European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

The European Peace Facility (EPF) has been operational since 1 July 2021. This off-EU budget instrument finances operations with military implications (previously financed by the Athena mechanism and the African Peace Facility), and provides support to the EU partner countries’ armies with infrastructure, training and equipment, including with lethal weapons. So far, it has funded operations in places as diverse as the Western Balkans, the Eastern Neighbourhood, in particular Ukraine, and sub-Saharan Africa. As stated in the Strategic Compass process, the EU aims to strengthen its crisis management role, with the EPF playing a crucial role in this process.

EPF: A budget of nearly €6 billion and a key role in EU security

The EPF was set up by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 (the EPF Decision) of 22 March 2021, and entered into force on the same day. The EPF has a financial ceiling of €5.692 billion (in current prices) for 2021-2027, with an annual ceiling that will gradually increase from €420 million in 2021 to €1.132 billion in 2027. Member States make yearly contributions to the facility in proportion to their GNI. Denmark opted out of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) on military matters (by a formal declaration made under Article 31(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The EPF has two financing pillars, brought together in an effort to simplify decision-making and make EU actions more coherent. The operations pillar finances the common costs of CSDP missions and operations that have military or defence implications. The assistance measures pillar finances EU actions for third states and regional or international organisations, aimed at strengthening military and defence capacities and supporting military aspects of peace support operations (PSOs). The facility has two secretariats: one for CSDP operations, hosted by the Council, and another for assistance measures, hosted by the European Commission’s Foreign Policy Instruments Service.

Emerging external actors pose challenges to the EU’s CSDP missions and operations. It is hoped that the EPF, which for the first time allows the EU to train and equip, including with lethal weapons, the armies of its partner countries, will help counter these challenges. In a rapidly evolving security context, the Strategic Compass, expected to be formally adopted at the European Council meeting on 24-25 March 2022, will seek to strengthen the EU’s role in crisis management, with the help of both civilian experts and military forces. It will also aim to make full use of the EPF, without any geographical limitations, to make the EU partners more resilient against hybrid threats. The compass suggests forging closer links between CSDP missions and operations, on the one hand, and European-led ad-hoc coalitions, on the other, notably in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Strait of Hormuz; it also suggests that EPF-funded activities might help these ad-hoc coalitions.

A farewell to the African Peace Facility, but not to funding for military activities

The African Peace Facility (APF), which was created in 2003, is still de facto in force, but will no longer receive new funding. Through the APF, EU Member States have funded military activities in Africa, namely African Union (AU)-led or AU-supported PSOs, in places like South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Somalia, the Sahel, Gambia, and the Lake Chad Basin. The EPF has now taken the place of the APF to finance the military components of AU-led or AU-supported PSOs, while the Neighbourhood, Development and International Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE) is used to finance the civilian components of those PSOs.

On 22 July 2021, the Council adopted an assistance measure under the EPF in the form of a general programme for support to the AU. With a budget of €130 million, the assistance measure will provide support to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali national army. It will also help to finance: the military component of the G5 Sahel Force (covering Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger); the PSO in Gambia (ECOMIG); and the Multi-national Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (which supports the fight against Boko Haram in Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger).

Common costs of CSDP military missions and operations: Not a farewell to Athena

Observing the ban imposed by Article 41(2) TEU on paying operating expenditure arising from CSDP operations having military or defence implications from the EU budget, but using the possibility offered by this article to charge Member States for such expenditure, the Council established the Athena mechanism in 2004. This mechanism has financed the ‘common costs’ of CSDP operations, covering 5-10 % of the total cost of an operation. The EPF has maintained the Athena cost-sharing mechanism and its governance system, and currently contributes to the common costs of the seven active CSDP operations and missions.

EPF-funded assistance measures

In December 2021, the Council adopted a €24 million EPF-funded assistance measure for Mali, for a period of 30 months. Jointly with the EU Training Mission in Mali, this measure will help strengthen the capacities of the Malian armed forces to conduct military operations aimed at restoring Malian territorial integrity and reducing the threat posed by terrorist groups. The Malian minister for foreign affairs has requested that the EU training mission evolve, possibly with the EPF, into both a more efficient training component (with ‘train the trainers’ programmes) and more combative components (with directly deployable equipment, lethal weapons, vehicles, aircraft and means of communications). On 2 February 2022, the HR/VP deeply regretted the expulsion of the French Ambassador to Mali by the country’s transitional government.

On 12 July 2021, the Council set up a military training mission to Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique). Officially launched on 15 October, the mission seeks to help address the crisis in Cabo Delgado province, by providing the Mozambican army – more specifically the military units that will be part of a future quick reaction force – with training and capacity-building. The common costs of the mission are funded by the EPF, which also supports assistance measures to the mission. On 30 July 2021, the Council approved a concept note for a €4 million assistance measure under the EPF for the most urgently required equipment; on 19 November 2021, the Council decided to complement the former measure with a €40 million assistance measure, to enable the units trained by EUTM Mozambique to conduct security operations in Cabo Delgado province. EUTM Mozambique, which mainly consists of Portuguese special forces, will train a total of 11 companies of the Mozambican army and navy. The EU is providing these units with individual and collective equipment, ground mobility assets, technical tools and a field hospital. Moreover, a Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission, the SAMIM, was deployed on 15 July 2021 to join forces with the Mozambican national army and other (South African but also Zimbabwean and Rwandan) foreign troops in combating the Islamic terrorists; the SADC decided on 12 January 2022 to extend the SAMIM mandate for three months. For comparison, the extension will cost almost €26 million for the SADC.
The EU is likely to respond favourably to possible requests from Rwanda (although it is not a SADC member state), Mozambique or the AU, to fund, through the EPF, the deployment of African troops in Mozambique.

On 4 November 2021, the Council adopted an assistance measure of €10 million to support the capacity building of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and to finance the delivery of 68 medical and transport vehicles and 150 metal detectors to the BiH humanitarian demining battalion, with the aim of helping the country become mine-free by 2027. EPF funds also support EUFOR Althea, which has, with around 600 troops, an executive mandate to maintain a stable and secure environment in BiH.

On 2 December 2021, the Council adopted assistance measures to Georgia (€12.75 million) Moldova (€7 million) and Ukraine (€31 million), all for a period of three years and aimed at strengthening the capacities of the beneficiary countries in military and defence matters, as well as promoting domestic resilience and peace. The measure for Ukraine finances military medical units (including field hospitals), engineering units (including demining), mobility and logistics units, and support for cyber-defence. It is worth noting that, against the backdrop of renewed Russian threats on the Ukrainian border, a cyber-attack was launched against the Ukrainian government’s websites on 14 January 2022. The HR/VP intends to propose establishing an EU Military Advisory and Training Mission in Ukraine; the costs of such a mission, its possible participants, the Ukrainian needs and the modalities of EU help have already been evaluated; pending Member States’ agreement, the preparatory work to deploy the mission is ongoing at an accelerated speed. On 24 January, the Council stressed that the EU is defining arrangements for support to Ukraine in the area of professional military education. So far, none of the EPF-funded active assistance measures that the Council has approved at the request of the countries concerned allows for the controversial supply of equipment designed to deliver lethal force.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘The European Peace Facility: A new tool in action‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jakub Przetacznik with Linda Tothova.

Since the beginning of 2021, Ukraine has struggled with Russia’s attempts to further destabilise the country and intensify tensions in Europe’s east, including through repetitive military build-ups along Ukraine’s borders. Russia’s most recent threatening troop manoeuvres, together with its unsupportable security demands, met with a united response from Western countries, making it clear that a very high price will be paid if Russia attacks Ukraine. The EU and its institutions, including the European Parliament, have been clear in their response to Russia’s aggression on Ukrainian territory. The EU does not recognise the illegal annexation of Crimea and regularly calls on Russia to de-escalate and withdraw its forces, and urges Moscow and Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine to adhere to the ceasefire agreement. Currently the situation remains very volatile.

Relations between the European Union and Ukraine continue to be shaped by the 2014 Association Agreement, which includes the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. The long-term relationship between the EU and Ukraine covers a broad range of areas including trade, providing assistance to the country’s health sector, support for the country’s reform agenda, and support for the fight against hybrid attacks against Ukraine that have been perpetrated by Russia ever since Ukraine made its firm pro-European choice in 2014.

Russia decided to respond aggressively to the Revolution of Dignity – a revolution whose main aim was the signature of the Association Agreement – and immediately after the change of power in Ukraine in 2014 it annexed Crimea and moved to actively support Donbas separatists. Intensive fighting in Donbas in 2014 and early 2015 led to the Minsk agreements, but limited progress in implementing the agreements on the Russian side have led to the prolongation of Western sanctions against Russia. Russia continues its bullying policy towards Ukraine with a wide range of instruments, including disinformation, blackmail and cyber-attacks.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-Ukraine relations and the security situation in the country‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rosamund Shreeves.

The European Union (EU) is committed to working collectively to eradicate female genital mutilation (FGM), as part of broader efforts to combat all forms of violence against women and girls, and to supporting the efforts of its Member States in this field. The European Commission has undertaken to assess EU efforts to combat FGM every year, on or around 6 February – the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation.

Facts and figures

Female genital mutilation (FGM) includes all procedures that intentionally alter or cause injury to the female genital organs for non-medical purposes. FGM is carried out for cultural, religious and/or social reasons, mostly on young girls between infancy and the age of 15. It has no health benefits and can have serious immediate and long-term effects on health and wellbeing.

The exact number of girls and women affected by FGM is not known, but the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that, worldwide, at least 200 million women and girls have been cut, while around 4 million girls are at risk of undergoing FGM every year. The practice, which is most common in 28 African countries, is also prevalent in parts of the Middle East and Asia, and has been reported to a lesser extent elsewhere. Assessments issued by the United Nations Secretary-General and UNICEF-UNFPA, find that prevalence has been reduced in some regions, but progress could be cancelled out as a result of population growth, girls undergoing FGM at a younger age and further spread of the practice as a result of population movement. The coronavirus pandemic has been a further obstacle to progress, putting more girls at risk of FGM and disrupting prevention efforts and support services. Medicalisation of FGM is a growing problem.

Although official EU data on the prevalence of FGM in Europe are lacking, four studies to map FGM, conducted by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) between 2012 and 2020, found that there are victims (or potential victims) in at least 16 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Around 20 000 women and girls from FGM-practising countries seek asylum in the EU every year, with an estimated 1 000 asylum claims relating directly to FGM. This number has grown steadily since 2008.

Commitments and action to combat FGM

FGM constitutes a form of child abuse and gender-based violence, and is recognised internationally as a violation of the human rights of girls and women. The practice also violates a person’s rights to health, security and physical integrity; the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and the right to life in cases where the procedure results in death. Measures have been adopted at international, EU and national level to prevent FGM and to protect FGM victims.

Instruments and action at international level

At international level, United Nations (UN) and Council of Europe standards are benchmarks for work to combat FGM. Key treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Geneva Convention, all cover FGM indirectly, with specific guidance on protection and asylum for victims. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (‘Istanbul Convention’), is the first treaty to recognise that FGM exists in Europe (Article 38), and sets out specific obligations on preventing and combating the practice, and providing support for victims and those at risk.

The UN’s longstanding efforts to end the practice culminated in its first specific resolution on FGM in 2012, calling for the adoption of national action plans and comprehensive strategies to eliminate it. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development identifies FGM as a harmful practice, to be eliminated by 2030 (Goal 5), a priority reaffirmed by the UN – in a resolution in 2018 and at the International Conference on Population and Development in 2019. Concrete targets were set at the Generation Equality Forum in 2021. The UN also recommended action to tackle FGM in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. The UN has named 6 February the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation, and the European Commission takes stock annually, around that day, of EU efforts to combat FGM.

Legislative and policy framework at EU level

The EU itself currently has no binding instrument designed to protect women from violence, but relevant instruments exist in a number of areas. The principles of gender equality and non-discrimination are affirmed in the Treaties and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which also guarantees the right to dignity and includes provisions on the right to physical and mental integrity. The Directive on Victims’ Rights requires provision of support services for victims of violence, including FGM. The Asylum Reception Conditions Directive specifically mentions victims of FGM as being among vulnerable persons who should receive appropriate healthcare during their asylum procedure, while the recast Qualification Directive includes FGM as grounds to consider when granting asylum. Both directives are under review. The EU signed the Istanbul Convention in 2017 and is currently in the accession process. Parliament has urged those Member States that have not yet done so to ratify and implement this convention.

Combating gender-based violence, including FGM, is one of the priorities of the EU’s external action and its internal strategies on children’s rights and gender equality Proposals for new EU legislation on gender-based violence and a recommendation on measures to prevent harmful practices are planned for 2022. In addition, the approach to eliminating FGM adopted in 2013 will continue, with the aim of ensuring that action to combat FGM is mainstreamed across the fields of justice, police, health, social services, child protection, education, immigration and asylum and external action. Areas where the Commission has promised to act include:

• providing the reliable, comparable EU-level data necessary to establish the prevalence of FGM and provide a solid basis for policy;
• improving victim support by helping Member States to develop support services for victims, and training and awareness-raising for relevant professionals, focusing on empowering communities;
• supporting Member States in prosecuting FGM more effectively;
• ensuring that women at risk are protected more effectively under EU asylum rules through proper transposition and implementation of the EU legislative framework on asylum and victim protection;
• promoting worldwide elimination of FGM, by ensuring that EU external policy addresses FGM.

Funding for tackling FGM is made available through the joint EU-UN Spotlight Initiative and EU funding programmes, notably the longstanding Daphne strand, which is continuing under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme for 2021-2027.

National-level instruments against FGM

Many of the actions needed to end FGM lie within the competences of the Member States. FGM is now a prosecutable offence under national law in all Member States, either as a specific criminal act or as an act of bodily harm or injury. However, very few cases are brought to court. A number of Member States have also developed national action plans on FGM. Continuing issues of concern include barriers to reporting and successful prosecution, victim support, and ways to ensure long-term, sustainable cultural change.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has played an important role in raising awareness and pushing for firm action on FGM, including through the work of its Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). Parliament adopted resolutions on FGM in 2001, 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2018, calling on the Commission and Member States to provide the legal and other means required to raise awareness, protect and support victims and ensure that offenders are prosecuted. In 2016, it called for appropriate protection for women and girls seeking asylum on grounds of FGM. In 2020, Parliament set out its own recommendations for an EU strategy to put an end to FGM around the world. It has called for coordination of external and internal programmes and for action to address the increased risks of FGM resulting from the pandemic. Parliament has also welcomed the Commission’s plan for an EU recommendation.

This publication is a further update of an ‘at a glance’ note originally published in January 2015.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Zero tolerance for female genital mutilation‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alex Wilson (1st edition).

On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a major revision (recast) of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD), as part of the ‘Fit for 55’ package. The latter consists of several legislative proposals to meet the new EU objective of a minimum 55 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 compared to 1990. It is a core part of the European Green Deal, which aims to set the EU firmly on the path towards net zero GHG emissions (climate neutrality) by 2050.

The recast EPBD aims to accelerate building renovation rates, reduce GHG emissions and energy consumption, and promote the uptake of renewable energy in buildings. It would introduce a new EU definition of a ‘zero emissions building’, applicable to all new buildings from 2027 and to all renovated buildings from 2030. Zero-emissions buildings would need to factor in their life-cycle global warming potential. The recast EPBD would accelerate energy-efficient renovations in the worst performing 15 % of EU buildings, and would set minimum energy performance standards. In due course, every building would need to achieve at least a Class E on a revised A-G scale of energy performance certificates (EPCs). EPCs would be included in linked national databases. Other provisions introduce building renovation passports and a smart readiness indicator, end subsidies for fossil fuel boilers, and make building automation and control systems more widespread.

The file has been referred to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), which will in due course appoint a rapporteur, who will produce a draft report.

Versions

• February 2022: Revision of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive: Fit for 55 package (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the energy performance of buildings (recast) Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2021) 802 final
15.12.2021Rapporteur:To be appointed2021/0426(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Appointment of rapporteur

Written by Gregor Erbach with Nela Foukalova (1st edition).

As part of the ‘Fit for 55’ package, the Commission presented a legislative proposal to review the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). The aim of the review is to align the EU ETS Directive with the EU target set out in the European Climate Law to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 55 % by 2030, compared to 1990 levels.

To this end, the amount of emission allowances would be reduced, fewer allowances would be allocated for free, and the ETS would be extended to maritime transport. This would reduce emissions in the ETS sectors by 61 % by 2030, compared to 2005. A separate new emissions trading system would be established for fuel distribution for road transport and buildings. The Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund would be enlarged, and Member States would be obliged to spend all of their ETS revenues on climate action.

In the European Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which has appointed Peter Liese (EPP, Germany) as rapporteur.

Versions

• January 2022: Review of the EU ETS: ‘Fit for 55’ package (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and Regulation (EU) 2015/757 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 551
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Peter Liese (EPP, Germany)2021/0211(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jytte Guteland (S&D, Sweden)
Emma Wiesner (Renew, Sweden)
Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Danilo Oscar Lancini (ID, Italy)
Alexandr Vondra (ECR, Czechia)
Silvia Modig (The Left, Finland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote on draft report in committee

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

Held every 4 February since 2000, World Cancer Day aims at raising worldwide awareness of the action needed to fight cancer. With over 100 million Europeans expected to be diagnosed with cancer in the next 25 years, Parliament is expected to debate the final report of its Special Committee on Beating Cancer during the February plenary session, and vote on a series of recommendations calling for specific policy measures in this crucial area of public health.

Background

In June 2020, the European Parliament approved the establishment of the Special Committee on Beating Cancer (BECA). BECA held a series of public hearings with high-level experts, set up an exchange of views with national parliaments and international organisations, and conducted a public consultation, running from February to March 2021, on the impact of the pandemic on cancer care and research. In November 2021, a BECA delegation travelled to the World Health Organization (WHO) headquarters in Geneva (Switzerland), and then to Lyon (France) to meet experts, researchers and healthcare professionals at the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and at CLARA, an oncology and cancer research cluster with a European dimension looking to accelerate research and innovation in the specific area of childhood, adolescent and rare cancers. BECA used its mandate to focus on ways to strengthen cancer prevention and control in health systems, examine the impact of the coronavirus crisis on the continuity of cancer care delivery, assess the need to address inequalities in cancer prevention and care across the EU and highlight the importance of the availability of quality data and evidence to underpin health policies.

EU action against cancer

As far back as 1985, the EU has been fighting cancer and investing in cancer research, even though responsibility for health policies lies primarily with the Member States (Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). Cancer is the second most common cause of death in the EU, after heart disease. In February 2021, the European Commission adopted the ‘Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan‘ to address cancer-related inequalities and help improve prevention and care. This plan forms part of the Commission’s proposals for a strong European health union.

European Parliament position

On 9 December 2021, BECA adopted its final report on ‘strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer – towards a comprehensive and coordinated strategy’. The report’s main recommendations include taking stronger EU action to address the key risk factors of cancer (including alcohol and tobacco consumption), extending screening schemes and launching an EU platform for national screening centres, facilitating cancer patients’ access to cross-border health care and clinical trials, and developing European multi-centre clinical trials. The report also advocates extending the use of joint procurement procedures to manage cancer medicine shortages, and guaranteeing cancer survivors the ‘right to be forgotten’, so as to prevent discrimination and improve access to financial services. Calling for transparency throughout the pharmaceutical system (fair pricing and affordability) and equal access to innovative cancer treatments, the report notes that a holistic approach and multidisciplinary cancer research are fundamental to securing improvements in cancer prevention, diagnosis, treatment and follow-up care for survivors. Finally, the report advocates increased funding for research into the causes of cancer, action to boost the efficiency of preventive measures, more research into paediatric and rare cancers, and additional funding for the European Reference Networks, and their integration into national health systems, while also building up the Knowledge Centre on Cancer.

Own-initiative report: 2020/2267(INI); Committee responsible: BECA; Rapporteur: Véronique Trillet-Lenoir (Renew Europe, France).

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso.

A major innovation in EU finances to counter the socio-economic impact of the pandemic, the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument enters its full deployment phase in 2022. On this occasion, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) has launched a new series of briefings – ‘Next Generation EU (NGEU) delivery: How are the Member States doing?’.

The EU is currently projected to use €504 billion out of the maximum allocation available (€723.8 billion) under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the centrepiece of NGEU. But how is this significant amount of resources going to be used to meet the key objectives of the green transition, the digital transformation, resilience and inclusion?

The publications in the series look at the national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs) put forward by the Member States to benefit from investment under the RRF. Each briefing sets out the funding each Member State can access, the country-specific challenges that the plan is designed to address, the investment and reform measures put forward by national authorities, and the Commission’s assessment of their plans. Other sections present the milestones and targets to be met and the latest state of play in the implementation, as well as a flavour of the debate individual plans have triggered. Various graphics recapitulate key data in a snapshot. In a nutshell, the briefings aim to provide the essentials of each national plan in an easily accessible format.

The series will cover all Member States and the briefings will be updated regularly, at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. The first briefings in the series are devoted to: Cyprus; Estonia; Germany; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; and Spain.

Don’t hesitate to return to this page to discover new briefings and the latest updates as we add them .

Written by Henrique Morgado Simões (1st edition).

The proposal to revise the market stability reserve (MSR) for the EU emissions trading system (ETS) consists of prolonging its current parameters. Under the current rules, the intake rate of allowances to the MSR and the minimum allowances placed in the reserve have been doubled until the end of 2023, to allow for a quick removal of surplus EU ETS allowances. The proposal is aimed at maintaining the current doubled intake rate (24 %) and minimum number of allowances placed in the reserve (200 million) until 31 December 2030, the end of Phase IV of the EU ETS.

In Parliament, the rapporteur has produced a draft report to be voted in the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). The Council is currently debating the proposal. Its December 2021 progress report notes delegations’ differing views on the proposal.

Versions

• February 2022: Revision of the market stability reserve for the EU emissions trading system: Fit for 55 package (1st edition)

Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Decision (EU) 2015/1814 as regards the amount of allowances to be placed in the market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme until 2030. Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 571
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Cyrus Engerer (S&D, Malta)2021/0202(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Emma Wiesner (Renew, Sweden)
Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Alexandr Vondra (ECR, Czechia)
Silvia Modig (The Left, Finland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Jaan Soone (1st edition).

On 14 July 2021, the European Commission presented a package of proposals to make the EU’s climate, energy, land use, transport and taxation policies fit for reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, compared with 1990 levels – the fit for 55 package. The package includes a proposal to ensure a level playing field for sustainable air transport, also known as the ReFuelEU Aviation initiative.

In the draft regulation, the Commission proposes obligations on fuel suppliers to distribute sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), with an increasing share of SAF (including synthetic aviation fuels, commonly known as e-fuels) over time, in order to increase the uptake of SAF by airlines and thereby reduce emissions from aviation. The proposal also includes obligations on airlines to limit the uptake of jet fuel before departing from EU airports to what is needed for safe operation of flights, with the aim of ensuring a level playing field for airlines and airports, and avoiding additional emissions related to extra weight of aircraft carrying excessive amounts of fuel.

In the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Transport and Tourism as lead committee. The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy are associated under Rule 57.

Versions

• January 2022: ReFuelEU Aviation initiative: Sustainable aviation fuels and the fit for 55 package (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ensuring a level playing field for sustainable air transport Committee responsible:Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2021) 561
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Søren Gade (Renew, Denmark)2021/0205(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (EPP, Portugal)
Erik Bergkvist (S&D, Sweden)
Ciarán Cuffe (Greens/EFA, Ireland)
Julie Lechanteux (ID, France)
Kosma Złotowski (ECR, Poland)
Clare Daly (The Left, Ireland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of the draft report

Written by Liselotte Jensen (1st edition).

As part of the ‘Fit for 55’ package, the Commission is proposing a revision to the EU’s emissions trading system (ETS) as regards carbon dioxide emissions from aviation. The proposal seeks to ensure that the sector contributes to the EU’s climate targets through increased auctioning of allowances, with an end to free allowances from 2027, and by applying the linear reduction of aviation allowances. The proposal will also integrate, into the revised ETS, the International Civil Aviation Organization’s agreed global market-based Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and apply it to international flights departing from or arriving at an airport inside the European Economic Area (EEA). For domestic flights in the Member States or flights within the EEA, the ETS would continue to apply. In the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), where the rapporteur, Sunčana Glavak (EPP, Croatia), has published her draft report.

Versions

• January 2022: Aviation’s contribution to European Union climate action: Revision of EU ETS as regards aviation (1st edition).

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC as regards aviation’s contribution to the Union’s economy-wide emission reduction target and appropriately implementing a global market-based measure Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 552
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Sunčana Glavak (EPP, Croatia)2021/0207 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Milan Brglez (S&D, Slovenia)
Claudia Gamon (Renew, Austria)
Bas Eickhout (Greens/EFA, the Netherlands)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Silvia Modig (The Left, Finland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote on draft report in committee

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Angelos Delivorias, Martin Höflmayer, Karoline Kowald, Marianna Pari and Magdalena Sapała, with Nele Foukalova.

According to preliminary figures for 2021, gross domestic product (GDP) rebounded significantly in all EU Member States (by 5 per cent), and even exceeded last year’s more modest expectations. The European Commission expects euro-area and EU GDP growth to continue in 2022, but becoming more muted. This forecast depends on several variables, however, including whether the pandemic finally subsides, supply bottlenecks and/or material shortages, and inflation, which – against expectations – could remain high or increase further. Other risks identified could stem from the international environment (in particular China and Russia) or climate change (with extreme weather events likely to occur more frequently).

When it comes to employment, the national and EU measures, such as the temporary ‘Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency’ (SURE) instrument, put in place early in the Covid‑19 crisis helped to dampen its effects to a greater degree than expected in 2021. Moreover, unemployment is projected to decline further in the coming months. As was the case last year, this rebound in GDP and the diminishing unemployment figures are common to most major economies, although the rates vary slightly. In the course of 2022, the unemployment rate will depend on the timing and pace of the withdrawal of policy support schemes and on whether the economic recovery continues. Taking these factors into consideration, unemployment is expected to fall in the coming years.

As a result of the various measures put in place, general government deficits grew significantly in 2021. While these deficits are thought to have peaked, the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to remain high, with levels in 14 Member States still higher than the Maastricht Treaty limit of 60 % in 2023. Therefore, it is expected that deficit and debt will be at the centre of discussions in the immediate future, as application of the general escape clause comes to an end, and also in the context of the review of the EU economic governance framework.

Similarly, in 2021, the European Central Bank (ECB) significantly expanded its holdings under the Asset Purchase Programmes and the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme. Following its Governing Council meeting in December 2021, the ECB is expected to ease off on these purchases, but the future pathway is not yet clear, as it depends on elements such as complete recovery from the crisis and the course of inflation. Indeed, following several years of low inflation, the strong resumption of economic activity in the EU has been accompanied by a swift pick-up in prices, with average inflation for the euro area in October 2021 at 4.1 % and strong variations between Member States. Inflation – as estimated in November 2021 – was expected to reach 2.4 % in 2021 in the euro area and 2.6 % in the EU as a whole, with similar trends in other major economies. This has led to a discussion regarding the nature of the current inflationary pressures and whether these transitory price pressures will become more persistent.

The pandemic has had a major impact on the design of the medium-term structure for EU finances, resulting in the adoption of an unprecedented budgetary package that combines the €1 210.9 billion multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the years 2021 to 2027 with the €806.9 billion Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument. This new financial architecture has brought new momentum to the EU budget, assigning it a major role in the Union’s strategy to relaunch the economy. In addition, on the revenue side, the European Commission has proposed a package of new own resources that could generate an average total of up to €17 billion annually (in 2018 prices) for the EU budget over the years 2026 to 2030. This sum would help to repay the funds raised by the EU to finance the grant component of Next Generation EU.

The 2022 budget is designed to support the EU’s recovery through investments, in addition to its other objectives. Although it is limited to €169.5 billion in commitments (1.14 % of EU-27 gross national income – GNI), it represents an important stimulus for public investment in several Member States, all the more so when considered in conjunction with NGEU, which is expected to provide an additional €143.5 billion. The EU budget includes a €1.6 billion reinforcement of flagship EU priorities, as negotiated and secured by the European Parliament. In this second year of both the 2021-2027 MFF and NGEU, the implementation of the new generation of EU actions and programmes is expected to gain momentum, while the programmes from the previous financing period, 2014 to 2020, approach closure. The green transition is an integral part of the recovery. It is estimated that, in 2022, the EU budget and NGEU will jointly contribute €165.3 billion to this objective. Other priorities supported by EU resources include cohesion and agriculture, the digital transformation, security and defence, migration and border management, and the EU’s role in the world.

The focus of this year’s edition of the Economic and Budgetary Outlook is recovery. Given the importance of the subject, two chapters are devoted to it (Chapters 6 and 7). The first deals with economic aspects of the recovery, while the second focuses on the Next Generation EU instrument and the Recovery and Resilience Facility.

The response provided by Member States and the EU to the pandemic, as well as the economic support provided to cushion the effects of lay-offs, preserve incomes and protect businesses, are the subject of this year’s ‘economic focus’. The fiscal and monetary reaction has been unprecedented, in terms of both approaches and volumes. It is described in detail, from the EU’s recovery package (MFF and NGEU) of €2 018 billion, to the ECB’s new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme of €1 850 billion. This leads on to a topical debate on the fiscal rules, on whether (and to what extent) debt-financed government spending should be kept in check, and on some of the proposals available. Furthermore, as governments shift from the ‘rescue’ to the ‘recovery’ phase, some possible ways to harness this phase, to support the transition towards sustainable economies, are explored.

The Covid-19 pandemic has caused significant labour market dislocation, with effects varying between countries, sectors and social groups, exacerbating the pre-existing inequalities and accelerating the transition towards automation and digitalisation. The EU’s immediate ‘rescue’ policy response included job retention schemes, while – as economies have begun to recover – Member States have started to move towards long-term recovery measures. The recovery is expected to be unequal across sectors, and reallocation and other active labour market policies will play an important role. The Commission’s recommendation on ‘effective, active support to employment’ (EASE) offers a strategy for a gradual transition towards a job-rich recovery, supporting job creation and job-to-job transition, for instance to the green and digital sectors.

Lastly, the EU’s recovery response steers the transition towards climate neutrality, in line with the European Green Deal. To this end, an unprecedented volume of resources has been earmarked: 30 % of the EU’s long-term budget and NGEU taken together has been allocated to addressing climate change and biodiversity protection. Moreover, all investments must uphold the ‘do no significant harm’ principle. The EU’s green recovery areas are labelled ‘Power up’ (clean technologies and renewables), ‘Renovate’ (improvement of energy efficiency of public and private buildings) and ‘Recharge and refuel’ (sustainable, accessible and smart transport, charging and refuelling stations, and extension of public transport).

Overall, Next Generation EU – the recovery instrument financed through resources borrowed on the markets by the European Commission on behalf of the Union – represents a major innovation in EU finances. Complementing ECB action and national stimulus packages, with a coordinated common fiscal response, NGEU significantly reinforces the resources channelled through EU budgetary instruments up until 2026. Its main expenditure tool, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), is implemented through national plans that comprise a coherent package of reforms and investments aimed at making the EU economy more sustainable, innovative and inclusive. To this end, the RRF focuses its action on six policy areas of European relevance identified as vital for strengthening the EU’s resilience, including the green transition (at least 37 % of each national plan) and the digital transformation (at least 20 %). The grant component of NGEU (up to €338 billion) is projected to be used entirely, whereas Member States have so far requested less than half of the available loan component (€166 billion out of €385.8 billion). While the RRF is already contributing to the EU recovery, 2022 is the first year of its full deployment, putting the focus on the importance of RRF implementation and monitoring, as underlined by the European Parliament. Lessons learnt from the RRF are likely to feed into the ongoing debate on the review of the EU’s economic governance framework.

Read the complete study on ‘Economic and Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Hendrik Mildebrath.

The datafication of everyday life and data scandals have made the protection of personal information an increasingly important social, legal and political matter for the EU. In recent years, awareness of data rights and expectations for EU action in this area have both grown considerably.

The right to privacy and the right to protection of personal data are both enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and in the EU Treaties. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 gave the Charter the same legal value as the Treaties and abolished the pillar structure, providing a stronger basis for a more effective and comprehensive EU data protection regime.

In 2012, the European Commission launched an ambitious reform to modernise the EU data protection framework. In 2016, the co-legislators adopted the EU’s most prominent data protection legislation – the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) – and the Law Enforcement Directive. The framework overhaul also included adopting an updated Regulation on Data Protection in the EU institutions and reforming the e-Privacy Directive, which is currently the subject of negotiation between the co-legislators.

The European Parliament has played a key role in these reforms, both as co-legislator and author of own-initiative reports and resolutions seeking to guarantee a high level of data protection for EU citizens. The European Court of Justice plays a crucial role in developing the EU data protection framework through case law.

In the coming years, challenges in the area of data protection will include balancing compliance and data needs of emerging technologies, equipping data protection authorities with sufficient resources to fulfil their tasks, mitigating compliance burdens for small and medium-sized enterprises, taming digital surveillance and further clarifying requirements of valid consent.

This is an updated edition of a briefing written by Sofija Voronova in May 2020.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Conference on the Future of Europe‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Niombo Lomba, Lenka Jančová and Meenakshi Fernandes.

Europe is in the midst of a digital revolution that is transforming our approach to work and communication and building significant potential to improve living standards and economic output. With a potential to drastically change the economy and society, digital transformation can bring both promising developments and challenges. Digital transformation touches on all aspects of our lives, from public health, societal and democracy issues, and the environment, to the economy. The internet of things (IoT), cloud computing, artificial intelligence, advanced robotics and block-chain technologies are examples of technologies driving the revolution. Their influence on society is driven by the increasing affordability and computer power of consumer devices.

The European Union (EU) has implemented a set of digital principles and long-term digital targets with the European Commission communication on the digital decade. Nevertheless, there is a wide variation in advances in digital transformation both within the EU and between Member States. To this end, the EU and Member States are developing and adopting policies targeted at boosting digital transformation. This paper draws from the annexed study of the cost of non-Europe in digital transformation prepared by Ecorys, focusing on the competences of Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). 

Figure 1 – Key gaps and barriers affecting aspects related to digital transformation

This Cost of Non-Europe study analyses the status quo of digital transformation in the EU in order to identify key gaps and barriers (see Figure 1) that negatively impact or hamper innovation; the EU’s digital leadership; its ability to achieve an effective twin transition entailing a green sustainable transformation; as well as social and fundamental rights aspects, such as gender equality and social inclusion. These gaps and barriers could be driven to some extent by the fragmentation of the internal market. Their impact is estimated in both economic and non-economic terms.

While not explicitly assessed, environmental pressures are also considered in this paper. These pressures are relevant in light of the EU ambition to achieve the digital as well as the green transition. 

If no additional EU-level action is taken to support the digital transformation, the cost is estimated at €315 billion in 2021, and would be expected to grow over time to reach €1.3 trillion by 2033. This cost stems from the identified gaps and barriers. The estimate is based on an assumed baseline scenario from mid-2020, reflecting the expected economic developments in the absence of further EU action. The manufacturing, construction and transportation sectors would see the greatest gains (14 %, 6 % and 4 % respectively). It should be noted that not all aspects of the cost of non-Europe (namely geopolitical and social impacts and impacts on fundamental rights), could be assessed in quantitative terms. Thus, the estimated figures could be understood as representing the lower bounds of the true cost of non-Europe in the area of the digital transformation.

Figure 2 – Policy options explored in the study

The research and analysis conducted throughout this study led to the development of the three main policy options (see Figure 2). The development of these policy options takes account of the initiatives announced up to May 2021. The selected policy options therefore go beyond those announced initiatives and point to potential initiatives that could further eliminate the existing gaps and further accelerate the ongoing digital transformation.

The policy options put forward and explored are unique and differ from each other in their impacts and benefits. Each policy option could be implemented independently of the others. However, they are complementary and one policy option could be strengthened by adding an individual element(s) from another policy option(s). As shown in Table 1, the assessments of policy options 1 and 3 are similar although policy option 1 scores lower in terms of the gaps and barriers addressed. The assessment for policy option 2 was weaker on some criteria in particular economic impacts and feasibility. Policy option 3 would generate the greatest economic benefits in terms of gross domestic profit (GDP) and employment. Moreover, it would address all the identified gaps and barriers for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – a group that faces greater challenges in the digital transformation. When assessing the policy options in a quantitative manner, this paper makes assumptions as to what extent the proposed policy options could address the selected gaps and barriers. The estimated figures can be understood as representing the lower bounds of the potential benefits.

Table 1 – Summary of policy options assessments

Policy Option 1 – Enhance cybersecurity and trustPolicy Option 2 – Strengthen R&DPolicy Option 3 – Digital policy for SMEsExtent to which gaps and barriers addressed++++++Economic impacts+++++++Other impacts+++
(on innovation, geopolitics, competitiveness, acceptance of technology)++
(on innovation, competitiveness, changing mind-sets, spill-over innovation to other technologies)+++
(on innovation, geopolitics, competitiveness, benefits across the value chain, digital skills)Feasibility of implementing a policy option+++++++Proportionality and subsidiarity+++++++++Notes: feasibility, proportionality and subsidiarity are ranked from low (+), medium (++), to high (+++).
Source: Annex to this study – Ecorys.

Read the complete study on ‘Digital transformation – Cost of Non-Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rafał Mańko.

The annual rule of law reports, launched by the Commission in September 2020, are a new addition to the European institutions’ rule of law toolbox. The exercise can be described as a monitoring tool, as it collects data on the state of the rule of law in each of the 27 EU Member States but without drawing legal conclusions or giving specific recommendations. The second rule of law report was published in July 2021 and the third is expected in 2022, with the annual exercise becoming a permanent mechanism.

The methodology adopted by the Commission provides for reporting on four subject areas in all 27 Member States: (i) justice systems; (ii) the anti-corruption framework; (iii) media pluralism; and (iv) other institutional issues related to checks and balances. This methodology underlines the close involvement of Member States in the preparation of the annual reports and their follow-up.

The Member States are involved throughout the process by way of: (i) a network of contact persons on the rule of law that meets regularly with the Commission; (ii) contact persons providing written contributions to the report; (iii) dialogue between the Commission and Member States through the network of contact persons, the group of contact persons on national justice systems, the national contact points on corruption, and bilaterally at political and technical level; (iv) country visits; and (v) the opportunity for each Member State to comment on the part of the report concerning them.

The reports have met with some criticism from academics, who draw attention to the purely descriptive, rather than prescriptive nature of the reports and the lack of concrete follow-up.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Commission’s annual rule of law reports: A new monitoring tool‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Meenakshi Fernandes and Aleksandra Heflich.

Why this study?

Recent years have witnessed a number of disruptive events and developments that have generated significant and sometimes transformational impacts on society. Examples include the global financial crisis in 2008, the Brexit referendum results in 2016 and the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020. Current policy design and assessment tools seem to be ill-equipped to deal with the risks such events may entail. Moreover, Better Regulation tools such as ex-ante impact assessment and stakeholder consultation have often been sidelined due to the urgency to act.

Policy-makers are increasingly seeking to ‘future proof’ policies. In October 2021, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) called on governments to enable the development of agile and future-proof regulation. In November 2021, the European Commission issued a revised Better Regulation Guidelines and Toolbox that promotes the integration of strategic foresight into EU policy-making. Stress-testing is a strategic foresight method that appears particularly suitable for reinforcing the resilience and robustness of policies and legislation in view of unexpected shocks that could plausibly occur in the future. In a nutshell, stress-testing involves a critical assessment of a piece of legislation’s preparedness for the advent of disruptive events and developments. For example, would EU legislation concerning legal migration continue to function as intended if the internet failed? What elements in the legislation would support its resilience in the face of such an event? What additional elements could promote the legislation’s resilience to the event?

This study presents a practical methodology to stress-test EU legislation. This methodology can be applied to different policy areas and for different types of EU legislation (e.g. directives, regulations and recommendations). It draws on the lessons learnt and recommendations made following independent research led by Dr Tine Andersen of the Danish Technological Institute (see Annex – DTI Study). The research encompassed a comprehensive literature review, in-depth research in four countries with advanced foresight practices (Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United Kingdom), and a pilot-test for three policy areas (robotics and artificial intelligence (AI), information and consultation of workers, and competition policy – State aid).

Key findings

Stress-testing policies against a small number of disruptive events is achievable in a limited timeframe and can generate added value for the EU law-making process. Stress-testing can help to identify weak points or gaps for closer scrutiny in EU legislation, which could be addressed via proposed amendments or new legislation. 

In combination with strategic foresight, stress-testing can be applied most notably in the agenda-setting phase, but also in other phases of thelegislative cycle. It requires dedicated effort to carry out exercises and to maintain ties and communication with relevant institutions and networks. Stress-testing exercises should engage policy-makers and stakeholders at key points in the process. Following these guidelines could promote the relevance of the stress-testing exercise and its outcomes for EU law-making.

This study presents a step-by-step approach to carrying out stress-testing on EU policies. This approach draws on a range of expertise, tools and methods, including legal analysis, strategic foresight, regulatory policy analysis, narrative storytelling, online stakeholder engagement and SWOT (strength/weakness/opportunity/threat) analysis.

Recommendations

The European Parliament should consider the use of stress-testing to support its law-making and scrutiny activities and bolster its role as co-legislator. The organisational arrangements to facilitate the uptake of stress-testing could be inspired by examples from national parliaments. This study highlights the example of Finland, where the national Parliament includes a Committee for the Future.

Stress-testing in the European Parliament should ensure a participatory and transparent approach with other EU institutions and stakeholders. The stress-testing methodology, presented and discussed in this study, will be extended to other policy areas and legislation at different stages of its policy life-cycle. For this reason and to assist the European Parliament in using the methodology, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), will continue the stress-testing project in the second half of the ninth parliamentary term.

Read the complete study on ‘How to stress-test EU policies: Building a more resilient Europe for tomorrow‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

How to stress-test EU legislation

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass and Philippe Perchoc, with Clare Ferguson.

Each year, Parliament marks the International Day of Commemoration in memory of the victims of the Holocaust, the state-sponsored, systematic persecution and mass murder of Jews, whom the Nazi regime and its collaborators sought to annihilate along with other persecuted groups, such as Roma and Sinti. The day falls on the anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz Nazi concentration camp in 1945, now 77 years ago. At Thursday’s special plenary meeting in Brussels, Members will hear an address by Margot Friedländer, a Holocaust survivor.

As an ethnic cleansing process designed to erase any trace of Jewish life from European culture, the Holocaust – referred to in Yiddish as Khurbn (destruction) – brought the Yiddish language almost to extinction in the 20th century. However, many Jewish communities still use Yiddish, and the language and culture are enjoying a revival. The EU has adopted a cultural heritage approach to Yiddish language and culture, with various projects devoted to Jewish culture supported by Creative Europe funding. Nevertheless, Europe is not playing a leading role in the process of reviving and preserving the culture of the language, and it remains to be seen whether Yiddish will end up with the same fate as Latin.

See also our Topical Digest on International Holocaust Remembrance Day

The expropriation, state-sponsored discrimination and persecution of the Jews by the Nazi regime began in 1933, followed by pogroms and their mass incarceration in concentration camps, allowing the Nazis to seize Jewish property for the regime’s museums, but also enabling some prominent Nazis to develop their own art collections. Trade in looted art flourished, in both Europe and the United States, as a result of the ensuing chaos. While works of art found in Western-occupied zones were returned to the countries from which they had been seized, with the expectation that they would be restored to their rightful owners, this did not always happen. International efforts continue to this day to pursue the restitution of cultural property looted by Nazis and their collaborators, not only as an act of justice, but also in recognition of the Jewish contribution to flourishing cultural and artistic life in Europe.

Since 1995, the European Parliament has adopted resolutions drawing attention to the obligation to remember the events of the Holocaust, not only through commemorations but also through education. In November 2018, the EU became a permanent international partner of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).

Written by Jana Titievskaia with Alina Dobreva (1st edition).

The EU has implemented the world’s largest carbon-pricing system, the emissions trading system (ETS). While pricing emissions can encourage industrial decarbonisation, it also risks carbon leakage, whereby EU companies move their production abroad. To date, the EU has mitigated carbon leakage through free allocations to certain industries, but with rising climate ambition and higher carbon prices, the Commission seeks to phase out free allocations. In parallel, a novel carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) would be introduced, requiring EU importers, as of 2026, to purchase certificates equivalent to the weekly EU carbon price. During the transition period, starting in 2023, importers would be required to report emissions, with a system of monitoring, reporting and verification ensuring accurate reporting of carbon footprints. The CBAM would initially apply to imports in five emissions-intensive sectors deemed at greater risk of carbon leakage: cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, and electricity. The CBAM charge would cover imports of these goods from all third countries, except those participating in the ETS or a linked mechanism.

The CBAM aims to contribute to the EU’s climate neutrality objectives, and encourage partner countries to decarbonise their production processes by levelling the playing field in carbon pricing between the EU and third-country producers; less developed countries could be supported in their climate transitions. Following publication of the Commission proposal on the CBAM in July 2020, Parliament referred the file to the Environment Committee.

Versions

• January 2022: EU carbon border adjustment mechanism: Implications for climate and competitiveness (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 564
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Mohammed Chahim (S&D, Netherlands)2021/0214(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Adam Jarubas (EPP, Poland)
Nicolae Ştefănuță (Renew, Romania)
Yannick Jadot (Greens/EFA, France)
Catherine Griset (ID, France)
Hermann Tertsch (ECR, Spain)
Malin Björk (The Left, Sweden)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote on draft report in committee

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Education is more than a human right: it is a collective responsibility and an investment in the future.

The United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 24 January as International Day of Education, in celebration of its fundamental role as a building block for peace and development. Worryingly, data from UNESCO show that currently 258 million young people still do not attend school; 617 million children and adolescents cannot read and do basic math; less than 40 % of girls in sub-Saharan Africa complete lower secondary school and some 4 million children and youth refugees are out of school.

This year we mark the fourth International Day of Education as humankind has reached a watershed: inequalities are growing, our planet is scarred and polarisation is increasing. The still-raging Covid‑19 pandemic has put an additional strain on society and exacerbated a pre-existing education crisis. We are thus faced with a generational choice: keep on doing ‘business as usual’ or radically change course. Curiously, the ongoing pandemic has become an eye-opener, as existing educational gaps have become increasingly evident. Socio-economic inequalities, greater difficulties of access for those with special educational needs, issues in school communication and between teachers and educational authorities have been amplified by the lack of digital tools and skills. However, the sudden leap has also given rise to outreach initiatives and a growing awareness of resources whose potential was still under-exploited.

In November 2021, UNESCO released a new global report on the future of education entitled Reimagining our futures together: A new social contract for education. Prepared by an international commission with the aim of activating a global debate, the report gathered contributions from over a million people, calling for ‘a major transformation in education to repair past injustices and enhance our capacity to act together for a more sustainable and just future’. The report answers three fundamental questions: What should we continue doing? What should we abandon? What needs to be creatively reimagined?

Indeed, the Covid‑19 pandemic was a painful reminder of our fragilities, interdependencies and the need to redefine our relationships with each other. We are already familiar with the solutions, but need to consider them again and, most importantly, start implementing them:

• we need to develop scientific and digital literacies to counter the spread of misinformation plaguing and dividing our societies;
• redefine our relationship with our home – the one and only planet Earth – empowering students with the right sets of skills to care for it through education for sustainable development;
• ensure innovative pedagogies supporting solidarity and cooperation and cherishing diversity, pluralism and creativity;
• place teachers at the heart of education renewal; their crucial role has been highlighted (again) by the pandemic and they deserve recognition and professional support;
• redefine our relationship with technology to make sure digital tools benefit all and are at the service of all. The digital transformation would be a vain effort if it is not centred around inclusion.

Crucially, placing education at the very core of transformation and making it meaningful for everyone, would help to succeed with these aims. However, this will require a societal shift. Such a challenging enterprise will need broad support encompassing governments, civil society, educators, students and youth to mobilise all available resources and reimagine a common future, built on respect, courage and creativity.

With all this in mind, the new generation of Erasmus + is on a good track. It places a strong focus on social inclusion, the green and digital transitions, as well as on promoting young people’s participation in democratic life. In line with the European Green Deal, the programme will lead by example, by encouraging participants to use lower-carbon transport as an alternative to flying. Erasmus funding will also be channelled into building knowledge and understanding of sustainability and climate action. (Just a few days ago, on 14 January, the European Commission published a proposal for a recommendation on learning about environmental sustainability.) Similarly, the programme strives to be more inclusive for people with fewer opportunities and more accessible for small organisations. What is more, 70 % of its €28 billion budget will support mobility opportunities for all, in a lifelong learning perspective. About 10 million individuals, including students, teachers and trainers, are expected to participate in mobility activities abroad during the course of the programme. Thus, as teachers, students and parents continue experimenting with new forms of education, policy-makers will continue analysing the results of such experiments to make education more flexible, inclusive and resilient in the future.

Further resources

Breaking cycles of disadvantage through education: An EU perspective
In-depth analysis by Denise Chircop, EPRS, December 2021
The analysis looks at statistics on perpetuated disadvantage in education and training, and studies a number of contributing factors by looking at evidence from case studies and other research that investigates the development of educational systems. It also analyses the extent to which reforms have been possible and the complex reasons behind them.

Lifelong Learning in the EU
Animated infographic by Denise Chircop, EPRS, September 2021
Learning is not limited to a single, specific phase in life, that of the years at school, but also happens in different contexts, over the course of a lifetime. With its strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training, ET2020, the European Union supported the concept of lifelong learning by coordinating cooperation between Member States on training and formal, non-formal, and informal education.

Participation in early education and care
Infographic by Denise Chircop and Eulalia Claros Gimeno, EPRS, September 2021
Following research findings on the positive impact of early childhood education, EU education ministers set a participation target for 2030 of 96 % of all children aged three and over. This will depend on having enough places that are accessible and affordable. At the same time, the quality of the provision is just as important to reap the potential benefits. The infographic looks at the current participation of young children in early childhood education and what Member States are doing to improve upon it.

The future of tertiary education in Europe
In-depth analysis by Denise Chircop, EPRS, September 2020
The analysis focuses on six challenges facing tertiary education in the EU: the need to maintain relevance to current and future aspirations; the impact of digital and disruptive technologies; the way it collaborates with business; global and intra-EU collaboration; quality assurance; and financing and barriers to inclusion. It also looks at trends in two of the largest higher education systems outside the European Higher Education Area, those in the United States and China.

Further reading

Erasmus 2021-2027: The Union programme for education, training, youth and sport
‘EU Legislation in Progress’ briefing by Denise Chircop, EPRS, July 2021

Inclusion measures within the Erasmus+ programme 2014-2020
Study by Ex-Post Evaluation Unit, EPRS, September 2021

The European Education Area and the 2030 strategic framework for education and training
Briefing by Denise Chircop, EPRS, May 2021

Education in isolation in the pandemic, following the path of Isaac Newton
Briefing by Denise Chircop, EPRS, June 2020

Implementation of citizenship education actions in the EU
Study by Ex-Post Evaluation Unit, EPRS, August 2021

Rethinking education in the digital age
Study by Scientific Foresight Unit, EPRS, March 2020

Education and the New European Bauhaus
‘At a glance’ note by Denise Chircop, EPRS, March 2021

Early leavers from education and training
Infographic by Denise Chircop and Eulalia Claros Gimeno, EPRS, March 2021

Inclusion of migrants in formal education
Infographic by Denise Chircop and Eulalia Claros Gimeno, EPRS, November 2019

In 2021, people from across the European Union (EU) and elsewhere in the world turned to the European Parliament and its late President, David Maria Sassoli, to request information, call for action to be taken, express their opinions or suggest ideas on a wide range of topics.The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) replied in the 24 EU official languages.

In 2021, Ask EP received around 8 600 individual messages and 4 300 campaign enquiries. Citizens wrote on various topics, including the coronavirus pandemic, fundamental rights, migration and asylum, Afghanistan, Belarus, and many others. Ask EP also received many questions related to the European Parliament and its Members, its traineeship offers and how to visit Parliament.

Most frequent topics in individual enquiries in 2021

The most frequently addressed topic in 2021 was matters concerning the European Parliament itself. The Parliament received over 1 850 enquiries, in which citizens expressed interest in Members of European Parliament and their activities, enquired about traineeship and job opportunities and the possibilities to visit Parliament during the pandemic. They also requested information on topics such as parliamentary questions, committee meetings and the right to petition.

The second most frequent topic on which citizens contacted Ask EP last year related to civil liberties, justice and home affairs matters, with around 1 450 enquiries. People voiced their concerns, for instance, about fundamental rights, the rule of law in Poland, Brexit, the situation of persons with disabilities, as well as migration and asylum.

Citizens were concerned about public health, in particular health care and the coronavirus pandemic, with around 950 enquiries received in 2021. Many citizens wrote questions and comments about the EU Covid‑19 certificate, travel restrictions during the pandemic and the management of the crisis by individual EU countries. In particular, many enquiries related to Covid‑19 vaccines and the EU countries’ national Covid‑19 vaccination strategies. More information about the EU response to Covid‑19 is available on the European Parliament’s website.

Issues concerning foreign affairs were another key focus, with over 850 enquiries. Many of the comments and questions focused on Afghanistan, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the situation at the Polish-Belarusian border. Regarding the situation in Afghanistan, the European Parliament called for more humanitarian aid and a coordinated response to protect those most vulnerable, in a resolution adopted in September 2021. Parliament also adopted several resolutions about Russia, in particular concerning the case of human rights organisation Memorial, EU-Russia political relations, the situation of Russian activist Alexei Navalny and the Russian military build-up on Ukraine’s border. In December 2021, the European Parliament awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Alexei Navalny.

Finally, the European Parliament received many enquiries about citizens’ personal situations with requests for assistance to help them solve problems (financial support, legal aid, cross-border administrative issues, cases of discrimination, etc.). Although neither the European Parliament nor its President are able to resolve many of these types of requests directly, the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit tried to provide citizens with a contact point and sources of information whenever possible.

Campaign messages sent to the European Parliament in 2021

As a response to political, humanitarian and economic events, citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament, expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. These messages may sometimes be identical, as part of wider public campaigns.

Since March 2021, the President of the European Parliament received 750 messages on the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. Citizens called on the EU not to ratify the agreement, citing human rights abuse in China. The European Parliament needs to vote on the agreement between the European Commission and China for it to come into force. However, it is currently still on hold. The answer given by the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit mentioned Parliament’s scrutiny of the agreement and recalled Parliament’s resolution on the crackdown on the democratic opposition in Hong Kong (January 2021), as well as its resolution on forced labour and the situation of the Uyghurs (December 2020).

In the months of May-June 2021, the President received almost 1 730 messages regarding a non-binding own-initiative report adopted by the European Parliament committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality on sexual and reproductive health and rights in the European Union. Citizens expressed concerns about the report, which they saw as threatening the powers of EU countries to regulate access to abortions. The answer given by the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit notably reminded citizens that the President of the European Parliament is not permitted to give voting instructions to Members who, under Article 2 of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament, exercise their mandate freely and independently.

Over the summer, the European Parliament received around 230 messages calling on the President of the European Parliament to intervene in favour of the release of Native American activist Leonard Peltier. On 23 August 2021, President Sassoli announced that he would address a letter to the United States authorities asking for clemency for Leonard Peltier. The full answer given by the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit is available on the EPRS blog.

Are you curious about our answers to other campaign messages in 2021? You can find all replies to campaigns totalling over 50 enquiries, as well as posts on topical themes on the EPRS blog.

If you wish, you can put your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP), using our contact form, the Citizens’ app, or by post. We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

We are looking forward to your enquiries in 2022! Your Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

A solemn ceremony was held in Strasbourg to honour the Parliament’s late President David Maria Sassoli, who died the previous week. Following this sad occasion, the main point on the agenda for the January 2022 plenary session was the already scheduled mid-term election of Parliament’s President, 14 Vice-Presidents and 5 Quaestors. Parliament also debated the programme of activities of the French Council Presidency, with Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic.

Election of Parliament’s President

Parliament holds elections for its President, Vice-Presidents and Quaestors at the start and again at the mid-point of each term. Roberta Metsola (EPP, Malta) was elected President of the European Parliament with 458 votes in favour, and thus comfortably securing the absolute majority of votes cast (50 % +1), in the first round of voting. President Metsola will hold office for the second half of the current term, up to the next European elections. Elections to the offices of Vice-Presidents and Quaestors were also conducted. Voting for all the posts was by secret ballot, with three rounds needed to complete the election of the Vice-Presidents who make up Parliament’s Bureau, and two rounds for the five Quaestors.

French Presidency of the Council

France took over the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU on 1 January 2022, and Parliament hosted President Emmanuel Macron for the customary presentation to Parliament of the priorities of the Presidency. Although France has considerable experience of the role, including during the 2008 financial crisis, this Presidency will have to tackle the continuing Covid‑19 pandemic, the energy crisis and the EU’s relations to the east, as well as the ongoing aftermath of Brexit, all whilst holding a national election. Priority is also expected to be given to the conclusions of, and preparing the follow-up to, the Conference on the Future of Europe, seeking to take stock of citizens’ recommendations in defining the future of the Union.

Digital services act

Parliament debated and approved its position on the proposed digital services act by 530 votes to 78, with 80 abstentions The Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) report on the proposal, which seeks to define digital service provider accountability for ensuring a transparent and safe online environment, endorses the European Commission’s proposal to update the EU regulatory framework. The committee suggests amendments to include more stringent content moderation, and stronger transparency and consent requirements for targeted advertising, especially better protection of children. The committee wishes to impose additional obligations on very large online platforms and online marketplaces, but also recognises the need to allow waivers for smaller companies. Further amendments introduced in plenary aim at protecting freedom of expression and freedom and pluralism of the media, as well as introducing a new provision on the right to use and pay for digital services anonymously. The text adopted in plenary constitutes Parliament’s mandate for interinstitutional negotiations.

European Medicines Agency

Members approved a provisional agreement reached with the Council on a proposal for a reinforced role for the European Medicines Agency. The new legislation will make it easier for the Agency to act with greater agility and assuredness in emergencies. The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) report stressed the need for ‘more Europe’ in health, including creating an interoperable digital platform to monitor and report on medicine shortages; addressing the shortcomings that experience with clinical trials revealed during Covid‑19; and calling for more transparency in the steering groups’ work.

Animal transport

Parliament has long echoed citizens’ concerns about animal welfare in calling for action to ensure that the high standards demanded by EU law are respected in all EU countries. In 2020, Parliament set up a Committee of Inquiry on the Protection of Animals during Transport (ANIT) to investigate European Commission enforcement and Member State implementation of EU rules. Members debated the ANIT committee’s concluding report and voted on recommendations to the Council and Commission. The ANIT report on alleged contraventions of EU law on animal transport indicated a number of measures that could be introduced to ensure transport is less stressful for animals, including acknowledging new scientific evidence. The report noted that, while some Member States actively protect animals during transport, others could be stricter in their interpretation and enforcement of EU law, and urged the Commission to present an action plan. The rules on transporting vulnerable animals are a particular concern.

Nomination of members of the Court of Auditors

Even though the opinion adopted by the European Parliament on nominations to the Court of Auditors is not legally binding, Parliament holds a public hearing for each candidate, which encourages Member States to propose nominees who meet the competence and impartiality requirements of membership of the Court. Members endorsed the position of Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) following recent hearings, giving a favourable opinion on two candidates whose mandates are to be renewed (Czech nominee Jan Gregor and Latvian nominee Mihails Kozlovs), as well as a new Slovenian nominee, Kristijan Petrovič. However, Members followed the committee’s position and confirmed the unfavourable opinion on the renewal of the mandate of the Polish nominee, Marek Opioła, maintaining Parliament’s negative opinion voted when the candidate was originally nominated to the position he now holds.

Situation in Kazakhstan

Members debated the situation in Kazakhstan, where protests since the beginning of the year, initially triggered by a rise in fuel prices, have led to chaos. The unrest has roots in citizens’ frustration at perceived political inertia in the face of inequalities. Parliament issued a resolution on the situation, demanding a proper international investigation into the crimes committed against the people of Kazakhstan.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without a vote, two mandates for negotiations from the Agriculture (AGRI) Committee on the proposal for a recommendation for a decision on additional requirements for certain types of intervention specified by Member States in their common agricultural policy (CAP) strategic plans for 2023‑2027, and on the proposal for a decision on rules on paying agencies and other bodies, financial management, clearance of accounts, securities and the use of the euro.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – December 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.