European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s armed forces have increased their bombardment and shelling of Ukrainian cities, stepping up the war launched on 24 February. However, new talks between Moscow and Kiev about a future status for Ukraine outside NATO have raised hopes about a possible breakthrough in the biggest military conflict in Europe since World War II. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has renewed calls on NATO to establish a ‘no-fly zone’ over Ukraine. Instead, the West has imposed tough sanctions against Russia, and many companies are withdrawing from the country, pushing it towards a default, emptying its shops and sending the rouble into freefall. Russian President Vladimir Putin said on 16 March that Russia was ready to discuss Ukraine’s neutrality, but added that Moscow would still achieve the goals of its military operation. Ukraine says it is willing to negotiate to end the war but will not surrender or accept Russian ultimatums.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine, its implications for the two countries, for the European Union and for the whole world. Earlier analyses of the implications of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

The Western response to Putin’s war has been remarkable. But it’s not enough
Atlantic Council, March 2022

What are the risks and benefits of US/NATO military options in Ukraine? Our strategic risk calculator has answers
Atlantic Council, March 2022

What’s left to sanction in Russia? Wallets, stocks and foreign investments
Atlantic Council, March 2022

Four ways the war in Ukraine might end
Atlantic Council, March 2022

The economic policy consequences of the war
Bruegel, March 2022

Can China bail out Putin?
Bruegel, March 2022

War in Europe: The financial front
Bruegel, March 2022

How to wean Europe off Russian gas as swiftly as possible
Bruegel, March 2022

Mapping financial countermeasures against Russian aggression: Introducing the Brookings Sanctions Tracker
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Mind the escalation aversion: Managing risk without losing the initiative in the Russia-Ukraine war
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Russia vs. Ukraine: How does this end?
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Developing economies must act now to dampen the shocks from the Ukraine conflict
Brookings Institution, March 2022

Will Ukraine’s tragedy spur UN Security Council reform?
Brookings Institution, March 2022

What Russia’s war in Ukraine means for Europe
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

Darkness looms over Ukraine’s neighborhood
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

Russia’s war against Ukraine ends Europe’s self-deception
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

The war in Ukraine could change Poland
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

Can sanctions end Russia’s war in Ukraine?
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

The Kremlin’s crackdown on Western social networks
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

How the war is affecting the Russian gas sector
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

The US embargo on Russian energy resources: The consequences for Russia
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

Sanctions against Russia: the government is becoming increasingly nervous
Centre for Eastern Studies, March 2022

When the taps are turned off: How to get Europe through the next winter without Russian gas
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

The European security order after Putin’s aggression
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

Considering Ukraine, why Georgia deserves EU membership
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

The EU grants temporary protection for people fleeing war in Ukraine
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

Russia-Ukraine: The West needs a sanctions strategy
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

Four questions on how the Russian assault on Ukraine will affect Europe
Centre for European Reform, March 2022

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict
Chatham House, March 2022

Will American support for Ukraine last?
Chatham House, March 2022

Devising the strategy to deter Russia and weaken Putin
Chatham House, March 2022

Ukraine’s wider impact on Turkey’s international future
Chatham House, March 2022

Putin’s support from Russian society may decline fast
Chatham House, March 2022

Russia’s war against Ukraine: Preliminary observations
Clingendael, March 2022

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, March 2022

European defence and the war in Ukraine
Clingendael, March 2022

How bad is Ukraine’s humanitarian crisis?
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Will international sanctions stop Russia in Ukraine?
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Five questions: Russia’s war on Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Ukraine war should slow but not stop the U.S. pivot to Asia
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

From war of choice to war of perseverance
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

The Ukraine crisis could sideline the Iran Nuclear Deal
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Tracking cyber operations and actors in the Russia-Ukraine war
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

How Asia is responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

What’s next as Russia’s invasion continues?
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, March 2022

Russia import dependency problem
European Centre for International Political Economy, March 2022

The crisis of European security: What Europeans think about the war in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

View from Kyiv: Putin’s failed blitzkrieg and the future of Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2022

Putin’s critical raw materials are a threat to EU economic security
Egmont, March 2022

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement after Ukraine’s EU membership application: Still fit for purpose
Egmont, March 2022

Putin is creating the multipolar world he (thought he) wanted
Egmont, March 2022

For Russia, the Ukraine front stretches to the Mediterranean
Egmont, March 2022

The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement after Ukraine’s EU membership application: Still fit for purpose
European Policy Centre, March 2022

Putin’s war on Ukrainian women
European Policy Centre, March 2022

The EU has been sleepwalking into war, but it’s Germany and France who have a lot to answer for
European Policy Centre, March 2022

The war in Ukraine: China walking amid the shrapnel
European Policy Centre, March 2022

War in Ukraine: The European Union evolves as Putin attacks
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, March 2022

Guerre en Ukraine: L’armée russe est-elle sur le point d’atteindre le «point culminant» de son offensive?
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, March 2022

Russia’s nuclear gamble
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, March 2022

Silence the guns in Ukraine: What international diplomacy can (and can’t) do
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, March 2022

We will need a ‘New Deal’ to engage with a post-Putin Russia
Friends of Europe, March 2022

Can Russia’s war on Ukraine drive Turkey and the West to reconcile?
German Marshall Fund, March 2022

L’UE fournit des armes létales à l’Ukraine: Trajectoire et portée d’une nouvelle compétence
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, March 2022

Russian energy exports and the conflict in Ukraine: What options for Italy and the EU?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

The EU and the Ukraine war: Making sense of the rise of a ‘geopolitical’ Union
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

Japan responds to Russia’s war: Strong solidarity with Ukraine with an eye on China
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

Putin’s use and abuse of history: Back to the 19th century?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

Comment l’Ukraine rebat les cartes du monde
Institut Montaigne, March 2022

L’Ukraine montre que les crypto-monnaies pourraient devenir une arme de (financement) de guerre
Institut Thomas More, March 2022

The Ukraine war: A global crisis?
International Crisis Group, March 2022

No-fly zone in Ukraine: War with Russia by another name
International Crisis Group, March 2022

The war against Ukraine: An expert assessment from on the ground
International Institute for Peace, March 2022

The danger of a single story: From Ukraine to Western Balkans
International Institute for Peace, March 2022

Time for NATO to find a way out of the escalation trap in Ukraine
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2022

Could the Ukraine crisis accelerate a longer-term policy shift away from fossil fuels?
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2022

The UN’s indictment of Russia and its long-term consequences
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2022

Ukraine’s EU application: A new paradigm for EU enlargement?
Irish Institute of International and European Affairs, March 2022

The Ukraine war and the risk of a new foreign fighters wave
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2022

Réfugiés ukrainiens: Le pas d’après
Institut Jacques Delors, March 2022

Putins heiliger Krieg
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, March 2022

Russia vs Ukraine: Where does China (really) stand?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2022

Europe’s economic response to the Russia: Ukraine war will redefine its priorities and future
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Financial sanctions have devastated Russia’s economy: The EU and global financial system are absorbing the shock
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2022

No-fly zone over Ukraine?
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2022

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the threat to cultural heritage
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2022

Keeping Russians informed about Ukraine could help end this war
Rand Corporation, March 2022

Is Putin irrational? What nuclear strategic theory says about deterrence of potentially irrational opponents
Rand Corporation, March 2022

Latin America in the Ukraine crisis: A pawn in the game for Putin’sresurgent Russia
Real Instituto Elcano, March 2022

The Kremlin’s gas wars
Bruegel, February 2022

An attack on Ukraine; An attack on the Western worldview
International Institute for Peace, February 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Latest analyses of Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has caused vast displacement of people within the country as well as across the EU borders. While the annexation of Crimea had a negative impact on the country’s education system, recent events have added additional strain.

Outbound student mobility was already substantial in recent years, but it has accelerated even further since the Crimean conflict began . After doubling from some 25 000 to nearly 50 000 between 2007 and 2014, the number of Ukrainian students abroad has since skyrocketed by another 54 % to around 78 000 in 2019.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Ukrainian students in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos Delivorias (1st edition).

European long-term investment funds (ELTIFs) invest on a long-term basis in infrastructure projects, real estate and SMEs, among others. While the legislative framework – the ELTIF Regulation – for these funds was adopted six years ago, their market remains small. For this reason, the Commission has proposed amending the ELTIF Regulation to make it more appealing to investors. The key mulled changes involve differentiating between ELTIFs marketed to professional investors and those to which retail investors can have access; removing barriers to retail investor access to ELTIFs; and establishing an optional liquidity window mechanism for redemptions, for cases where investors need to exit early.

The file is currently under review by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, it has been assigned to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. The draft report is expected soon.

Versions

• March 2022: Amending the European Long-Term Investment Funds (ELTIFs) Regulation (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2015/760 as regards the scope of eligible assets and investments, the portfolio composition and diversification requirements, the borrowing of cash and other fund rules and as regards requirements pertaining to the authorisation, investment policies and operating conditions of European long-term investment funds Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2021) 722
25.11.2021Rapporteur:Michiel Hoogeveen (ECR, the Netherlands)2021/0377(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jessica Polfjärd (EPP, Sweden)
Elisabetta Gualmini (S&D, Italy)
Ondřej Kovařík (Renew, Czechia)
Claude Gruffat (Greens/EFA, France)
Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure
(COD) (Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Claudia Vinci.

Up until the 2022 Russian invasion, Ukraine was exporting more than 40 % of its goods to the EU, making the EU the country’s leading trading partner. The principal goods imported by the EU were raw materials, chemical products and machinery. With regard to the agri-food sector, Ukraine supplied almost half of the cereals and vegetable oils and a quarter of the poultry meat consumed in Europe. While the full impact of the Russian invasion on Ukraine’s agri-food trade has still to be assessed, some possible scenarios have already emerged.

Background

The EU accounted for more than 40 % of Ukrainian trade in 2019, making it Ukraine’s main trading partner. Ukraine, on the other hand, represented only around 1.1 % of EU total trade, importing machinery and transport equipment, chemicals and manufactured goods. Ukraine exports mostly raw materials, chemical products and machinery to the EU. These exports rose by 48.5 % between 2016 and 2019, amounting to €24.2 billion in 2019, with total trade worth €43.3 billion in the same year.

Figure 1 – EU trade in goods with the world and Ukraine (2020)

Ukraine has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2008. In 2014, the EU and Ukraine signed an association agreement, including a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA). The agreement formally entered into force in 2017, after a one-year provisional application period. The pandemic led to a significant drop in both exports and imports between the EU and Ukraine in 2020.

Agricultural sector

In 2019, the agricultural sector contributed almost 10 % to Ukraine’s gross domestic product (GDP), accounting for 18 % of the country’s jobs and 44 % of its export value.

The specific soil composition (chernozem) and landscape in Ukraine are optimal for agricultural production, in particular for crops. Around 80 % of the total utilised agricultural area in Ukraine is used for to grow cereals, oilseeds, vegetables and other annual crops. Ukraine’s agricultural producers benefit from a value added tax exemption or reduction on exported goods, used as leverage to encourage production and trade. In the period between 2000 and 2019, production of cereals rose from 23.8 million tonnes to 74.1 million tonnes, and oilseed production rose from 3.7 million tonnes to 22.2 million tonnes.

Figure 2 – EU trade with Ukraine: Agricultural products (2020) Agri-food trade figures

Of the 1.0 % of EU goods originating in Ukraine, 35.7 % are agricultural products. Agricultural products imported from Ukraine represent 4.6 % of all agri-food imports into the EU. When it comes to exports, the EU sells 1.2 % of its commodities to Ukraine, 12.4 % of which are agricultural products.

The main products imported from Ukraine are cereals, animal and vegetable fats and oils, oilseeds, food industry residues and waste, edible fruits and nuts, and meat and edible meat offal. The main exports from the EU to Ukraine are beverages, tobacco, dairy products, cocoa, edible preparations, food industry residues and waste, and oilseeds.

Figure 3 – EU trade with Ukraine: Agricultural trade by product (2020)

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: EU-Ukraine trade in agri-food products‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eric Pichon.

In the face of the Covid-19 pandemic, ‘nobody is safe until everybody is safe’. On this basis, the EU, along with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other public and private partners, set up a global initiative to facilitate the development, production and global distribution of Covid-19 vaccines. COVAX was initially designed to pool funds and vaccine doses in order to ensure an equitable distribution between all participating economies until all of them – higher- and lower-income alike – reached a threshold of 20 % of their populations vaccinated.

The COVAX mechanism does not, however, prevent high-income economies from striking bilateral agreements with vaccine manufacturers or selected beneficiary countries. In this context, self-financing economies have secured several times more vaccine doses than their populations need, widening the vaccine supply gap for poorer economies.

The EU and participating Member States have contributed nearly a third of COVAX funding, however, as is the case for most donors, their vaccine donations have fallen short of the levels needed. The new rise in cases shows that ‘vaccine nationalism’ is not a viable policy.

The European Parliament has welcomed the EU’s participation in COVAX and expects the Commission to publish an assessment of this participation. To achieve the objective of immunising 70 % of the world population by mid-2022, the WHO has called on the EU, other donors and manufacturers to deliver on their pledges. In parallel, the plan is to develop vaccine manufacturing capacities in lower income economies, and devise a fair solution for sharing Covid-19-related knowledge and patents.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding COVAX: The EU’s role in vaccinating the world against Covid-19‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alex Wilson (1st edition).

On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to recast the 2009 EU Gas Directive, as part of the proposed hydrogen and decarbonised gas markets package. This reflects the EU’s growing climate ambitions, set out in the European Green Deal and its ‘Fit for 55’ package.

The Commission’s proposal aims to support the decarbonisation of the energy sector by ramping up the production of renewable gases and hydrogen, and facilitating their integration in EU energy networks. The recast directive would become a core component of a new EU legislative framework for hydrogen networks, comparable to those that already exist for natural gas and electricity.

The Commission’s proposal would refine the principles of the existing Gas Directive and fully extend their scope to cover hydrogen networks. This includes an important set of consumer rights, provisions relating to transmission and distribution system operators (including their unbundling), third-party access and integrated network planning, and independent regulatory authorities. 

In the Parliament, the file was attributed to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), which appointed Jens Geier (S&D, Germany) as rapporteur on 7 February 2022.

Versions

• March 2022: EU directive on gas and hydrogen networks (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal markets in renewable and natural gases and in hydrogen (recast) Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2021) 803 final
15.12.2021Rapporteur:Jens Geier (S&D, Germany)2021/0425(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jerzy Buzek (EPP, Poland)
Claudia Gamon (Renew, Austria)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Marketa Pape (1st edition).

To support its economy, provide mobility for people and goods and ensure connectivity of all regions while also limiting negative impacts on climate and environment, the EU has been building a multimodal transport network across its territory: the trans-European transport network (TEN‑T). 

The TEN‑T policy is based on 2013 Union guidelines that defined the technical requirements for the planned transport infrastructure and the network layout. Network construction is also supported through EU funding, including the dedicated Connecting Europe Facility programme.   

Having evaluated the progress in TEN‑T implementation, the European Commission put forward revised TEN‑T guidelines in December 2021, to ensure sustainable connectivity through a reliable and high-quality infrastructure network, aligned with the objectives of the European Green Deal.

As co-legislators, the European Parliament and the Council will have to agree on the final form of the proposed regulation. In the Parliament, the Committee on Transport and Tourism will lead the file.

Versions

• March 2022: Revision of the trans-European transport network guidelines (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 and Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) 1315/2013 Committee responsible:Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2021) 812
14.12.2021Rapporteur:To be confirmed2021/0420(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Isabel García Muñoz (S&D, Spain)
Jakop G. Dalunde (Greens/EFA, Sweden)
Roberts Zīle (ECR, Latvia)
Elena Kountoura (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Initial discussions in committee

While Russia deploys cyber warfare and disinformation strategies in its war on Ukraine, social platforms, and telecommunication, media and internet operators are playing an important role in relaying information on the war and shaping public opinion. The EU has taken a number of immediate, practical, measures to support Ukraine, and is contemplating further action to build the resilience of its communications infrastructures, strengthen cybersecurity and counter disinformation.

State of play

Russia’s military aggression has largely destroyed and destabilised Ukraine’s communications infrastructure. This has been accompanied by hybrid threats, including massive disinformation campaigns and cybersecurity attacks. The work done by the EU’s East StratCom Task Force, set up to address Russia’s disinformation campaigns, shows that, since 2014, over 13 500 cases of disinformation (nearly 40 % of all cases identified) have targeted Ukraine. In recent weeks, the pro-Kremlin disinformation narrative on the situation in Ukraine has been gaining momentum; it includes a misrepresentation of the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and claims that the West is imposing censorship through state institutions and privately-owned social-media companies. Furthermore, Ukraine has suffered a string of cyber attacks in recent weeks, and concerns are also rising with regard to cyber strikes targeting the EU. The European Central Bank has gone so far as to warn European financial institutions of the risk of retaliatory Russian cyber attacks. Faced with these exceptional circumstances, the EU has acted to support Ukraine, and is exploring the need to adopt additional measures to foster the resilience of the communications infrastructure, strengthen cybersecurity and counter disinformation.

The global submarine cable network is the internet’s ‘backbone’. Over 95 % of international telecommunications are provided through undersea cables, transmitting vast amounts of data across oceans. The vulnerabilities of this infrastructure are long documented. Some experts warn that, in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine, hostile action could be taken to damage or destroy physical internet infrastructure (such as undersea cables) that could disrupt global internet traffic and the flow of government and citizen communications, with serious economic consequences. EU response

• Boosting communications infrastructure resilience. Keeping Ukraine’s telecommunications services operational is critical to ensure normal functioning of the Ukrainian government, as well as to relieve the humanitarian crisis. Some European telecom companies have taken voluntary measures, such as offering free international calls to Ukraine, distributing SIM cards to refugees, and providing free Wi-Fi at refugee camps. In addition, the French Presidency of the Council of the EU will coordinate the efforts of private-sector companies in the Member States to provide Ukraine with IT equipment. The EU may also intensify its efforts to back the Ukrainian authorities by means of the €25 million EU project to support Ukraine’s digital transformation agreed in 2020, and the investment schemes under the Global Gateway strategy to finance digital infrastructure.
• Banning Russian propaganda on its war on Ukraine. Combating war propaganda and disinformation is a particularly pressing issue in Russia’s war. The Council decided on 2 March 2022 to suspend the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and Russia Today taking place in or directed at the EU until the aggression towards Ukraine ends and Russia and its associated outlets cease to conduct disinformation and information manipulation actions against the EU and its Member States. This extraordinary measure, which was immediately and directly applicable in all EU Member States, restricts the access of the main Russian state-controlled media outlets to the European media market. Furthermore, following the Commission’s call, European media regulators have agreed to strengthen their cooperation in establishing a taskforce that will focus on foreign disinformation in the context of the situation in Ukraine.
• Strengthening the EU anti-disinformation toolbox. The Ukraine crisis is fostering a debate on how to fend off foreign interference and disinformation more effectively. There are already proposals to increase East StratCom Task Force funding and extend the EU’s rapid alert system on disinformation to cover Ukraine and other interested parties. Moreover, on 8 March 2022, EU ministers called on tech firms (online platforms, internet service providers and social media companies) to take additional voluntary measures to combat online disinformation and information manipulation. The Ukrainian situation is also likely to steer EU lawmakers towards strengthening the EU’s online media framework in the pending digital services act and other initiatives under the democracy action plan, and in the European media freedom act due to be adopted in the third quarter of 2022.
• Supporting Ukraine’s fight against cyber threats. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and following on from the EU/Ukraine cyber dialogue launched in June 2021, the EU Foreign Affairs Council announced on 21 February 2022 that the EU would do more to help Ukraine defend itself against cyber attacks. A Cyber Rapid Response Team composed of EU experts has been deployed to that end.
• Bolstering EU cybersecurity capacities. The situation in Ukraine has also prompted the EU to reflect on how to complement its current framework to counter hybrid threats, and accelerate the pace of European cooperation to address cybersecurity challenges more effectively. On 24 January 2022, the Council of the EU called on the Commission to strengthen the EU’s resilience and ability to fight back against cyber attacks. Further initiatives to ensure resilience of electronic communications infrastructure and networks in Europe have been announced, including more cooperation at operational level, a future cyber resilience act, and the establishment of a cybersecurity emergency response fund.
• Limiting Russia’s access to dual-use technologies. The EU sanctions adopted on 25 February 2022 intend, not least, to limit Russia’s access to crucial advanced technology. Dual-use technologies – namely those that can be used for both peaceful and military objectives – such as semiconductors or cutting-edge technologies, radio communication technology and crypto-assets, must not be sold or otherwise supplied for use in Russia or to a Russian entity.

European Parliament position

The Parliament has long supported EU initiatives to regulate digital platforms and reinforce EU capacities to tackle disinformation and cyber threats. At its extraordinary session on 1 March 2022, it adopted a resolution, condemning the use of information warfare by Russian authorities, state media and proxies ‘to create division with denigrating content and false narratives’ about the EU. The resolution called on the Commission and the European External Action Service to enhance alternative online Russian-language information on the unfolding developments to counter disinformation. It welcomed the ban on Russia Today and Sputnik in the EU, and reiterated the calls on Google and YouTube to remove war propaganda accounts. Furthermore, it called for the EU and the Member States to terminate the software licences for military and civilian equipment in Russia and Belarus, more specifically those used for communication and satellite navigation. Finally, the resolution called for full use of the EU cyber sanctions regime against individuals, entities and bodies responsible or involved in the various cyber attacks targeting Ukraine, and for action to support Ukraine and Eastern partner countries in improving their resilience against possible Russian attacks. On 9 March 2022, the Parliament’s plenary adopted the final report of its Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the EU, including Disinformation (INGE), urging the Commission to propose a more coordinated European strategy to counter operations by foreign governments using disinformation. The report recommends the setting up of a European centre to tackle interference threats, and stronger measures to address disinformation on online platforms. It also calls for new counter- and deterrence measures to ensure cybersecurity and resilience against cyber attacks, and to protect critical infrastructure and strategic sectors.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: The digital dimension‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel.

At the informal European Council meeting held in Versailles, outside Paris, on 10-11 March 2022, EU leaders focused on Ukraine, security and defence, energy, and economic and financial affairs. They adopted the ‘Versailles Declaration’, condemning the ‘unprovoked and unjustified’ Russian military aggression against Ukraine, praising the Ukrainian people’s courage, demanding that Russia end its aggression, and stressing that the EU remained ‘ready to move quickly with further sanctions’. They also agreed to phase out EU dependency on Russian fossil fuels, though without setting a deadline, recognised Ukraine’s ‘European aspiration’, and committed to support reconstruction ‘once the Russian onslaught has ceased’. The leaders reiterated the Union’s commitment to ‘take more responsibility for its own security’, including by bolstering investment in defence capabilities and by strengthening the defence industry. They identified critical raw materials, semiconductors, health, digital and food as key sectors where the EU should reduce its strategic dependence, stating that it was time for the Union to ‘take further decisive steps towards building our European sovereignty’. Finally, EU leaders stated that national fiscal policies would need to take account of investment needs and reflect the new geopolitical situation.

1. Background

In his letter of invitation, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, stressed that ‘it is more urgent than ever that we take decisive steps towards building our sovereignty, reducing our dependencies and designing a new growth and investment model’. He outlined the three main topics EU leaders would focus on in addition to Ukraine, which, in the light of events, was the main discussion point. These were: i) strengthening defence capabilities; ii) reducing energy dependency, in particular on Russian fossil fuels; and iii) building a more robust economic base. This was a substantially amended and expanded agenda compared with the original topics of discussion – investment and growth – announced in the indicative Leader’s Agenda in October 2021. Michel spoke of a ‘strategic summit’ to decide on an operational agenda, with a view to making the EU more sovereign and less dependent. Ahead of the meeting, he once again organised preparatory meetings by video-conference with various smaller groups of Heads of State or Government, with the aim of building consensus on the various agenda items in advance.

The meeting opened with an address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. EU leaders were joined for the debate on economic and financial affairs by the Presidents of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde, and the Eurogroup, Paschal Donohoe.  

2. Main results of the European Council meeting

EU leaders discussed Ukraine over dinner and adopted a statement on ‘Russian military aggression against Ukraine’, then incorporated within the final Versailles Declaration. The text outlines new strategic guidelines for security and defence, energy, and economic and financial affairs.

Ukraine

EU leaders stressed Russia’s responsibility for the war in Ukraine and for targeting civilians. They underlined that ‘those responsible will be held to account for their crimes’. They demanded that the ‘safety and security’ of nuclear facilities in Ukraine be ensured with the support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and that Russia withdraw its forces from the ‘entire territory of Ukraine immediately and unconditionally’, and fully respect ‘Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders’.

EU leaders praised the courage of the Ukrainians and stressed the EU was resolute in its coordinated ‘political, financial, material and humanitarian support’ for Ukraine as well as determined to step up pressure on Russia and Belarus, including through further sanctions. Michel indicated that the EU had ‘imposed on Russia the strictest sanctions ever adopted’, whilst European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen confirmed that a fourth package of sanctions was being examined. The Prime Minister of Latvia, Krišjānis Karinš, underlined that the EU should ‘go much faster, much further’ with the sanctions, generalise the SWIFT ban across all banks in Russia and Belarus, and stop energy imports, in order not only to isolate but also to rapidly cripple the Russian economy.

Two weeks after the Russian invasion, over 2.5 million Ukrainians have fled the war and 2 million are internally displaced. EU leaders emphasised that the Union was offering ‘temporary protection to all war refugees from Ukraine’, commended European countries, in particular those bordering Ukraine, for their solidarity, confirmed that the EU would continue to ‘offer humanitarian, medical and financial support to all refugees and the countries hosting them’ through REACT-EU, and called for the rapid adoption of the proposal on Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE).

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that ‘sanctions must continue to bite hard’, warning that ‘Putin will not stop in Kyiv, just as he did not stop in Crimea’.

Enlargement

Although enlargement was not on the agenda in President Michel’s invitation letter, in light of the membership applications received from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, the topic had to be considered, not least to give a political signal. The debate centred on whether or not to ‘fast-track’ Ukraine’s accession. The Prime Minister of Slovakia, Eduard Heger, made a proposal to invite the President of Ukraine regularly as a guest to European Council meetings. EU leaders acknowledged Ukraine’s ‘European aspirations and the European choice’ expressed in the Association Agreement, and called for efforts to ‘further strengthen our bonds and deepen our partnership to support Ukraine in pursuing its European path’. The President of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda, tweeted that the ‘heroic Ukrainian nation deserves to know that they are welcome in the EU’.

EU leaders noted the Council’s swift action in inviting the European Commission to submit – ‘in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties’ – its opinion not only on the Ukrainian bid, but also on the Moldovan and Georgian requests. This development does not preclude the European Council from stepping in later, on the basis of Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) to review ground rules and set specific conditionality for ‘fast-tracking’. Article 49 TEU, which the declaration does not refer to explicitly, lays down the eligibility criteria and procedure in only limited detail, and states that ‘the conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account’. This is understood as referring to the Copenhagen criteria set by the European Council back in 1993 and to subsequent changes to them, including stricter conditionality rules agreed in recent years.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that ‘an open European perspective’ would give Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia hope of a European future.  

Energy policy

Given the situation, EU leaders agreed to phase out EU dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal as soon as possible – no date being specified. This should be done notably by reducing ‘overall reliance on fossil fuels, diversifying suppliers and routes by using LNG and developing biogas’ as well as by ‘developing a hydrogen market in Europe’ and accelerating development of renewables. Moreover, ‘the interconnection of European gas and electricity networks’ should be improved. The European Commission had already published REPowerEU, a communication in which it proposed to cut by two-thirds the EU’s dependency on Russian gas by the end of 2022. The Commission President confirmed after the meeting that, by May 2022, the Commission would present a plan allowing fossil fuel dependency on Russia to be phased out by 2027. She called the Versailles meeting a ‘finding moment’ triggering a rethink of energy policy from an energy security perspective, with a view to reducing dependency on Russian fossil fuels and investing in home-grown renewable energy.

The High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) Josep Borrell recognised that the EU had increased its dependency on Russian gas since 2014. Figure 1 shows that, with the exception of crude oil, mineral fuels imports have increased. In 2020, Russia was the EU’s number one supplier of crude oil, hard coal and natural gas, with the exception of LNG. Overall, 47 % of the EU’s gas and 25 % of its petroleum came from Russia in the first half of 2021. The debate on reducing energy dependency is not new. In 2014, EU leaders adopted the 2014-2019 Strategic Agenda recognising that ‘Europe’s current energy dependency is a vulnerability’ and that ‘diversification of energy supply and routes’ was needed ‘to reduce energy dependency, notably on a single source or supplier’. The 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda reiterated that call.

Figure 1 – EU imports of mineral fuels from Russia (2020)

EU leaders also committed to ‘urgently address’ the current spike in energy prices ‘and consider concrete options’ to counter its impact. In close coordination with the European Commission, initial measures had been put in place at national level in the fall of 2021. In a letter addressed to Ursula von der Leyen, however, the Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, called for measures to counter the ‘weaponisation’ of gas as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including ‘targeted and temporary market intervention’ to avoid speculation. EU leaders will return to the topic at their forthcoming meeting on 24-25 March 2022, at which they are expected to take decisions allowing action to counter the impact of energy prices on the most vulnerable citizens.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: RobertaMetsola stressed that the EU’s ‘immediate goal must be energy security’ based on diversity of sources, suppliers and routes. She underlined that the EU should move towards ‘zero gas from Russia’ and stated that ‘the bottom line is that we should not be forced to fund the bombs falling on Ukraine’.

Security and defence

EU leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen European security and defence and increase the EU’s ‘capacity to act autonomously’. They stressed that close EU-NATO cooperation was key to European security and that an EU stronger on defence, complementary to NATO, would only make it a more reliable transatlantic partner. EU leaders acknowledged that for those Member States that are also members of NATO, the Alliance remained the foundation of their collective defence. They therefore committed to continue ‘to invest in our mutual assistance under Article 42(7) TEU’. In a joint letter, Finland and Sweden had recalled the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU), which sets an obligation of ‘aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’. There are still lessons to be learned from the first activation of the clause in 2015, which could help to clarify the procedure to be followed in the event of any new activation.

The Prime Minister of Sweden, Magdalena Andersson, stressed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had shifted the continent’s security equilibrium, confirming her country’s decision to increase defence spending to 2 % of GDP. Several other EU countries, including Germany and Romania, have also announced an increase in their defence spending. At Versailles, EU leaders committed to bolstering the development of joint capabilities, building synergies between civil and defence space research and strengthening the European defence industry. Ursula von der Leyen announced that the European Commission would prepare an ‘analysis of the defence investments gaps’ by May 2022, when EU leaders are expected to meet informally. In the interim, EU leaders are expected to endorse the Strategic Compass at the spring European Council meeting on 24-25 March 2022.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that the EU ‘must go beyond the European Defence Fund and make the EU budget work for our security and defence policy whenever it adds value’. She underlined that PESCO should be reformed to facilitate flexible and resilient projects and that the EDA ‘should be brought under the EU’s budget umbrella’.

Reducing dependencies, boosting the economy and fostering investments

Given the ‘new geopolitical situation‘, EU leaders agreed to foster investment by mobilising EU and national public funding. Although the modalities have yet to be defined, national fiscal policies will reflect these needs. The leaders also committed to a robust trade policy and agreed that the EU should reduce its dependence on others, identifying five strategic areas: critical raw materials, health, digital, food security and semiconductors. For semiconductors, the leaders set a measurable objective: to develop EU production capacity to secure 20 % of the global market by 2030. A 2008 French Senate report stressed the strategic nature of the EU semiconductor industry, which was at risk because of global market shifts. The EU’s share of the global market has since reached a historic low.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola underlined that the EU needed to focus on ‘restructuring and reinvesting in research and raw materials’.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the informal European Council in Versailles on 10-11 March 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Henrique Morgado Simões (1st edition).

On 15 December 2021, the Commission presented a proposal to regulate methane emissions reductions in the energy sector. The proposal is part of the second batch of proposals in the ‘fit for 55’ package, aiming to align EU climate and energy laws with the EU Climate Law’s 2030 target.

The proposal aims to address gaps in current legislation: those relating to methane emissions from upstream exploration and the production of oil and fossil gas, but also those from the gathering and processing of fossil gas, the transmission, distribution and underground storage of gas, and liquid gas terminals operating with fossil and/or renewable methane. The proposal furthermore introduces provisions on methane emissions from coal mines and those originating from outside the EU in relation to importer information requirements, the methane transparency database and the methane-emitters monitoring tool. Similarly, it sets out requirements for methane emissions reduction, monitoring and reporting, leak detection and repair, and limits to venting and flaring.

In Parliament, the proposal was referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), with the rapporteur still to be appointed.

Versions

• March 2022: Fit for 55 package: Reducing methane emissions in the energy sector (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 805
15.12.2021Rapporteur:To be appointed2021/0423(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Günther Sidl (S&D, Austria)
Martin Hojsík (Renew, Slovakia)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Appointment of rapporteur Figure 1 – Key methane facts Figure 2 – Nature and timeline of requirements Figure 3 – Inactive wells: Member States’ and CAs’ responsibilities

Written by Alex Wilson (1st edition).

On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to recast the 2009 EU Gas Regulation, as part of the hydrogen and decarbonised gas markets package. This reflects the EU’s growing climate ambitions, outlined in the European Green Deal and its ‘Fit for 55’ package.

The Commission’s legislative proposal aims to support the decarbonisation of the energy sector by ramping up the production of renewable gases and hydrogen across the EU, and facilitating their integration in existing or new gas networks. It would create an EU legislative framework for hydrogen networks, comparable to those that already exist for natural gas and electricity. It would also oblige existing natural gas infrastructure to integrate a higher share of hydrogen and renewable gases, by means of high tariff discounts; provisions to facilitate blending of hydrogen with natural gas and renewable gases; and greater EU cooperation on gas quality and storage.

The Commission’s legislative proposal likewise includes a targeted revision of the 2017 Security of Gas Supply Regulation. This aims to foster greater regional cooperation on gas storage, facilitate the (voluntary) joint procurement of strategic stocks, and encourages Member States to take measures to address the growing risk of cyber-attacks on EU energy networks.

Versions

• March 2022: Recast EU Regulation on Gas and Hydrogen Networks (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal markets for renewable and natural gases and for hydrogen (recast) Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2021) 804
15.12.2021Rapporteur:Jerzy Buzek (EPP, Poland)2021/0424(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Patrizia Toia (S&D, Italy)
Marie Toussaint (Greens/EFA, France)
Zdzisław Krasnodębski (ECR, Poland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Marketa Pape.

In response to Russia’s unjustified invasion of Ukraine, the European Union has adopted unprecedented new sanctions. These included a ban of all Russian aircraft from its airspace, to which Russia reacted by banning all EU airlines from its skies. While the full weight of these decisions is only starting to be felt, the implications of the conflict for EU transport are much larger and include steep increases in fuel prices, interruptions to supply chains and the need to ensure the safe return of stranded drivers and seafarers, already problematic due to Covid-19.

State of play before the conflict

In reaction to Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the EU adopted its first sanctions against Russia. These remain in place and target Russian individuals and organisations, but also the country’s strategic sectors of defence, energy and finance, without limiting transport connections.

In October 2021, the EU and Ukraine signed a common aviation area agreement, as a result of a process that started in 2005. It was to offer new opportunities for airlines and consumers (9.8 million passengers from the EU in 2019), based on common standards in aviation safety, security and air traffic management.

As one of the countries of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, Ukraine has been included in EU efforts to improve transport links with the Union and among these countries. The EU’s plans to extend its strategic transport infrastructure were prepared in 2018 by the European Commission and the World Bank and confirmed by the Eastern Partnership Summit in December 2021. The 39 projects in Ukraine amounting to about €4.5 billion covered all modes of transport and sought to support its trade with the EU, worth €43.3 billion in 2019.

Implications for EU transport Aviation

Reacting to Moscow’s new invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, EU countries have adopted new sanctions. In the first set of sanctions of 25 February 2022, the EU banned the sale of aircraft, parts and equipment to Russian companies, including insurance and maintenance services. Two days later, the EU banned all Russian aircraft, including private jets, from its airspace. Russia responded by banning from its skies all EU airlines and the airlines of 36 countries that have adopted similar sanctions. Further airspace closures were adopted by Belarus (partial) and Moldova (full). With Ukrainian airspace closed, movements by air of roughly 3.3 % of air passenger traffic in Europe have stopped, in addition to the passenger flights between Russia and Europe, which accounted for 5.7 % of global international traffic in 2021.  

Many flights have had to be cancelled or rerouted, with impacts mostly on Europe-Asia and Asia-North America connections. Bypassing Russian airspace lengthens flight times and increases fuel consumption. Following the invasion, the price of jet fuel increased to US$141 per barrel on 4 March, up 27 % in one month. Expert estimates of costs for an extra hour of passenger flight time vary between €3 600 and €15 000, depending on the size of the aeroplane and the price of fuel, which makes some routes uneconomic or impractical. Re-routing may also necessitate a refuelling stop, if the path extends beyond the range of the aircraft. Air operators are evaluating which flights to continue operating and whether to pass on the costs to consumers through fuel surcharges. Air cargo rates have also increased, to 120 % above their pre-crisis level by 7 March, and are continuing to rise. Sanctions and bans are expected to reduce flight capacity, especially between Europe and Asia, unless airlines in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East, fill the gap. Higher airfares could reduce demand for air travel.

According to analysts, Russian airlines have about 980 passenger jets in service, of which 777 are leased, mostly from companies based in Ireland. The sanctions have made it hard for Russian airlines to pay their lessors and also require that the existing lease contracts with Russian airlines be terminated by 28 March. However, leasing companies fear for their assets, as the state-owned airline Aeroflot and carriers that it owns are not responding to requests for the return of aircraft once lease agreements are terminated.

Rail

In addition to extra train services run by Ukrainian Railways, rail companies in neighbouring countries are organising humanitarian trains to evacuate refugees from Ukraine and send humanitarian aid back into the country. Other rail companies are banding together to offer additional carriages on trains and make travel free for Ukrainians to reach refuge or join family members across the continent.

While Russian railways are targeted by EU sanctions, freight trains can still run through Russia, but they cannot stop there. Many logistics companies operating rail freight connections between China and the EU are avoiding transit through Russia for security reasons. Instead of the ‘main route’, which previously served half of all EU-bound rail freight traffic, they opt for the ‘middle corridor’ through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Istanbul, where the cargo is reloaded onto vessels bound for Trieste. Transit through Ukraine accounted for only 2 % of the westbound container traffic volumes on the New Silk Route in 2021, but was on the rise, a fact recognised both by China and by Slovakia and Hungary, which were planning investments to develop the route through Ukraine.

Road

On 25 February, the International Road Transport Union (IRU) estimated that at least 12 000 truck drivers of many nationalities were stuck in Ukraine and the wider region, and urged the governments concerned to protect blocked truck drivers and prioritise their passage. By 4 March, with up to 5 000 drivers still stranded, the IRU called again on the Ukrainian authorities to ease the passage of drivers at border crossings.

Many transport organisations have offered their buses, coaches and trucks to help transport refugees and essential goods. To facilitate this support, seven EU countries along major transport routes towards Ukraine exempted humanitarian transport from tolls and rules on professional driving time and rest time.

In December 2021, road transport operators warned that driver shortages, pandemic restrictions, increased demand and rising fuel prices were causing supply chain disruptions. Uncertain fuel prices and supply are likely to further increase road freight rates, already at record high levels before the invasion.

Maritime

To address the impacts of the situation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov on shipping and seafarers, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) called an extraordinary session of its Council for 10-11 March.

Ukrainian and Russian seafarers make up 14.5 % of the global shipping workforce and EU fleets rely on them heavily. Fearing the impact on crew changes, already stretched due to Covid-19, European ship owners urged EU regulators to guarantee seafarers’ mobility and their rights as essential workers. They also warned that the severe crew shortages, delayed salary payments and closed Ukrainian ports could disrupt supply chains. With several commercial ships hit in the conflict, operators were forced to divert vessels. Most large shipping companies, citing unpredictable operational impacts, have suspended shipments to and from Russia, but some also to Ukraine. Bunker fuel prices rose sharply across the globe following the invasion.

Sanctions against Russia are complex and evolving. The companies targeted by EU sanctions include the Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port and the United Shipbuilding Corporation. The UK, for its part, has banned Russian ships from its ports. It has been suggested, though, that as the UK ban is not accompanied by a blacklist, port operators are left with the complex task of identifying those ships, which requires the tracking of roughly 6 000 Russian-affiliated vessels, of which about 60 % do not sail under a Russian flag.

Renewed focus on military mobility

In the longer term, the conflict will likely lead to increased military spending. In the Versailles declaration, adopted by the European Council on 11 March 2022, EU leaders pledged to accelerate the ongoing efforts to enhance military mobility throughout the EU. While this refers to the ability to deploy, train and supply armed forces across European territory, for transport it means enhancing some strategic infrastructure segments of its transport network to support their dual use for military and civilian purposes. About €1.7 billion in co-funding is earmarked for such projects in the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Implications for EU transport‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

It is widely held that geopolitical tensions in the world are on the rise. One of the clear indicators of this phenomenon is the increasing use of economic tools for the pursuit of strategic and geopolitical aims. This can take the form of coercion exerted by one country on another through trade or investment restrictions to interfere with their sovereign choices. In response to the EU and its Member States becoming the target of deliberate economic coercion in recent years, on 8 December 2021 the Commission published a proposal for the adoption of an anti-coercion instrument (ACI) that would allow the EU to better respond to such challenges on a global scale.

While the new framework is primarily designed to deter economic coercive action through dialogue and engagement, it also allows – as a last resort – to retaliate with countermeasures comprising a wide range of trade, investment and funding restrictions. While there is broad support for creating a legislative tool to address the growing problem of economic coercion, opinions are divided as regards the severity of countermeasures and the manner of establishing when they should kick in.

Within the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on International Trade (INTA). A draft report is expected to be published in April.

Versions

• March 2022: Proposed anti-coercion instrument (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries Committee responsible:International Trade (INTA)COM(2021) 775
8.12.2021Rapporteur:Bernd Lange (S&D, Germany)2021/0406(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou (EPP, Greece); Marie-Pierre Vedrenne (Renew, France); Reinhard Bütikofer (Greens/EFA, Germany); Roman Haider (ID, Germany);
Michiel Hoogeveen (ERC, Belgium);
Helmut Scholz (The Left, Germany).Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Rachele Rossi.

One of the main objectives of EU policy is to maintain vibrant rural areas. Rural economies however still face a number of socio‑economic pressures. The European Commission’s long-term vision for EU rural areas, to 2040, identifies action to take to ensure stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas and communities.

Recent figures reveal that rural areas cover more than 80 % of total EU territory and are home to 30 % of the EU population. These areas are both nature reservoirs and agricultural spaces. Moreover, life in rural areas can be a safer and healthier alternative to living in highly populated cities, and a hub for innovating ideas on more sustainable business models. However, many EU rural areas face the same challenges, such as demographic decline, low income and lack of economic opportunities, poor access to services and connectivity, low education and digital skill levels, and low employment rates, especially among women.

In 1997, the European Commission’s Agenda 2000 made the first move towards creating an EU rural development policy within the common agricultural policy (CAP). Co‑financed by EU and national funds, rural development measures helped rural areas tackle economic, environmental and social challenges. Over the years, rural development expenditure has continued to increase. Evaluations have highlighted the positive impact of certain measures, such as those related to village renewal and local development approach, as they are considered well-targeted and relevant to local needs. Although these measures only represent a small proportion of CAP funding, they play an important role in addressing the socio-economic needs of rural areas.

The recently adopted rules of the post-2022 CAP set the types of intervention for rural development that should be funded under the national CAP strategic plans. Each EU country will define where CAP funding will be used to achieve set objectives, including employment, growth, gender equality, social inclusion and local development in rural areas. The Commission’s recommendations on the national CAP strategic plans indicate that they are aiming to make fast broadband internet in rural areas accessible to 100 % of the population by 2025. This means that the share of rural households with next generation access (NGA) broadband will have to increase significantly from the 2019 EU average share of 56.4 %.

Following a public consultation launched in September 2020, the European Commission published ‘A long-term Vision for the EU’s Rural Areas – Towards stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas by 2040‘ on 30 June 2021. This represents a significant policy development. The specific issues and challenges faced by rural areas are now at the core of a wide‑ranging set of actions that look even beyond the CAP’s rural development measures. The long‑term vision includes proposals for a rural pact that engages EU, national, regional and local levels in supporting the vision and action plan with flagship projects and new tools to support stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas. A rural observatory will help improve data collection and analysis on the situation in rural areas. A ‘rural proofing’ mechanism will assess the anticipated impact of major EU legislative initiatives on rural areas.

The Commission’s communication sparked stakeholders’ interest and expectations for its potentially game‑changing role in the EU’s approach to the development of rural areas. For its part, the European Parliament has decided to draw up an own-initiative report on the long‑term vision for the EU’s rural areas.

More information can be found in the briefings on ‘Long-term vision for rural areas: European Commission communication‘ and ‘EU rural development policy: Impact, challenges and outlook‘ on the European Parliament Think Tank.

Written by Bruno Bilquin with Beatrix Immenkamp.

In an unprecedented and unanimous reaction to the Russian war on Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, the EU swiftly decided to provide €500 million from the European Peace Facility to fund and coordinate EU military assistance and to deliver military (including lethal) equipment to Ukraine. The Council had already adopted an assistance measure of €31 million for non-lethal assistance to Ukraine on 2 December 2021. For the first time in its history, the EU is now using a dedicated, although off-budget, tool to finance – but not to deliver, with that responsibility falling on Member States alone – lethal military equipment for a third country.

The EU decisions to mobilise €500 million for military assistance to Ukraine

On 27 February 2022, the EU High-Representative for Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, announced that he would propose that the Council respond favourably to a request for military assistance by Ukraine and use the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-EU budget instrument operational since 1 July 2021, to fund emergency assistance measures. This would include a support package worth €450 million for military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force, and a €50 million package to finance supplies such as fuel, protective equipment and emergency medical items. On 28 February, the Council took the corresponding decisions for two assistance measures under the EPF aimed at assisting the Ukrainian armed forces, Decision (CFSP) 2022/338 for the supply of military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force and Decision (CFSP) 2022/339 for non-lethal support.

The EPF has a financial ceiling of €5.692 billion (in current prices) for 2021‑2027, with an annual ceiling that should increase gradually every year. For 2022, the planned ceiling is €540 million. The new €500 million assistance measures to Ukraine cover 2022 and 2023 (in accordance with Article 1(4) of Decisions 2022/338 and 2022/339). An increased EPF budget is reportedly on the agenda of the informal European Council meeting of 10 and 11 March 2022, in Versailles. Member States contribute to the EPF budget annually, according to their GNI. Denmark has opted out of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and therefore does not contribute to the part of the EPF which replaces the Athena mechanism and finances common costs of the EU’s military operations under the CSDP. Following the invasion of Ukraine, on 6 March 2022, the main Danish parliamentary parties agreed that a referendum will be held on 1 June 2022 to decide on Denmark’s CSDP participation, signalling a possible ending of the Danish opt-out, although it is not yet clear whether this would impact Denmark’s position vis-à-vis the EPF. However, Denmark is planning to supply high-tech weapons to Ukraine, a decision reportedly backed by a broad majority in its parliament. Austria, Ireland and Malta, neutral Member States without CSDP opt-outs, are only contributing to non-lethal assistance measures.

On 2 December 2021, the Council adopted assistance measures for Georgia (€12.75 million) Moldova (€7 million) and Ukraine (€31 million), all for three years and aimed at strengthening the capacities of the beneficiary countries in military and defence matters, as well as promoting domestic resilience and peace. Providing military equipment to Ukraine: The clearing house

In response to the Russian attack on Ukraine, individual Member States began to supply military equipment to Ukraine earlier this year, subject to available stocks. This did not necessarily meet the needs of the Ukrainian army. In response, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) has set up a clearing house within the EUMS to coordinate supply and demand (in accordance with Article 4(2) of Decision 2022/338). Ukraine sends official lists to this clearing house, specifying the equipment needed. Clearing-house staff hold meetings with all Member States and with partners – the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, with the possibility to also involve South Korea and Norway in future – and provide information on: the equipment needed, offers, comparison, analysis of priorities and a military analysis of the evolution of the situation. Ukraine and the EU check and validate the list, after which the Member States then agree on what they will provide and each deliver the equipment and arms individually. The ongoing strategic compass process is expected to confirm the role of the EUMS in implementing the EPF-funded military assistance measures, and stress the importance of the EPF itself as a tool for EU action as a global security and peace provider.

The EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine, a non-executive civilian mission under the CSDP, began operations in December 2014. Its mandate is to contribute to the creation of an accountable and efficient civilian security sector. Due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, EUAM was forced to evacuate. The mission continues, however, to maintain contact with its Ukrainian counterparts. The fighter jets question

The Ukrainian Foreign Minister asked the EU to provide Soviet-era fighter jets, which could be operated by Ukrainian military pilots. The EU has considered providing such assistance; Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia fly or store such models. However, on 1 March 2022, Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia reportedly ruled out supplying their planes. On 6 March 2022, Poland suggested handing over its 28 MiG‑29 fighter planes to the Ukrainian armed forces, through US intermediaries, a proposal that took several forms and was the subject of diplomatic exchanges, but has not come to fruition. Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby issued a statement rejecting the plan on 8 March 2022, citing concerns it would raise a serious issue for NATO.

No plans for a no-fly zone over Ukraine, nor for NATO troops to fight in Ukraine

Ukraine has asked NATO to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine. However, on 5 March 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned NATO against the move: ‘We will consider any move in this direction as participation in the armed conflict of the country from whose territory a threat to our servicemen is created. We will consider them participants in hostilities [from] that very second’. During a press conference on 4 March 2022, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed that there would be no ‘no-fly zone’ over Ukraine and that NATO troops would not fight in Ukraine.

European Parliament position

The Parliament held an extraordinary plenary session, on 1 March 2022, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) Ruslan Stefanchuk speaking from Kyiv. Following the session, Parliament adopted a resolution calling for: the EPF to be used to allocate significant additional funding to provide Ukraine with defensive military capacity; the full and immediate implementation of the assistance measures to Ukraine decided on 2 December 2021 and 28 February 2022; tougher sanctions against Russia; and new efforts to consider Ukraine’s request for EU candidate status. The resolution also calls for an urgent reassessment of the EUAM’s mandate and for it to be updated with a military training component. Based on earlier discussions, the latter would be linked to EPF funding. Parliament also supports the strengthening of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova (EUBAM) at the border between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova/Transnistria. Further debate on the refugee situation and the EU’s role and Europe’s security situation took place in plenary on 8‑9 March 2022.

EU Member States providing equipment to Ukraine
Under the EPF, Member States can be reimbursed for both lethal and non-lethal military equipment they have sent to Ukraine since the beginning of this year. Equipment already sent or promised includes (non-exhaustive list): Belgium: 5 000 machine guns (2 000 initially, followed by 3 000), as well as body armour, helmets and fuel. Germany: 1 000 anti-tank weapons and 500 missiles. Austria: 10 000 helmets. Denmark: 2 700 weapons, shoulder-borne anti-tank weapons and protective equipment such as body armour. Spain: weapons, ammunitions, medical material and protective equipment. France: missiles, ammunitions, protective equipment and fuel. Italy: demining material and protective equipment. Netherlands: anti-tank weapons, 100 rifles, 400 missiles, ammunition, as well as radars and protective equipment. Sweden: 5 000 anti-tank rocket launchers and 5 000 bullet-proof vests. Czechia: arms, including 150 guns, 5 000 assault rifles, 2 085 other rifles, 3 200 machine guns, the corresponding ammunition, as well as medical material. Estonia: anti-tank missiles, protective equipment and medical material. Latvia: drones and ammunition. Finland: 2 500 assault rifles, ammunition, 1 500 anti-tank weapons, plus protective equipment, medical material and enhanced humanitarian support. Hungary: no lethal weapons, but a humanitarian aid package, including fuel and food.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: The EU’s financing of military assistance to Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

Summary

The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States, as well as the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. It became a formal European Union (EU) institution, with a full-time President, under the Treaty of Lisbon. Although it does not exercise legislative functions, the European Council’s role – to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development’ and to define its ‘general political directions and priorities’ – has developed rapidly over the past twelve years. The European Council President has a crucial role to play in this context.

The first term of Charles Michel, the incumbent President, comes to an end on 31 May 2022. Based on previous cycles, the decision on the (re-)election of the European Council President for the period from July 2022 to November 2024 is expected to be taken at the last formal European Council meeting before the end of the current mandate.

This briefing provides answers to some of the most frequently asked questions on the office of President of the European Council, in particular the position’s role and the election process. It also provides examples from the mandates of the three office holders to date.

1. When was the permanent office of President of the European Council created?

The office of full-time President was introduced in 2009 with the Lisbon Treaty – at the same time as the European Council became a fully fledged EU institution. It replaced the previous rotating presidency of the European Council, held by the Head of State or Government of the Member State holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers), which continues to chair most Council formations. The office was created, among other reasons, to bring more continuity and coherence to the European Council’s work.

This updates an October 2016 EPRS Briefing, ‘The choice of the President of the European Council: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)’.

2. What is the role of the European Council President?

The role of the President is set out in Article 15(6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which specifies that the President of the European Council:

• chairs the European Council and drives forward its work;
• ensures the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council;
• endeavours to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council;
• presents a report to the European Parliament after each formal meeting of the European Council.

The President of the European Council also ensures the external representation of the EU on issues concerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Herman Van Rompuy, the first full-time President of the European Council, described his role as follows:

The European Council is generally considered to be the highest political authority in the Union but the job description and formal competences of its President are rather vague, even meagre. A lot therefore depends on what you do with it or make of it! I can put it differently: everything what was not foreseen formally, had to be created informally.

3. Is the President a member of the European Council?

The European Council’s President, just like the President of the European Commission, is a member of the European Council. Article 15 TEU states that ‘the European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission’. The difference between these two categories of members is that, as opposed to the Heads of State or Government, the two presidents do not have voting rights; thus, according to Article 235(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ‘where the European Council decides by vote, its President and the President of the Commission shall not take part in the vote’.

4. How long is the President’s term of office?

Article 15(5) TEU states that the term of office of the President of the European Council is two and a half years. The same person can be re-elected once. Prior to 31 May 2022, the Heads of State or Government will need to decide whether or not to appoint Charles Michel for a second term as President, or choose someone else to succeed him. In both cases, the (re-)election process is the same. Based on previous practice, the decision is expected to be taken at the last formal European Council meeting before 31 May 2022, i.e. the spring meeting, on 24-25 March.

5. Who can replace the President if necessary?

There is no Vice-President of the European Council to provide support to the President or take over in the event that were necessary. In case of illness or death, or if the President’s term is ended due to impediment or serious misconduct in accordance with Article 15(5) TEU, the member of the European Council representing the Member State holding the rotating Council presidency replaces the President of the European Council until the election of his or her successor (Article 2(4) of the European Council Rules of Procedure).

6. Who proposes the candidate(s) for the office of President?

Neither the Treaties nor the European Council’s Rules of Procedure specify who is officially in charge of steering the nomination process and proposing the names of possible candidates. For the election and re-election of Herman Van Rompuy, it was the leader of the Member State holding the rotating Council presidency (the Swedish and Danish Prime Ministers, respectively) who collected proposals from the Heads of State or Government and sounded out the views of the other EU leaders. When considering his successor, the President himself was crucial in the selection process and proposed Donald Tusk as candidate, after seeking out the opinion of the Heads of State or Government.

When considering the re-election of Donald Tusk, it was the Head of State or Government of the Member State holding the rotating presidency at the time (i.e. the Prime Minister of Malta), who sounded out the views of the European Council members and chaired this agenda point. When looking for a successor in 2019, the process was coordinated by Donald Tusk.

7. How does the election process work?

The election of the President of the European Council is decided by qualified majority voting (Article 15(5) TEU). Using the same procedure, the European Council can also terminate his or her term of office in the case of an impediment or serious misconduct.

While decision-making by consensus is sought, this has not always been achieved. For Donald Tusk’s re-election on 9 March 2017, the Polish government voted against re-electing him, while all the others voted in favour. As a protest against Donald Tusk’s re-election, the then Polish Prime Minister, Beata Szydło, refused to agree on the conclusions, which can only be adopted by consensus; thus, for the first time, the European Council meeting ended with ‘conclusions by the President of the European Council’, as opposed to the standard European Council conclusions.

During the process of selecting his successor (and other high-level appointments at the start of the 2019 institutional cycle), Donald Tusk stressed that these decisions were to be taken by consensus, if possible, but that he ‘would not shy away from putting [them] to the vote’ if needed.

The election of the European Council’s President, as opposed to that of the Commission President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (as a member of the College of Commissioners), does not need the European Parliament’s approval (see Table 1).

PositionTreaty articleEuropean Council roleEuropean Parliament rolePresident of the European Commission17(7) TEUPropose candidateElect candidatePresident of the European Council15(5) TEUElectNoneHigh Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy18(1) TEUAppoint (with agreement of the President of the Commission)Part of the approval of the College of CommissionersTable 1 – Treaty-based roles of the European Council and the European Parliament for high-level appointments 8. Who has held the office to date?

To date, three individuals have held the office of President of the European Council: Herman Van Rompuy, Donald Tusk and Charles Michel. Herman Van Rompuy was 62 years old at the start of him term of office as President (in 2009), while Donald Tusk was 57 (2014) and Charles Michel was 43 (2019).

Figure1 – Office holders, their European political party affiliation, Member State and date of (re-)election 9. What are the criteria for choosing the President?

Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, there was no choice for the members of the European Council as to who should hold the presidency, as it was automatically the Head of State or Government of the Member State holding the rotating presidency who carried out this role. The changes introduced with Lisbon gave them the possibility to choose the person who they believed would be most suitable to hold this office.

When choosing the future President of the European Council, EU leaders take into account other factors besides the candidates’ professional experience and performance to date. Attention may notably be paid to ensuring a certain balance between political forces in the EU, Member States and gender.

This balance is partially reflected and formalised in Declaration (No 6) on Article 15(5) and (6), Article 17(6) and (7) and Article 18 TEU, which states that ‘in choosing the persons called upon to hold the offices of President of the European Council, President of the Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, due account is to be taken of the need to respect the geographical and demographic diversity of the Union and its Member States’. During the nomination process for the EU’s new institutional leadership in 2019, Donald Tusk stressed that the nominations should reflect the EU’s demography and geographical balance, but also gender and political balances.

Unlike in previous cases, the election of Charles Michel as President of the European Council in 2019 was part of a package agreed at the special European Council meeting of 30 June-3 July 2019, which also included the positions of President of the European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and President of the European Central Bank (the latter not being a political appointment).

Figure 2 – Overview of high-level office-holders since the 2009 European Parliament elections 10. What factors determine whether a President is re-elected?

When the President seeks re-election, his or her prospects depend on various factors, including how successful or unsuccessful their first term in office has been; how many supporters or critics they may have in the European Council; the extent of political support in their home country; the existence of any strong or obvious alternative candidates; and the party political balance in the European Council at the time.

11. Can the President of the European Council hold other offices?

While the Treaty clearly states that the European Council President ‘shall not hold a national office’ (Article 15(6) TEU), it does not specify that it is forbidden to hold another European office. In fact, Herman Van Rompuy, Donald Tusk and Charles Michel each also served as President of the Euro Summit while President of the European Council.

The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) lays down that ‘the President of the Euro Summit shall be appointed by the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro by simple majority at the same time as the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office’ (Article 12 TSCG). It does not specify that the President of the Euro Summit must come from a country that is part of the euro area. Donald Tusk (Poland) was President of the Euro Summit, but did not come from a country that was part of the euro area.

Merging the positions of President of the European Council and President of the European Commission

As argued by academics and mentioned in the European Parliament’s February 2017 resolution on improving the functioning of the EU, building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty, the Treaties leave open the possibility for the offices of Presidents of the European Council and of the European Commission to be held concurrently by the same person.

In his 2017 State of the Union address, then Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker proposed to merge the offices of the Presidents of the European Commission and of the European Council into a ‘double-hatted President‘, as ‘Europe would be easier to understand if one captain was steering the ship’. He added that ‘having a single President would better reflect the true nature of our European Union as both a Union of States and a Union of citizens’.

Read this briefing on ‘Role and election of the President of the European Council: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

As the March I 2022 plenary session in Strasbourg took place just two weeks after Russia launched its war on Ukraine, security and economic issues were high on the agenda. Members held a debate with Kaja Kallas, Prime Minister of Estonia, on the EU’s role in a changing world and the security situation in Europe, and debated Council and Commission statements on the deterioration of the situation of refugees fleeing Ukraine. Celebrating International Women’s Day, Members heard an address by Ukrainian author, Oksana Zabuzhko. Members also debated a number of other Commission statements: on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina; on transparency and standards in public access requests; on the need for EU action on sustainable textiles and on chronic kidney disease. Members approved the establishment of three temporary committees: a special committee on Covid‑19; an inquiry committee on the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware; and the continuation for a second one-year term of the work of the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the EU, including Disinformation (INGE). Several debates and votes on legislative files took place, inter alia on the European Semester, batteries and battery waste and the general Union environment action programme to 2030.

Batteries and waste batteries

Members debated an Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) Committee report on a European Commission proposal for a regulation on batteries and waste batteries. The ENVI committee’s report calls for even higher ambition, with a wider scope to include e-bike and other light transport batteries, and greater diligence throughout the battery lifecycle, from manufacture to recycling. Members adopted Parliament’s first-reading position, setting Parliament’s negotiating position and opening the way for interinstitutional negotiations to begin.

General Union environment programme to 2030

Members debated the EU’s climate ambitions and the eighth environment action programme – the framework for EU environmental policy to 2030. Parliament adopted the provisional agreement reached between the co-legislators, setting the priorities for EU objectives targeting a sustainable economy. The aim is to accelerate the transition to a climate-neutral economy, whilst ensuring that environmental measures do not perpetuate social and gender inequalities, and to phase out fossil fuel and other harmful subsidies.

Regional economic accounts for agriculture

Members considered, and adopted at first reading, the agreed text on the proposed overhaul of the regulation on economic accounts for agriculture, formalising regional agricultural data reporting. During the negotiations, Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) underlined the need to ensure cost-efficient agricultural data collection and avoid redundancy in data reporting.

Citizenship and residence by investment schemes

A considerable number of EU countries have offered citizenship and residence by investment schemes to those (estimated at over 132 000 people between 2011 and 2019) who are wealthy enough to pay. While investment received is estimated at €21.4 billion, the schemes bear obvious risks to sincere cooperation between EU Member States, and commodify EU rights, as well as posing security, corruption, money laundering, and tax avoidance risks. Parliament has expressed concern regarding these schemes since 2014, and Members returned to the issue to consider and adopt a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The committee report demands that the Commission come up with proposals to phase out citizenship by investment schemes completely, and propose new laws to harmonise and govern the rules on residence by investment schemes.

Foreign interference in democratic processes in the EU

Parliament has criticised countries who attempt to influence elections and other democratic processes in EU countries. Russia and China are among the best-known sources of foreign interference, but over 80 countries spread disinformation. Members heard the conclusions of the report on external attempts to influence elections and other democratic processes in EU countries from Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference (INGE). Parliament adopted a resolution based on the committee’s report, which summarises the EU’s main vulnerabilities to foreign interference, witnessed in several recent elections, and recommends a comprehensive EU strategy to develop resilience. Greater awareness of the problem should be encouraged through media literacy, by closing loopholes that allow foreign financing of political parties, and through stronger sanctions for foreign actors who interfere with our democracies. Parliament later voted to continue this work in a new special committee mandate for the coming year.

Shrinking space for civil society in Europe

A political, economic, social and cultural life in which freedom of expression and of association are respected is one guarantee of a resilient civil society. Parliament is concerned that the EU civic space has deteriorated, particularly since the pandemic, with some governments hindering civil society organisations’ participation in democratic life. Members debated and adopted a LIBE committee own-initiative report, advocating new measures, including a specific EU strategy, to protect and boost civil society organisations in the EU. The report underlines that the strategy should align with EU action in other fields, including on racism.

Role of culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism

Members also considered and adopted a Culture and Education Committee own-initiative report on the role of culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism. Considering the 2020 EU action plan on racism, the committee underlines the action still needed to combat stereotypes, develop inclusive education, raise awareness of the history of racism and ensure fair representation of ethnic minorities in the media. The committee insists that adequate resources be made available to ensure that the ambitions can be realised, and calls for the Commission to act on discrimination in sport. The committee also urges EU countries to take effective measures to prevent the media from spreading hate speech and false narratives about particular ethnic groups.

EU gender action plan III

Parliament debated elements driving gender parity in EU external policy. Members considered and adopted a report prepared by the Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and the Development (DEVE) Committees, on the third EU gender action plan, which seeks to mainstream gender equality in external policy. The report welcomes integration of the EU action plan on women, peace and security into GAP III, as well as the inclusion of climate change considerations, among other things. However, regretting the Council’s failure to endorse GAP III, it also criticises the omission of issues including women’s access to natural resources; sexual exploitation and violence; and the inclusion of women in mediation processes. Finally, it calls for more EU action to counter the effects of the pandemic on women, and greater focus on gender equality in trade and investment policy.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without vote, a mandate for negotiation from the Fisheries (PECH) Committee on the proposal for a regulation laying down conservation and management measures applicable in the Western and Central Pacific Convention Area.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – March I 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Many politicians and analysts have been arguing in recent years that, being highly vulnerable to external shocks, the European Union should boost its ‘strategic autonomy’ and/or develop a higher degree of ‘European sovereignty’. These concepts encompass a greater potential for independence, self-reliance and resilience in a wide range of fields – such as defence, security and trade, as well as in industrial, digital, economic, migration and health policies.

Russia’s military offensive in Ukraine gives this issue great urgency. In energy, the European Commission has now published plans to cut EU dependency on Russian gas by two-thirds this year and end its reliance on Russian supplies of the fuel well before 2030. And the debate is moving on to ideas and projects involving significantly more integration, solidarity and stronger joint security and defence. The EU’s strategic compass, a medium-term defence and security strategy, is being quickly updated to take into account the biggest armed conflict in Europe since World War II.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the European issues related to European strategic autonomy and sovereignty.

The European Peace Facility: Supporting Ukraine and bolstering the EU’s strategic responsibility
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2022

The EU and the Ukraine war: Making sense of the rise of a ‘geopolitical’ Union
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2022

What Russia’s war in Ukraine means for Europe
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

Russia’s war against Ukraine ends Europe’s self-deception
Carnegie Europe, March 2022

European strategic autonomy in light of Ukraine
Clingendael, February 2022

Why the Ukraine crisis should push the UK and EU into a tighter embrace on security policy
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2022

Could EU-endorsed ‘coalitions of the willing’ strengthen EU security policy?
Centre for European Reform, February 2022

Global Gateway: Positioning Europe for a sustainable future
Clingendael, February 2022

The return of US leadership in Europe: Biden and the Russia crisis
Istituto Affari Internazionali, February 2022

Ukrainian crisis: Rethinking security in Europe
Notre Europe: Jacques Delors Institute, February 2022

The UK must not dismiss European ‘strategic autonomy’
Chatham House, February 2022

Elevating the EU’s added value as a security provider
Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, January 2022

EU strategic autonomy: A perennial pipe dream?
European Policy Centre, January 2022

The European Army project: The answer to the Union’s strategic shrinkage?
Europeum, January 2022

Strategic autonomy: Not without integration
Egmont, Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, January 2022

Strategic Compass: Towards EU space strategy for security and defence
Polish Institute for International Affairs, January 2022

In the shadow of war: Ukraine and the limits of a ‘geopolitical’ EU
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2022

Construire l’autonomie stratégique de l’Europe face à la Chine
Institut Jacques Delors, December 2021

The future of European strategy in a changing geopolitical environment
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, December 2021

Strategic Autonomy: Views from the North
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, December 2021

Strategic Compass: New bearings for EU security and defence?
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, December 2021

Europe’s Strategic Compass: Merits and shortcomings
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2021

Multipolarity and EU Foreign and Security Policy: Divergent approaches to conflict and crisis response
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2021

The Global Gateway: A real step towards a stronger Europe in the world?
Bruegel, December 2021

The need for cooperative security In Europe
Brussels School of Governance, December 2021

European strategic autonomy in defence
Rand Corporation, November 2021

European reactions to AUKUS and implications for EU strategic autonomy
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2021

Instruments of a strategic foreign economic policy
Bruegel, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, DIW Berlin, November 2021

An architecture fit for strategic autonomy
Foundation for Progressive European Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, November 2021

Unpacking open strategic autonomy
Clingendael, November 2021

An architecture fit for strategic autonomy: Institutional and operational steps towards a more autonomous EU external action
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondation Jean Jaures, November 2021

European strategic autonomy and Spain’s interests
Real Instituto Elcano, November 2021

L’autonomie stratégique, cet obscur objet du désir
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2021

Building European strategic autonomy vs. Turkish strategic depth: Macron’s diplomatic gamble
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2021

Seven steps to European defence, Transatlantic equilibrium, and Global Europe
Egmont, October 2021

The Strategic Compass: Entering the fray
Egmont, September 2021

Europe’s open strategic autonomy
European Trade Union Institute, September 2021

Read this briefing on ‘EU strategic autonomy in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Cesluk-Grajewski and Nicola Censini.

On Tuesday 22 February 2022, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) organised a conference on ‘Wellbeing and Covid‑19: Life in the pandemic’.

The event, moderated by Jutta Schulze‑Hollmén, Director of Human Resources at EPRS, followed the publication of an OECD report analysing the immediate implications of the pandemic for people’s lives and livelihoods in the industrialised world. Michal Šimečka (Renew, Slovakia), Vice-President of the European Parliament opened the conference and set the scene, recalling the severe economic and social toll Covid‑19 has inflicted. During his speech, he said that ”while a useful concept, GDP does not provide a sufficiently detailed picture of the living conditions that ordinary people experience”. It is necessary, instead, ”to dwell more on the human dimension of the disease”, notably issues such as work-life balance, health, family life, education and safety, as well as a rapidly growing number of cases of depression and the feeling of social exclusion.

In her presentation, Carrie Exton, OECD Senior Expert on Well-Being Data Insights and Policy Practice, accurately highlighted some significant social and economic inequalities that emerged during the pandemic and how these are shaping and orienting people’s daily lives. At European level, the overall picture is not so optimistic. In addition to providing interesting data on jobs, health, work-life balance, safety and more, she said people suffered from increased levels of fear, worry and depression. Such feelings are a direct result of health-related anxieties, such as the possibility of being hospitalised or dying, worries about the financial situation, the complications arising from domestic family arrangements during times of lockdown and restrictions on activities and social connectedness. While negative mental health consequences affect all ages, young people in particular have been found to be at high risk of developing poor mental health. Specific groups have been particularly hard hit, including health and care workers, people with pre-existing mental health problems, and women.

During her presentation, Carrie Exton also examined the role that wellbeing evidence can play in supporting governments” pandemic recovery efforts and in redesigning policy content from a more multidimensional perspective. Proper work-life balance, culture and civil engagement are indeed important for life satisfaction. It is therefore important that institutions start to deal with these problems as soon as possible. If mental and physical wellbeing is not addressed, there might also be both mid- and long-term consequences for our societies. That is’ why it is important to actively involve citizens and stimulate the debate on what policies and tools are needed to achieve these goals.

The conference then continued with an open discussion, with the participation of Céline Nieuwenhuys, who advises the Belgian government as Secretary General of the Federation of Social Services for Brussels and Wallonia, and Miquel Oliu Barton, Visiting Fellow at the Bruegel think tank and Adviser to the French and Spanish governments.

Céline Nieuwenhuys pointed out that crises such as pandemics often lead to divisions in a society, and governments should therefore act to bridge them, notably by taking care of the most vulnerable people’. In particular, she appealed to institutions and companies to remain open to citizens, with an individual welcome at a front desk, where time is taken to solve individual problems. In her opinion, the backlash against vaccinations might have resulted in many people losing trust in governments, or even democracy in general. She also said teleworking from home was welcomed by many, but was hated by a significant part of society, for example, single mothers who had to work while also caring for their children who had to stay at home, or those with cramped spaces. She added that tele-education was not a good solution for students.

Miquel Oliu Barton, noted that ‘the right policies should seek to overcome dichotomies such lockdowns and the erosion of trust in the government and science’. While presenting his research on Covid‑19 certificates, he pointed out that governments did not greatly improve security, but they did a lot to incentivise people to get vaccinated. The vaccination uptake grew massively since the adoption of this too. Anti-Covid policies should have been better coordinated among EU Member States, he said. The coordination worked in the economic response to the pandemic, but not in health and mobility’.

In conclusion, Petra Claes, Head of Medical Preparedness and Crisis Management at the European Parliament, described how the pandemic affected the Parliament and the concrete measures taken to prevent the spread of coronavirus in recent months.

To watch this event online, please click here.

You can find the next coming EPRS online events here.

Written by Matthew Parry and Ionel Zamfir.

International condemnation of Moscow’s war on Ukraine has reached far beyond Europe, as evidenced by overwhelming support for a United Nations (UN) resolution condemning the invasion. Several countries have gone further and joined the EU in adopting sanctions against Russia or sending military aid to Ukraine.

Broad international condemnation of Russia’s invasion at the UN

On 2 March 2022, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) convened in a special session and adopted, with a broad majority (141 votes in favour, to 5 against, with 35 abstentions and 12 absentees), resolution ES‑11/1 reaffirming Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. The text largely resembles the draft resolution vetoed earlier by Russia in the UN Security Council (UNSC). Unlike UNSC resolutions, UNGA resolutions cannot be vetoed, but are non-binding. Besides Russia and Belarus, the world’s least democratic regimes – Eritrea, North Korea and Syria – also voted against the UNGA resolution. Several countries that abstained (in particular China and Pakistan, but also South Africa) emphasised the need to address the security interests of both parties to the conflict. In Africa, 17 countries abstained, including those importing Russian arms, those where the Russian Wagner Group is active, and two of the continent’s most stable democracies, Senegal and South Africa. In Latin America, unsurprisingly, authoritarian regimes with traditional strong ties with Russia – Cuba and Nicaragua – abstained, along with Bolivia and El Salvador. In Asia, India and Vietnam, both importers of Russian arms, also abstained. Some countries have called for fair treatment of third countries’ nationals at Ukraine’s borders in light of reported incidents of discrimination.

Sanctions adopted against Russia

Both the EU and the United States (US) had promised before the war that Russia would pay a steep financial price for any attack on Ukraine, and have since coordinated their restrictive measures against Russia. In four rounds of sanctions, adopted on 23 February after Russia’s recognition of the two so-called ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk, and on 25 February, 28 February and 2 March after the start of the war, the EU imposed restrictions on individuals, including Vladimir Putin and senior Russian ministers; on financial transactions with all state-controlled banks; and on trade with the energy and aviation sectors, among others. Russian aeroplanes are banned from EU airspace and EU airports. US sanctions imposed from 21 February to 3 March include restrictions on Russian state banks; full blocking sanctions on numerous Russian financial institutions and businesses, including the parent company of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline project and senior Russian and Belarussian political and business figures; and export controls on US technology. Moreover, EU countries, the US and others agreed to cut out certain Russian banks from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) financial transactions service. Discussions are ongoing in the US and the EU on a full ban on Russian oil imports.

Other countries joined the EU and the US in imposing sanctions. On 28 February, Switzerland announced a break with its long-standing policy of neutrality to mirror EU financial sanctions on Russia. On 1 and 2 March, the United Kingdom (UK) published regulations introducing new financial, trade and shipping sanctions against Russia. In addition, several allies or strategic partners of the US in the Asia-Pacific region imposed sanctions, namely Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, with Japan’s sanctions, while less far-reaching than those imposed by the EU and the US, marking a departure from previous practice. Some of the countries that voted for the UNGA resolution, such as Brazil or Turkey, have however criticised the sanctions imposed on Russia, for different reasons.

Commitment of military aid to Ukraine

Both the EU (from the off-budget European Peace Facility) and the US paired sanctions with commitments of military aid to Ukraine in the form of money and weapons (but, so far, have neither sent combat troops nor made moves to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine).

Most EU Member States have committed to provide defence aid, including Germany, which prior to the conflict refused to send lethal aid, as well as historically neutral Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden (albeit non-lethal aid in the case of the former two). These countries have been joined by non-EU countries such as Australia, Canada, North Macedonia and the UK.

Table 1: International reactions to Russia’s war on Ukraine

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: International reactions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.