European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass and Philippe Perchoc, with Clare Ferguson.

Each year, Parliament marks the International Day of Commemoration in memory of the victims of the Holocaust, the state-sponsored, systematic persecution and mass murder of Jews, whom the Nazi regime and its collaborators sought to annihilate along with other persecuted groups, such as Roma and Sinti. The day falls on the anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz Nazi concentration camp in 1945, now 77 years ago. At Thursday’s special plenary meeting in Brussels, Members will hear an address by Margot Friedländer, a Holocaust survivor.

As an ethnic cleansing process designed to erase any trace of Jewish life from European culture, the Holocaust – referred to in Yiddish as Khurbn (destruction) – brought the Yiddish language almost to extinction in the 20th century. However, many Jewish communities still use Yiddish, and the language and culture are enjoying a revival. The EU has adopted a cultural heritage approach to Yiddish language and culture, with various projects devoted to Jewish culture supported by Creative Europe funding. Nevertheless, Europe is not playing a leading role in the process of reviving and preserving the culture of the language, and it remains to be seen whether Yiddish will end up with the same fate as Latin.

See also our Topical Digest on International Holocaust Remembrance Day

The expropriation, state-sponsored discrimination and persecution of the Jews by the Nazi regime began in 1933, followed by pogroms and their mass incarceration in concentration camps, allowing the Nazis to seize Jewish property for the regime’s museums, but also enabling some prominent Nazis to develop their own art collections. Trade in looted art flourished, in both Europe and the United States, as a result of the ensuing chaos. While works of art found in Western-occupied zones were returned to the countries from which they had been seized, with the expectation that they would be restored to their rightful owners, this did not always happen. International efforts continue to this day to pursue the restitution of cultural property looted by Nazis and their collaborators, not only as an act of justice, but also in recognition of the Jewish contribution to flourishing cultural and artistic life in Europe.

Since 1995, the European Parliament has adopted resolutions drawing attention to the obligation to remember the events of the Holocaust, not only through commemorations but also through education. In November 2018, the EU became a permanent international partner of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).

Written by Jana Titievskaia with Alina Dobreva (1st edition).

The EU has implemented the world’s largest carbon-pricing system, the emissions trading system (ETS). While pricing emissions can encourage industrial decarbonisation, it also risks carbon leakage, whereby EU companies move their production abroad. To date, the EU has mitigated carbon leakage through free allocations to certain industries, but with rising climate ambition and higher carbon prices, the Commission seeks to phase out free allocations. In parallel, a novel carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) would be introduced, requiring EU importers, as of 2026, to purchase certificates equivalent to the weekly EU carbon price. During the transition period, starting in 2023, importers would be required to report emissions, with a system of monitoring, reporting and verification ensuring accurate reporting of carbon footprints. The CBAM would initially apply to imports in five emissions-intensive sectors deemed at greater risk of carbon leakage: cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, and electricity. The CBAM charge would cover imports of these goods from all third countries, except those participating in the ETS or a linked mechanism.

The CBAM aims to contribute to the EU’s climate neutrality objectives, and encourage partner countries to decarbonise their production processes by levelling the playing field in carbon pricing between the EU and third-country producers; less developed countries could be supported in their climate transitions. Following publication of the Commission proposal on the CBAM in July 2020, Parliament referred the file to the Environment Committee.

Versions

• January 2022: EU carbon border adjustment mechanism: Implications for climate and competitiveness (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 564
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Mohammed Chahim (S&D, Netherlands)2021/0214(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Adam Jarubas (EPP, Poland)
Nicolae Ştefănuță (Renew, Romania)
Yannick Jadot (Greens/EFA, France)
Catherine Griset (ID, France)
Hermann Tertsch (ECR, Spain)
Malin Björk (The Left, Sweden)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote on draft report in committee

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Education is more than a human right: it is a collective responsibility and an investment in the future.

The United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 24 January as International Day of Education, in celebration of its fundamental role as a building block for peace and development. Worryingly, data from UNESCO show that currently 258 million young people still do not attend school; 617 million children and adolescents cannot read and do basic math; less than 40 % of girls in sub-Saharan Africa complete lower secondary school and some 4 million children and youth refugees are out of school.

This year we mark the fourth International Day of Education as humankind has reached a watershed: inequalities are growing, our planet is scarred and polarisation is increasing. The still-raging Covid‑19 pandemic has put an additional strain on society and exacerbated a pre-existing education crisis. We are thus faced with a generational choice: keep on doing ‘business as usual’ or radically change course. Curiously, the ongoing pandemic has become an eye-opener, as existing educational gaps have become increasingly evident. Socio-economic inequalities, greater difficulties of access for those with special educational needs, issues in school communication and between teachers and educational authorities have been amplified by the lack of digital tools and skills. However, the sudden leap has also given rise to outreach initiatives and a growing awareness of resources whose potential was still under-exploited.

In November 2021, UNESCO released a new global report on the future of education entitled Reimagining our futures together: A new social contract for education. Prepared by an international commission with the aim of activating a global debate, the report gathered contributions from over a million people, calling for ‘a major transformation in education to repair past injustices and enhance our capacity to act together for a more sustainable and just future’. The report answers three fundamental questions: What should we continue doing? What should we abandon? What needs to be creatively reimagined?

Indeed, the Covid‑19 pandemic was a painful reminder of our fragilities, interdependencies and the need to redefine our relationships with each other. We are already familiar with the solutions, but need to consider them again and, most importantly, start implementing them:

• we need to develop scientific and digital literacies to counter the spread of misinformation plaguing and dividing our societies;
• redefine our relationship with our home – the one and only planet Earth – empowering students with the right sets of skills to care for it through education for sustainable development;
• ensure innovative pedagogies supporting solidarity and cooperation and cherishing diversity, pluralism and creativity;
• place teachers at the heart of education renewal; their crucial role has been highlighted (again) by the pandemic and they deserve recognition and professional support;
• redefine our relationship with technology to make sure digital tools benefit all and are at the service of all. The digital transformation would be a vain effort if it is not centred around inclusion.

Crucially, placing education at the very core of transformation and making it meaningful for everyone, would help to succeed with these aims. However, this will require a societal shift. Such a challenging enterprise will need broad support encompassing governments, civil society, educators, students and youth to mobilise all available resources and reimagine a common future, built on respect, courage and creativity.

With all this in mind, the new generation of Erasmus + is on a good track. It places a strong focus on social inclusion, the green and digital transitions, as well as on promoting young people’s participation in democratic life. In line with the European Green Deal, the programme will lead by example, by encouraging participants to use lower-carbon transport as an alternative to flying. Erasmus funding will also be channelled into building knowledge and understanding of sustainability and climate action. (Just a few days ago, on 14 January, the European Commission published a proposal for a recommendation on learning about environmental sustainability.) Similarly, the programme strives to be more inclusive for people with fewer opportunities and more accessible for small organisations. What is more, 70 % of its €28 billion budget will support mobility opportunities for all, in a lifelong learning perspective. About 10 million individuals, including students, teachers and trainers, are expected to participate in mobility activities abroad during the course of the programme. Thus, as teachers, students and parents continue experimenting with new forms of education, policy-makers will continue analysing the results of such experiments to make education more flexible, inclusive and resilient in the future.

Further resources

Breaking cycles of disadvantage through education: An EU perspective
In-depth analysis by Denise Chircop, EPRS, December 2021
The analysis looks at statistics on perpetuated disadvantage in education and training, and studies a number of contributing factors by looking at evidence from case studies and other research that investigates the development of educational systems. It also analyses the extent to which reforms have been possible and the complex reasons behind them.

Lifelong Learning in the EU
Animated infographic by Denise Chircop, EPRS, September 2021
Learning is not limited to a single, specific phase in life, that of the years at school, but also happens in different contexts, over the course of a lifetime. With its strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training, ET2020, the European Union supported the concept of lifelong learning by coordinating cooperation between Member States on training and formal, non-formal, and informal education.

Participation in early education and care
Infographic by Denise Chircop and Eulalia Claros Gimeno, EPRS, September 2021
Following research findings on the positive impact of early childhood education, EU education ministers set a participation target for 2030 of 96 % of all children aged three and over. This will depend on having enough places that are accessible and affordable. At the same time, the quality of the provision is just as important to reap the potential benefits. The infographic looks at the current participation of young children in early childhood education and what Member States are doing to improve upon it.

The future of tertiary education in Europe
In-depth analysis by Denise Chircop, EPRS, September 2020
The analysis focuses on six challenges facing tertiary education in the EU: the need to maintain relevance to current and future aspirations; the impact of digital and disruptive technologies; the way it collaborates with business; global and intra-EU collaboration; quality assurance; and financing and barriers to inclusion. It also looks at trends in two of the largest higher education systems outside the European Higher Education Area, those in the United States and China.

Further reading

Erasmus 2021-2027: The Union programme for education, training, youth and sport
‘EU Legislation in Progress’ briefing by Denise Chircop, EPRS, July 2021

Inclusion measures within the Erasmus+ programme 2014-2020
Study by Ex-Post Evaluation Unit, EPRS, September 2021

The European Education Area and the 2030 strategic framework for education and training
Briefing by Denise Chircop, EPRS, May 2021

Education in isolation in the pandemic, following the path of Isaac Newton
Briefing by Denise Chircop, EPRS, June 2020

Implementation of citizenship education actions in the EU
Study by Ex-Post Evaluation Unit, EPRS, August 2021

Rethinking education in the digital age
Study by Scientific Foresight Unit, EPRS, March 2020

Education and the New European Bauhaus
‘At a glance’ note by Denise Chircop, EPRS, March 2021

Early leavers from education and training
Infographic by Denise Chircop and Eulalia Claros Gimeno, EPRS, March 2021

Inclusion of migrants in formal education
Infographic by Denise Chircop and Eulalia Claros Gimeno, EPRS, November 2019

In 2021, people from across the European Union (EU) and elsewhere in the world turned to the European Parliament and its late President, David Maria Sassoli, to request information, call for action to be taken, express their opinions or suggest ideas on a wide range of topics.The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) replied in the 24 EU official languages.

In 2021, Ask EP received around 8 600 individual messages and 4 300 campaign enquiries. Citizens wrote on various topics, including the coronavirus pandemic, fundamental rights, migration and asylum, Afghanistan, Belarus, and many others. Ask EP also received many questions related to the European Parliament and its Members, its traineeship offers and how to visit Parliament.

Most frequent topics in individual enquiries in 2021

The most frequently addressed topic in 2021 was matters concerning the European Parliament itself. The Parliament received over 1 850 enquiries, in which citizens expressed interest in Members of European Parliament and their activities, enquired about traineeship and job opportunities and the possibilities to visit Parliament during the pandemic. They also requested information on topics such as parliamentary questions, committee meetings and the right to petition.

The second most frequent topic on which citizens contacted Ask EP last year related to civil liberties, justice and home affairs matters, with around 1 450 enquiries. People voiced their concerns, for instance, about fundamental rights, the rule of law in Poland, Brexit, the situation of persons with disabilities, as well as migration and asylum.

Citizens were concerned about public health, in particular health care and the coronavirus pandemic, with around 950 enquiries received in 2021. Many citizens wrote questions and comments about the EU Covid‑19 certificate, travel restrictions during the pandemic and the management of the crisis by individual EU countries. In particular, many enquiries related to Covid‑19 vaccines and the EU countries’ national Covid‑19 vaccination strategies. More information about the EU response to Covid‑19 is available on the European Parliament’s website.

Issues concerning foreign affairs were another key focus, with over 850 enquiries. Many of the comments and questions focused on Afghanistan, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the situation at the Polish-Belarusian border. Regarding the situation in Afghanistan, the European Parliament called for more humanitarian aid and a coordinated response to protect those most vulnerable, in a resolution adopted in September 2021. Parliament also adopted several resolutions about Russia, in particular concerning the case of human rights organisation Memorial, EU-Russia political relations, the situation of Russian activist Alexei Navalny and the Russian military build-up on Ukraine’s border. In December 2021, the European Parliament awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Alexei Navalny.

Finally, the European Parliament received many enquiries about citizens’ personal situations with requests for assistance to help them solve problems (financial support, legal aid, cross-border administrative issues, cases of discrimination, etc.). Although neither the European Parliament nor its President are able to resolve many of these types of requests directly, the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit tried to provide citizens with a contact point and sources of information whenever possible.

Campaign messages sent to the European Parliament in 2021

As a response to political, humanitarian and economic events, citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament, expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. These messages may sometimes be identical, as part of wider public campaigns.

Since March 2021, the President of the European Parliament received 750 messages on the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. Citizens called on the EU not to ratify the agreement, citing human rights abuse in China. The European Parliament needs to vote on the agreement between the European Commission and China for it to come into force. However, it is currently still on hold. The answer given by the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit mentioned Parliament’s scrutiny of the agreement and recalled Parliament’s resolution on the crackdown on the democratic opposition in Hong Kong (January 2021), as well as its resolution on forced labour and the situation of the Uyghurs (December 2020).

In the months of May-June 2021, the President received almost 1 730 messages regarding a non-binding own-initiative report adopted by the European Parliament committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality on sexual and reproductive health and rights in the European Union. Citizens expressed concerns about the report, which they saw as threatening the powers of EU countries to regulate access to abortions. The answer given by the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit notably reminded citizens that the President of the European Parliament is not permitted to give voting instructions to Members who, under Article 2 of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament, exercise their mandate freely and independently.

Over the summer, the European Parliament received around 230 messages calling on the President of the European Parliament to intervene in favour of the release of Native American activist Leonard Peltier. On 23 August 2021, President Sassoli announced that he would address a letter to the United States authorities asking for clemency for Leonard Peltier. The full answer given by the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit is available on the EPRS blog.

Are you curious about our answers to other campaign messages in 2021? You can find all replies to campaigns totalling over 50 enquiries, as well as posts on topical themes on the EPRS blog.

If you wish, you can put your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP), using our contact form, the Citizens’ app, or by post. We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

We are looking forward to your enquiries in 2022! Your Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

A solemn ceremony was held in Strasbourg to honour the Parliament’s late President David Maria Sassoli, who died the previous week. Following this sad occasion, the main point on the agenda for the January 2022 plenary session was the already scheduled mid-term election of Parliament’s President, 14 Vice-Presidents and 5 Quaestors. Parliament also debated the programme of activities of the French Council Presidency, with Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic.

Election of Parliament’s President

Parliament holds elections for its President, Vice-Presidents and Quaestors at the start and again at the mid-point of each term. Roberta Metsola (EPP, Malta) was elected President of the European Parliament with 458 votes in favour, and thus comfortably securing the absolute majority of votes cast (50 % +1), in the first round of voting. President Metsola will hold office for the second half of the current term, up to the next European elections. Elections to the offices of Vice-Presidents and Quaestors were also conducted. Voting for all the posts was by secret ballot, with three rounds needed to complete the election of the Vice-Presidents who make up Parliament’s Bureau, and two rounds for the five Quaestors.

French Presidency of the Council

France took over the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU on 1 January 2022, and Parliament hosted President Emmanuel Macron for the customary presentation to Parliament of the priorities of the Presidency. Although France has considerable experience of the role, including during the 2008 financial crisis, this Presidency will have to tackle the continuing Covid‑19 pandemic, the energy crisis and the EU’s relations to the east, as well as the ongoing aftermath of Brexit, all whilst holding a national election. Priority is also expected to be given to the conclusions of, and preparing the follow-up to, the Conference on the Future of Europe, seeking to take stock of citizens’ recommendations in defining the future of the Union.

Digital services act

Parliament debated and approved its position on the proposed digital services act by 530 votes to 78, with 80 abstentions The Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) report on the proposal, which seeks to define digital service provider accountability for ensuring a transparent and safe online environment, endorses the European Commission’s proposal to update the EU regulatory framework. The committee suggests amendments to include more stringent content moderation, and stronger transparency and consent requirements for targeted advertising, especially better protection of children. The committee wishes to impose additional obligations on very large online platforms and online marketplaces, but also recognises the need to allow waivers for smaller companies. Further amendments introduced in plenary aim at protecting freedom of expression and freedom and pluralism of the media, as well as introducing a new provision on the right to use and pay for digital services anonymously. The text adopted in plenary constitutes Parliament’s mandate for interinstitutional negotiations.

European Medicines Agency

Members approved a provisional agreement reached with the Council on a proposal for a reinforced role for the European Medicines Agency. The new legislation will make it easier for the Agency to act with greater agility and assuredness in emergencies. The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) report stressed the need for ‘more Europe’ in health, including creating an interoperable digital platform to monitor and report on medicine shortages; addressing the shortcomings that experience with clinical trials revealed during Covid‑19; and calling for more transparency in the steering groups’ work.

Animal transport

Parliament has long echoed citizens’ concerns about animal welfare in calling for action to ensure that the high standards demanded by EU law are respected in all EU countries. In 2020, Parliament set up a Committee of Inquiry on the Protection of Animals during Transport (ANIT) to investigate European Commission enforcement and Member State implementation of EU rules. Members debated the ANIT committee’s concluding report and voted on recommendations to the Council and Commission. The ANIT report on alleged contraventions of EU law on animal transport indicated a number of measures that could be introduced to ensure transport is less stressful for animals, including acknowledging new scientific evidence. The report noted that, while some Member States actively protect animals during transport, others could be stricter in their interpretation and enforcement of EU law, and urged the Commission to present an action plan. The rules on transporting vulnerable animals are a particular concern.

Nomination of members of the Court of Auditors

Even though the opinion adopted by the European Parliament on nominations to the Court of Auditors is not legally binding, Parliament holds a public hearing for each candidate, which encourages Member States to propose nominees who meet the competence and impartiality requirements of membership of the Court. Members endorsed the position of Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) following recent hearings, giving a favourable opinion on two candidates whose mandates are to be renewed (Czech nominee Jan Gregor and Latvian nominee Mihails Kozlovs), as well as a new Slovenian nominee, Kristijan Petrovič. However, Members followed the committee’s position and confirmed the unfavourable opinion on the renewal of the mandate of the Polish nominee, Marek Opioła, maintaining Parliament’s negative opinion voted when the candidate was originally nominated to the position he now holds.

Situation in Kazakhstan

Members debated the situation in Kazakhstan, where protests since the beginning of the year, initially triggered by a rise in fuel prices, have led to chaos. The unrest has roots in citizens’ frustration at perceived political inertia in the face of inequalities. Parliament issued a resolution on the situation, demanding a proper international investigation into the crimes committed against the people of Kazakhstan.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without a vote, two mandates for negotiations from the Agriculture (AGRI) Committee on the proposal for a recommendation for a decision on additional requirements for certain types of intervention specified by Member States in their common agricultural policy (CAP) strategic plans for 2023‑2027, and on the proposal for a decision on rules on paying agencies and other bodies, financial management, clearance of accounts, securities and the use of the euro.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – December 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jaan Soone.

Air traffic fell steeply due to Covid‑19. To provide temporary relief from the rules on take-off and landing slot utilisation, the European Union suspended airport slot use requirements – the ‘use it-or-lose-it’ rule – from March to 24 October 2020. Under the normal slot rules, airlines are required to use 80 % of their slots to secure their full slot portfolios for subsequent scheduling seasons. If they do not reach the set threshold, the slots go to the slot pool for reallocation. On 14 October 2020, the European Commission extended the slot waiver until 27 March 2021. The relief measures aim at protecting airlines and preventing the environmental harm caused by running empty flights purely to retain slots for the following year.

According to the slot rules, airport slots are allocated by independent coordinators, for summer or winter scheduling seasons. To keep their slots and retain them in the next corresponding season, air carriers have to use them at least 80 % of the time over the scheduling period for which they have been allocated (also known as ‘historical slots’, ‘grandfather rights’ or the ’80‑20 rule’). Otherwise, the slots go back into the slot pool for allocation, with the under-used slots then reallocated (known as the ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rule). Temporary suspensions have been used in the past: in 2002, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks; in 2003, following the Iraq war and the SARS epidemic, and in 2009, in response to the economic crisis.

In December 2020, pointing to some recovery in the demand for air travel and the need to begin a return to the normal application of the ‘use it-or-lose-it’ rule to maximise benefits for the greatest number of slot users, consumers and connectivity, the Commission proposed to set the ‘use it-or-lose-it’ threshold to 40 % temporarily (instead of 80 % under the normal rules – suspended until 27 March 2021 at the time).

Following discussions in the Council and Parliament, the agreed threshold was set at 50 %. For the summer season, running from 28 March to 30 October 2021, airlines were also allowed to return 50 % of their slot series to the slot coordinators for reallocation before the start of the season, without impacting their rights for the slots for the following summer season. Airlines were obliged to operate their remaining slot series at a 50 % utilisation rate to retain their historic rights in those series. The amended rules also included the ‘justified non-use of slots’ exception, protecting airlines’ historic rights to slots when state-imposed coronavirus-related measures severely impede passengers’ ability to travel. The Commission was given delegated powers for one year to decide on the extension of the relief measures and to amend the slot use rate within a 30‑70 % range.

As provided for under the relief rules, in July 2021, the Commission extended the relief measure to the winter scheduling season, running from 31 October 2021 until 27 March 2022, with a 50 % threshold for the ‘use it-or-lose-it’ rule. In December 2021, the Commission extended the slot relief rules for the 2022 summer scheduling season, running from 28 March 2022 until 29 October 2022. According to the changes, airlines will have to use 64 % of the slots to retain historic rights in those slots. The ‘justified non-use of slots’ exception was also extended.

Efforts to revise and update the slot use rules have been made since 2011, when the Commission issued a proposal to amend the rules to ensure optimal use of the scarce capacity available at airports. The Parliament adopted its position in December 2012. However, the proposal remains blocked in the Council. In its resolution of 16 February 2017, the European Parliament urged the Council and Member States to make swift progress on deadlocked files, including the slots proposal.

Written by Miroslava Karaboytcheva (1st edition).

The revision of the Energy Taxation Directive (ETD) is part of the ‘fit for 55’ package. The current ETD (Directive 2003/96/EC) is outdated and out of sync with the EU’s climate and energy objectives. It favours the use of fossil fuels and no longer contributes to the proper functioning of the internal market. The aspects of energy taxation requiring most urgent revision are the level and structure of minimum rates, replacement of the volume-based approach to energy taxation with one based on energy content and environmental performance, and the introduction of an indexation mechanism. The effectiveness of the current directive is further limited by outdated coverage of energy products, specifically biofuels, and a series of tax differentiations, reductions and exemptions.

In July 2021, the Commission presented a proposal for the revision of the Energy Taxation Directive. Its objective is to align the taxation of energy products with EU energy and climate policies by promoting clean technologies, removing outdated exemptions and reducing rates that de facto encourage the use of fossil fuels. The ETD revision is a consultation procedure. It requires unanimity in Council, after consulting the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee. Parliament has assigned the file to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, which appointed a rapporteur in September 2021. The ITRE committee is associated with the procedure under Rule 57.

Versions

• January 2022: Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive: Fit for 55 package (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council Directive restructuring the Union framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (recast) Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2021)0563
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium)2021/0213(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Georgios Kyrtsos (EPP, Greece)
Joachim Schuster (S&D, Germany)
Ondřej Kovařík (Renew, Czechia)
Claude Gruffat (Greens/EFA, France)
Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany)
José Gusmão (The Left, Portugal)Consultation procedure (CNS) –
Parliament adopts a
non-binding opinion only Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by María Díaz Crego and Rafał Mańko.

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in March 2020 presented parliamentary institutions around the world with a new and unprecedented scenario. Parliamentary rules of procedure in representative democracies are commonly built upon the principles of pluralism, deliberation and transparency, aiming to provide an arena in which representatives of the people have the opportunity to publicly confront each other’s points of view in a free and fair setting. It is, therefore, safe to say that ordinary parliamentary practice and procedures are essentially incompatible with measures seeking to minimise social contacts and discourage − or directly forbid − mass gatherings. As a logical result of the adoption of the first restrictive measures aiming to limit the spread of the virus adopted in EU Member States in the first months of 2020, parliaments followed suit and implemented specific measures aiming to ensure the continuity of parliamentary business while limiting the spread of the virus and protecting the health of their members and staff. In the early days of the pandemic, the European Parliament, together with some other EU national parliaments rushed to digitalise parliamentary activities in an attempt to ensure that all members could take part in parliamentary proceedings despite the crisis situation. Some EU national parliaments opted to adopt decisions with a reduced number of members and others decided to adopt social distancing measures, while at the same time ensuring that all members could continue to take part in parliamentary activities. Nearly two years on from the beginning of the pandemic and with Covid‑19 infection rates spiking all over Europe due to the Omicron variant, it is time to take stock of the lessons learnt from this health crisis from the point of view of parliamentary law. In this vein, this publication updates a previous briefing of April 2020 and analyses the modifications in the working methods of the European Parliament and selected EU national parliaments throughout the pandemic, aiming to show the advantages, but also the possible drawbacks of the new practices.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Parliaments in emergency mode: Lessons learnt after two years of pandemic‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Parliament is scheduled to open its first plenary session of 2022 in Strasbourg, with a ceremony honouring the memory of President David Sassoli, whose untimely death just a week before he completed his term in office has overshadowed the start of the year in Parliament. His leadership was vital in steering Parliament through the coronavirus crisis, and with the public health situation still difficult, this session will again see Members able to participate remotely, with a hybrid format in place. While the agenda this time is relatively short, it is no less significant for that.

As President Sassoli amply demonstrated, as well as directing the work of the Parliament, the institution’s President plays an important and increasingly visible function both in the EU and internationally, mirroring the influential role of the Parliament in shaping EU policy. Long planned for this session, the main business on Tuesday will be the election of Parliament’s 31st President. The Member elected will hold office for the second half of the current term, up to the next European elections. Elections are also scheduled for the offices of Vice-Presidents and Quaestors. Candidates are nominated by the political groups, with the names announced at the opening of the session. Voting takes place in a maximum of four rounds of secret ballot, with the successful candidates elected by an absolute majority of votes cast (50 % +1).

France took over the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU on 1 January 2022, and Parliament expects to welcome President Emmanuel Macron for the traditional presentation of the priorities of the Presidency to Parliament. Although France has considerable experience of the role, including during the 2008 financial crisis, this Presidency will have to tackle the continuing Covid‑19 pandemic, the energy crisis and the EU’s relations to the east, as well as the ongoing aftermath of Brexit, all whilst holding a national election. It is expected that priority will also be given to the conclusion – and preparing their follow-up – of the Conference on the Future of Europe, seeking to take stock of citizens’ recommendations in defining the future of the Union.

On Wednesday, Parliament should debate the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) report on the proposed digital services act. The proposal seeks to define digital service provider accountability for ensuring a transparent and safe online environment. The committee endorses the European Commission’s proposal to update the EU regulatory framework and suggests amendments, including more stringent content moderation and stronger transparency and consent requirements for targeted advertising, including better protection of children. The committee wishes to impose additional obligations on very large online platforms and online marketplaces, but also recognises the need to allow waivers for smaller companies. The text adopted in plenary will constitute Parliament’s negotiating position for trilogue discussions with the Council.

Members are also expected to vote on Wednesday on a trilogue agreement reached with the Council on a proposal for a reinforced role for the European Medicines Agency. Once adopted, the new legislation will make it easier for the Agency to act with greater agility and assuredness in emergencies. The report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) stressed the need for ‘more Europe’ in health, including creating an interoperable digital platform to monitor and report on medicines shortages; addressing the shortcomings that experience with clinical trials revealed during the pandemic; and calling for greater transparency in the steering groups’ work.

The need for a more sustainable model of agriculture is another aspect of tackling both the danger of zoonotic disease like the coronavirus and the impact of climate change – an issue the European Parliamentary Research Service has identified as one of its Top 10 ‘issues to watch’ in 2022.

Parliament has long echoed citizens’ concerns about animal welfare in calling for action to ensure that the high standards demanded by EU law are respected in all EU countries. In 2020, Parliament set up a Committee of Inquiry on the Protection of Animals during Transport (ANIT) to investigate European Commission enforcement and Member State implementation of EU rules. On Thursday, Members are expected to debate the ANIT committee’s concluding report, as well as vote on recommendations to the Council and Commission. The ANIT report looks into alleged contraventions of EU law on animal transport and makes a number of conclusions on measures that could be introduced to ensure transport is less stressful for animals, including acknowledging new scientific evidence. The report notes that, while some Member States actively protect animals during transport, others could be stricter in their interpretation and enforcement of EU law, urging the Commission to present an action plan and for the introduction of a number of specific measures, including promoting a shift from live animal transport to alternatives. The rules on transporting vulnerable animals are a particular concern.

Even though the opinion adopted by the European Parliament on nominations to the Court of Auditors is not legally binding, Parliament holds a public hearing for each candidate, which encourages Member States to propose nominees who meet the competence and impartiality requirements of membership of the Court. Recent hearings led to Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) giving a favourable opinion on two candidates whose mandates would be renewed (Czech nominee Jan Gregor and Latvian nominee Mihails Kozlovs), as well as a new Slovenian nominee, Kristijan Petrovič. However, the committee issued an unfavourable opinion on the renewal of the mandate of the Polish nominee, Marek Opioła. Members are expected to vote on the committee’s recommendations on Wednesday.

Parliament is expected to hear European Council and Commission statements on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 16‑17 December 2021 on Wednesday. With a number of difficult geopolitical issues on the agenda, the meeting mainly reiterated Council’s position in the search for a consensus over the long term, and updated the indicative Leaders’ agenda on issues ranging from Covid‑19 to migration, energy, security and defence. On external relations, EU leaders warned Russia of the consequences of military escalation in Ukraine.

Members are also due to debate the situation in Kazakhstan on Wednesday afternoon. Protests since the beginning of the year, initially triggered by a rise in fuel prices, have led to chaos in the country. The unrest has roots in citizens’ frustration at perceived political inertia in the face of inequalities. While Russia is leading a peacekeeping mission to restore order, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission has called for more inclusive dialogue and for an end to the violence.

Written by Martin Russell.

Protests erupted in Kazakhstan on 2 January 2022 and quickly span out of control, resulting in multiple deaths and several days of chaos. Although initially triggered by a fuel price hike, the unrest points to deeper causes of discontent, including poverty, inequality and frustration at the lack of political change. A Russia-led peacekeeping mission has helped to restore order, but could also compromise Kazakh independence.

What is happening in Kazakhstan?

After Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Armenia’s 2018 Velvet Revolution, fraudulent elections and opposition protests in Belarus, and political turmoil in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan is the latest post-Soviet country to be hit by unrest. On New Year’s Day 2022, the government lifted the price cap on liquefied petroleum gas, the fuel most commonly used by Kazakh drivers, causing its price to almost double overnight. On 2 January, initially peaceful protests broke out in Zhanaozen, a city in western Kazakhstan, and soon spread to Almaty, former capital and still the country’s largest city.

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev quickly responded by dismissing the government, and ordered the new administration to reinstate fuel price caps. Despite this, protests continued to escalate, with mobs storming government buildings in Almaty. Denouncing protestors as ‘terrorists’ and ‘bandits’, Tokayev rejected international calls for dialogue, and ordered police to shoot to kill. Over 160, including 16 security officers, were killed in increasingly violent clashes, and as of 11 January, nearly 10 000 had been arrested. During the protests, internet access was blocked for several days, flights from Almaty were cancelled, and large parts of the economy shut down.

On 6 January, Tokayev requested support from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Russia-led military alliance founded in 1992 to which Kazakhstan also belongs. Over 2 000 CSTO peacekeepers were deployed. After a few days of rioting, the government now appears to be back in control, and an uneasy calm has returned to the streets of Almaty.

What caused the protests?

Since the country’s 1991 independence, former President Nursultan Nazarbayev ruled with an iron fist for nearly 30 years. After his retirement in 2019, his ally Tokayev took over the presidency in a stage-managed transition, but with Nazarbayev maintaining considerable influence behind the scenes. One of the most stable and – thanks to huge exports of oil, uranium and other natural resources – prosperous countries in the post-Soviet region, Kazakhstan appeared to be less at risk of unrest than its central Asian neighbours. However, even if the January 2022 protests came as a surprise, they are not unprecedented. The worst previous violence was in 2011, when brutal repression of an oil workers’ strike killed at least 16 people. There were more major protests in 2016 following planned reforms allowing foreigners to buy land; in February 2019 after the deaths of five children in a house fire were blamed on inadequate welfare for poor families; and in March of the same year when newly elected president Tokayev renamed the country’s capital Nur-Sultan after his predecessor.

The fact that violence continued to escalate after the withdrawal of fuel price rises – the initial trigger for protests – points to deeper causes. Kazakh officials claim that protestors were well prepared and coordinated, and spoke foreign languages. However, they have not specified further who the organisers might be. In the past, such incidents were often blamed on exiled banker and former government minister Mukhtar Ablyazov, who leads the opposition Democratic Choice for Kazakhstan movement. Ablyazov himself has called for western intervention, and acknowledged that he has contacts with protestors, but there is no convincing evidence of foreign involvement. Another theory, also as yet unproven, is that rival pro-Tokayev and pro-Nazarbayev factions, and/or criminal gangs were behind the violence.

Protests also reflect long-standing discontent with the status quo. Double-digit inflation has eroded living standards, and many have lost jobs due to the pandemic. Perhaps it is no coincidence that young men, among the worst affected by unemployment, also made up the vast majority of protestors in Almaty. Their grievances are exacerbated by the wealth of the elite, none more so than Nazarbayev and his family, which is reported to have spent at least US$785 million on real estate purchases in Europe and the US since 2000.

Like the March 2019 protests at the start of Tokayev’s presidency, the current unrest may point to frustration at the lack of real political change. At that time, Tokayev promised a ‘listening state’ and a multi-party political system, but the exclusion of genuine opposition parties from the March 2021 parliamentary elections – won overwhelmingly for the sixth consecutive time by Nur Otan, the party founded by Nazarbayev – highlighted the lack of progress to democracy. While Tokayev has made some efforts to assert his independence – for example by removing Nazarbayev’s daughter Dariga, seen as a possible future president, from her position as Senate chair in May 2020 – he is still often perceived as a mere puppet of his predecessor. For this reason, anger was mainly directed at Nazarbayev, with protestors calling on the ‘old man’ to leave, and demolishing statues of him.

What are the implications for Kazakhstan’s future?

In the absence of leaders or a clearly stated agenda, the protests never had much chance of forcing political change. If anything, they may have strengthened Tokayev’s position by allowing him to neutralise Nazarbayev and his supporters. The latter include former prime minister Askar Mamin – now replaced by ex-Finance Minister Alikhan Smailov – and intelligence chief Karim Masimov, who has since been arrested on suspicion of treason. Nazarbayev himself, who has not appeared in public since the protests broke out, was also sidelined, with Tokayev taking over as Security Council chair on 5 January.

On 11 January, Tokayev called for more equal sharing of the country’s wealth, for example through new taxes on mining companies. Yet while such initiatives may go some way towards addressing the economic causes of discontent, the precedent of other post-Soviet countries where protests have occurred – such as Belarus – suggests that political concessions are unlikely.

Tokayev’s request for CSTO peacekeepers could backfire. Until now, Kazakhstan has carefully avoided over-dependence on Russia by building strong ties with other regional players: in 2015, it became the first central Asian country to sign an enhanced partnership and cooperation agreement with the EU, and it is also a leading participant in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The prolonged presence of (essentially Russian) foreign troops could jeopardise this multi-vector foreign policy. It could also prove unpopular domestically; strong suspicion of foreign influences was previously highlighted by the 2016 land reform protests. In view of these risks, the deployment will only be short-term, with peacekeepers due to leave within two weeks.

For Russia, Kazakhstan’s crisis is both a threat and an opportunity. Unrest could threaten Moscow’s interests in the country, such as the Baikonur space-rocket launch site and a large ethnic Russian minority. With Russian armed forces already thinly stretched, the peacekeeping mission could be an unwelcome distraction from more strategic interests such as Ukraine. On the other hand, the mission could help to draw Kazakhstan closer into Moscow’s orbit. Since November 2020, Russian peacekeepers have been deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh, and a second peacekeeping mission will reinforce Russia’s role as regional security guarantor. Moreover, the mission is the CSTO’s first ever intervention (the Nagorno-Karabakh mission, which is taking place outside the internationally recognised territory of a CSTO state, is exclusively Russian), and as such could give the alliance some much-needed credibility.

International reactions

Unsurprisingly, Russia has sided with Tokayev, echoing his narrative that the protests are the result of foreign meddling – a necessary condition for CSTO intervention given that the alliance’s remit does not extend to purely domestic threats. China has also denounced interference by external forces. For his part, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who comments that ‘once Russians are in your house, it’s sometimes very difficult to get them to leave’, is demanding an explanation of the rationale for CSTO involvement, and criticises Tokayev’s shoot-to-kill order. A statement by the EU’s High Representative calls for peaceful resolution of the crisis, condemns the violence, and urges the Kazakh authorities to respect freedoms of assembly, of expression, and of the media. Similar calls for restraint and dialogue come from European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, as well as the OSCE and UN Human Rights Commissioner Michelle Bachelet.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Chaos and crackdown in Kazakhstan: What next?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gianliuca Quaglio.

Since the first successful organ transplant in 1954, the procedure has become increasingly prevalent, revolutionising the treatment of end-stage organ failure. Nevertheless, organ shortage remains a critical problem that could potentially be overcome by xenotransplantation, a promising alternative approach.

While the field of organ and cell allotransplantation (from a donor of the same species) remains limited, xenotransplantation (from the Greek xenos, meaning ‘foreign’) could alleviate the increasing demand for donor organs. Xenotransplantation, defined as the transplantation of animal-derived organs and cells into humans, is currently a very active focus of research, as it over-rides some of the obstacles encountered with tissue engineering, such as revascularisation and innervation. The resurgence of interest in xenotransplantation is mainly attributed to the improvement of gene-editing techniques (such as CRISPR/Cas9), since genetically engineered animals have been bred to overcome organ rejection. However, xenotransplantation also raises multiple biological and ethical questions that should be taken into consideration.

Potential impacts and developments

Pigs, the most suitable xenograft source.The greatest difficulty encountered in transplantation is rejection caused by the mounting of immune responses against the donor organ, perceived as a foreign threat by the human body. Graft rejection can be classified as hyperacute, acute or chronic, depending on the time it takes for antibodies to react against donor antigens, known as substances that trigger the immune system. While non-human primates (NHPs) are phylogenetically closer to humans than pigs, the latter are regarded as a more appropriate xenograft source for multiple reasons.

Pigs not only reproduce easily and have organs of comparable size to humans, they also present physiological similarities. For instance, porcine valve replacement has been successful for over 30 years and is considered a better alternative to mechanical valves, which are more prone to blood clot formation. Attempts have also been made to transplant pig kidneys, corneas and livers, but the main challenge remains that of overcoming the immune barriers to xenotransplantation. Finally, there are fewer ethical and other implications when working with pigs than with NHPs.

Genome editing. The implementation of potent immunosuppressive regimens has helped to prolong xenograft survival significantly by reducing the risk of rejection. However, a number of issues, such as coagulation dysfunction between the pig-derived graft and the human, remain problematic, as certain molecular incompatibilities cannot simply be overcome by immunosuppression. As a result, scientists have focused primarily on the generation of genetically modified pigs.

These not only have engineered organs that are less prone to rejection, but are also protected from a number of viruses that could cause the transmission of zoonoses following xenotransplantation. The dynamic developments in this field of research have occurred mainly as a result of CRISPR/Cas9, a novel gene-editing technology that has revolutionised biomedical research. It basically consists of an enzyme (Cas9) acting as a pair of ‘molecular scissors’ that follow the guide RNA (gRNA) to a target sequence in the DNA in order to introduce changes or make deletions.

Examples of transgenic pigs for xenotransplantation purposes. Pig-antigens are not synthesised by the human species and can cause mounting immune responses that lead to organ rejection. It is therefore of vital importance to eliminate the pig genes responsible for encoding these antigens for the organ recipient. A recent study involving the inactivation of three such pig genes and the insertion of nine human genes using CRISPR/Cas9 technology generated very encouraging results. Importantly, one of the genes inserted plays a crucial role in regulating the coagulation system. The cells resulting from these genetically modified pigs were resistant to rejection, demonstrating greater compatibility with humans in terms of the immune system as well as the blood-coagulation system.

Another promising achievement beyond overcoming rejection is the use of CRISPR/Cas9 technology to limit the risk of cross-species transmission of infectious viruses, therefore removing a major hurdle to using pigs for xenotransplantation. In an attempt to mitigate incompatibility, various studies have so far attempted more than 40 genetic modifications on the pig genome thanks to the development of new gene-editing tools. This global effort has very recently culminated in the first successful pig to human xenotransplantation of a genetically modified heart, raising hopes that we are ‘one step closer to solving the organ shortage crisis’.

Anticipatory policy-making

The rate of organ donations increased by 14 % in the EU between 2010 and 2019, with kidney transplants accounting for 85 % of all transplants. This is partly the result of some EU countries (such as Belgium, Austria and France) adopting the opt-out system and endorsing the principle of presumed consent, according to which all brain-dead individuals are considered donors unless otherwise stated. However, the supply of organ donations does not meet demand, despite overall progress.

This is illustrated by the death in 2020 of 668 individuals who were on the Eurotransplant waiting list. Eurotransplant is an institution that manages an international collaborative framework responsible for allocating donor organs in eight EU Member States. Another key organisation is the European Society for Organ Transplantation (ESOT), which structures and streamlines transplant activities in Europe and worldwide.

The European Medicines Agency (EMA) classifies xenogeneic cell therapy and products as advanced therapy medicinal products (ATMPs). The ATMP regulatory framework centres on Regulation (EC) No 1394, adopted in 2007. This is associated with an EMA guideline issued in 2009 that sets out general principles for the development, authorisation and pharmacovigilance of xenogeneic cell-based medicinal products. Overall, these documents stress the importance of quality and manufacturing aspects of ATMPs, taking into account the source, procurement and processing of xenogeneic materials (e.g. animal tissues and organs).

There have been no major legislative developments specific to xenotransplantation in the EU in recent years however. While the above-mentioned regulation marked an important step towards a unified ethical and legal EU framework on xenotransplantation, a more competent regulatory authority is needed in order for this promising practice to reach its full potential.

As mentioned by the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP), a quality assurance system specific to xenotransplantation is crucial to guarantee the correct pathogen-free health status of donor animals. It is also vital to ensure that the animals are kept under the best possible conditions, so as to prevent their suffering during the procedure before organ explant. These issues are also being addressed by the World Health Organization and the International Xenotransplantation Association (IXA), both of which play a critical role in the drafting of xenotransplantation directives, notably regarding preclinical efficacy requirements.

In conclusion, multiple issues have still to be resolved before xenotransplantation becomes commonplace in clinical practice. However, the EU regulatory aspects of xenotransplantation were drafted in part at a time when the risks involved with the procedure were higher, not reflecting the latest ground-breaking developments in this fast-evolving field. Their revised interpretation by regulatory authorities and research institutes could therefore facilitate the safer design and conduct of clinical trials, in order to arrive at an appropriate compromise between existing and adapted guidelines.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if xenotransplantation was the answer to the donor organ shortage?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if xenotransplantation was the answer to the donor organ shortage?’ on YouTube.

Written by Stefano Spinaci (1st edition).

Green bonds are committed to financing or re-financing investments, projects, expenditure or assets helping to address climate and environmental issues. Both governments and companies use them to finance the transition to a more sustainable and low-carbon economy.

Since the EIB inaugurated the green bond market in 2007 with its Climate Awareness Bond, the market has grown very fast, but it still represents only about 3 to 3.5 % of overall bond issuance. The green bond market needs to grow more quickly to achieve the targets in the Paris Agreement.

The Commission’s proposal aims to establish an official EU standard for green bonds aligned with the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, based on a registration system and supervisory framework for external reviewers of European green bonds.

The proposal is currently being examined by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the ECON committee. In the Council, the working party on financial services is meeting to discuss the dossier.

Versions

• January 2022: European green bonds: A standard for Europe, open to the world (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European green bonds Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2021) 391
6.7.2021Rapporteur:Paul Tang (S&D, The Netherlands)2021/0191(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Christophe Hansen (EPP, Luxembourg)
Gilles Boyer (Renew, France)
Bas Eickhout (Greens/EFA, The Netherlands)
Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany)
Andżelika Anna Możdżanowska (ECR, Poland)
José Gusmão (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Consideration of draft report in committee

Written by Angelos Delivorias.

Payment systems are of vital importance for today’s economies and are the core activity of central banks. To adapt to recent trends – including the decline in cash usage, the surge in online commerce and contactless forms of payment, and the creation of cryptocurrencies – central banks have, in recent years, explored the possibility of issuing digital currencies themselves.

Proponents of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) note that, among other things, they can: alleviate the problem of concentration of the payments infrastructure; facilitate instantaneous and cheaper execution of payments; discourage illicit activity and rein in the shadow economy; spur competition in the payment industry; reduce the problem of banks being ‘too big to fail’; promote financial inclusion; contribute to financial stability; preserve the EU’s sovereignty over transactions; help facilitate monetary policy; and support the international role of the euro.

Critics of CBDCs range from those who question the need for such currencies altogether, to those who point out the risks, including the possibility that CBDCs could: amplify the international spillover effects of shocks; curtail the autonomy of less powerful economies in their monetary policy, and even substitute their domestic currency; facilitate tax avoidance or a loss of domestic oversight capabilities; put at risk the variety of payment instruments available to households; create undesired volatility in exchange rates; and put banks’ deposit bases under threat, with negative implications for credit provision and output.

The European Central Bank (ECB) is involved in the general discussion about the design and launch of CBDCs. In October 2020, it published a report on a digital euro, identifying and discussing features of and options for a euro-area CBDC. In July 2021, the ECB launched an investigation phase, which should last 2 years and aims to address key issues of design and distribution. The European Parliament, as well as other stakeholders, is expected to participate actively in this phase.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Central bank digital currencies: Evolution or revolution?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Central bank digital currencies: Evolution or revolution?‘ on YouTube.

Written by Ionel Zamfir (1st edition).

On 21 September 2021, the Commission published its proposal for a new EU scheme of generalised preferences. Two of the current scheme’s three components are due to expire at the end of 2023, which would deprive developing countries of a vital opportunity to trade under preferential terms with the EU. Therefore, renewing the scheme appears to be both a necessity and an opportunity to strengthen its conditionality in the light of lessons learned and the increased urgency for dealing with the climate.

The Commission considers that the scheme has delivered on its objectives, and proposes some ‘fine-tuning’. To ensure that its benefits remain broadly shared, it proposes changes to the economic vulnerability criteria for GSP+ and to the product graduation threshold for Standard GSP. Taking on board proposals from civil society, but also from the Parliament, the Commission proposes to extend negative conditionality to environmental and good governance conventions, and to improve monitoring and stakeholders’ involvement overall.

Civil society organisations and other stakeholders have put forward some more ambitious proposals, such as making the monitoring fully transparent and rewarding countries that fulfil jointly agreed benchmarks related to the conventions under the GSP with additional preferences.

Versions

• New EU scheme of generalised preferences (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council Committee responsible:International Trade (INTA)COM(2021) 579
22.9.2021Rapporteur:Heidi Hautala (Greens/EFA, Finland)2021/0297(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Gabriel Mato (EPP, Spain)
Raphaël Glucksmann (S&D, France)
Jordi Cañas (Renew, Spain)
Marco Campomenosi (ID, Italy)
Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR, Greece)
Helmut Scholz (The Left, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Current beneficiaries of the EU GSP

Written by Etienne Bassot.

Two years of pandemic have taught us – institutions, researchers and citizens alike – how much today’s issues are global. From fighting the virus to addressing climate change or securing supply chains, the pandemic has accelerated our awareness of our common destiny. Global issues call for global solutions and global leadership − solutions that can inspire other countries and continents all over the world.

Watch the video on “Ten issues to watch in 2022“.

To help us to understand these global challenges and make sense of what is unfolding before our eyes, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) asked its policy analysts to identify ten issues to watch in 2022. With so many burning issues in Europe and in the world, a selection of just ten is by definition subjective. Yet, it is the opportunity to shine the spotlight on a series of topics selected for their obvious importance or their relevance to global leadership. EPRS then tasked the experts selected to explain why these issues matter particularly in 2022 and what we might expect in the year to come. For other issues that remain ‘hot’, such as migration at Europe’s borders and the situation in Ukraine, readers will find our analysis in previous editions of this publication (listed under the ‘Further reading section’) and in the thousands of publications EPRS has issued online and in paper over the years.

While the previous edition of this publication, and the associated introductory event, had highlighted the interdependence of the selected issues, the underlying theme of this 2022 edition is the global nature of the issues. This is seen in the written contributions but also inspires the visual representation of the ten issues on the cover of this publication. The ten topics selected either affect the world as a whole − achieving zero greenhouse gas emissions while maintaining economic growth, securing supply chains, moving towards sustainable agriculture, ensuring nuclear non-proliferation − or present standards, solutions or ways ahead that could be taken up worldwide. These include shaping the recovery, striking the right monetary policy balance between continued favourable financing conditions to support the recovery and addressing inflation concerns, setting standards for the internet of things, the potential of the truly innovative participatory democracy experience of the Conference on the Future of Europe, the vision of a continent where people in all their diversity are equal, and strengthening a defence union when the European Union is experiencing ‘loneliness’ (solitude) in transatlantic relations and needs to define its ‘narrative’ (récit), to quote Luuk van Middelaar’s geopolitical analysis.  

The year 2022 brings us into the third year of a pandemic that is far from over, although the resilience of people and societies has been tested to the limits. But 2022 also means the next European elections are just two years off, with a series of issues where the European Union has demonstrated its capacity to rebound, shape its future, and project its leadership worldwide, and where the European Parliament is in the vanguard. This 2022 edition brings some notes of hope at the start of a critical year. We hope that you will enjoy reading this latest edition of ‘Ten Issues to Watch’ and that it will stimulate your own reflection, and ignite your curiosity as you explore the challenges and opportunities of 2022.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Or watch the video on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2022‘ on YouTube.

Chips global supply chain Global fabrication capacity by region, 2019 (%) Developments in EU defence under the current Commission

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

At the January 2022 plenary sitting, the European Parliament (EP) is due to elect its 33rd President, to hold office for the second half of the current term, up to the next European elections, following which the new Parliament will elect its President in July 2024. The President has an important and increasingly visible function in the EU institutional and international setting, mirroring the influential role of the Parliament as shaper of EU policies and as co-legislator.

Election procedure

Until 1979, EP Presidents were chosen on an annual or biennial basis. Since the first EP election by universal suffrage in 1979, the President is elected to the office for a renewable period of two and a half years. During each legislative term, a first election is normally held in July, immediately after the election of the new Parliament, and a second mid-term election is held two and a half years later, in January. It is currently envisaged that the January 2022 session will be held with Members present, but to ensure physical distancing, two additional rooms may be used simultaneously with the hemicycle.

According to Article 14(4) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the European Parliament elects its President from among its Members. The Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (RoP), as last revised in 2020 and 2021, set out the procedure for this election.

The President is elected based on nominations, which may be handed in before each round of the ballot, with the nominees’ consent. Candidates are proposed by political groups, but may also be nominated by a number of Members reaching at least the ‘low threshold’, i.e. one-twentieth (36) of Parliament’s Members, (Rules 15 and 179). During the first plenary sitting after the election of a new Parliament, or at the sitting designated to elect the President for the mid-term election, the procedure is chaired by the outgoing President, or by one of the outgoing Vice-Presidents in order of precedence or, in their absence, by the MEP having held office for the longest period (Rule 14). The Parliament cannot deal with any other activity until the election of the new President is concluded (Rule 14(2)).

The vote is by secret ballot (Rule 15). Prior to January 2017, Rule 15 provided that, if the number of candidates (for President, Vice-Presidents and Quaestors) was less than or equal to the number of seats to be filled, the election may be held by acclamation. Rule 15 now provides that, in those circumstances, the election shall be held by acclamation unless a number of Members or political group(s) reaching at least the ‘high threshold’, i.e. one-fifth of Members (141), request a secret ballot. This provision is, however, unlikely to apply to the presidential election, where traditionally more than one nominee runs for the seat.Rule 16 provides that after nominations have been handed to the provisional chair of the plenary sitting, the latter announces them in plenary. The President is elected by an absolute majority of votes cast, i.e. 50 % +1, which can be less than an absolute majority of all Members since abstentions and spoilt or blank votes do not count. Rule 16 provides for a maximum of four ballots. If, after the third ballot, no absolute majority is reached, the fourth ballot is confined to the two candidates who obtained the highest number of votes in the third ballot, in which case the victory is attributed to the candidate (among the two) with the higher score. In the case of a tie at the fourth ballot, Rule 16(1) assigns the presidency to the older candidate. In electing the President, Vice-Presidents and Quaestors, account should be taken of the need to ensure a fair representation of political views, geographical balance and gender balance (Rule 15(2)). The elected President is the sole person entitled to give an opening address.

Duties of the President Figure 1 – European Parliament Presidents

The President enjoys executive and representative powers, as well as responsibility for ensuring the rules of procedure are respected. The President directs all of Parliament’s activities, including the duty to ‘open, suspend and close sittings; to rule on the admissibility of amendments and other texts put to the vote, as well as on the admissibility of parliamentary questions’. Order is maintained during sittings by the President giving the floor to speakers. The President also closes debates, puts matters to the vote, announces the results of votes and makes relevant communications to committees. The President’s responsibility extends also to the security and inviolability of the Parliament’s premises (Rule 22). Rule 22(4) attributes to the President the power to represent Parliament in international relations, on ceremonial occasions and in administrative, legal and financial matters, although some of these powers may be delegated.
The powers of the President, however, extend far beyond the mere letter of Rule 22. They also include, for example, the power to convene the conciliation committee, under both ordinary legislative procedure and in the budgetary procedure, in agreement with the President of the Council, and to chair Parliament’s delegation to the conciliation committee (although under the ordinary legislative procedure this duty has often been delegated); to chair formal sittings when visiting heads of state address the Parliament; and during important votes or debates.

Since the late 1980s, the practice of the EP President addressing the European Council at the opening of all its meetings has developed, a sign of the increased visibility and recognition of the role in relation to the other institutions and the outside world. The President chairs both the EP Bureau and the Conference of Presidents, and may cast a deciding vote in the Bureau in the event of a tie. One significant symbol of the extent to which Parliament’s powers have evolved is that the EP President co-signs, with the President of the Council, legislative acts adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 297(1) TFEU). And, at the end of the annual budgetary procedure, it is the EP President who declares the EU budget adopted (Article 314(9) TFEU).

Election of Vice-Presidents and Quaestors

Rule 15 makes it explicit that, after the election of the President, Members then elect the other main political office-holders of the Parliament – required for the correct functioning of the institution’s activities. First the 14 Vice-Presidents, and then the 5 Quaestors, are elected in plenary. Nominations are made on the same basis as for the President (Rule 15). Under Rule 17, the 14 Vice-Presidents are elected in a single ballot by a majority of votes cast. If the number of successful candidates is less than 14, a second vote is held to assign the remaining seats under the same conditions (absolute majority of votes cast). If a third vote is necessary, a relative majority is sufficient to fill the remaining seats (abstentions and spoilt votes do not count). Vice-Presidents take precedence in the order in which they are elected and, in the event of a tie, by age. If voted by acclamation, a vote by secret ballot determines the order of precedence. The election of Quaestors follows the same procedure as that for the election of Vice-Presidents (Rule 18).

In practice, the political groups aim to ensure that the Parliament’s Bureau, made up of the Vice‑Presidents, and the Quaestors, broadly reflect the numerical strength of the groups, including taking into account the results of the election of the President.

This is a further update of an ‘at a glance’ note, the most recent edition of which was published in June 2019.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Electing the European Parliament’s President‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lucienne Attard (Legislative Planning and Coordination Unit, Directorate-General for the Presidency).

France will hold the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2022. It will initiate the work of the Trio Presidency composed of France, Czechia and Sweden. Executive power is exercised by the President of the Republic, who is elected by direct, popular vote, and the Government. The Prime Minister, appointed by the President, together with the Ministers, is answerable to the National Assembly, the lower house of Parliament, and they can be removed by a vote of censure. Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the Senate. The National Assembly is the principal parliamentary body, composed of 577 members, who are elected directly for five-year terms. The Presidential election will coincide with the French Presidency, in April 2022.

France is a founding Member State of the European Union, and has already held the rotating Presidency of the Council 13 times. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, will present the political priorities of the Presidency to the European Parliament during the January plenary session in Strasbourg.

While the last French Presidency, in 2008, was characterised by the global financial crisis, the forthcoming one is expected to be dominated by the ongoing Covid pandemic, the cost of energy crisis and the aftermath of Brexit. The French Presidency will very likely give special impetus to the conclusion of the Conference on the Future of Europe, which should take place in the first half of 2022. The plan is for the Trio Presidency, in its role as member/observer in the Executive Board of the Conference, to draw on the outcomes of the various activities and citizens’ recommendations, outline how they define the future of the Union, and start the implementation process.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Priority dossiers under the French EU Council Presidency‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer.

Introduction to France’s parliamentary system

The role of the French Parliament has varied under successive French Republics. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic, adopted in 1958, was amended by referendum in 1962 to establish the direct election of the President by universal suffrage. This created a hybrid political regime with some presidential and some parliamentary characteristics, sometimes described as a ‘semi-presidential regime’ or a ‘hyper-presidential’ regime.

The government is responsible to Parliament, but contrary to classical parliamentary regimes, the President plays an important role. The President has the power to dissolve the National Assembly (Assemblée nationale). He or she appoints the Prime Minister, as well as – on the recommendation of the Prime Minister – the other members of the government.

Traditionally, the Prime Minister makes the government’s programme or a general policy statement an issue of a vote of confidence before the National Assembly. The latter can overthrow the government, but is largely subordinate to the executive – consisting of the President and the government placed under the authority of the Prime Minister. In periods of ‘cohabitation‘, the National Assembly plays a greater role in supporting the Prime Minister, who in this specific configuration acts as leader of the majority.

Legislative powers are exercised by the two houses, who vote on laws, monitor government action and assess public policy. The National Assembly (Assemblée nationale) is elected for five years by direct universal suffrage. The indirectly elected Senate (Sénat) represents the ‘territorial communities of the Republic’ (Article 24 of the Constitution) and shares legislative power with the National Assembly. It embodies continuity, as it cannot be dissolved and half of its Members are renewed every three years. However, in cases of disagreement, the National Assembly has the final say.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The French Parliament and EU affairs‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nera Kuljanic with Carl Pierer.

Technological sovereignty is an important ambition for the European Union (EU). The Covid‑19 pandemic has drawn attention to critical technologies, due to its impact on many value chains. However, there is no common definition of technological sovereignty. The resulting ambiguity can lead to divisive rhetoric that threatens the EU’s ambitions, since the policy objectives and the fulfilment of the corresponding aspirations depend on the definition of the term.

In EU industrial policy, certain technologies are considered particularly critical for advancement, growth and sovereignty. Among them are six key enabling technologies (KETs): advanced manufacturing, advanced (nano)materials, life-science technologies, micro/nano-electronics and phototonics, artificial intelligence, and security and connectivity technologies. Concretely, these overarching clusters of technologies have applications in autonomous systems and Industry 4.0, in biomaterials and rapid prototyping, in neurotechnology and bioelectronics, in quantum computing, in robotics, and in cryptography, among other things. Mastering these six KETs could therefore make Europe more resilient and competitive in a global context.

A new STOA study proposes a definition of technological sovereignty for the EU, and analyses how the EU is performing in developing and protecting ownership and know-how in these critical technologies, especially in comparison with strong global players such as China and the United States of America (USA). Based on the challenges identified in the analysis, it discusses policy options for strengthening the EU’s technological sovereignty.

Europe losing ground despite strong commitments

According to the study, technological sovereignty can be understood as Europe’s ability to develop, provide, protect and retain critical technologies required for European citizens’ welfare and business prosperity, as well as the ability to act and decide independently in a globalised environment.

In pursuing technological sovereignty in KETs, the EU faces five major obstacles:

• Lack of resources/raw materials: Europe is dependent on third countries for access to many of the critical raw materials or resources needed in the context of KETs.
• Dependence on non-European suppliers: in several KETs, many of the supply and value chains depend on non-European organisations and know-how.
• Digital skills: a lack and drain of technological experts and know-how can be observed, compromising European industry and academia.
• Commercialisation of research results: Europe struggles to turn good scientific research results into commercial products and to retain them in Europe.
• Regulatory fragmentation: there is a lack of joint action and coordination between different levels of governance and sometimes between different policies.

The analysis shows that Europe has made strong efforts to support the development of KETs, evidenced in dedicated investment programmes, research successes resulting in patents, and a competitive start-up ecosystem. However, the analysis also shows that Europe lags behind China and the USA due to a lack of research and development (R&D) funding, especially from the private sector, a lack of qualified skills in technology, and a lack of industrial leaders in KETs. Ultimately, Europe loses ground with its many good ideas and companies being acquired by non-European players.

The road to EU technological sovereignty

To address these difficulties, to avoid losing ground to other geopolitical actors, and to ensure the EU’s technological sovereignty, the study puts forward a total of 25 policy options organised in 4 ‘packages’. The first package outlines a proposal for a new EU strategy for KETs based on an institutionalised policy dialogue between all the relevant players: EU institutions; Member States; regions; and academic and industry stakeholders, including SMEs. The other three packages address the four key challenges across the KETs. They are, however, not KETs-specific, and should therefore contribute to improving the endowment of raw materials, reducing dependence on non-European suppliers, advancing skills and commercialisation overall. Most policy options target EU policy-makers, but some could be taken up at national level.

The study was complemented with an online event organised by STOA, which took place on 15 June 2021. Chaired by STOA Second Vice-Chair Ivars Ijabs (Renew, LV), it featured presentations by one of the study authors, Michael Flickenschild, Consultant with the Economic Growth team of Ecorys, and by Daniel Fiott, Security and Defense Editor at the European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Read the full report and accompanying Options Brief to find out more.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Piotr Bakowski (1st edition).

On 20 July 2021, the European Commission presented a package of legislative proposals in the area of anti-money-laundering efforts and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). The package includes a proposal for a regulation on preventing the use of the financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing. The proposed regulation would be the central element of what is commonly referred to as an EU ‘single rulebook’ on AML/CFT. Its detailed and directly applicable provisions would replace the minimum rules of the EU AML directives currently in force.

The package has been adopted in response to repeated calls by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union to enhance the EU’s regulatory framework on AML/CFT. The aim is for the framework to become more coherent, keeping in step with technological innovations and related new forms of crime, as well as remaining in line with international standards in the field. In Parliament, the Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs are jointly responsible for the file.

Versions

• December 2021: Proposal for a regulation to fight money laundering and counter terrorist financing (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) (jointly under Rule 58)COM(2021) 420
20.7.2021Rapporteurs:Eero Heinäluoma (S&D, Finland) and
Damien Carême (Greens/EFA, France)2021/0239(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ralf Seekatz (EPP, Germany); Franco Roberti (S&D, Italy); Dragoş Pîslaru (Renew, Romania); Ramona Strugariu (Renew, Romania); Kira Marie Peter‑Hansen (Greens/EFA, Denmark); Jean-Paul Garraud (ID, France); Jadwiga Wiśniewska (ECR, Poland); Roberts Zīle (ECR, Latvia); Clare Daly (The Left, Ireland); Martin Schirdewann (The Left, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report