Defense`s Feeds

Americas

Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems Won a $325 million deal for the repair of the Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared System used in support of the F/A-18 Super Hornet aircraft. The ATFLIR is a multi-sensor electro-optical targeting pod used to provide navigation and targeting for military aircraft in adverse weather and using precision-guided munitions such as laser-guided bombs. According to Raytheon, the system is used to provide navigation and targeting for military aircraft in adverse weather, and is intended to replace the Navy’s AN/AA-38 Nite Hawk pod. Work will take place in Texas and Floria. Estimated completion will be by May 2025.

Bell Boeing won a $10.2 million contract modification, which provides for additional repairs in support of the V-22 Common Configuration Readiness and Modernization program. Additionally, this modification provides non-recurring engineering for a drive tube engineering change proposal in support of V-22 Osprey multirole combat aircraft production. The V-22 Osprey is a tiltrotor military aircraft with both vertical takeoff and landing as well as short takeoff and landing capabilities. It has been in use by the US Army, Navy and Marine Corps and Japan’s Self-Defense Force, since 2007. There are currently about 200 Ospreys in service. Work on the contract will be performed at a variety of locations, including Fort Worth, Texas, Ridley Park, Penn., and Amarillo Texas. The expected completion date for the contract is in September 2022.

Middle East & Africa

The Egyptian Navy welcomed its third Type 209/1400 submarine to its main Ras el-Tin base in Alexandria after it completed its maiden voyage from Germany. A video released by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense showed the new submarine S 43 (867) leading the other two Type 209/1400s and two Project 033 (Improved Romeo) Class submarines that the Egyptian Navy has retained in service for the time being despite the arrival of the new boats. These were followed by the FREMM frigate Tahya Misr, which was received from France in 2015, and the two Mistral Class amphibious assault ships, which were handed over the following year. Both Mistrals carried six attack helicopters on their flight decks.

Europe

Flighting Electronics won an $18.6 million contract for the manufacture and delivery of 543 TTU-597/E engineering change proposal kits to address parts obsolescence and availability issues on the fuel control test set for Navy and Foreign Military Sales customers. Additionally, this contract provides logistics support documents to include technical manual updates, provisioning data and the interim support items list. Work will take place in New York and the UK. Expected completion will be by May 2024.

Sweden has formally launched the search for a new jet trainer aircraft, with a request for information (RFI) released by the FMV national procurement agency. The RFI seeks to source a replacement for the Swedish Air Force’s Saab 105 jet trainer aircraft that first flew in 1963 and joined the SwAF inventory in 1967. The jet trainer requirement seeks to procure new aircraft, simulators, safety equipment, and maintenance. With government authorization now granted for a replacement platform for the first phase of pilot training, the goal is to have the system in place at Malmen in Linkoping by the third quarter of 2023. SwAF flight instructors should have access to the platform before that date in order to prepare for the commencement of student training.

Asia-Pacific

A Republic of China Army (ROCA) Aviation OH-58D helicopter, #634, suffered a hard landing during a training flight at Guerin base. Two people on board, an instructor and student, were not injured. The Army is evaluating the damage, and a special taskforce will be assigned to investigate the incident, the AASFC said. All Army flight training will be suspended until the cause of the accident has been determined, the AASFC said. An Army officer, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on the matter, told CNA that the incident occurred at 3:20 p.m. at the AASFC’s Guiren base in Tainan. A flight student and his instructor were performing an emergency landing drill that simulated a situation in which the helicopter lost power, the officer said.

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Americas

The Air Force deployed four B1-B Lancer bombers and 200 airmen to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, from Texas for training operations. Three Lancers flew to Guam while one flew east of Japan to conduct training with US Navy assets operating in the region before heading to Andersen AFB, the Air Force said in a statement. The aircraft and personnel are part of the 9th Bomb Squad, 7th Bomb Wing of Dyess Air Force Base in Texas. The length of the deployment was not announced. B-1s, which can carry a larger missile payload than B-52 bombers, were last deployed to the Indo-Pacific region in 2017. “Deployments like this allow our airmen to enhance the readiness and training necessary to respond to any potential crisis or challenge across the globe,” Col. Ed Sumangil, 7th Bomber Wing commander, said in the statement. “It also provides a valuable opportunity to better integrate with our allies and partners through joint and combined operations and exercises.”

Northrop Grumman and Raytheon Missiles & Defense will partner to develop the Defense Department’s next missile interceptor, the companies announced. The joint effort is in pursuit of of a US Missile Defense Agency contract to replace the Redesigned Kill Vehicle program, which was abruptly cancelled in August 2019. Two bidders will be selected to compete for the Next Generation Interceptor program, a $664.1 million project of the MDA. The Pentagon formally issued a request for proposals in April, and will accept bids until July 31.The US military currently uses Raytheon’s Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle, which uses a ground-based interceptor missile to boost it to an intercept trajectory. It then separates from the boost vehicle and using its own rockets to correct the trajectory, collides with an incoming warhead, known as hit-to-kill.

Middle East & Africa

The Israel’s Ministry of Defense ordered 6.6-pound drones for its ground forces working in urban areas. The Rafael Spike Firefly is a “loitering munition,” also known as a kamikaze drone or suicide drone, a category in which the single-use munition loiters airborne in a target area, searches for targets, and attacks once one is located, exploding on contact. The munition weighs about 6.6 pounds. It fills a niche between cruise missiles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles, although the system chosen by the IDF is notably small and transportable by a single soldier.

Europe

General Dynamics Electric Boat won a $60.6 million contract to provide US Trident II Strategic Weapon System (SWS) ship alterations and United Kingdom SWS ship alterations for Strategic Systems Program shipboard integration installations. The Trident missile is a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). Originally developed by Lockheed Missiles and Space Corporation, the missile is armed with thermonuclear warheads and is launched from nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Trident missiles are carried by fourteen United States Navy Ohio-class submarines, with American warheads, as well as four Royal Navy Vanguard-class submarines, with British warheads. The missile is named after the mythological trident of Neptune. Work will take place Washington, Connecticut, Georgia, Florida, Virginia, Scotland and England. Estimated completion will be by April 2024.

Serbia’s 3rd missile battalion of the 250th Air Defense Missile Brigade has been equipped with the Pantsir-S1E self-propelled, medium-range surface-to-air missile system. Serbian President Aleksandar Vu?i? visited the unit on the 21st anniversary of the shot down of USAF chief of staff Gen. David Goldfein on May 2. Goldfein’s F-16 was hit by a S-125 missile fired by the unit.

Asia-Pacific

Boeing Australia has rolled out the first of three Loyal Wingman prototype unmanned aircraft. The aircraft will make its maiden flight this year. It’s the first of three prototypes for Australia’s Loyal Wingman Advanced Development Program, and the first aircraft to be designed, engineered and manufactured in Australia in more than 50 years. Loyal Wingman drones are meant to provide fighter-like performance with the capacity to fly more than 2,000 nautical miles (2,300 statute miles). The prototype unveiled today will now begin ground testing, with taxi tests and flight tests due later this year.

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Following his appointment by the EDA Steering Board on 5 March, Jiří Šedivý has officially taken over on 4 May as the Agency’s new Chief Executive for an initial 3-year mandate, extendable for two additional years. 

“It is a great honour and privilege for me to take up the position of Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency. As European defence cooperation has made significant progress over recent years with the establishment of new EU defence tools, the importance of the Agency has considerably grown. The current global COVID-19 pandemic and its economic, budgetary and security-related repercussions make EU defence cooperation even more indispensable. New challenges notwithstanding, we must preserve the continuity and dynamics in the area of collaborative defence capability development. Therefore, and perhaps more than before, we need a strong, effective and reliable Agency supporting its Member States, enhancing cooperation with all relevant EU bodies and institutions as well as partners”, Jiří Šedivý stated when taking up his duties. 
  

Defence experience 

Mr Šedivý has extensive experience in the defence domain, having served as Defence Minister of the Czech Republic (2006-2007), Deputy Defence Minister (2010-2012), NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning (2007-2010) and Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to NATO (2012-2019). 
 

More information:

• Jiří Šedivý, EDA Chief Executive

 

Americas

Northrop Grumman Systems won a $27.4 million contract modification to exercise options to procure integrated bridge and navigation systems for the DDG-51 (guided missile destroyer) New Construction Ship Program and DDG-51 Midlife Modernization Program with physical throttles kits and engineering services. The Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) Class guided missile destroyers provide a wide range of warfighting capabilities in multi-threat air, surface and subsurface environments. These ships respond to Low Intensity Conflict/Coastal and Littoral Offshore Warfare (LIC/CALOW) scenarios as well as open-ocean conflict independently or as units of Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), Surface Action Groups (SAG), and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG). Work will take place in Charlottesville, Virginia. The integrated bridge and navigation system is a hull, mechanical and electrical upgrade. It is part of the comprehensive plan to modernize the DDG-51 class to ensure the ships remain combat relevant and affordable throughout their life. Estimated completion will be by August, 2021.

Raytheon won $17.2 million for dual band radar systems engineering in support of CVN 78. According to the company, the dual band radar is the first radar system in the US Navy fleet capable of operating on the S-band and X-band frequency at the same time. DBR systems allow unmanned operation of and uses commercial off-the-shelf technology for signal and data processing. CVN 78 is the lead ship of her class of aircraft carriers. Work will take place in Rhode Island and Massachusetts. Estimated completion will be by February 2022.

Middle East & Africa

Point Junction Car Rental won a $95 million contract for lease vehicle services at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, the Pentagon announced. This is a non-personal services contract to provide vehicle lease service for the Expeditionary Logistic Readiness Support Squadron. Completion date is November 30, 2024. Work is the result of a competitive acquisition with 21 offers received. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $30,713 will be obligated at the time of award.

Europe

The German Navy reported that its U212A diesel submarine U33 had moved to Kiel earlier the same day to be placed in drydock after the crew found a leak while at sea the previous week. ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems’ Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft shipyard, which built the submarine, will repair the leak in one of the U33’s torpedo tubes, which could not be precisely located at sea, the German Navy said. The German Navy expects the U33 to return to sea no later than May 11 to continue normal operations.

Asia-Pacific

Lockheed Martin won a $19.5 million contract modification for the procurement of the Korean Gun Computing System development, software, and hardware and subassemblies for installation. The modification will finalize the Korean Gun Computing System interface design specifications for the integration with the Aegis combat system. The Aegis Combat System is an American integrated naval weapons system. The heart of the system is the AN/SPY-1, an advanced, automatic detect and track, multi-function phased-array radar. Work will take place South Korea, New Jersey and Florida. Expected completion will be by July 2026.

DRS Laurel Technology won a $11.8 million modification to exercise options for procurement of AN/USQ-82(V) hardware in support of DDG-51 (guided missile destroyer) class new construction, DDG-51 class modernization, and Aegis Ashore Japan. Aegis Ashore is the land-based variant of the Navy’s Aegis Weapons System. The AN/USQ-82(V) Program is a control system network. Its purpose is to transfer mission critical data to and from users associated with combat, navigation, aviation, power, propulsion, steering, alarms indicating and damage control systems. Work will take place in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Estimate completion will be by August 2021.

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Americas

Lockheed Martin won a $6.1 billion contract for incidental services, hardware, facilities, equipment and all technical, planning, management, manufacturing and testing efforts to produce Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (PATRIOT) Advanced Capability-3 missiles, missile segment enhancement configuration and associated ground support equipment and spares. The PATRIOTs in question, commonly known as “PATRIOT PAC-3,” comprise only the missile portion of the PATRIOT air defense system. Lockheed peer Raytheon produces the missile’s launcher system and its radar tracker. In addition to the US military, nine allied nations, including Bahrain, Germany, Japan, Korea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Sweden, and the United Arab Emirates have signed agreements to procure PAC-3 MSE interceptors from Lockheed. Work will take place in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Massachusetts, Texas and Pennsylvania. Estimated completion date is June 30, 2027.

Honeywell International won a $11 million contract for the purchase and repair of one spare part supporting the AN/TPQ-50 Counterfire Target Acquisition Radar System. The AN/TPQ-50 is a US Army Program of Record that provides early warning for indirect fire and counterfire target acquisition support. The system has proven to be exceptionally effective at providing early warning and location of rocket and mortar threats facing the warfighter. The AN/TPQ-50 is part of the LCMR family of radars that SRC produces for counterfire missions. Work will take place in Florida. Estimated completion date is April 29, 2025.

Middle East & Africa

Kratos Technology & Training Solutions won a $16.1 million contract supporting all levels of In-Kingdom Royal Saudi Naval Forces training, logistical and advisory services in support of the Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity. Kratos Technology & Training Solutions, Inc. provides information technology services. The Company delivers management software products, as well as offers implementation and consultative services. The contract will include a six-month base period with an additional three-month period option and a 15-day period for demobilization which, if exercised, will bring the total value to $25.6 million.  Saudi Arabian funds in the amount of $16.1 million will be obligated at the time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Saudi Arabian funds will be used under the Foreign Military Sales program. Work will take place in Saudi Arabia and California. The base period of performance is expected to be complete by November 2020; if options are exercised, work will be complete by February 2021.

Europe

Lockheed Martin won a $129.2 million contract modification, which procures the kits required for modification and retrofit activities of delivered Air Force and government of Norway F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. In November 2008, the Norwegian government selected the F-35 as the replacement for the F-16 fleet. And in September 2015, the first F-35A was unveiled before Norwegian and US government officials and Lockheed Martin leadership at a formal ceremony at the Lockheed Martin production facility in Fort Worth, Texas. Work will take place in Nashua, New Hampshire; Fort Worth, Texas; and Baltimore, Maryland. Work is expected to be complete by April 2025.

Asia-Pacific

The DoS approved a possible Foreign Military Sale for six AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and related equipment for an estimated cost of $1.5 billion.The AH-64E Apache is a twin-seat, twin-turboshaft attack helicopter. The E variant is a recent upgrade, expanding the engine, armament, and on-board connectivity capabilities. The E variant is capable of controlling unmanned aerial vehicles and has a greater payload capacity along with more sophisticated datalinks. The Philippines is considering either the AH-1Z or the AH-64E to modernize its attack helicopter capabilities. The proposed sale will assist the Philippines in developing and maintaining strong self-defense, counterterrorism, and critical infrastructure protection capabilities. The Philippines will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and support into its armed forces.

The DoS also approved a Foreign Military Sale to the Philippines of six AH-1Z attack helicopters and related equipment for an estimated cost of $450 million. The AH-1Z Viper is a twin-engine attack helicopter that is smaller than the Apache and a lower payload capacity. The Philippines armed forces would incorporate the proposed attack helicopters for use in counterterrorism and critical infrastructure protection missions. The United States has supported the Philippines in counterterrorism in recent years, including with logistical and intelligence support. Both proposed sales “will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country that continues to be an important force for political stability, peace, and economic progress in South-East Asia,” the DSCA noted in its releases.

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Americas

Physical Optics won a $17.8 million order, which provides non-recurring engineering for the production, test, integration and delivery of the T-45 Head-Up Display (HUD) and its associated internal software. The T-45A/C Goshawk is the US Navy’s two-seat advanced jet trainer. The aircraft is jointly manufactured by Boeing and BAE Systems. The T-45A was selected to meet the US Navy requirement for an undergraduate jet pilot trainer to replace the TA-4J Skyhawk and T-2C Buckeye. The TA-4J was retired in 2003 and the T-2C in August 2008. Work will take place in Torrance, California. Estimated completion date is in April 2022.

An initial report by the US Air Force into the use of contractor-operated boom-type tankers has found legal, regulatory, and financial challenges. Thus, Air Force Secretary Barbara Barrett has given Air Mobility Command another 60 days to better understand those legal and financial issues. The service was keen to have a contractor-operated boom-type tanker support aerial refueling for test and training missions. Private companies are supposed to supply one aircraft equipped with boom and hose and drogue refueling for refueling duties at around 1,100 sorties a year.

Middle East & Africa

The US Army has named FN America LLC and Colt’s Manufacturing Co. LLC as competitors in its $383.3 million contract to supply M16 rifles to Afghanistan, Iraq, Grenada, Lebanon and Nepal. The M16A4 is the fourth generation of the M16 series of military rifles. The US has approved the sale of 80000 and 4400 M16A4 rifles to Iraq in 2008 and 2017, and 891 of them to Afghanistan in 2016. Bids were solicited via the internet with three received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of April 28, 2025. Starting 2015, the US military began replacing the M16 with a shorter and lighter version, the M4 carbine.

Europe

CFM International won a $13.6 million contract modification, which exercises an option to procure one CFM56-7B27AE commercial-off-the-shelf engine for the government of the United Kingdom. CFM International is a joint venture between GE Aviation and Safran Aircraft Engines. The joint venture has delivered 30,700 engines to more than 570 operators and has 13,700 engines in backlog. Work will take place in France, North Carolina and is expected to be complete by April 2021. Foreign Military Sales funds in the amount of $13,582,486 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

Saab has successfully completed the first air trials with its new fighter X-band Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, which will be offered as a new addition to Saab’s PS-05/A radar family. Saab continues to develop core AESA technology and has now successfully completed the first air trials with the new X-band AESA radar. The trials were flown successfully, collecting data while detecting and tracking objects. The radar is designed for fighter aircraft and can be adapted to a variety of platforms. As Saab previously announced, a version of the new AESA antenna has been sold to the US. Government customer. “This is an important step in the development of our new fighter AESA radar. We see great possibilities for the radar, and its modular, adaptable and scalable design means it can also be used for a range of other applications”, says Anders Carp, SVP and head of Saab’s business area Surveillance.

Asia-Pacific

South Korean shipbuilder Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) has launched the fourth of eight Daegu (FFX-II) Class guided-missile frigates on order for the Republic of Korea Navy. Named Donghae, the 122.1 m-long warship entered the water during a ceremony held on April 29 at HHI’s facilities in the southeastern coastal city of Ulsan, and is expected to be handed over to the service in late 2021. The Daegu class is a larger variant of South Korea’s six Incheon (FFX-I) Class ships, the first of which entered service in 2013. The class has an overall beam of 14 m, a standard displacement of 2,800 tonnes, and a full-loaded displacement of 3,650 tonnes. Each FFX-II ship is powered by one Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbine engine and two Leonardo DRS permanent magnet motors driven by MTU 12 V 4000 diesel-generator sets in a combined diesel-electric or gas (CODLOG) configuration. Each of the ships can attain a maximum speed of 30 kt.

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Americas

Lockheed Martin won a $13.1 million to provide engineering and management services for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)-19 Post Shakedown Availability (PSA). LCS-19 is a Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship. The Freedom Class are small and fast vessels, intended to operate in littoral zones, for example close to the shore. These are designed to combat with small craft, rather than equal warships. These ships are designed to have a shallow draft and operate at high speed. Work will take place in New Jersey, Florida, Virginia, Washington DC. Work is scheduled to be finished by September 2021.

Boeing won a $9.7 million contract modification provides engineering, manufacturing and development support to integrate BRR3.1 software to the Next Generation Jammer on Boeing EA-18G Growler carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft, resulting in BRR3.1 software initial operating capability. EA-18G Growler is an airborne electronic attack (AEA) aircraft, which operates from either an aircraft carrier or from land-bases. The Growler was developed as a replacement for the United States Navy EA-6B Prowler aircraft that entered service in 1971 and is approaching the end of operational life. Work will take place in St. Louis, Missouri, and is expected to be complete by December 2020.

Middle East & Africa

The United Arab Emirates’ first of potentially five GlobalEye swing-role surveillance aircraft has touched down in Abu Dhabi following a delivery flight from Linkoping, Sweden. Saab said that it had commenced deliveries of the Bombardier Global 6000 business jet-based platform that were contracted to the UAE Air Force and Defense (AF&D) under the Swing Role Surveillance System award from late 2015. Deliveries of the remaining two aircraft are set to run through to the end of 2021, while an anticipated contract for two additional platforms has not yet been signed. The ground systems had already been handed over to the UAE AF&D, ahead of the aircraft arrival. The GlobalEye is built around the Saab Erieye Extended Range (ER) radar that is housed in the same external dorsal ‘plank’ as the company’s original Erieye system. Equipped with Gallium Nitride (GaN) and other technologies, the Erieye ER is an active electronically scanned array (AESA) system that doubles the radar’s power efficiency compared with previous Erieye iterations. It has a range in excess of 650 km that can be extended by focusing the radar’s energy.

Europe

General Electric has won $707.3 million to supply F110 engines to power F-16 fighter jets of Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Taiwan. The contract includes F110-GE-129 engine production, provision of installs and spares and modernized engine management system computers. According to GE, the F110 powers more than 70 percent of the Air Force’s F-16C/D aircraft, and the 129 variant offers significant mission advantages, including significant additional thrust, for F-15 and F-16 aircraft. For Qatar, the engines will power the twin-engined Boeing F-15QT. Work will take place in Cincinnati and is expected to be finished by December 31.

German defense minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and her French counterpart, Florence Parly, have signed a framework agreement on the Franco-German Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), Germany’s Federal Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on its website on April 28, describing this as “an important signal for European defense co-operation”. The system will replace German Leopard 2 and French Leclerc main battle tanks (MBTs) starting in the mid-2030s.

Asia-Pacific

The delivery of KM-SAM Block I, developed by South Korea’s Agency of the Defense Development, to the Republic of Korea Air Force (RoKAF) has been completed. The KM-SAM, which is also known as the Cheongung, the first indigenously developed mid-range surface-to-air guided missile, is capable of striking a hostile aircraft at an altitude of up to 40 kilometers. Dubbed the “Korean Patriot,” the system has been deployed since 2015, after the Agency of the Defense Development completed its development in 2011, according to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration.

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One more policy brief from the series on Russian strategic culture and leadership decision-making, written for a collaborative project organized by the Marshall Center with support from the Russia Strategy Initiative. This one is on Russia-China military cooperation.  Several sections of this brief are based on previous work on Russia-China cooperation that was co-authored with Michael Kofman, Paul Schwartz, and Katherine Baughman.

As with the previous ones, I am posting the full text here with permission from the Marshall Center. Please go to the newly updated Marshall Center website if you would prefer to read a PDF version.

Executive Summary

• Since 2014, Russia and China have developed a strategic partnership, primarily due to enhanced military cooperation, including sales of advanced military equipment and an increasingly robust program of bilateral and multi-lateral military exercises. Economic and diplomatic cooperation have also increased, though to a much lesser extent.
• Bilateral cooperation is unlikely to advance to the level of a full alliance because of differences in geopolitical interests and asymmetries of power, with Russia remaining reluctant to fully acknowledge China’s geopolitical rise.
• Actions by the United States to pressure both Russia and China have the effect of pushing the two countries closer together. To prevent a closer partnership, the United States should focus on creating areas of policy divergence between the two states.

Introduction

There is widespread consensus among scholars that, although Russia and China have been moving toward closer cooperation through the entire post-Soviet era, the trend has accelerated rapidly since 2014.1 The relationship was boosted by Russian leaders’ belief that Russia could survive its sudden confrontation with the West only by finding an alternative external partner. China was the obvious candidate because it had a suitably large economy, was not openly hostile to Russia, and was not planning to impose sanctions in response to the Ukraine crisis.

Since 2014, the bilateral relationship has been focused on increased military cooperation, closer economic ties, and an increase in coordination on responses to various issues in international politics. Although some advances have occurred in all three areas, military cooperation has advanced the most. As discussed in more detail later in this paper, Russia and China have institutionalized a comprehensive mechanism for military consultation, expanded military technical cooperation initiatives and military personnel exchanges, and expanded regular joint military exercises. In the diplomatic sphere, Russia and China have supported each other in various international organizations and worked to establish new international institutions that could act as alternatives to existing Western-dominated institutions.2

Although economic cooperation is the weakest aspect of the Russia-China alignment, it has progressed a great deal, particularly in the energy field. “China is eager to increase energy relations with Russian companies,… [while] Russian concern over its increased dependence on China in the East is deemed secondary to expanding Russia’s customer base beyond the still dominant European market.”3 At the same time, there have been limits to this cooperation, particularly in the economic and financial sectors outside of the energy sphere. China refused to help Russia overcome the effects of Western economic sanctions and bilateral trade and trade in national currencies has remained limited, with little diversification of trade and investments. On the political side, neither country has shown itself to be prepared to support the other’s geopolitical interests if doing so would hurt its own interests.4

This policy brief focuses primarily on strategic and military cooperation, where the two sides have made the greatest progress. After briefly discussing the prospects for a strategic partnership between Russia and China, I examine the progress in and remaining constraints on expanding bilateral military cooperation, outline three scenarios for future cooperation in this sphere, and conclude with a discussion of how the United States should respond.

Strategic Partnership?

As bilateral cooperation has progressed, analysts have increasingly examined whether the Russia-China relationship has reached a level of strategic partnership. The growing consensus is that it has.5 According to Alexander Korolev, the partnership is neither ad hoc nor temporary and provides clear benefits for both sides: “Through this partnership, Russia can gain access to more instruments for promoting its agenda of balancing the United States and enhancing its version of multi-polarity in Europe. China, in turn, receives Russia’s political backing and access to Russia’s energy resources and military technologies, which are essential assets for China in its growing tensions with the U.S. in Asia.”6  Some Russian scholars are even more optimistic about the trajectory of the relationship, suggesting that, over time, the two states might even develop an alliance.7

At the same time, there is a similar consensus forming that the current upward trend in Russia-China strategic cooperation should not be viewed as irreversible. In particular, scholars note that, should Russia’s challenge to the United States start to destabilize the international system, it may also jeopardize China’s peaceful rise. This would lead to a divergence in the countries’ interests and potentially cause a rift between the two powers to emerge.8 Some scholars argue that the geopolitical and economic factors that have hindered Russia’s past Asian pivots could have a similar effect again, although this is distinctly a minority position. One possibility proposed by analysts who hold this view is that a future leadership transition in Russia might result in a policy shift back toward a preference for closer relations with Europe, undermining the long-term prospects of Russia’s partnership with China.9

Central Asia represents one potential area of tension between Russia and China, because the two states have formulated competing regional influence projects for the region. As a result, some analysts believe that the two countries may be heading toward a strategic rivalry caused by China’s increasing desire to play a role in Central Asian security and by competition over energy export routes and trade connectivity in general.10 A more likely scenario, however, is that the two countries will maintain a division of responsibilities that allows them to continue to cooperate in the region, with Russia taking primary responsibility for security issues while China focuses on economic development.11

The global coronavirus pandemic initially introduced another source of tension into the Russia-China relationship, especially since Russia moved quickly in late January to close its borders with China. This move was seen by some observers as an indicator of a lack of trust in Chinese information, since China at the time was still making an effort to minimize the scope and threat of the epidemic. At the same time, the almost immediate decision to reopen the border to commercial traffic highlighted Russia’s dependence on Chinese goods.12 As it turned out, even this partial closure proved to be economically damaging, especially in the Russian Far East.13 However, any residual tension was overcome once China largely ended community spread of the virus. Once the threat of spread was over, the two countries developed complementary information campaigns designed to highlight their mutual assistance in the crisis and the superiority of authoritarian systems over democratic ones in marshalling resources to fight the pandemic.14

Future of Bilateral Military Cooperation

Russian senior officials have highlighted the special nature of Russia’s defense relationship with China by characterizing the ties in terms of a strategic partnership. As the two countries have expanded the number of military exercises and consultations while deepening military technical cooperation, analysts have suggested a growing alignment between the two countries at a political level that allows for stronger defense ties. This does not mean that Russia and China are about to enter a military alliance. As cogently argued by Michael Kofman, Russian and Chinese leaders have labeled the relationship a strategic alliance because a military alliance is not needed, given that the two countries do not need each other for security guarantees or extended nuclear deterrence. That said, they have sought to make their ties more formal, as shown by the 2017 agreement on a three-year road map to establish a legal framework to govern military cooperation. This framework is expected to be completed and signed later in 2020, further codifying various aspects of defense ties, including the option of conducting joint long-range aviation patrols.15

Military Technical Cooperation

Although China was Russia’s leading client for military hardware in the 1990s and early 2000s, the arms sales relationship sharply declined after 2006 because of a combination of Chinese unhappiness with Russian pricing policies and the poor maintenance record of Russian equipment, as well as Russian concerns about China’s tendency to reverse-engineer Russian equipment for both its own use and export abroad. Russian arms sales to China saw a modest revival post-2011 but expanded most substantially after the Ukraine crisis, with agreements for the sale of S-400 air defense systems and Su-35 combat aircraft signaling the end of Russia’s informal ban on sales of advanced weapon systems to China.16 In October 2019, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was helping China develop its own ballistic missile early warning system. Russia’s new willingness to share information related to strategic nuclear weapons highlights the extent to which old sensitivities about sharing advanced military technology with China has dissipated in recent years.17 Russia has also turned to China for electronic components and naval diesel engines that it could no longer obtain from the West. Most significantly, military cooperation and defense ties improved as defense sales declined, making clear that such ties are driven at the senior political level and not tied to arms sales.

However, Russia faces a difficult choice this decade in either providing advanced technology to China, knowing that the technology will most likely be copied, or forgoing arms sales but with the expectation that China’s defense sector will develop comparable systems in the near future. The previous Russian arms export strategy of selling the “second-best” technology available while staying a generation ahead is no longer viable. China’s defense industry has sufficiently caught up with or worked around Russia via defense-cooperation deals with other countries that it is now only interested in the most-advanced Russian weapons available. China’s advances in weapon design and general goal of self-sufficiency in military production suggest that Russian arms sales will never reach the peak achieved in the early 2000s and that China will emerge as a stronger arms market competitor to Russia over time.

Military Exercises

Military exercises are a central pillar of bilateral military relations. Moscow and Beijing have recently been rapidly expanding the scale and pace of their joint exercise activity far beyond the two traditional programs, the Peace Mission ground forces exercises in Central Asia and the Joint Sea naval exercises. Both of the long-standing exercise programs have had an anti-U.S. character, with gradually increasing levels of complexity and joint activity. However, the exercises have been criticized for being overly scripted and poorly coordinated, as well as for continuing to lack a joint command structure.18 These criticisms are not necessarily warranted, as the purposes of the exercises are primarily to build military ties at the senior level and to signal political intentions rather than to establish interoperability. There has been no evidence that Russia and China intend to operate in a joint command structure; such a structure would not make sense for two countries that have not entered a formal military alliance.

The naval exercises between Russia and China have been more effective in terms of providing realistic operational experience, although they have not focused particularly on interoperability between the two navies. Naval exercises are not only becoming more frequent but also are being held in new geographical areas. Before the Ukraine crisis, Russia refused to hold bilateral exercises in such controversial territories as southern China near Taiwan. Since 2015, however, naval exercises have been held in areas such as the Baltic and South China Seas as a way of signaling the two countries’ growing power, expanding military ties, and mutual displeasure with the United States.19 Recent trilateral exercises with Iran represent another example of this steady expansion in the use of exercises for political signaling, now including third nations.20 Given China’s desire to be more visible in the European maritime theater, one can expect an increase in exercises that serve the Chinese desire to show its flag in distant waters.

Since 2015, the two countries have expanded their repertoire of exercises, including adding joint missile defense exercises in response to the U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. Most observers are aware of growing Chinese participation in Russian strategic exercises, including Vostok-2018 and Tsentr-2019. A joint Russian-Chinese bomber patrol in July 2019 demonstrated that Moscow is increasingly willing to disregard the interests of other states in the Asia-Pacific region in its pursuit of a closer military relationship with China.21

These exercises are primarily focused on setting a positive tone for military-to-military ties at the highest levels, rather than increasing interoperability at the tactical level. The exercises suggest that Russian-Chinese military cooperation in the air domain, which lags naval exercises, will increase. Stronger participation of Chinese air assets in Tsentr-2019 further substantiates this observed trend.22 Space is the next likely frontier for expanding cooperation, although it may be limited given sensitivities about the technologies involved in this domain.

Limitations on Bilateral Military Cooperation

Despite steady progress over the past decade, there remain significant geopolitical and technical constraints on military cooperation between Russia and China. Although senior Chinese and Russian officials repeatedly and publicly affirm that their relationship is characterized by great trust, in reality, a lack of mutual trust remains an obstacle to more robust cooperation. Although Russia and China formally settled the last of their border disputes in 2008, there are still regions where the two sides’ geopolitical interests may not align in the long term. Russia remains concerned over potential Chinese encroachment into the Russian Far East. Russia’s concerns are fueled by a combination of past Chinese claims to territory Russia annexed in the 1800s and the contrast between the sparsely populated Russian Far East and the densely populated Chinese border regions, which have generated ongoing Chinese immigration. A military incursion is seen as unlikely by Moscow relative to the more insidious problem of what Russian leaders fear could prove to be (1) a creeping annexation, in which China projects influence into parts of the Russian Far East on a de facto basis through a large influx of illegal Chinese immigrants, and (2) a steady reorientation of the Russian Far East toward more economically attractive Chinese markets and away from the distant center of power in Moscow.

As the relative balance of influence in Central Asia continues to shift more in favor of China, the potential for the two sides to clash over interests in the region remains significant. Beijing has steadily supplanted Russia as the principal economic power in Central Asia in terms of investment and lending. Still, countries in the region continue to look primarily to Russia to defend their security interests; additionally, Russia remains the principal labor market for this region.

Thus far, this de facto division of labor has enabled Russia and China to maintain a reasonably stable working relationship in Central Asia, such that they do not step on each other’s vital national interests or security concerns. However, as China’s Belt and Road Initiative develops, its economic footprint in Central Asia is likely to grow larger, which could lead to tensions between Beijing and Moscow.

Russia has sought to play a key role in the development of the Arctic region; in particular, it plans to capitalize on new energy sources, as well as the opening of the Northern Sea Route. While Moscow has been willing to work with other members of the Arctic Council, Russia has been reluctant to allow non-Arctic powers, such as China, to play a major role in the region. By contrast, a resource-hungry China has plans to extend its presence to the Arctic and is building its first domestically-produced icebreaker. Although none of these geopolitical concerns are currently likely to cause tensions that could limit military cooperation between Russia and China, they could be factors in the long term.

The asymmetry in economic power between the two countries, including their potential regional influence and global heft, has grown more visible. Furthermore, Russian strategic culture, long having seen itself as superior to China, is visibly struggling with the new realities of this power balance. As a result, Russian political elites have yet to come to terms with China’s rise. Finally, both countries are deeply nationalistic and prestige-seeking, which means neither would be particularly willing to subordinate its military to the leadership of the other. Russian leaders’ desire to maintain an independent foreign policy means that they will not accept Chinese leadership or impose limitations on their relationships with other countries for the sake of Chinese foreign policy. Although the two countries seek to manage conflict over core interests, most international competition is seen as fair game, whether it is arms sales or foreign direct investment.

Russia and China have placed a low priority on achieving greater interoperability during joint military exercises, reflecting an enduring lack of interest on the part of both sides in developing the kind of integrated military capability needed to conduct effective joint military operations.23 At the tactical level, issues such as language and communication highlight that these are decidedly different military structures, with different planning processes and organizational cultures. This limits what the Chinese are able to learn from their counterparts.

China is seen as a predatory power by many Russian experts, so there is a natural degree of apprehension among the Russian military. General Staffs plan contingencies around capabilities, because intent can change. This is especially so when dealing with another great power that is self-admittedly revisionist in its ambitions. Despite the positive outlook of Russia’s national leadership on the benefits of a growing Sino-Russian alignment, the military establishment will always see the Chinese military as a potential adversary and plan accordingly.

Scenarios for Future Russia-China Military Cooperation

The impact of various scenarios for the development of Russia-China military cooperation on U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region is inversely correlated with their likelihood. That is, the most likely scenarios are relatively low impact, while the highest-impact scenarios are very unlikely to develop. In this section, I outline three scenarios for future military cooperation between Russia and China.

Low Impact, High Probability

In a low-impact, high-probability scenario, Russia and China expand their military cooperation by holding additional joint naval exercises with countries that are seen as adversarial to the United States and expanding the visibility of their maritime presence both in the Pacific and the Mediterranean regions. As noted earlier, previous joint naval exercises have been conducted in the South China Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Baltic Sea, and future theaters could include other areas within the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Expanded exercises in these regions would serve the two countries’ respective purposes, as Russia seeks greater visibility in the Asia-Pacific and China seeks greater visibility in the European maritime theater.

Both countries seek to reciprocate U.S. freedom-of-navigation operations to the extent possible by visiting the Western Hemisphere. Russia and China could agree to hold a naval exercise in the Caribbean Sea, hosted by Venezuela or Cuba. Such an exercise would have little long-term impact on either Russia’s or China’s geopolitical influence in Latin America and it would not do much to improve their military capabilities or naval interoperability. It would, however, generate a great deal of media attention, highlighting the countries’ ostensible global reach and potential strategic partnership. In other words, both countries could feel that they had scored a propaganda win at relatively low cost, but the actual impact on regional security would be negligible.

Medium Impact, Medium Probability

A medium-impact, medium-probability scenario might focus on additional sales of Russian advanced military equipment. The most interesting systems for China would include diesel-electric submarines, over-the-horizon radar systems, early warning systems, space-related technology for satellites, microchips, and next-generation aircraft engines. In return, Russia might accelerate the purchase of Chinese defense-industrial components, such as heavy-lift cranes, machine tools, and circuitry board components and parts. Although Russia would benefit substantially from procuring Chinese surface combatant vessels, given the shortcomings in those parts of the Russian defense-industrial complex, the financial interests of Russia’s domestic defense industry would likely prevent such deals from being made.

The two countries could also build on Russia’s recent sale to China of S-400 long-range air defense systems to agree to the sale of Russian S-500 air defense systems once those come online. S-500 systems would have a longer range than existing systems owned by China and may have the capability of defending against a wider range of missile types. These capabilities would lead to a significant improvement in Chinese air defense capabilities versus the United States and its allies. China would seek to acquire the 40N6 extended-range (400-km) missile, which has reached initial operating capability with the S-400, either as part of an S-500 deal or on its own for China’s existing S-400 systems.

High Impact, Low Probability

A number of highly unlikely but potentially very damaging scenarios present themselves. One such area would involve greater Russian-Chinese defense industrial cooperation on sensitive technology, such as theater hypersonic weapons or submarine quieting. Although military establishments on both sides would almost certainly resist allowing the other side access to such technology, if such cooperation did develop, it would substantially affect the ability of the United States to maintain a favorable regional military balance and retain a technological edge in certain domains over China. One possibility for enhanced defense cooperation that has been discussed in recent years, though with little progress to date, is a potential technology transfer deal in which Moscow would provide Beijing with the RD-180 rocket engine in exchange for space-grade microelectronic components.24 Past discussion centered on trading finished equipment, but a  closer relationship between Russia and China may result in consideration of exchanging production technology in the future. Such a deal would increase China’s lift capacity and Russia’s ability to produce advanced guidance and control systems.

Another scenario in this category is a joint military intervention, most likely in a Central Asian country in the event of a political crisis or instability, because Russia and China have previously conducted exercises to deconflict areas of responsibility in this type of scenario. However, one should not exclude the possibility of a joint Russian-Chinese intervention in Africa or the Middle East. While the countries lack core interests in these regions, the cost and risk of intervention is also dramatically lower and the barrier for entry in such operations is not especially high. Both countries have the expeditionary capacity to conduct relatively small force deployments around much of the world and might well seek to do so together in response to a contingency where their interests align.

The least likely, but nonetheless possible, scenario is a military crisis with the United States in which one country takes advantage of a situation to press for geopolitical gains. For example, in the event of a standoff between the United States and China, Russia would seek to leverage the distraction of the United States to make opportunistic gains. Russia could deploy forces to Asia or provide military assistance via deniable means to China in order to raise costs to the United States. Because China is quite remote from Europe, the likelihood of Chinese involvement in a crisis between Russia and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe is too low to be worth considering.

How Should the United States Respond?

There is a general perception among experts that greater cooperation between Russia and China is inevitable, given the core precepts of present-day U.S. foreign policy. Scholars focused on relative power suggest that the two countries will inevitably balance against the most powerful country in the international system.25 Furthermore, U.S. efforts to pursue a hard line against either Russia or China, and especially against both at the same time, have the effect of driving the two countries closer together. For some scholars, this suggests that accommodating them within the existing international order would be a more effective response.26 Scholars focused on the role played by ideas highlight the perceived threat of liberal ideology and suggest that if the United States reduces its emphasis on democracy promotion and regime change, this would reduce the impetus to Russian-Chinese cooperation.27

In this geopolitical environment, actions by the United States that threaten Russia and China in a similar manner or present a common security challenge will have the effect of driving the two countries closer together. This is especially true if the actions are strategic in nature. Examples of such actions include the deployment of missile defense systems or freedom-of-navigation operations near the shores of either Russia or China. Both of these actions create a perception among Russian and Chinese leaders that they share a common global security challenge from the United States—and one that is serious enough that they would be best served by facing it together.

On the other hand, actions that disaggregate the nature of the threat perceived by Russian and Chinese leaders would help create divergence in their interests and thereby slow the trend toward a closer bilateral relationship. For example, the United States could challenge Russia in ways that are exclusive to the European theater, such as by pulsing additional troops to NATO member states for exercises. Similarly, China could be challenged in the regions of Taiwan and Southeast Asia rather than in East Asia or maritime territories adjacent to Russian territory. Russian relations with such countries as Vietnam and India could be exploited to highlight potential tensions between Russia and China.

Notes

1 Alexander Gabuev, Friends with Benefits? Russian-Chinese Relations After the Ukraine Crisis, Carnegie Moscow Center, June 29 2016, https://carnegie.ru/2016/06/29/friends-with-benefits-russian-chinese-relations-after-ukraine-crisis-pub-63953.

2  Alexander Korolev, “How Closely Aligned Are China and Russia? Measuring Strategic Cooperation in IR,” International Politics, May 2019.

3 Tom Røseth, “Russia’s Energy Relations with China: Passing the Strategic Threshold?” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2017, pp. 23–55.

4 Mikhail Korostikov, Дружба на расстоянии руки: Как Москва и Пекин определили границы допустимого [“Friendship at Arms’ Length: How Moscow and Beijing Determined the Boundaries of the Permissible”], Kommersant, May 31, 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3984186.

5 Tom Røseth, “Moscow’s Response to a Rising China: Russia’s Partnership Policies in Its Military Relations with Beijing,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 66, No. 4, 2019, pp. 268–286.

6 Korolev, 2019, p. 29.

7 Vassily Kashin, “Is the Conflict Inevitable? Not at All. How Reasonable Are Western Expectations of a Russia-China Confrontation?” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2017

8 Andrej Krickovic, “The Symbiotic China-Russia Partnership: Cautious Riser and Desperate Challenger,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2017, pp. 299–329.

9 Chris Miller, “Will Russia’s Pivot to Asia Last?” Orbis, Winter 2020. See also Mikhail Karpov, “The Grandeur and Miseries of Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’: Russian-Chinese ‘Strategic Partnership’ in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis and Western Sanctions,” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2018.

10 Carla P. Freeman, “New Strategies for an Old Rivalry? China–Russia Relations in Central Asia After the Energy Boom,” Pacific Review, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2018, pp. 635–654.

11 Liselotte Odgaard, “Beijing’s Quest for Stability in Its Neighborhood: China’s Relations with Russia in Central Asia,” Asian Security, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2017, pp. 41–58.

12 Jake Rudnitsky and Evgenia Pismennaya, “Russia Closes Border With China to People, Not Goods,” Bloomberg News, January 30, 2020,  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-30/russia-closing-border-with-china-to-affect-people-not-goods.

13 Andrew Higgins, “Businesses Getting Killed on Russian Border as Coronavirus Fears Rise,” New York Times, February 24, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/24/world/europe/coronavirus-russia-china-commerce.html.

14 Van Ivej, “Выход из Кризиса и Преимущества Китая, [Exit from Crisis and China’s Advantages],” Russia in Global Affairs, April 1, 2020, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/vyhod-iz-krizisa-i-preimushhestva-kitaya/; Fyodor Lukyanov, “Вирус Разнообразия [Virus of Diversity],” Russia in Global Affairs, March 25, 2020, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/virus-raznoobraziya/.

15 Michael Kofman, “Towards a Sino-Russian Entente?” Riddle, November 29, 2019, https://www.ridl.io/en/towards-a-sino-russian-entente.

16 Siemon Wezeman, “China, Russia and the Shifting Landscape of Arms Sales,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, July 5, 2017, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/china-russia-and-shifting-landscape-arms-sales.

17 Dmitry Stefanovich, “Russia to Help China Develop an Early Warning System,” The Diplomat, October 25, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/russia-to-help-china-develop-an-early-warning-system.

18 Daniel Urchik, “What We Learned from Peace Mission 2018,” Small Wars Journalundated, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-we-learned-peace-mission-2018.

19 Chris Buckley, “Russia to Join China in Naval Exercise in Disputed South China Sea,” New York Times, July 29, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/world/asia/russia-china-south-china-sea-naval-exercise.html and Andrew Higgins, “China and Russia Hold First Joint Naval Drill in the Baltic Sea,” New York Times, July 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/world/europe/china-russia-baltic-navy-exercises.html.

20 Andrew Osborn, “Russia, China, Iran Start Joint Naval Drills in Indian Ocean,” Reuters, December 27, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-military-russia-china/russia-china-iran-start-joint-naval-drills-in-indian-ocean-idUSKBN1YV0IB.

21 Franz-Stefan Gady, “The Significance of the First Ever China-Russia Strategic Bomber Patrol,” The Diplomat, July 25, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/the-significance-of-the-first-ever-china-russia-strategic-bomber-patrol/.

22 “China to Send 1,600 Troops, About 30 Aircraft to Russia’s Strategic Military Drills,” TASS, August 29, 2019, https://tass.com/defense/1075535.

23 Paul Schwartz, “The Military Dimension in Sino-Russian Relations,” in Jo Inge Bekkevold and Bobo Lo, eds. Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 105.

24 Eric Berger, “Russia Now Looking to Sell Its Prized Rocket Engines to China,” Ars Technica, January 18, 2018, https://arstechnica.com/science/2018/01/russia-now-looking-to-sell-its-prized-rocket-engines-to-china.

25 Robert S. Ross, “Sino‑Russian Relations: The False Promise of Russian Balancing,” International Politics, September 2019.

26 Krickovic, 2017.

27 John M. Owen IV, “Sino‑Russian Cooperation Against Liberal Hegemony,” International Politics, January 2020.

Americas

Bell Boeing Joint Program Office won an $8.1 million contract modification, which adds non-recurring baseline performance rig test efforts in support of the Improved Inlet Solution/Engine Air Particle Separator preliminary design on MV-22 and CV-22 Tiltrotor aircraft. The V-22 Osprey is a joint-service, medium-lift, multimission tilt-rotor aircraft developed by Boeing and Bell Helicopters. The tiltrotor aircraft is available in three configurations: the Combat Assault and Assault Support MV-22 for the USMC and the US Army; the long-range special operations CV-22 for US Special Operations Command (US SOCOM); and the US Navy HV-22, for combat search and rescue, special warfare and fleet logistic support. Work will take place in Indiana, Texas, Pennsylvania and Mississippi.

The Omaha World Herald reports that L3Harris will start converting the first of three KC-135R refueling tankers into WC-135R nuclear radiation sniffing aircraft starting from next month. A US Air Force spokesperson said the first jet is expected to be delivered to the 55th Wing at Offutt Air Force Base in 2022. Maj. Malinda Singleton added that besides removing the refueling boom from the tail of the aircraft, the flight deck will be modernized to the same standard as RC-135S and V/W.

Middle East & Africa

The Boeing AGM-84L Harpoon Block II missiles that the United States approved for Morocco’s Royal Air Force to purchase are the „non-coastal target suppression“ version, the US Federal Register revealed on Monday. This reduction in capability was not mentioned when the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on April 14 that the US State Department had approved the sale of 10 AGM-84Ls for an estimated USD62 million for use by the RMAF’s F-16 multirole fighters. The AGM-84L was designed to have a substantially improved ability to find target ships sailing close to shore or in congested waters.

Europe

A court in Vienna has stopped an Austrian investigation into alleged fraud by Airbus and Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH in connection with a $2 billion Eurofighter jet purchase in 2003, it said on April 27. The investigation was linked to accusations brought by Austria’s defense ministry in 2017, and its closure does not affect a broader criminal investigation of suspected bribery in the same deal that has been going on since 2011, a court spokeswoman said. The ministry triggered a new probe into Airbus and the Eurofighter consortium – which also includes Britain’s BAE Systems and Italy’s Leonardo in February 2017, alleging that they had misled the state about the price, deliverability and equipment of the planes. Among other things, the ministry accused Airbus and the consortium of illegally charging nearly 10% of the purchase price for so-called offset deals, which involve work being given to local companies.

The Royal Air Force is testing an NHS smartphone app that could help prevent the spread of COVID-19. According to the RAF website, personnel at RAF Leeming are trialling the software, led by the station’s digital unit, RAF eXperimental (RAFX), who have been working closely with NHSX and partners. he app uses Bluetooth software to determine a user’s proximity to other devices. If a person shows symptoms or tests positive for the virus, they can choose to share this information with the NHS via the app. An alert will then be sent to other devices they have been near, whose users can then be tested or self-isolate. It is understood that RAFX set up a scenario which simulated people’s experience of shopping. To adhere to social-distancing rules, phones were placed on tables to simulate people clustering in a shopping area.

Asia-Pacific

Airbus pulled out of a joint venture with Thai Airways, the country’s national airline, to provide maintenance, repair, and overhaul services at a civil-military airport near the country’s eastern seaboard. Speaking at a press conference officials from Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor office said in comments reported by the state-owned Thai News Agency that Airbus’ decision was prompted by the economic impact of Covid-19.

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Watch: USS VERMONT BLOCK 4 VIRGINIA CLASS SUBMARINE COMMISSIONED BY U.S NAVY !

Americas

Boeing won a $75.1 million deal in support of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter aircraft Service Life Assessment Program and Service Life Extension Program, Phase C follow-on effort. The Service Life Modification program started in 2018 and is expected to continue until 2040. The production rate is anticipated to peak at 40 aircraft annually. Boeing also won a contract from the USN in March 2019 to manufacture 78 new-build F/A-18E/F Super Hornets with service-life extensions and Block III upgrades incorporated. Work will take place in St. Louis, Missouri and El Segundo, California. The deal provides non-recurring engineering to assess the fatigue life of the aircraft as well as its subsystems and structures to extend the service life of the F/A-18E/F beyond the original design of the 6,000 flight hour service life. Work is expected to be finished by April 2025.

Hydroid Inc. won a $39.4 million modification to exercise Option Year One for production support for the MK-18 Family of Systems – Unmanned Underwater Vehicle systems. Based on the REMUS 100, the Swordfish MK-18 is designed to Search, Classify, and Map (SCM) the Very Shallow Water Region (10?40 ft). The Navy has a total of 24 Swordfish vehicles: EOD Mobile Unit 1 San Diego, CA : 4 Systems (12 Block A Vehicles), Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit 2 (MDSU?2), Norfolk, VA: 1 System (3 Block A Vehicles), Naval Oceanographic and Mine Warfare Command (NOMWC), Stennis, MS: 3 Systems (9 Block B vehicles). The Mk 18 Mod 1 Swordfish UUV is capable of performing low-visible exploration and reconnaissance in support of amphibious landing; MCM operations (including search, classification and mapping; and reacquire and identification); and hydrographic mapping in the VSW zone (10 to 40 feet depth) and the seaward approaches. It is capable of navigating via acoustic transponders in long-baseline or ultra-short-baseline mode or via P-coded GPS. Work will take place Pocasset, Massachusetts and is expected to be complete by April 2024.

Middle East & Africa

A senior commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Force says the corps will soon take delivery of the Fotros unmanned air vehicle. Fotros is the largest UAV built by Iran so far and was unveiled in 2013. Following extensive meetings with the Defense Ministry and evaluation of features of the homegrown drone, the IRGC Ground Force’s Drone Division has decided to utilize Fotros in operational zones.

Europe

Hensoldt has revealed a new airborne jammer that forms part of a wider family of electronic warfare (EW) systems it is developing for the NATO electronic attack requirement that the Luftwaffe has committed itself to deliver. The Kalaetron Attack jammerr is billed as a modular system that Hensoldt hopes will be adopted by the Luftwaffe to deliver its wider Luftgestützte Wirkung im Elektromagnetischen Spektrum capability to NATO from 2025. As noted by the German electronics house, the Kalaetron Attack jammer is a new addition to the Kalaetron EW product family that uses fully digitalised hardware and artificial intelligence to detect radar-based threats and neutralize them with targeted electronic countermeasures.

Asia-Pacific

Lockheed Martin won a $67.6 million modification to a Foreign Military Sales contract to India and Taiwan. The deal provides for modernized target acquisition designation sight/pilot night vision sensors and its subcomponents on the Apache 64D/E helicopter. The M-TADS/PNVS is a long-range, precision engagement and pilotage solution for day, night and adverse weather missions. The electro-optical sensor provides Apache aircrews with situational awareness. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of April 24, 2023.

China has recently commissioned a “new strategic nuclear-powered submarine”, according to a report by the state-owned Global Times newspaper. Written to reflect recent achievements of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in celebration of the 71st anniversary of the establishment of the naval service, the report refers to “new weapons” entering service including the Type 055 destroyer, the first domestically built aircraft carrier, and new anti-submarine patrol aircraft (the KQ-200), as well as the new submarine. Written to reflect recent achievements of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in celebration of the 71st anniversary of the establishment of the naval service, the report refers to “new weapons” entering service including the Type 055 destroyer, the first domestically built aircraft carrier, and new anti-submarine patrol aircraft (the KQ-200), as well as the new submarine.

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Watch: DEFENSE UPDATES WEEKLY NEWS ROUND-UP 26th APRIL-TRUMP TELLS NAVY TO DESTROY IRAN’s GUNBOATS & MORE!

The French Navy’s new nuclear attack submarine made its first sea trip on April 28

Tag: Suffren

Americas

Aviation Training Consulting won a $7.3 million contract modification for B-52 training system contractor logistics support and training system support center sustainment. The contract modification is for the third increment of the seven year basic contract. The B-52 Stratofortress is capable of dropping or launching a significant array of weapons including gravity bombs, cluster bombs and precision guided missiles. It is a long-range, subsonic, jet-powered strategic bomber. It has been operated by the US Air Force since the 50s. Work under the contract modification will take place at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana; and Minot AFB, North Dakota. Estimated completion date is October 31, 2020.

Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems won a $147.6 million contract action modification for the procurement of MK 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS) vertical launcher module electronic components. The electronic components are installed on USN Ticonderoga Class guided missile cruisers and  Arleigh Burke Class guided missile destroyers, as well as vessels operated by allied navies. The purchases are for the USN as well as including purchases via FMS for Finland, Germany and South Korea. The contracting activity is the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC. This agreement will be financed using the FY2018 and FY2019 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy) funds as well as $29.53 million of FMS funding which was obligated at the time of award. Work is expected to be completed by March 2025.

Middle East & Africa

The US State Department has approved a possible Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on April 23. The Government of the United Arab Emirates had earlier requested a Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement for common spares/repair parts to support the UAE’ fleet of AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black Hawk, and CH-47 Chinook helicopters, additional support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $150 million. The proposed sale will allow the UAE Joint Aviation Command to continue to purchase needed spare/repair parts to maintain its fleet of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters, and CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters as part of the Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement program.

A Israeli Air Force F-4 #022 that was neglected in the Air Force Museum has been restored to pristine condition by 201 Squadron and shipped back home to Ramon Air Force Base. 201 Squadron was the first and last operator of the Phantom in the Israeli Air Force. The F-4 Phantom aircraft and the 201 (“The One”) squadron, which currently operates the “Sufa” (F-16I) fighter jet, share a historic route. The squadron was the first and last to operate the aircraft that has since participated in countless IAF wars and operations. Recently, Ramon AFB received a newly renovated Phantom from the IAF museum located in Hatzerim AFB.

Europe

Saab has signed a three-year contract with the British Ministry of Defense for the provision of support and services to the Direct Fire Weapon Effects Simulator (DFWES) capability. The contract came into effect on April 1, 2020. DFWES is a laser-based Tactical Engagement Simulation (TES) system, that allows dismounted and mounted soldiers to simulate the effects of direct and indirect fire. This order includes support and maintenance for the British Army’s DFWES capability.

Asia-Pacific

South Korea will incorporate a Hanwha Systems-developed, medium-range multifunction radar (MFR) system on the new type of frigates referred to locally as the FFX-III class, Jane’s reports. The class, which is also known as the Ulsan Batch III in official Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) documents, will be the first warships to feature the Gallium Nitride-based sensor. The active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar will form the apex of the frigate’s integrated mast system. The Incheon Class frigates also known as the Future Frigate eXperimental or FFX during development, are coastal defense frigates of the Republic of Korea Navy.

Today’s Video

Watch: RAYTHEON TO BUILD 1000 NEXT GENERATION NUCLEAR ARMED AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE FOR U.S AIR FORCE !

Americas

Clark Construction Group won a $78.2 million contract modification, which provides for the construction of the VC-25B hangar complex at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland. The VC-25B, the next Air Force One, is a program to design, test and deliver two aircraft replacing the current VC-25A. The V-25B is to be retrofitted so that the president of the USA can run the federal government, including commanding and controlling the US military, while in flight. As such, detailed information about the aircraft’s components and capabilities are classified or tightly controlled. The aircraft also is likely to include missile warning systems and defensive technologies, such as chaff dispensing systems and directional infrared countermeasures. Work will be performed in Camp Springs, Maryland, and provides for the construction of a hangar complex, an aircraft access taxiway/parking apron, associated lighting, engine run-up pads and a hydrant refueling system with storage tanks. Additional requirements include, but are not limited to, site preparation, wetland/stream mitigation, storm water management, a parking lot, and a fire detection and suppression system. Expected completion will be by April 2022.

Raytheon won a $10.1 million delivery order for the repair of the ALE-50 towed decoy system used in support of the F/A-18 Super Hornet warfare air craft. The AN/ALE-50 towed decoy system was developed by Raytheon to protect multiple US military aircraft from radar-guided-missiles. The ALE-50 consists of a launch controller, launcher and towed decoy. It can be used on a variety of platforms without modification. When deployed, the ALE-50’s expendable aerial decoy is towed behind the aircraft. The decoy protects the host aircraft providing a more attractive target and steering the radar-guided missile away from the aircraft and right to the decoy. ALE-50 has countered both surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. Work will take place in Forest, Mississippi. Expected completion will be by October 2022.

Middle East & Africa

Iran has apparently lofted its first military satellite into orbit, ending a series of setbacks for the nation’s space program. The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) announced that the Noor-1, the country’s first military satellite, was launched from a location in the Dasht-e Kavir desert and successfully put into a 425 km orbit. The United States did not immediately confirm the launch’s success, but General John Hyten, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, left little doubt that Iran had put a satellite into orbit. “The first satellite of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been successfully launched into orbit by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC],” said the elite forces’ official website on Wednesday. It said the satellite – dubbed the Nour – was deployed from the Qassed two-stage launcher from the Markazi desert, a vast expanse in Iran’s central plateau.

Europe

Lockheed Martin won a $519.1 million contract for the procurement of international Aegis fire control loop development, Solid State S-Band Radar Processing Group, tools and test equipment and spares for five new multi-mission frigates supporting the Aegis combat system (Baseline 9C.2). The deal funds procurement of international Aegis fire control loop development, Solid State S-Band Radar Processing Group as well as tools, test equipment and spares for five new multi-mission frigates supporting the Aegis combat system. The Aegis Weapon System is a centralized, automated, command-and-control and weapons control system used by the US Navy, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Spanish Navy, Royal Norwegian Navy, Republic of Korea Navy and Royal Australian Navy on a variety of vessel types. Work will take place in New jersey, Wisconsin, Spain, Massachusetts, Washington DC and California. Work is expected by April 2030.

The Dutch Defense Materiel Organization ordered 127 mm guns for the four Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) De Zeven Provinciën Class air defense and command frigates (LCFs). Leonardo has contracted Thales Nederland to install the former’s 127/64 LW-Vulcano system by 2026. The MoD said that the medium gun system would be used mainly for surface fire and naval gunfire support, as well as for air defense. Leonardo’s website lists the system’s four subsystems as the 127/64 LW Gun assembly, a modular automated ammunition handling system, the Naval Fire Control Support mission planning system, and the Vulcano ammunition family. The 127/64 LW-Vulcano has a modular feeding system composed of four drums with 14 ready-to-fire rounds each that can be reloaded during firing, and that can be selected independently from their position in the drums. The gun can fire standard 127 mm rounds and precision-guided munitions, the latter with a range of up to 100 km, according to the MoD.

Asia-Pacific

The Wall Street Journal reported on April 20 that a Chinese airborne early warning aircraft has been operating out of Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea. The paper quoted anonymous US officials as saying that the reef is being used as a “forward operating base’ for various military aircraft.

Today’s Video

Watch: Indian Defence Updates : 1st F/A-18 Block-3 Ready,PAK CM-400 v/s BrahMos,100 VT4 Tanks,Exports Boost

Air Force One
(click to view full)

The USA’s fleet of 2 “VC-25” 747-200 derivatives is unique in several respects. It’s more popularly known as the latest incarnation of the “Air Force One” fleet that transports the President of the United States around the world, though the planes themselves only acquire the “Air Force One” call sign when the President is on board. The VC-25 can also serve as a secondary command post, thanks to a suite of advanced communications and electronics gear that’s both highly encrypted, and protected from the Electro-Magnetic Pulse effects of nuclear detonations. The 89th Airlift Wing operates them from Andrews AFB, MD.

During the Cold War, if humanity’s time on earth had been cut short, at least one of the orders would almost certainly have come from a 707-based “VC-137” predecessor. The 747-based VC-25s were ordered in 1985, and added to the fleet in 1990, where they continue to serve in the same roles, flying an average of nearly 200,000 miles per year. Of course, maintenance and upgrades are still required, such as the 2002/2003 upgrades that let the President address the nation from on board, new defensive systems, etc…

Contracts & Key Events FY 2012 – 2020

Wichita plant closure; USAF considers replacement; Various R&D and upgrades.

NG on Air Force One
click for video

The 89th Airlift Wing at Joint Base Andrews, MD flies the VC-25s. Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the 727th ACSG/PKB at Tinker Air Force Base, OK to Boeing in Wichita, KS. Eventually, Boeing’s move out of Wichita also moved these services to Oklahoma City, OK.

April 24/20: Hangar Complex Clark Construction Group won a $78.2 million contract modification, which provides for the construction of the VC-25B hangar complex at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland. The VC-25B, the next Air Force One, is a program to design, test and deliver two aircraft replacing the current VC-25A. The V-25B is to be retrofitted so that the president of the USA can run the federal government, including commanding and controlling the US military, while in flight. As such, detailed information about the aircraft’s components and capabilities are classified or tightly controlled. The aircraft also is likely to include missile warning systems and defensive technologies, such as chaff dispensing systems and directional infrared countermeasures. Work will be performed in Camp Springs, Maryland, and provides for the construction of a hangar complex, an aircraft access taxiway/parking apron, associated lighting, engine run-up pads and a hydrant refueling system with storage tanks. Additional requirements include, but are not limited to, site preparation, wetland/stream mitigation, storm water management, a parking lot, and a fire detection and suppression system. Expected completion will be by April 2022.

Oct 31/14: R&D. Boeing Aerospace Operations in Oklahoma City, OK receives a $9.3 million cost-plus-incentive-fee modification under the VC-25 Avionics Modernization Program. Boeing will actually subcontract the support necessary to provide one-time engineering services, and associated hardware, in support of this research and development effort.

Work will be performed at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and San Antonio, Texas, and is expected to be completed by May 30, 2018. Fiscal 2014 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $9,261,602 are being re-aligned at the time of award from funding previously obligated under the contract. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, is the contracting activity (FA8106-07-C-0001, PO 0212).

Aug 14/14: R&D. A $6.666 million contract modification for a VC-25 fuel tank Nitrogen Generation System Study, in order to comply with FAA Final Rule FAA-2005-22997 concerning fuel tank flammability. The total cumulative face value of the contract, including the referenced modification is now $316.9 million. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 USAF O&M funds.

Work will be performed at Oklahoma City, OK, and Long Beach, CA, and is expected to be complete by May 11/15. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WLKLA at Tinker AFB, OK manages the contract (FA8106-07-C-0001, PO 0148).

Sept 13/13: Upgrades. Boeing Aerospace Operations Inc. in Oklahoma City, OK receives an $8.5 million contract modification to work on upgrading 1 of the 2 VC-25As, in order to bring it into compliance with Federal Aviation Agency Airworthiness Directive 2008-23-09. All funds are committed immediately.

Basically, they’re going to replace the aircraft body’s AN-26 thermal/acoustic insulation layer, which falls short of fire resistance requirements in the FAA’s judgement. This contract involves any design and manufacture of the replacement. Installation will happen concurrently with heavy maintenance efforts under a separate contract.

Work will be performed at Oklahoma City, OK and San Antonio, TX, with an expected completion date of Oct 31/16 (FA8106-07-C-0001, P00135). See also: FAA Airworthiness Directive 2008-23-09.

Sept 9/13: Replacement. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center releases a sources sought survey regarding potential replacements for the VC-25.

It isn’t the first time. Back in 2007, USAF Air Mobility Command issued a similar solicitation, which included Airbus’ A380. The difference is time. The VC-25s are expected to hit their planned flight hour service life figures in 2017, and so the question is becoming more urgent. The USAF’s goal at this stage is a new plane in service by 2021, but they’ll need to issue the development contract within a couple of years if they want to make that happen. Sources: Gannett’s Air Force Times, Sept 9/13.

Jan 31/12: Support. Boeing in Wichita, KS receives a $47.9 million firm-fixed-price, time-and-material cost reimbursable and cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification for VC-25 Option Year III support. The work was performed in Wichita, KS until Dec 21/11 (FA8106-09-C-0005, PO 0039).

Jan 4/12: Wichita lineman, farewell. Boeing confirmed it’s going to close its Wichita, KS plant by the end of 2013. Some of the 2,160+ Wichita jobs will be moved; others will be cut, beginning in Q3 2012. Future aircraft maintenance, modification and support work will be placed at the Boeing facility in San Antonio, TX, which currently handles KC-135 and KC-10 maintenance and upgrade work. Boeing | NY Times | Congressman Mike Pompeo [R-KS-4, not happy].

Wichita closure

FY 2010 – 2011

How much to upgrade 1 aircraft? Support contracts; Dept. of ‘Don’t do this again’.

VC-25: Oops.
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Sept 30/11: Support. L-3 Link Simulation & Training in Arlington, TX receives an $8.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for the for the option III, IV, and V periods in support of the C-20B (Learjet III) and VC-25A Mission Communication System (MCS), which allows for ground and airborne, secure and non-secure communications between aircraft and ground stations.

Work will include program management, systems engineering, technical support for configuration management, review of service reports, requests for technical information, preliminary engineering investigations, field technical representatives, systems integration lab support and operation, and the requirement to maintain drawings and technical data files. This contract also provides for a 24-hour contact for in-flight emergencies, emergency inquiries, on-site support and operation of the test benches located at Andrews AFB including requests for software, firmware, and hardware changes including development and test, engineering feasibility studies, analysis and investigations of Material Deficiency Reports and mishaps; and requirements for technical orders, preliminary engineering change proposals, modifications, upgrades and enhancements including design, testing, integration, kit purchases and spares. The OC-ALCIGKSKB at Tinker AFB, OK manages this contract (FA8106-08-C-0005, PO 0065).

Jan 31/11: Deep maintenance. A $134 million contract modification for the heavy maintenance for 2011 VC-25 aircraft 9000 at Andrews AFB, MD. At this time, $86.8 million has been committed. This announcement has a different modification number, but looked like it could be a duplicate or revision of the Nov 30/10 award. On Feb 23/11, the USAF got back to DID with a clarification:

“We checked this question with the contracting folks — These are two modifications to the base-line contract. Each happen to be valued $134M. When combined, these two modifications are valued at $268M.”

Plus the initial $35.6 million award (q.v. Oct 29/10), makes $303.6 million for in-depth work on 1 aircraft. That’s slightly more than an airline would pay for a new 747-8 (FA8106-09-C-0005, PO 0023).

Jan 25/11: Support. A $13.2 million contract modification to provide Option Year II support for 1 of 2 VC-25 special air mission aircraft at Joint Base Andrews, MD. At this time, the entire amount has been committed (FA8106-09-C-0005, PO 0022).

Nov 30/10: Deep maintenance. A $134 million contract modification, covering the 2011 heavy maintenance effort scheduled for VC-25 tail number 92-9000. At this time, $19.4 million has been committed (FA8106-09-C-0005, PO 0020).

Oct 29/10: Deep maintenance. A $35.6 million contract to provide “heavy maintenance for the 2011 VC-25 aircraft 9000,” with all funds committed (FA8106-09-C-0005, PO 0019).

Jan 28/10: Support. A $35.4 million contract to continue providing contractor support for the USAF’s fleet of 2 VC-25A aircraft. At this time, $8.2 million has been committed (FA8106-09-C-0005, PO 0005).

May 27/09: Bad idea. Well, that didn’t go as planned. The White House wanted an updated picture of a VC-25, with New York in the background. They told some local officials – but not the mayor, or the citizens. Who saw a jumbo jet flying low with fighter jets behind it, and thought it was another 9/11 style terrorist attack. NBC New York:

“A Pentagon official confirmed that while the Presidential Airlift Group, which is based out of Andrews Air Force Base, did inform the FAA and New York City officials about this morning’s aerial photo op, they also told both agencies not to inform the public about it.The NYPD confirmed that statement.”

Louis Caldera, Director of the White House Military Office, ends up losing his job over the flyby. Cost for the photo shoot? $328,835. See also CNN Politics.

NY State of Mind

Additional Readings

Readers with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

• Fox News (March 24/10) – Pentagon Develops Plan to Buy New Air Force One Fleet

• DID (Oct 21/07) – USAF Talking to Airbus About A380 Air Force 1, C-5 Replacement? Airbus bowed out, leaving Boeing to decide between its 747-8 and 787 as a future bid.

EDA’s Steering Board has green-lit the launch of a new research project aimed at studying ways and means of improving the operational outfit and equipment of Armed Forces operating in extreme cold and icy weather conditions.  

Picture : Austrian Armed Forces

Military missions and operations in cold climate are particularly challenging as they demand from the troops a great deal of physical, operational and mental resilience. Experience from exercises in extreme cold has shown that a considerable number of the soldiers suffer from cold weather injuries (e.g. frostbite, hypothermia, chilblains, immersion foot) and negative energy balance which can highly compromise their performances. An in-depth knowledge of the risk factors for developing cold-related injuries and their impact on the troops’ safety and effectiveness is thus critical to sustain operations in the north.  

Against this backdrop, EDA has just launched a new R&T project to study this problem in greater detail to ascertain consequences and possible countermoves. Under the lead of the Netherlands, three more countries are participating: France, Sweden and Norway (the latter is no formal EDA Member State but has concluded an Administrative Agreement with the Agency). The overall objective is to contribute to improving the European capability of operating in arctic/cold environments by developing tools to reduce the risk of soldiers developing cold-weather-related injuries and enhance war fighter performance.  

The project has a duration of three to four years.
 

New territory

It is the first R&T project in EDA to study Cold Weather Operations on a European level. It will be important to identify the standards and procedures are currently being applied in the various Member States. The project will therefore identify national variations in the regulations and threshold values for body temperature, safe working duration and respective garment requirements and develop an interpretation guide to translate the generic advice of the main existing standard in this field, ISO-11079, and its extension to national clothing & equipment items. It will also review and measure individual variation in thermal stress response and nutritional demands in cold environments. Finally, the intention is also to identify the added value of wearable sensor technologies for improved personalised advice.  

The Cold Weather Operations project is one of several R&T activities under the CapTech CBRN and Human Factors. 
 

More information:

• EDA project page: CapTech CBRN and Human Factors

Americas

The 354th Fighter Wing has taken delivery of its first two F-35A fighters at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska on April 21. The jets flew non-stop from Forth Worth, Texas with mid-air refueling from two KC-135s from the 168th Wing. “This first aircraft is a milestone,” said Col. Benjamin Bishop, the 354th Fighter Wing commander. “Making the first aircraft arrival possible has been a long path, but it’s also just the first step in a journey that will continue at Eielson Air Force Base for decades to come.” By the end of 2021, 54 F-35s will make up two squadrons at Eielson, which is near Fairbanks.

The Pentagon announced that it is awarding $133 million to increase domestic production of N95 masks by over 39 million over the next 90 days. Under the contract, 3M will receive $76 million, O&M Halyward will receive $29 million and Honeywell will receive $27.4 million to make the masks, which have been in short supply since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic. According to the Department of Defense, the investment is intended to ensure the United States government “gets dedicated long term industrial capacity to meet the needs of the nation.” 3M is contracted to provide 78 million units within six months, with an additional 13 million units per month by June, where O&M Halyward will add 25 million units within 6 months and an additional 12.5 million masks every month after. Under the contract Honeywell will add 38 million units within six months and 12 million units per month after.

Middle East & Africa

II Corps Consultants won a $68.7 deal for the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning program. The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning ensures Marines deploy with an operational understanding of the local military and partner cultures and regional dynamics relevant to the mission, with select Marines being language-enabled, in order to facilitate mission success. CAOCL’s designs, delivers, and manages programming throughout the education and training continuum, conducts research and assessments, and provides scientific, policy, and subject matter advising. It also serves as one of the three proponents for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC)-related doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) issues throughout the Marine Corps as directed by the LREC Operational Advisory Group (OAG) Charter and the Marine Corps LREC Strategy. Work will take place in Virginia, Bahrain and Afghanistan. Expected completion date will be by April 2025.

Europe

Three Orion Unmanned Aerial Vehicles have been accepted by the Russian Ministry of Defense, JSC Kronshtadt Group said. General Designer of Kronshtadt, Nikolay Dolzhenkov, added that the aircraft will be modified for additional requirements that were not specified in the original contract. Orion is a Russian unmanned combat aerial vehicle developed by Kronshtadt Group. It can carry four bombs and four missiles and has maximum payload of 200 kg.

As health services across the world battle Coronavirus, NHS Wales is stepping up its defense against viruses of the technological kind. A new agreement with Thales will enable the NHS Wales Informatics Services (NWIS) team to protect vital systems from a surge in cyber-attacks by accessing Thales’s technical threat analysis service, a global centre of knowledge about the latest and emerging threats. According to Thales, the company will be providing the service to NHS Wales free of charge. Thales’s intelligence service makes available its intelligence, identification, computer virus spread monitoring, threat analysis and rapid response skills to healthcare systems across the world, now including NHS Wales.

Asia-Pacific

Guizhou Aviation Industry Corporation is expecting to fly a new variant of its JL-9 advanced jet trainer that is capable of operating from China’s aircraft carriers soon. The company announced recently that assembly is finished and the jet is being prepared for its maiden flight. It has been suggested that the new variant has removed the drag chute. While the Guizhou company did not elaborate on the project, it said in a separate statement in March that the goal was to “win a new victory in developing and producing the Naval Mountain Eagle,” and the statement came with a picture showing an aircraft carrier at sea, with a Naval Mountain Eagle flying above the carrier and J-15 fighter jets parked on the carrier’s flight deck.

Today’s Video

Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5wK9jQsWcsU

Here’s my latest policy brief from the series on Russian strategic culture and leadership decision-making, written for a collaborative project organized by the Marshall Center with support from the Russia Strategy Initiative. This one is on stability in Russia’s political elite during Vladimir Putin’s rule. As with the previous ones, I am posting the full text here with permission from the Marshall Center. Please go to the newly updated Marshall Center website if you would prefer to read a PDF version.

Executive Summary

• Russia’s political elite has undergone relatively little change under Vladimir Putin’s rule. Only sixty people have been ranked twentieth or higher at least once between 2000 and 2019 in the annual Nezavisimaya Gazeta list of the most politically influential Russians. Eighteen people have appeared on every list during this period. The greatest shift in elite composition occurred between 2007 and 2008, with smaller shifts around the presidential elections of 2004 and 2012.
• Most of the political elite originate in the government bureaucracy in Moscow or St. Petersburg or came to their positions of influence through personal ties to Vladimir Putin, either in St. Petersburg or in the security services. Only ten percent came to power through electoral politics; another ten percent are businessmen who made their money independently of any connections to Vladimir Putin.
• The elite is fairly evenly divided between individuals who have political influence solely because of their positions in government and individuals who have influence outside of their official role. People in the first group generally drop off the list quickly after leaving government or being demoted, and people in the second group tend to retain influence regardless of their position at any given time and remain influential for extended periods, even after departing government service.

Introduction

For most of the post-Soviet period, the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta has conducted a monthly survey of Russian political experts. This survey asks its respondents to rank the 100 most politically influential Russians in the previous month. Throughout this period, the newspaper has also published an annual ranking,1 based on the average rank of those mentioned during the previous calendar year. These data can be used to identify the most politically influential members of the Russian elite during the twenty years of Vladimir Putin’s rule.2

Characteristics of the Data Set

The dataset used includes all individuals identified in Nezavisimaya Gazeta’s survey who ranked at least twentieth at some point during the period from 2000 to 2019. Since the annual rankings run through 2019, they do not include changes in elite composition resulting from the government reshuffle that took place in January 2020. Such changes will be reflected in the next annual ranking, which is expected to be published in early 2021. This group is composed of just sixty individuals. Although most of those named are politicians or senior government officials, eight are well-connected businessmen or executives of state corporations. Only six individuals came to power through electoral politics. Two are religious leaders. Only three are women. Almost all built their careers in Moscow or St. Petersburg, with only three originally coming from the regions.

The dataset shows each individual’s average annual ranking if they were in the top 100 that year. In the graphs below, gaps indicate periods when the individual in question fell out of the top 100. The primary characteristic of the list is the extraordinary longevity of the people on it. Eighteen people have appeared in the top 100 every year from 2000 through 2019. Nine of them also appeared in the 1999 list, indicating that their political careers extend at least to the late Yeltsin period.3 Only four people have returned to the top 100 after spending more than a year off the list.

Members of the Putin-era political elite can be characterized in various ways. Many analysts have divided them according to their background, as having emerged from the security services or from Vladimir Putin’s circles in St. Petersburg or from private businesses established in the 1990s.4 Others have divided them according to the nature of their position.5 These are very useful ways to categorize, therefore both background and position are mentioned in the discussion below. However, I take a different starting point and categorize the elite on the basis of when they attracted the notice of expert analysts of the Russian political scene as being influential in that scene. This undoubtedly creates some artifacts. Some individuals undoubtedly flew under the radar for some period of time before attracting the notice of experts. Most importantly, individuals who may be influential advisors to senior leaders but stay in the shadows may be undervalued or missed entirely. Nevertheless, given that the main goal of this study is to examine elite stability and change, a primary focus on the chronology of the subjects’ appearance on the scene is more appropriate than one that puts the main focus on the subjects’ background or role in the political system.

Survivors of the Yeltsin Era

Ten members of the political elite can be characterized as long-term survivors of the Yeltsin era. These are individuals who have appeared on the list since at least 1999, which is the earliest year for which data is currently available. Strikingly, half of the group is still considered among the top thirty most politically influential people in Russia in 2019, twenty years later. This group of Council and former Governor of St. Petersburg Valentina Matvienko; and current Presidential Envoy of to the North Caucasus region and former Prosecutor General, Yuri Chaika. With the exception of Putin and Matvienko, these are people who have made careers as appointed senior officials rather than elected politicians.

The group of survivors also includes a number of people who have made their careers primarily in the business world, including such prominent oligarchs as Roman Abramovich and Vagit Alekperov. Vladimir Potanin is also included in the graphic as an oligarch known for his ability to maneuver through changes in Russia’s political scene and remain influential, although he is not part of the dataset, having never reached the top twenty in influence in any year measured. Although Anatolii Chubais was a prominent government official earlier in his career, during the period being analyzed here he has made his career in the world of state corporations, first as head of Russia’s electricity monopoly and then as head of the Rosnanotech state corporation. All four of these individuals have seen a decline in their influence in recent years, reflecting a general decline in influence among oligarchs in favor of bureaucratic officials.

The two other members of this group deserve a brief mention. Aleksandr Zhukov is a survivor who has played a variety of roles in government, including as a leading member of the State Duma, as the head of the Russian Olympic committee that organized the Sochi Winter Olympics, and as a deputy prime minister. Like the oligarchs, his influence has declined sharply in recent years. Finally, there is the case of Aleksandr Voloshin. Throughout Putin’s first term as President, Voloshin was the head of the presidential administration and considered one of the most powerful people in Russia. More interestingly, unlike other holdovers from the Yeltsin team described in the following section, he has consistently remained on the list of politically influential Russians since his resignation in 2003, albeit in relatively low positions.

Yeltsin-Era Politicians Who Did Not Last

A second group of members of the political elite were also survivors of the Yeltsin era, but have not retained their influence. These nine individuals are a fairly diverse group. Five of the nine were senior officials in the central government who stepped down at various points between 2001 and 2011 and thereafter disappeared from political life in Russia. These include Viktor Gerashchenko, who headed the Russian Central Bank until 2002; Aleksandr Veshniakov, who headed Russia’s Central Election Commission until 2007; and Mikhail Kasianov, who served as prime minister during Putin’s first term as president. There are also two former government ministers: Mikhail Zurabov, who headed the pension fund from 1999 to 2004 and was thereafter health minister until 2007 and Viktor Khristenko, who was deputy prime minister in both Yeltsin’s last year as president and in Putin’s first term and thereafter the minister of industry until 2012.

The other four members of this group can be described as more eclectic. Aleksei II’s influence came from his position as the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. As we will see below, after his death in 2008, his successor retained a roughly similar level of influence. Yuri Luzhkov rapidly lost influence after his removal from his post as mayor of Moscow in 2010. The two businessmen in this group had very different trajectories. Mikhail Khodorkovsky was, for a time, the most influential private businessman in Russia and remained influential even after his arrest in 2003, but he disappears from the list after his trial and imprisonment in 2005. Finally, Mikhail Fridman is somewhat different from the rest of this group. He is a businessman whose influence has gradually faded over time. In this, he is most similar to Vladimir Potanin in the previous group (the “survivors”), with the main difference being that the degree of his fade has taken him out of not only the top twenty, but the top 100, in recent years. Other than Fridman, the members of this group are all notable for having derived their influence from their positions, rather than their personal power. Unlike several people in the survivor group, their influence did not outlast their dismissal from their government positions.

Putin’s Original Team

When Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president in 2000, he quickly installed his own team of loyalists. With only one exception, these twelve individuals who first appeared on the list in 2000 have remained highly influential players in Russian politics over the next twenty years. The majority of the team are connected to Putin, either through their work in the security services or from Putin’s time working in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office in the 1990s.

The security service contingent includes Sergei Ivanov, Igor Sechin, Nikolai Patrushev, and Vladimir Ustinov. The first three people on this list have been among the core members of Putin’s inner circle throughout his time in power. One key difference when compared with the group of individuals that did not last is that the security service contingent’s influence has remained high regardless of the various positions they have held. Thus, Igor Sechin has variously served as deputy head of the presidential administration, deputy prime minister (while Putin was prime minister), and head of the Rosneft state oil corporation. His influence did not decrease when he departed from his government position in 2012 and he remains one of the ten most politically influential people in Russia to the present day.

Similarly, Nikolai Patrushev has been highly influential, both as FSB director and as secretary of the Security Council, despite the latter organization’s relatively limited formal power. Sergei Ivanov was highly influential first as defense minister, then as deputy prime minister, and finally as head of the presidential administration. His influence has faded in the last three years after his departure from the presidential administration, but the fact that he remains on the list despite having virtually no significant official role in Russian politics speaks to his personal connection to the president. Vladimir Ustinov is a somewhat different case. Although he played a powerful role in Russian politics while serving as prosecutor general, his removal from that position in 2006 was interpreted as a political defeat and resulted in a sharp decline in his perceived influence, even while he was still serving as Minister of Justice. After his dismissal from that position in 2008 and his transfer to the role of presidential representative to the Southern Federal District, he disappeared from the rankings entirely.

The St. Petersburg team includes Dmitry Medvedev, Aleksei Kudrin, German Gref, Dmitry Kozak, and Boris Gryzlov. These are also figures who have exhibited political influence regardless of the position they held. Medvedev served variously as deputy head and then head of the presidential administration, first deputy prime minister, president, and prime minister, retaining a position among the ten most influential Russian political figures since his appointment as head of the presidential administration in late 2003. Gref and Kudrin survived their departures from positions as minister for economic development and trade and minister of finance, respectively. Gref has retained influence in his role as head of Sberbank, while Kudrin remained highly influential despite having no major government or business position from 2011 until his appointment as head of the Accounts Chamber in 2018. Boris Gryzlov was highly influential as minister of internal affairs and as speaker of the State Duma, but disappeared from the list after stepping down as speaker in 2011. He returned in 2017, however, despite having a fairly low-level position as the president’s representative to the contact group on the Ukraine conflict.

Dmitry Kozak has held a wide variety of positions over the last twenty years, both in Moscow and in the regions, while remaining highly influential. His peak of influence was in Putin’s first two terms in office, when he held senior positions in the presidential administration and as presidential representative to the Southern Federal District. Note that his high level of influence in the latter position contrasts with the case of Vladimir Ustinov, who dropped off the influence list after replacing Kozak in this position. This strongly suggests that Kozak’s influence during this period was related to his personal connections, rather than the office he held.

Three other members of the team are not connected to Putin through prior service. Vladislav Surkov and Aleksei Gromov were already working in the central government in the 1990s but first rose to positions of prominence under Putin. Surkov served in the presidential administration until 2011, then briefly as head of the government executive office before becoming a personal advisor to Putin. Although his influence declined in the latter position and he is likely to drop out of the rankings entirely in 2020 after his very public resignation in February, he remained on the list throughout the period of the study. Gromov was the president’s press secretary in his first two terms, followed by twelve years in the presidential administration as deputy and first deputy chief of staff. His influence has steadily increased over the years, especially once he moved into the presidential administration. Finally, Oleg Deripaska is an outlier among this group, as his role is in business rather than government. Although he is linked more closely to Putin than some of the businessmen who appeared in the other groups, his influence has declined in the last decade as power has shifted away from people in business and toward government officials. People Who Became Influential During Putin’s First Term

Individuals who joined the list of politically influential figures between 2001 and 2004 fall into very similar categories as Putin’s original team. Once again, the majority are figures whose background is in the security services or in the St. Petersburg government, while a few rose through other channels. Unlike Putin’s original team, few of these individuals have the political capital to have influence separate from their positions.

Siloviki, political figures who rose to power in the security services, such as Mikhail Fradkov, Rashid Nurgaliev, and Viktor Ivanov, are good examples of this tendency. Fradkov, for example, appeared in relatively low positions on the list as head of the tax police in 2001 and 2002, then disappeared from the list entirely while serving as Russia’s representative to the European Union in 2003. He then spent four years as one of the most politically influential people in Russia while serving as prime minister, before again disappearing from the list entirely after losing that position. He returned to the list in 2013 while serving as head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, but disappeared after being dismissed from that position in 2016. Similarly, Rashid Nurgaliev was highly influential while serving as minister of internal affairs from 2004 to 2011, but disappeared from the list immediately after stepping down from that position. Viktor Ivanov spent several years as an assistant to President Putin and then several more as director of the Federal Narcotics Service. He disappeared from the list after being dismissed from the latter position in early 2016.

The political figures who came out of St. Petersburg are a relatively diverse group. Among them are two who have remained on the list throughout the period since their initial appearance in 2001–2002. Sergei Mironov served for many years as the speaker of the Federation Council, although he retained a certain amount of influence after moving to the State Duma in 2012. Aleksei Miller has remained among the twenty-five most politically influential Russians continuously since 2003 while serving as the head of Gazprom, Russia’s natural gas monopoly. Vladimir Iakunin was on the list only during the period from 2005 to 2015, when he headed the Russian Railroad state corporation. His immediate disappearance after his departure from that position in 2015 suggests that his influence derived from his position, rather than his personal power. Viktor Zubkov first made the list while running the Financial Monitoring Committee and reached higher positions on it, having served as prime minister and first deputy prime minister. He dropped off the list after losing the latter position in 2012.

The remaining four people in this group have had highly varied careers. Igor Shuvalov has served in a variety of roles in the government, including as the government’s chief of staff, as an assistant to the president, and as first deputy prime minister. He was most highly ranked on Nezavisimaya Gazeta’s list in the latter period, although he retained some influence even after departing that position in 2018. Aleksandr Khloponin is one of the few people on the overall list who appeared on the list while holding a position outside of Moscow. He was, for many years, the governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai and then served as deputy prime minister. The peak of his influence was in the period 2010–2014, when he concurrently served as deputy prime minister and presidential envoy to the North Caucasus Federal District. Even during this period, his highest position in the survey was twentieth in 2010, highlighting the extent to which Moscowbased political figures dominate the rankings.

Dmitry Rogozin first came to prominence as one of the few elected national-level politicians on this list. He was one of the leaders of the right-wing Rodina party until 2005 and was thus one of the few influential politicians with an independent power base. However, he dropped off the list after departing the party due to conflicts with other leaders. He returned to a position of influence in 2012 after being appointed deputy prime minister in charge of the defense and space industries. Finally, Sergei Pugachev is unique, in that he only appeared on the list for two years, but in very high positions. He was a businessman with close ties to Putin, but quickly fell out of favor after refusing to reinvest his capital in Russia. He has since renounced his Russian citizenship and now lives in France.

People Who Became Influential During Putin’s Second Term

A fairly large group—thirteen people—became politically influential during Putin’s second term. Although a few of these people appeared on the list early in the term, most joined or rose to high rankings in 2007 or 2008. Individuals who joined the political elite during this period fall into two major categories, with a few outliers.

Five people in this set had close ties with Putin, mostly dating to their schooling in the 1970s and 1980s or through working together in the security services in the 1980s and 1990s. All five of these individuals rose to highly influential positions at around the same time and have remained near the top of the list throughout Putin’s presidency. Aleksandr Bastrykin was a university classmate of Putin. He worked at the Ministry of Justice and in the Prosecutor-General’s office before being appointed in 2007 as head of the Investigative Committee (IC), an anti-corruption agency within the Prosecutor-General’s office. His influence increased further in 2011, when the IC became an independent agency directly subordinate to the president.

Sergei Naryshkin has served in a variety of roles over the years, including chief of staff to the prime minister, deputy prime minister, head of the presidential administration, chair of the State Duma and, most recently, director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. His influence has always come less from his position and more from his close ties to Vladimir Putin, whom he has known since the early 1980s, when they studied together in the Soviet security service (KGB) schools in Leningrad. He was perceived as having been appointed head of the presidential administration under Dmitry Medvedev in order to ensure Medvedev’s loyalty to Putin.6 Aleksandr Bortnikov spent his entire career in the KGB or its successor agency, the Federal Security Service (FSB), primarily in the Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) office. He was appointed deputy director of the FSB in 2004 and became its head in 2008. Although all three are influential because of their positions, they achieved these positions through a combination of their previous work and their connections to Vladimir Putin.

On the other hand, Sergei Chemezov and Yuri Kovalchuk have attained their positions almost entirely through their connections to Putin. Chemezov worked with Putin in the KGB in East Germany in the 1980s and again in the Presidential Property Office in Moscow in the late 1990s. Since Putin became president, Chemezov has held senior positions in a variety of state corporations, beginning with Rosoboronexport (the state defense export company) and since 2007 as general director of Rostec, which, under his leadership, has become the dominant player in Russia’s defense industry. Although Yuri Kovalchuk did not go to school or work with Putin, he has had close ties to the president dating back to the 1990s. Like Chemezov, he has never worked in the Russian government, having instead used his personal ties to Putin to amass a large fortune as the head of Bank Rossiia, a position that has led him to be labeled as “Putin’s personal banker.” 

A second set of five people rose to political influence by rising through the ranks of their agencies. Sergei Lavrov is perhaps the archetype of this figure. He has served as foreign minister since 2004, having previously served as a deputy foreign minister and as Russia’s representative to the United Nations. Although he was, for many years, described as someone who is a civil servant and chief implementer rather than a member of Putin’s inner circle, his longevity in his post has gradually translated into greater influence on decision-making. 

Tatiana Golikova rose through the ranks of the Ministry of Finance, becoming Deputy Finance Minister in the late 1990s. She was then appointed as Minister of Health and Social Development in 2007, going from that role to the position of Chair of the Accounts Chamber in 2013 and then becoming Deputy Prime Minister for Social Policy in 2018. Similarly, Elvira Nabiullina rose through the ranks at the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade, becoming the head of the ministry in 2007. She has retained influence since transitioning to her current position as head of Russia’s Central Bank in 2013.

Arkady Dvorkovich rose through the Finance Ministry and the Ministry for Economic Development, having developed close ties to German Gref in the latter ministry. He first rose to prominence as then-President Dmitry Medvedev’s chief economic advisor and then as deputy prime minister once Medvedev assumed the position of Prime Minister in 2012. He dropped off the list of politically influential Russians after losing that position in 2018, and now serves as president of the World Chess Federation. Finally, Patriarch Kirill rose through the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church and headed the Church’s Department for External Church Relations from 1989 until his election as Patriarch in 2009, following Patriarch Aleksei’s death.

He first appeared on the list of influential people in 2007, when it became increasingly clear that he was likely to become the next patriarch, even as Aleksei’s health was declining. All five of these individuals are influential because of their positions, rather than through personal ties.

Only two members of this group attained their positions through the political process, both initially in regions outside of Moscow. Sergei Sobianin has had a long career in electoral politics at the regional level, first winning election in 1991 as mayor of a small town in Siberia, gradually rising to higher positions in the region, including a five-year stint as governor of Tiumen. He moved to Moscow in 2005 to serve as head of the presidential administration, and has remained a fixture in the top twenty most influential Russians since 2007. He has been the mayor of Moscow since 2010.

Viacheslav Volodin won his first election even earlier, serving on the Saratov city council beginning in 1990. He represented Saratov in the State Duma beginning in 1999, serving as the Duma’s deputy speaker. He succeeded Sobianin as head of the government executive office in 2010 and has remained on the top twenty list since then, serving as deputy head of the presidential administration and, since 2016, as chair of the State Duma.

Finally, Anatoly Serdiukov is unique among this group in that he achieved his influence by virtue of his ties to someone in the top elite other than Putin. He appears on the list in 2007, when he moved from his previous position as head of the Federal Tax Service to Defense Minister. He dropped off the list in 2012, when he was dismissed from that position. His appointment was linked to his connection to Viktor Zubkov, as he was married to Zubkov’s daughter. Despite constant criticism from members of the military, he remained in the position until his wife filed for divorce in 2012, at which point he was quickly accused of corruption and removed from his position.

People Who Became Influential in the Last 12 Years

Although much has been written about efforts by Russia’s senior leadership to renew Russia’s political elite, very few people have joined the ranks of the most influential Russians since 2008. In fact, only one person who joined the list while Dmitry Medvedev was president has become highly influential, while another four rose to top positions between Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 and the end of 2019. As we saw in the previous section, a few others appeared on the list earlier, but only became highly influential after 2012. The five people in this group come from a variety of backgrounds, though most share the characteristic of rising to positions of influence through the ranks of the organizations they now lead, rather than achieving that position through personal connections to Putin or members of Putin’s inner circle. Dmitry Peskov rose through the diplomatic service and then through the presidential press office before becoming Putin’s press secretary in 2008. Anton Siluanov rose through the finance ministry, replacing the previous minister in late 2011. Anton Vaino rose through the presidential administration and has headed it since 2016. Vladimir Kolokoltsev served in various positions in the interior ministry, followed by a term as the Moscow police commissioner, before being appointed to head the interior ministry in 2012. Viktor Zolotov is the one exception in this group because he has been personally close to Putin since serving as a bodyguard to St. Petersburg mayor Anatolii Sobchak in the 1990s. Although he only appeared on the list of influential Russians in 2016, he headed the presidential security service from the start of Putin’s tenure in 2000 until his appointment as head of the newly established National Guard in 2016. He thus serves as a good example of the type of individual who was missed by expert rankings because of his tendency to keep out of the limelight.

Inflection Points

Although Russia’s political elite has experienced relatively little change over the last twenty years, there have been a few key moments of substantial renewal, most immediately before or after presidential elections. After the initial introduction of Putin’s team in 2000–2001, an initial shift took place in 2003–2004. This was a period of consolidation, during which holdovers from the Yeltsin administration such as Kasyanov and Voloshin left their positions and the influence of independent businessmen was largely eliminated after the arrest of Khodorkovsky. These figures’ residual influence meant that they remained on the list, though in relatively low positions, for some time thereafter. However, starting at this point, all senior officials were either members of Putin’s circle or technocrats.

A much bigger elite transition took place in 2007, with the departure of Veshniakov, Fradkov, and Zurabov and the decline in influence of Chubais, Gref, Zhukov, and Viktor Ivanov. At the same time, a large number of new people appeared on the list, including Chemezov, Bortnikov, Bastrykin, Kovalchuk, Golikova, Nabiullina, Dvorkovich, and Serdiukov. In addition, Naryshkin, Zubkov, Iakunin, and Shuvalov, who had all been on the list previously, first attained high levels of influence in 2007 or 2008. These changes occurred as part of the transition to what became known as the “tandemocracy,” a period during which Medvedev served as president while Putin was prime minister.

There was a second major transition around the 2012 presidential election, with the departures of Zubkov, Gryzlov, Khristenko, Nurgaliev, and Serdiukov and the decline of Kudrin and Surkov. At the same time, Shoigu, Bastrykin, Volodin, and Peskov became highly influential for the first time while Siluanov, Rogozin, and Kolokoltsev either first appeared on the list or returned after a lengthy absence. This date marked the consolidation of the conservative turn in Russian politics, with security officials in the ascendance and economic modernizers relegated to secondary roles.

Putin’s third term was characterized largely by stability, with only a few significant shifts in influence. There were early signs of a generational shift, although few younger officials had yet reached positions of highest influence by the end of 2019, as highlighted by the dearth of people in the final group discussed above. Although a big government shakeup took place in January 2020, initial monthly polling suggests that this will result primarily in a reshuffling, with potentially limited impact on the composition of the top elite beyond the addition of the new prime minister. The shift to a new generation is coming, but the highest level still consists primarily of the people who have been with Putin since the early days of his rule. This will likely remain the case at least until the next presidential election in 2024.

Conclusion

The small number of people represented in the elite suggests a high level of elite continuity, which has allowed the regime to remain remarkably stable over a twenty-year period. Regime stability can be fleeting and authoritarian regimes, in particular, can shift from the appearance of eternal stability to collapse in a brief period. Nevertheless, the level of elite continuity in Putin’s Russia has allowed for relatively high level of policy consistency. While Putin’s team certainly has its share of tensions, everyone in his inner circle understands how the others operate.

The expert survey data clearly show that Russia’s Putin-era political elite includes two types of officials. Members of the first group have influence because of their roles or positions in government, while members of the second group have influence independently of their positions because of their ties to Vladimir Putin. Those in the second group tend to remain influential even when they are no longer in positions of power, while those in the first group drop out of the rankings as soon as they step down from their official role. This finding suggests that the number of people with real power may be even smaller than the sixty people represented in the data set, as only the second group has lasting influence at the highest levels. It also suggests that the members of the elite who were displaced in the government turnover of January 2020 will have different fates. People who have close ties to Putin, such as Dmitry Medvedev, will remain influential, while those who have had power because of their roles in government, such as Surkov, are likely to disappear.

Notes

1 The most recent annual rankings were published in Dmitri Orlov, “100 ведущих политиков России в 2019 году,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 1, 2020, http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2020-01-13/7_7766_people.html.

2 The question of how well an expert survey of this type reflects actual power dynamics in Russia is a valid one. Because the main goal of this study is to examine political influence, ratings by Russian experts on domestic politics are likely to be a fairly accurate representation, especially because the survey used a consistent methodology throughout the period under study.

3 “1999 год. 100 ведущих политиков России.” https://ru.telegram.one/CorruptionTV/1499.

4 Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 19(4):289-306, 2003.

5 Tatiana Stanovaya, “Пять путинских элит на фоне транзита,” Carnegie Moscow Center, February 27, 2020. https://carnegie.ru/2020/02/27/ru-pub-81158.

6 Guy Faulconbridge, Michael Stott, “Medvedev’s Kremlin chiefs are Putin men,” Reuters, May 13, 2008. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-cabinet-kremlin/medvedevs-kremlin-chiefs-are-putin-men-idUSL1323497720080513.

BPC Mistral (Antilles et Guyane), BPC Dixmude (Réunion) et BPC Tonnerre (Corse) sont mobilisés.

Tag: BPCOpération Résilience

Americas

Timken Gears and Services won a $76.2 million contract modification to exercise options for main reduction gear shipsets for DDG-51 or Arleigh Burke Class guided-missile destroyers. The DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class is a multi-mission warship. It features an advanced anti-submarine warfare system, the AEGIS combat system, the Vertical Launching System, two embarked SH-60 helicopters along with advanced anti-aircraft missiles and land-attack missiles. The main reduction gears transmit the power from two main propulsion gas turbines to the propulsion shaft. Each DDG 51 Class destroyer has two gear assemblies, one for each propulsion shaft. The DDG 51-Class guided-missile destroyer is a multi-mission surface combatant with 67 delivered ships, and 21 more are currently under contract. Work will take place in Missouri, California, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Delaware and Wisconsin. Work is expected to be finished by November 2023.

The US Air Force has decided to focus on Raytheon’s design for the Long-Range Standoff Weapon program. Elizabeth Thorn, LRSO’s program manager said the decision is not a down-select. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon were given Technology Maturation and Risk contracts for the program in 2017. “We are reframing our relationship with Lockheed Martin to focus on specific technology maturation we believe either has future applicability for the final LRSO design or will reduce overall program risk,” Thorn said. The LRSO is designed to be a nuclear-armed cruise missile to replace the AGM-86.

Middle East & Africa

Iraq became the latest country to consider acquiring the Russian-made S-400 Triumf, local news reports. The country’s Parliamentary Security and Defense committee had submitted a report to the Iraqi prime minister’s office recommending the acquisition of the S-400. The country had previously announced in January that it would be examining potential offerings from China, Russia, and Ukraine. The acquisition will have to await approval of the country’s prime minister, with the post currently vacant. Former director of the country’s National Intelligence Service Mustafa al-Khadimi is currently the prime minister designate and is negotiating with other parties to form a coalition government.

Iran now has armed versions of its Ababil-3 UAV. This was revealed during a ceremony held to mark the delivery of three types of unmanned aircraft to the military. The Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics released photographs showing a hangar at the Aerospace Industries Organization facility in Isfahan with 11 Ababil-3s, one of which was carrying a television-guided munition on a hardpoint under a wing. This appeared to be a member of the Ghaem family of small-guided bombs that has previously been seen on Mohajer-6 UAVs. Iranian television showed an Ababil-3 with a different livery apparently carrying out a precision air strike against an old tank using a munition labelled as a Ghaem. The MODAFL cited Defense Minister Amir Hatami as saying the Ababil-3 has a range of 150 km.

Europe

The German government has approved the procurement of the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler to partially satisfy its Tornado replacement requirement, national media has reported. German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer has told the US government that Berlin has given clearance for the Luftwaffe to acquire 45 Super Hornet and Growler aircraft as part of its wider plans to replace 90 Panavia Tornado Interdiction and Strike (IDS)/Electronic Combat Reconnaissance (ECR) aircraft with 85 new platforms from 2025. The 30 Super Hornet multirole and 15 Growler electronic attack (EA) jets would enable the Luftwaffe to fulfil its airborne nuclear strike and EA requirements within the required timeframe,

Asia-Pacific

The Turkish defense company Aselsan announced that it had signed a new contract with Kazakhstan to supply its Stabilized Advanced Remote Weapon Platform (SARP)-Dual remote-controlled weapon station (RCWS). The Turkish company has strong links with Kazakhstan via its Kazakhstan Aselsan Engineering subsidiary, which was established to increase ‘manufacturing capacity in order to meet Kazakhstan’s military and civilian needs’. No details were provided about the delivery schedule, the size of the order, the value of the contract or the platforms the RWCSs are set to be installed upon. In November 2016 Kazakhstan had awarded the company a contract for an undisclosed number of SARP RWCSs, deliveries of which began the following year. However, these are believed to have been single weapon systems.

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Americas

Huntington Ingalls Industries won a $108 million contract modification to exercise options for the accomplishment of the planning yard services for the littoral combat in-service ships. The LCS is a high speed, agile, shallow draft, mission-focused surface combatant of the US Navy designed for operations in the littoral environment, yet fully capable of open ocean operations. It is a modular, reconfigurable ship designed to meet validated fleet requirements for anti-surface warfare (ASuW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and mine countermeasures (MCM) missions. The requirements under this contract include, but are not limited to ship installation drawings development; ship change document updates; operating cycle integration program management; work integration package engineering; type commander response; ship configuration logistics support information system support; configuration data management; research engineering and modeling; provisioned items order; cost and feasibility studies; integrated planning yard material support; provisioning technical documentation; naval ships engineering drawing repository system input and data management; interface and coordination with regional maintenance centers and fleet entities; design alteration and modification development; review and tracing; managing related class ship selected record documents; and hull, mechanical and electrical engineering standardization efforts.Work will take place in Virginia, Mississippi,California and Florida. Estimated completion will be by April 2021.

General Dynamics Electric Boat announced that it has delivered the nuclear-powered attack submarine Vermont to the Navy. The Vermont is the 19th submarine of the Virginia Class, which displace 7,835 tons, with a hull length of 377 feet and a diameter of 34 feet, and can carry eight masts, including a snorkel mast and high-data-rate satellite communication masts as well as a radar mast. The submarine is valued at $3 billion. “I am pleased to report that the Vermont has received some of the highest quality ratings in the history of the Virginia program. We wish Vermont and her crew a long and distinguished career in defense of our nation“, said Kevin Graney, President, General Dynamics Electric Boat, in a press release. Back in December the Navy awarded Electric Boat $22.2 billion for delivery of nine Virginia-class subs, and in January Lockheed Martin received $19.3 million to deliver masts for the boats.

Middle East & Africa

The first of 12 Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC)-Embraer A-29 Super Tucano light attack turboprops for Nigeria made its maiden flight at the Florida production facility on April 17. With the successful first flight completed, the aircraft will now be fitted with its mission systems by SNC in Colorado ahead of final trials and the commencement of deliveries to the Nigerian Air Force in 2021. The milestone comes about 30 months after the US Department of Defense (DoD) contracted SNC to deliver the 12 aircraft to Nigeria for use in the fight against the Boko Haram Islamist group. With weapons, the total value of the deal was estimated to be approximately $600 million. Powered by a single 1,600 SHP Pratt & Whitney PT6A-68/3 turboprop engine, the Super Tucano carries two 12.7 mm machine guns (200 rounds each) in the wings and can be configured with additional underwing weaponry such as 20 mm cannon pods, additional 12.7 mm machine guns, rockets pods, precision-guided munitions, and/or ‘dumb’ bombs of up to 1,500 kg.

Europe

The Italian Army has placed an order with Leonardo for 15 AW169 helicopters. This is the second successful sale of the military variant. Italy’s Guardia di Finanza police agency was the first to order this variant back in 2018 with an order for 22. The procurement, disclosed by the country’s Ministry of Defense solidifies an earlier announcement made in January that the AW169M was to be bought to replace the army’s Bell AB 205, AB 212, and AB 412 LUHs, and to augment its Boeing CH-47F Chinook, NHIndustries NH90, AgustaWestland A129 helicopters. According to the procurement document, the deal with Leonardo, which is valued at $301 million, comprises delivery of two helicopters in a ‘commercial basic trainer’ configuration, as well as approval for the start of development of 15 new ‘advanced multirole’ configuration helicopters for the Italian Army.

Asia-Pacific

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indian Navy emphasized that it remains combat-ready, mission-capable, and in full readiness, after 26 of its personnel were quarantined after testing positive for the coronavirus. “All missions for coastal and offshore security continue as before. Operational units are being maintained in readiness by following a 14-day quarantine routine to meet immediate contingencies, including assistance to civil authorities and friendly maritime neighbors“, said India’s Press Information Bureau. “Our naval assets continue to be mission-deployed in three dimensions, with all the networks and space assets functioning optimally,” it added.

Sankei News reports that Japan has created a working group of local and US aerospace companies for the development of the successor to the F-2 fighter. The report added that Britain lost the race for the joint development program as it wants to have the lead and Japan is unwilling to participate in joint development with other countries in the Tempest program. The F-2 is one of the main fighter jets used by the Air Self-Defense Force. According to government officials, about 10 Japanese companies, including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., IHI Corp. and Toshiba Corp., will join the conference. Japan will ask three US companies, including Lockheed Martin Corp. and Boeing Co., to join the conference.

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