprehensive approach aimed at ensuring various external policy programmes and instruments converge towards common objectives. Despite the revamping of the strategy in 2015 based on the lessons learnt, its implementation, which involves the coordination of multiple stakeholders, has been difficult. While it has contributed to notable progress towards integration and regionalisation, security challenges have impeded tangible achievements in preventing radicalisation and fostering inclusive development. The Sahel action plan, adopted in 2015 to provide an overall framework for the implementation of the strategy, comes to an end in 2020; its revision (or replacement) will need to take the EU’s and Africa’s new geopolitical interests on board. As the EU endeavours to reconnect with Africa in a regional and full-fledged partnership, the successes and failures of the EU Strategy for the Sahel could inspire the whole EU development and security policy on the continent.

This briefing is a translated and revised version of Le Sahel: un enjeu stratégique pour l’Union européenne, of November 2017.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding the EU Strategy for the Sahel‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Understanding the EU Strategy for the Sahel’ on YouTube.

Written by Nera Kuljanic with Samuel Gregory-Manning,

© Bchyla / Adobe Stock

Biodiversity is in crisis across the globe: species extinctions and a loss of nature occurring at rates unprecedented in human history, and with the EU no exception, our biodiversity and the essential value it brings are under threat. Could ‘rewilding’ help restore Europe’s nature?

Biodiversity refers to the variety of life on Earth in all its forms and interactions: from the genetic level to individual species, right up to complex ecological communities. Biodiversity is essential for human life – from the air we breathe, to the food we eat and the water we drink. However, the over-exploitation of land and water, climate change, pollution and invasive species are exerting immense pressure on biodiversity and only 16 % of EU habitats and 23 % of EU species have favourable status, Europe’s biodiversity and its intrinsic social and economic value are under grave threat.

The EU biodiversity strategy for 2030 acknowledges the urgency of this crisis and its importance in tackling other existential threats such as climate change and pandemics. The strategy has ecosystem restoration at its core, which is also the main goal of ‘rewilding’, a conservation practice that is gaining increasing attention as a way to combat the crisis of biodiversity loss.

Potential impacts and developments

Rewilding can be broadly defined as the restoration of ecosystems and natural processes through the creation or upgrading of natural areas with minimal human activity, promoting the connectivity of these areas, and reintroducing integral species and their interactions. These are known as keystone species, playing a disproportionate role in the ecosystems they inhabit and vital to their healthy functioning. In Europe, keystone species include large carnivores that control and influence prey populations, such as the brown bear, grey wolf, lynx and wolverine, birds of prey (e.g. eagles and vultures), large grazing animals that promote plant diversity such as European bison and deer species, and ‘ecosystem engineers’ such as the Eurasian beaver.

The Natura 2000 network, part of the Birds and Habitats Directives, is a coordinated network of protected areas, currently covering 18 % of EU land and 6 % of EU marine territory. However, not all of the areas that fall under the network are strictly protected, with most privately owned; the effectiveness of the network is therefore limited by insufficient stakeholder participation and a lack of habitat connectivity and diversity covered. There are 60 active rewilding initiatives from non-profit and private organisations under way across Europe, from restoring the natural processes of the Oder river delta in Poland to the return of bison in the Carpathian mountains of Romania, and from reintroducing moose to a protected region in northern Denmark to establishing self-sustaining ecosystems in the Côa valley in Portugal.

Healthy ecosystems and their biodiversity are essential to human life on Earth, with complex biological functions underpinning our societies and economies in the form of ecosystem services. These include essential processes that range from climate regulation and carbon sequestration and storage, and the delivery of clean air and water, to plant pollination, soil formation, and the production of goods, medicinal resources, raw materials and energy. In their current degraded state, European ecosystems’ capability to deliver these vital services is reduced. In restoring these ecosystems, the beneficial services they provide would also be restored: their economic value in agriculture and fisheries; habitats acting as natural carbon dioxide sinks to limit climate change; increased climate resilience to natural disasters such as droughts, flooding and wildfires; greater food security; reducing the risk of and increasing resilience to future diseases. Nature also has cultural importance, offering people aesthetic and spiritual enrichment, cognitive development, and recreation opportunities. As well as the benefits to physical health from cleaner air and water, nature also has positive effects on mental health in alleviating anxiety, depression and stress.

Rural depopulation and the abandonment of farmland is an increasing and ongoing phenomenon in Europe. Rewilding initiatives could play a part in trans-European green infrastructure initiatives to repurpose this abandoned land, increasing biodiversity and stimulating local economies. Marine environments are particularly difficult to protect, due to the myriad pressures they face and the inherent complexity in working within them, and have therefore made less progress in their recovery under the Natura 2000 network. Restoring nature is not limited to just wilderness; Europe’s increasingly urban population would benefit from greener cities with accessible and connected urban forests and parks, and reduced use of pesticides and harmful management, allowing biodiversity to return.

Large animals do pose risks to human safety. While wild animals are generally wary of humans, and direct attacks on people are rare, increasing numbers of these species could result in increased incidence of human-wildlife conflict. Fears around apex predators are culturally ingrained throughout Europe, with many persecuted to local extinction; indeed, where some species have been increasing in number, old conflicts have returned. European attitudes to the return of wildlife differ between rural and urban communities, with the latter more likely to hold favourable views towards rewilding schemes. Those living in rural areas will have legitimate concerns and will be the most likely to encounter conflict with wildlife, specifically pertaining to the loss of livestock, damage to crops, or drastic changes to their environment.

Ecological restoration can be limited where habitats are heavily degraded and require high levels of intervention, as well as where the area required for certain ecological processes and large animals is simply not available or poorly connected. Several large animal species in Europe are extinct, while others have been locally extinct for centuries; species occupying similar ecological niches can fulfil these missing roles, such as semi-wild cattle replacing the extinct bovines, the aurochs. Where a self-sustaining ecosystem is not attainable or a long time in coming, active management may be required, which raises questions regarding the level of management required or whether the term ‘rewilding’ in such situations is appropriate. Indeed, debate exists amongst ecologists surrounding the exact definition, while the semi-wild managed Dutch nature reserve Oostvaardersplassen, for example, has been the subject of much controversy, particularly when thousands of animals died from starvation.

Anticipatory policy-making

In light of the insufficient progress made by the previous strategy in halting the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services degradation, the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030 builds upon existing legislation to commit to an expansion of 30 % of EU land and 30 % of EU seas as protected Natura 2000 network areas. Promoting the connectivity of these areas will be essential for their functional viability, to allow for animal movement and sufficient genetic exchange between populations, and to enhance ecosystem service delivery. Habitats and ecosystems across Europe are heterogeneous, which means that policies relating to their unique attributes will have to be equally diverse; specific coordination and cooperation with local communities and stakeholders will be integral to the success of ecological restoration projects.

The strategy plays a key role in the European Green Deal, highlighting the need to tackle biodiversity loss conjointly with tackling climate change. It is also linked to the Farm to Fork strategy, with commitments to reduce pesticide use, establish biodiverse habitat on 10 % of farmland and manage 25 % of agro-ecological farmland. Proposed reform of the Common Agricultural Policy could offer results-based payment schemes to give farmers an incentive to invest actively in facilitating the transition to a more sustainable food system in which production and biodiversity can co-exist.

The European green infrastructure strategy aims to serve both people and nature, and could work to stimulate rural areas by providing jobs, making sustainable practices in farming more profitable and offering alternative sources of income, such as tourism. Assessment of suitable areas and potential risks in establishing this trans-European infrastructure will be required.

Many keystone species in Europe are already protected under current EU legislation. Recent years have seen calls for greater exemptions to cull species of large carnivores that are deemed to pose an economic threat. As populations continue to stabilise and increase, sustained and coordinated conflict mitigation with relevant stakeholders will be required, expanding upon existing compensation and other mitigation measures.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if ‘rewilding’ could help reverse biodiversity loss in Europe?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if ‘rewilding’ could help reverse biodiversity loss in Europe?’ on YouTube.

Written by Nicole Scholz,

© Leigh Prather / Adobe Stock

On 17 June 2020, the European Commission presented a strategy to accelerate the development, manufacturing and deployment of vaccines against the coronavirus disease (Covid-19). The strategy aims to secure high quality, safe, effective and affordable Covid-19 vaccines for all in the EU within 12-18 months, if not earlier. To this end, the Commission has started to enter into advance purchase agreements with vaccine producers on behalf of the EU Member States. With the Coronavirus Global Response initiative and its participation in the COVAX facility, the EU is also positioning itself as a leader of global solidarity effort to speed up universal access to vaccines.

Context and main elements

A vaccine against the coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) is considered to be the most likely permanent solution to stop the pandemic. As of 28 September 2020, 191 vaccine candidates are under development worldwide, with 40 being tested in humans. Vaccine development is complex, risky and costly and often lasts 10 to 15 years. The Commission’s two-pillar Covid-19 vaccines strategy proposes centralised procurement to secure vaccine supplies in a compressed timeframe. The objectives: ensuring vaccine quality, safety and efficacy; securing swift access to vaccines for Member States and their population while leading the global solidarity effort; and ensuring equitable access to an affordable vaccine as early as possible. The Commission seeks to diversify its vaccine candidate portfolio with different technologies and different companies. The strategy’s first pillar consists of securing the production of sufficient quantities of vaccines in the EU through advance purchase agreements with vaccine producers. In return for the right to buy a given number of vaccine doses for a set price, the Commission will finance part of the upfront costs faced by vaccine producers through advance purchase agreements. As the Commission points out, the high cost and failure rate make investing in a Covid-19 vaccine a high-risk decision for vaccine companies, and the agreements will allow investments to be made that otherwise ‘would simply probably not happen’. Once any of the vaccines proves successful, the Member States will be able to buy it directly from the company. Funding is considered a down payment on the vaccines that will actually be bought by the Member States. The agreements will be financed through the €2.7 billion Emergency Support Instrument (ESI), which Member States have the possibility to top up. According to the German Council Presidency, ‘a significant number of Member States already made a concrete financial commitment to increase the ESI budget’. The strategy’s second pillar involves adapting the EU’s regulatory framework to the current urgency while maintaining vaccine quality, safety and efficacy standards. The regulatory flexibilities offered by EU pharmaceuticals legislation can be used to speed up authorisation and availability of Covid-19 vaccines without compromising on standards. This includes early engagement with the European Medicines Agency (EMA) (Covid-19 EMA pandemic task force) and international cooperation; an accelerated procedure for authorisation (conditional authorisation); and flexibility as regards labelling and packaging (alleviating the language requirements). As some of the vaccine candidates are based on attenuated viruses or viral vectors that may fall under the definition of a genetically modified organism (GMO), the Commission proposed in June 2020 a regulation for a temporary derogation from certain rules for clinical trials of medicinal products involving GMOs. The procedure was treated urgently and the regulation entered into force on 18 July.

Parliament’s position and MEPs’ views

In a July 2020 resolution, Parliament called for ‘EU joint procurement to be used for the purchase of Covid‑19 vaccines and treatments, and for it to be used more systematically to avoid Member States competing against each other and to ensure equal and affordable access to important medicines and medical devices’, including new vaccines. On 7 September, Members of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) debated the vaccines strategy with Sandra Gallina, Deputy Director-General of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety (SANTE). MEPs raised the issue of liability for vaccine producers, underlining that there should be no exceptions from current rules. The ENVI Chair stressed the need for transparency to achieve trust in Covid-19 vaccines and regretted that more information on the agreements had not been shared proactively. During a September joint hearing on Covid-19 vaccines, held by ENVI and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), MEPs questioned representatives of vaccine producers, academia, civil society and the EMA on advance purchase agreements, costs, patents and clinical trial data, as well as transparency.

EU’s role in global efforts

Under the Coronavirus Global Response, launched by the Commission in May, €15.9 billion has been pledged for universal access to tests, treatments and vaccines against coronavirus. It complements the Access to Covid-19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-A) global collaborative framework launched in April, which brings together governments, scientists, businesses, civil society, philanthropists and health organisations with the aim to accelerate development, production and equitable access to Covid-19 diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines. On 18 September, ‘Team Europe‘ – the Commission and the 27 Member States – joined COVAX, the ACT-A’s vaccine pillar. COVAX aims to get wealthier countries to sign up to help finance vaccines for low- and middle-income countries. According to the Commission, Team Europe will contribute to COVAX with €400 million in cash and guarantees: an initial €230 million in cash through a loan from the European Investment Bank, backed by the same amount in guarantees provided by the EU budget, will be complemented with €170 million in financial guarantees from the EU budget. EU participation in COVAX is complementary to negotiations with vaccine companies under the strategy, the Commission says.

The ongoing European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Right to Cure‘ calls on the EU ‘to put public health before private profit [and] make anti-pandemic vaccines and treatments a global public good, freely accessible to everyone’. Stakeholder views

In a letter to Health Commissioner Stella Kyriakides, the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) considers it crucial that any agreements concluded with vaccine developers, including possible liability arrangements, are fully transparent, and everyone has access to information about vaccines. Consumers should benefit from quick and effective compensation schemes if they suffer an adverse reaction. BEUC notes that, in principle, vaccine developers need to remain liable for the products they develop and should be required to maintain strict post-marketing and surveillance. In a joint statement, six health groups request more transparency in the governance of the purchase agreements, including the EU’s spending on Covid-19 vaccines; high regulatory assessment standards; transparency of the joint procurement process; and transparent liability clauses to make sure responsibilities are fairly shared. In its report on pharmaceutical industry lobbying during the pandemic, the Corporate Europe Observatory bemoans that the advance purchase agreements ‘are being negotiated in the dark’ and use public money to remove financial risk and liability from the vaccine companies without corresponding public interest conditions.

State of play and next steps

Two contracts have so far been signed. A first agreement with AstraZeneca to purchase 300 million doses, with an option to buy 100 million more, entered into force on 27 August. A €336 million down payment was reportedly made. An agreement with Sanofi-GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) to purchase up to 300 million doses entered into force on 18 September. As the Commission points out, exploratory talks have been concluded with: Johnson and Johnson for an initial purchase of 200 million doses and the possibility to buy 200 million more; CureVac for an initial 225 million doses; Moderna for an initial 80 million doses and the option to buy up to a further 80 million; BioNTech-Pfizer for an initial 200 million doses and an optional 100 million more. ‘Intensive discussions’ continue with other companies, reportedly including Novavax and ReiThera. According to the DG SANTE Deputy Director-General, the first vaccinations should take place by the end of 2020, and a large number of vaccine doses should become available in the first part of 2021. Vaccines would be distributed to EU Member States based on population size. It would be up to Member States to decide who will be vaccinated first. Prices would range from €5-15 per dose to assure affordability for all Member States.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Coronavirus vaccines strategy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katrien Luyten and Anita Orav,

© aalutcenko / Adobe Stock

The ‘hotspot approach’ was presented by the European Commission as part of the European Agenda on Migration in April 2015, when record numbers of refugees, asylum-seekers and other migrants flocked to the EU. The ‘hotspots’ – first reception facilities – aim to improve coordination of the EU agencies’ and national authorities’ efforts at the external borders of the EU, in the initial reception, identification, registration and fingerprinting of asylum-seekers and migrants. Even though other Member States also have the possibility to benefit from the hotspot approach, only Greece and Italy host hotspots.

In Greece, the hotspot approach remains the key strategy in addressing migratory pressures. The EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016, closely linked to the implementation of the hotspot approach in Greece, led to a considerable drop in irregular migration flows from Turkey to the EU. However, returns of irregular migrants to Turkey – a cornerstone of the agreement – are low. The deteriorating relationship between Turkey and the EU is putting the agreement under increasing pressure.

The hotspot approach was also set up to contribute to the temporary emergency relocation mechanisms that – between September 2015 and September 2017 – helped to transfer asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy to other EU Member States. Even though 96 % of the people eligible had been relocated by the end of March 2018, relocation numbers were far from the targets originally set and the system led to tensions with Czechia, Hungary and Poland, which refused to comply with the mechanism.

Since their inception, the majority of the hotspots have suffered from overcrowding, and concerns have been raised by stakeholders with regard to camp facilities and living conditions – in particular for vulnerable migrants and asylum-seekers – and to gaps in access to asylum procedures. These shortcomings cause tensions among the migrants and with local populations and have already led to violent protests. On 8 September 2020, a devastating fire in the Moria camp, on Lesvos, only aggravated the existing problems. The European Parliament has called repeatedly for action to ensure that the hotspot approach does not endanger the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers and migrants.

This briefing updates two earlier ones published in March 2016 and in June 2018.

Read this briefing on ‘Hotspots at EU external borders: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Hotspots in Greece and in Italy

Written by Maria Diaz Crego, Rafał Mańko and Wouter van Ballegooiij,

© European Union, 2020

Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) lays down the founding values of the European Union, referring to ‘human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’. The provision defines the constitutional core of the European Union through a set of values that are shared by the Member States. The EU’s founding values are binding not only on the EU institutions, but also on the Member States, as both candidate countries and Member States are required to comply with the EU’s founding values by virtue of the Treaties (Articles 7 and 49 TEU) and certain consequences are attached to situations where such values are not observed (for example, the impossibility to accede to the EU or the possibility of sanctions).

EU primary law provides for various mechanisms that can and have been used to monitor, prevent breaches of, or enforce EU values within the Member States, namely, the two procedures provided for under Article 7 TEU (preventive and sanctions), infringement procedures (Articles 258-259 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union − TFEU) and preliminary references (Article 267 TFEU). While the first mechanisms are to be used only in cases of systemic threats or breaches of EU values and are characterised by the leading role assumed by the Council of the European Union (Council, hereafter) and the European Council, the two other mechanisms can be described as judicial tools with regard to which the European Court of Justice assumes a major role.

Although the Treaties already provide for a range of tools that can be deployed to protect EU values within Member States, since 2007 the EU institutions have established a wide range of other mechanisms to monitor and prevent breaches of EU values in Member States. Between 2012 and 2014, the EU institutions created three monitoring and preventive tools to that end. The Commission launched its Justice Scoreboard in 2013, aimed at measuring the efficiency, quality and independence of the Member States’ justice systems, and feeding into the European Semester process for economic governance. A year later, in 2014, the European Commission established its rule of law framework, a preventive mechanism aimed at addressing threats to EU values before Article 7 TEU procedures are launched, and finally the Council decided to set up its annual dialogues on the rule of law.

However, these new mechanisms have not exhausted the discussion on the adequacy of the EU toolbox to address Member States’ deficiencies regarding EU values. In October 2016, Parliament called on the Commission to establish an EU pact on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, to monitor compliance with those values in the Member States. Although the Commission did not take up the proposal to start with, in 2019, it decided to take stock of experience gained from applying the existing mechanisms to different Member States and launched a broad debate on how to strengthen the EU mechanisms to address common values deficiencies in the Member States. As a result, the Commission decided to establish a Rule of Law Review Cycle (2019), a monitoring tool that has yet to bear fruit, with the European Commission issuing its first rule of law report in September 2020. In a similar vein, as part of the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) legislative package, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation establishing rule of law conditionality, allowing EU institutions to withdraw or suspend EU funds for Member States with systemic deficiencies in that regard. At the time of writing, the proposal is still being considered by the co-legislators, although the introduction of rule of law conditionality was announced after the European Council special meeting of 17-21 July 2020 at which a political agreement was reached on the 2021-2027 MFF.

Taking these elements into account, this study aims to analyse the existing and proposed mechanisms for monitoring, prevention and enforcement of EU values within the Member States. The focus will be on their scope of application, the main procedural features and their effectiveness in addressing shortcomings in Member States as regards compliance with the common EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.

Read the complete ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Protecting EU common values within the Member States: An overview of monitoring, prevention and enforcement mechanisms at EU level‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.