Central Europe

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM followed up on reports of a woman killed in Holmivskyi due to shrapnel injuries and a woman injured by shrapnel when her house was damaged by gunfire in Olenivka; it observed damage from shelling and gunfire to houses in Horlivka, Chermalyk and Tavrycheske, to a power substation in Irmino and to the House of Culture and a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The Mission saw fresh craters and damage from shelling to residential buildings inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Metalist.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw fresh craters near Zolote, Vodiane, Irmino and Molodizhne.
• The Mission spotted trucks near Stepne along the border with the Russian Federation.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 215), compared with the previous reporting period (about 450 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and southerly and south-easterly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (15), compared with the previous reporting period (about 250 explosions). Over half of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-south-east and north of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Woman killed in Holmivskyi due to shrapnel injuries and damage to a residential building

In Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), on 11 July, the SMM saw the body of a deceased woman (70 years old) lying on a sofa inside her apartment on the fifth floor of a five-storey residential building at 23 Bolnychna Street. At the building, the son (man, in his forties) of the deceased woman told the SMM that at around 08:00 on 11 July he had received a phone call from his mother who reported sustaining injuries from an explosion. He said that he immediately arrived to his mother’s apartment and saw injuries on the right and left sides of her chest. He told the SMM that by the time the ambulance had arrived at 08:50, his mother had already died.

About 40m east of the above five-storey residential building, the SMM saw a fresh crater assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round, but could not assess the direction of fire. It saw fresh shrapnel marks on the building’s east-facing wall and shattered east-facing windows and balcony doors from the second to the fifth floor.

Woman injured by shrapnel and damage to residential houses in Olenivka

In Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), at 31 Shevchenka Street, a woman (64 years old) with a scratch on her upper left arm told the SMM that on the early morning hours of 12 July she had been at her house when she heard an explosion and was injured by shrapnel. She said that her 17-year old grandson had been sleeping in the room next-door when the explosion occurred.

The SMM saw a hole on the south-west-facing outer wall of her one-storey house, assessed as caused by a 30mm high-explosive round (undetermined weapon) fired from a west-south-west direction. Inside the house, it saw about 50 holes in three broken doors, in several walls, in the television screen and in wooden floor boards, all assessed as fresh shrapnel damage. The house is about 400m north-east of a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-20, a road used daily by civilians to cross the contact line.

About 500m north-west, at 64 Lenina Street, the SMM saw a fresh impact in the south-west facing side of the roof of a one-storey residential house, assessed as caused by a projectile (30mm) fired from a west-north-westerly direction. A neighbour (woman in her seventies) told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the early hours of 11 July.

About 600m south-west, at 98 Pereizna Street, the SMM saw a tree with broken branches about 3m from the north-facing wall of a one-storey residential house, assessed as caused by a projectile (likely 30mm) fired from a west-north-westerly direction. The SMM saw a fresh hole in a north-facing window, pieces of glass below it and small damage to the surface on the north-facing concrete wall, all assessed as shrapnel damage from the above mentioned projectile. The SMM saw also fresh shrapnel damage to a fence about 2m north of the house. A neighbour (woman in her seventies) told the SMM that she had heard an explosion on 11 July at 03:30.

Damage to residential houses from shelling in Tavrycheske and to power substation in Irmino

On 11 July, at 8 Zakhidna Street in Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 48km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two fresh craters (including one with shrapnel scattered around it) in a garden about 20 and 100m west of a one-storey house. The Mission was unable to assess the type of weapon(s) used and direction of the fire. The Mission saw a hole on the west-facing corner of the roof of the house and a shattered north-west-facing window pane with shards of glass scattered on the ground underneath it, as well as cracks in the internal walls of the main room. About 4m south-west of the house, the SMM saw a shattered north-west-facing window pane of a one-storey brick building, with shards of glass scattered on the ground underneath it. About 20m west of the aforementioned house, the SMM saw that a 3m-long section of the outer wooden fence had been destroyed and observed at least 15 holes in the remaining part. The SMM assessed all the above damage as fresh and likely caused by shrapnel from the same explosions. A resident of the house (woman in her seventies) told the SMM that she had been at home on the morning of 10 July when she had heard explosions and that nobody had been injured.

About 10m north-west of the abovementioned house, at a one-storey house at 6 Zakhidna Street in Tavrycheske, the SMM saw a partially shattered north-west-facing window pane with shards of glass scattered on the ground underneath it, six holes on the north-west-facing wall and a hole on the north-west-facing side of the roof. About 4m south-west of the house, the SMM saw three partially shattered north-east-facing window panes at a one-storey stone building. The SMM assessed all damage as fresh and likely caused by shrapnel from the same abovementioned explosions. Two residents of the house (man and woman in their sixties) told the SMM they had been at home on the morning of 10 July when they had heard explosions and that nobody had been injured.

On the same day, at a power station at Diukanova Street in Irmino (non-government-controlled, 54km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a fresh impact (hole) in the west-north-west-facing side of the roof of a two-storey central building of a power station control point and the SMM saw a corresponding hole through the concrete floor on the second floor while inside the building. The SMM assessed the impact as probably caused by an artillery round fired from an undetermined direction. Inside the building, the SMM saw concrete debris scattered on the second-floor and staircase. It observed four shattered windows, including one with steel security bars bent outwards. At another two-storey building of the power station, 10-15m east, the SMM saw shrapnel damage on the west-facing brick wall and projectile remnants on the ground between the two buildings. The SMM assessed all damage as caused by shrapnel from the above mentioned round. The SMM saw a crater in soft soil, 130m west-south-west of the central building, assessed as probably caused by an artillery round, but could not assess direction of fire.

Damage from gunfire to House of Culture and functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 11 July, on the south-western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), about 500m east of the western edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted a hole in the west-facing part of the roof of the three-storey building of the House of Culture. The SMM was unable to assess the type of weapon used and direction of fire. About 700m further west, at the three-storey brick building of a functioning school on Myru Street, the SMM saw fresh damage (holes or shattered window panes) to four north-facing windows on the ground, second and third floors, assessed as damage from gunfire. A school employee (woman, 60 years old) told the SMM that she had seen the damage on the morning of 11 July (for the most recent observations at this location, see SMM Daily Report 18 June 2019).

Damage to residential house from shelling in Chermalyk

In Chermalyk, at 6 Nikitna Street, the SMM accompanied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) saw a fresh crater located about 45m east of a residential house, assessed as caused by a 82mm mortar round. The SMM saw about ten dents on the east-facing wall of the house. Two residents of the house (woman and man, in their eighties) told the SMM that they were inside the house when they heard shelling in the late evening hours on 11 July.

Small-arms fire assessed as directed at an SMM mini- UAV near Metalist

While conducting a mini-UAV flight about 4km south-west of Metalist (non-government-controlled, 7km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 20 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 1-1.5km north, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which was also flying about 1km north of the patrol’s position. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area. Analysis of imagery recorded by the same UAV showed one man pointing a rifle in the direction of the UAV.*

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 12 July, inside the disengagement area, south of the broken part of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them.

At the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the broken part of the bridge, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC [2] and a group of seven civilians, including a local administration representative, walking towards the broken section of the bridge, reportedly conducting a feasibility assessment for a shuttle service to carry “impaired” civilians from the broken bridge to the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. About 200m south of the EECP, the SMM saw eight members of the State Emergency Services (SES) carrying mine detectors.

Outside of the disengagement area, about 15m north of the EECP, the SMM saw continuing works for the building of a concrete reinforced structure (see SMM Daily Report 12 July 2019). A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier told the SMM that they were building a shelter.

On the afternoon of 12 July, positioned 600m south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-3km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 7 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted in a field about 300m north of the Zolote disengagement area about 30 craters, assessed as fresh and caused by mortar rounds (the SMM could not assess the direction of fire).

On 10 July, inside the Zolote disengagement area, on the southern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted about 20 craters, all assessed as fresh and caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from southerly and south-easterly directions. Five of the aforementioned craters were about 2m from residential buildings, four of which (two houses and two barns) had their concrete-asbestos roof panels destroyed and damage to their windows. The mini-UAV spotted also damage to power lines, fences, trees and vegetable gardens nearby, all assessed as shrapnel damage. The same UAV also spotted, near road T-1306, about 50m south of the railway bridge, 18 craters assessed as fresh and caused by 82mm mortar rounds (the SMM could not assess the direction of fire), as well as seven craters, assessed as fresh and caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from southerly and south-easterly directions.  

On the evening of 11 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 3-5km south-east (unable to assess as inside or outside the disengagement area). The same camera recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 3-5km east-north-east and east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

During the day on 12 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

10 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) inside a building near Bohdanivka (44km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

12 July

The SMM saw:

• an MLRS (BM-21) at the railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk) and
• six surface-to-air-missile systems (9K35 Strela10) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.

12 July

The SMM noted that:

• seven MLRS (BM-21) were present and
• 23 MLRS (BM-21) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1, Gvozdika, 122mm) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

10 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1), an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Zolote-4/Rodina (60km west of Luhansk).

11 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two ACVs, two IFVs (BMP-1) and a 15m-long recently dug trench extension (not seen in imagery of 16 June 2019) near Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV near Bohdanivka (see above).

11 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted six armoured personnel carriers (APC) (one BTR-80 and five MT-LB) in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

Fresh craters in and near Vodiane and Molodizhne

On 11 July, in and near Vodiane, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 26 fresh craters, seven of which were in a residential area and the rest in a nearby field. The SMM assessed 20 of the craters as caused by 122mm artillery rounds and six by 120mm mortar rounds, including 16 assessed as fired from easterly and north-easterly directions.

On 11 July, about 1.7km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), on the shoulder of the southern side of the asphalt road, the SMM saw a fresh crater but was unable to assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire. About 600m further east, the SMM saw a second crater in the asphalt road (and a tailfin of an 82mm mortar round in it), assessed as fresh and caused by the impact of an 82mm mortar round fired from a west-south-westerly direction.

Trucks spotted near Stepne along the border with the Russian Federation

On 5 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of at least five trucks facing west along a tree line along the border with the Russian Federation, about 2km south-east of Stepne (non-government-controlled, 72km south-east of Donetsk), in an area where there are no official border crossing points and no roads. About 2km west of the trucks, the same aerial imagery revealed the presence of five fresh vehicle tracks leading to the border. About 1.6km further south, it also revealed three fresh vehicle tracks leading towards the border.

SMM facilitation of repair works and the operations of civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna and to power lines in Katerynivka.

The SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). While positioned near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and facilitating the operation of the DFS, the SMM heard about 70 ceasefire violations, including about 55 undetermined explosions, assessed as near the DFS.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “orders from their supervisor.” While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in both directions.
• On two occasions, two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, one visibly armed, denied the SMM access into a heavy weapons holding area in  Donetsk region, citing the absence of permission from their commander.  

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight about 4km south-west of Metalist (non-government-controlled, 7km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 20 shots of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely (see above).
• On three occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming while flying over Makiivka (non-government-controlled, 12km north-east of Donetsk).[7]

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Shyrokyne and Svitlodarsk were non-operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.  

[6]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position. 

VIENNA, 13 July 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today condemned the grenade attack on the office building of Ukrainian TV channel 112 Ukraine in Kyiv.

“I condemn the attack on channel 112 Ukraine premises today in Kyiv. Hopefully nobody was wounded but such violence and threats against media cannot be tolerated. This is an unacceptable act of intimidation which could have had dramatic consequences,” Désir said, welcoming the swift response of law enforcement officials in the case. 

Last night an unknown person shot at the premises of the channel with a grenade launcher. No injuries were reported. According to the law enforcement, a criminal case was launched on terrorism charges.

“I call on the Ukrainian authorities to thoroughly investigate this attack, and to bring those responsible for this crime to justice,” Désir said.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw damage to houses from shelling in Khreshchatytske.
• It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, including over 40 multiple launch rocket systems in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines near Pisky, some for the first time, and craters in Lozove.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and Luhansk city. SMM unmanned aerial vehicles continued to experience signal interference, assessed as due to jamming.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 450), compared with the previous reporting period (about 280 explosions). Over half of ceasefire violations were recorded in westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), and areas south-south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 250), compared with the previous reporting period (about 85 explosions). Over half of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).  

Damage to houses from shelling in Khreshchatytske

On 10 July, in the central part of Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a crater (1.5m in diameter) in gravel soil on the eastern edge of Pervomaiska Street, assessed as recent and caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from the west-north-west. About 4m east of the crater, the SMM saw that a wooden fence was partially blown away. About 20m west of the crater, at an inhabited single-storey house at 10 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw three east-facing windows covered in plastic and one shattered south-facing window, as well as at least 15 marks on an east-facing wall, all assessed as recent and caused by shrapnel. At a summer kitchen attached to the house, the SMM saw that two north-facing windows were each missing one panel and were covered with plastic sheeting. About 30m south-south-east of the crater, at an inhabited single-storey house at 9 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw shrapnel damage (a hole and two marks) on a north-facing outer wall, and a damaged west-facing window (partially shattered glass with a hole in the frame).

About 50m south-south-east of the crater, at an inhabited single-storey house at 8 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw at least eight holes (5-15cm) in the roof, as well as broken glass panels on the ground under a recently-repaired north-facing window and a shattered rear window of a car parked next to it, all assessed as recent and caused by shrapnel. A resident of the house (man in his fifties) told the SMM that he had been at home when he heard explosions on the morning of 8 July. Two additional residents of the neighbourhood (a man in his thirties and a woman in her fifties) separately told the SMM that they had been at home on the morning of 8 July when they had heard explosions.

About 80m east-north-east of 9 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw another crater (2mx2m) in a cultivated vegetable garden along with a fuse tunnel and shrapnel in it, assessed as recent and caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from the west-north-west. About 100m south-west of the crater, at an inhabited one-storey house at 6 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw a crater (2m x 2m) in a cultivated fruit garden, assessed as recent and caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from the west. About 6m north of the crater, the SMM saw more than 50 holes and marks on the south-facing wall of the house, all assessed as caused by shrapnel, and, about 4m north-east of the crater, the SMM saw that the corner of a concrete barn had collapsed and that roof panels on the south-west corner of the barn roof had been blown off. A resident of the house (man in his sixties) told the SMM that he had been at home in the early morning of 1 July when he had heard explosions. About 50m north-east of the crater, at an inhabited single-storey house at 8 Radianska Street, the SMM saw a broken west-facing window of a barn and three holes (3cm x 4cm) in the south-facing wall of a shed, all assessed as recent and caused by shrapnel. About 5m south of the crater, at an inhabited one-storey house at 5 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw more than 40 holes and shrapnel marks on a north-facing wall and window, and saw that a fruit tree about 1m south of the crater had been ripped out of the ground.

About 260m south-east of 5 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw a crater (1.5x1.5m) in soft soil with a fuse tunnel and shrapnel in it, assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from the west-south-west. About 3m east of the crater, the SMM saw cut branches of a tree, assessed as caused by the blast. About 15m south-east of the crater, at an inhabited two-storey apartment building at 12a Parkova Street, the SMM saw a shattered north-facing window, three shattered south-facing windows, and cut branches on a tree about 20m east of the crater, assessed as caused by shrapnel. In a field west-north-west, the SMM saw at least three recent craters assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from an undetermined direction. On the same day, at a building of the armed formations in Khreshchatytske, the SMM saw about ten people filing claims for damage to their property and collecting plastic sheeting and other materials to cover damage.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 10 July, inside the disengagement area, between the former forward position of the armed formations south of the wooden ramps on the broken part of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk) and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw seven members of the armed formations, all of whom were wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them. On the evening of the same day, at the northern edge of the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw six Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, three of whom were officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). [2].

On 11 July, inside the disengagement area, about 200m south of the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers cutting trees about 100m west of the road. Also inside of the disengagement area, the SMM saw five Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, including three Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC, along with two civilians, measuring sections of the path north of and on the broken bridge. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that they were taking measurements for a possible shuttle service that is planned to carry “impaired” civilians from the broken bridge to the EECP north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. At the same time, the SMM saw two members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them, standing at the southern edge of the broken part of the bridge about 20m south of the aforementioned group and at least seven others in the area between the former forward position and the checkpoint south of the bridge. In front of the former forward position of the armed formations south of the wooden ramps, the SMM saw a man in military-type clothing with a white armband and blue helmet.

In the morning, at the EECP north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, on three occasions, the SMM saw about 500-600 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 150-300 people queuing to exit. Also at the EECP, the SMM saw a crane, two military trucks, an excavator, a welding machine, and three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers building a concrete reinforcement structure.

On the morning of 10 July, positioned near the Prince Ihor Monument about 250m south-east of the disengagement area’s south-eastern edge, the SMM heard two bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km north-west. On the same morning, positioned inside the disengagement area about 90m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1.5-2km east. On the morning of 11 July, positioned inside the disengagement area about 250m south of its northern edge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-4km south-west. All of the above were assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening and night of 10-11 July, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east and nine projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 11 July, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight at the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire about 1.5km north-north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area and aimed at the mini-UAV, which was flying about 1.3km north-north-west of the SMM’s location. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

During the day on 11 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11 July

The SMM saw:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) mounted on armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) in Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) on the north-eastern outskirts of Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 22 MLRS (BM-21) near Bokovo-Platove (54km south-west of Luhansk);
• eight MLRS (BM-21) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk);
• 13 MLRS (BM-21) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk); and
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

10 July

The SMM saw:

• three self-propelled howitzers (probable 2S1) north of Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk) and
• four self-propelled howitzers (probable 2S1) and two tanks at the railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk).

11 July

The SMM saw:

• an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in Pokrovsk;
• five self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Rodynske (59km north-west of Donetsk); and
• at least 30 tanks (T-64) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (see above).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 38 tanks (T-72), five self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30) and nine towed mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk);
• 18 towed howitzers (types undetermined) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk);
• six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 15 towed anti-tank guns (MT-12) near Bokovo-Platove (see above);
• four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35), 12 towed howitzers (D-30) and ten tanks (T-64) in a training area near Miusynsk (see above);
• 28 tanks (T-72) and a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) in a training area near Ternove; and
• ten tanks (T-72) near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

9 July

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two probable APCs (MT-LB) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

10 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two APCs (BTR-80) near Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol).

11 July

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) in Novhorodske;
• two APCs (MT-LB) and an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and
• three APCs (MT-LB) near Krasnohorivka.

Presence of anti-tank mines and a crater near Pisky, fresh craters near Lozove

On 9 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time at least ten probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in a single line running from north-west to south-east in a field about 2km south-west of Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk), as part of a larger group of about 90 previously observed anti-tank mines, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The same UAV again saw 40 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across both lanes of road M-04, about 500m south of the aforementioned mines.

The same UAV also spotted for the first time a crater assessed as caused by a probable 120mm mortar round, with a probable tail fin visible in the center of it, in a field about 3km south-west of Pisky (not visible in imagery from 27 June 2019). Additionally, the same UAV spotted for the first time about 20 craters assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds in a field about 3km north-west of Lozove (non-government-controlled, 13km west of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 27 June 2019).

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the repair of a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, and to facilitate the maintenance of a water tower near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Additionally, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to support the crossing of a telecommunications vehicle containing spare parts for repair works from government-controlled areas to non-government-controlled areas.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour and a half, the SMM saw 15 cars (one with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as seven with “DPR” plates) and 12 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) entering Ukraine, and 28 cars (nine with Ukrainian, one with Armenian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 12 with “DPR” and one with “LPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates), two buses (with “DPR” plates), and three pedestrians (two men and one woman, mixed ages) exiting Ukraine.

Security situation along the Black Sea in the Kherson and Mykolaiv regions

On 9 and 10 July, the SMM observed a calm situation along the Black Sea coast between Bilozerka (31km west of Kherson) and Ochakiv (79km west of Kherson).

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing demining activities in the area.” At the same time, the SMM saw civilians crossing the checkpoint in both directions.
• At a compound of the armed formations in non-government-controlled Luhansk city, two members of the armed formations denied the SMM access, citing no permission granted from superiors.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delayed:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only after about 25 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 10-11 July, an SMM long range-UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, on three occasions while flying over areas near Fashchivka (non-government-controlled, 61km south-west of Luhansk), Vedmezhe (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Donetsk) and Petrivka (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), as well as signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Druzhba (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).[6]
• On 11 July, while conducting a mini-UAV flight inside of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and just north of its southern edge, the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire about 1.5km north-north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely (see above).
• On 11 July, SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, on three occasions while flying over Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol) and on one occasion while flying over Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position. 

CHISINAU, 12 July 2019 - The mediators and observers in the Permanent Conference on Political Issues in the Framework of the Negotiation Process on the Transdniestrian Settlement in the 5+2 format visited Chisinau and Tiraspol on 12 July 2019 for talks with the Moldovan and Transdniestrian leaderships.

During their visit, the mediators and observers met in Chisinau with the Moldovan President Igor Dodon, Prime Minister Maia Sandu as well as Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration and Chief Negotiator Vasilii Sova. In Tiraspol they met with the Transdniestrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky and Chief Negotiator Vitaly Ignatiev.

The mediators and observers welcomed the political commitment shown by the leaderships of both Sides to further build on the positive dynamic in the Transdniestrian settlement process and to achieve further tangible results by the end of this year with regard to the implementation of the Berlin-plus package.

To that end, the mediators and observers urged the Sides to continue the active and substantive engagement in the joint expert working groups and to hold 1+1 meetings of the chief negotiators on a regular basis to provide these groups with the necessary guidance and they welcome in this regard the commitment by both chief negotiators to meet within the next two weeks. Taking into account the result-oriented approach, substantive political discussions in the 5+2 format can be convened in Bratislava, Slovakia within the next three months to take stock of the progress made with regard to the implementation of the Berlin-plus package and to identify further priority issues in the field of confidence-building measures. The mediators and observers further welcomed the readiness of both Sides to address selected priority issues from the joint expert working groups in a retreat to be organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova in Bavaria, Germany in autumn.

Talks in the 5+2 format include representatives of the Sides – Moldova and Transdniestria, the mediators from the OSCE, the Russian Federation and Ukraine as well as the observers from the European Union and the United States of America.

Kunduz Rysbek

An-OSCE supported training seminar on regulatory aspects of raising funds and countering measures to avert financial pyramids took place on 12 July 2019 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

The one-day event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in partnership with Kazakhstan’s National Bank. It brought together some fifteen representatives of Kazakhstan’s National Bank.

OSCE-supported international experts from Moldova and Slovakia familiarized participants with types and schemes of financial pyramids in financial and capital markets as well as ways to identify, block and prevent them by the regulatory body. They also focused on emerging risks associated with new financial technologies and ways to increase the population’s financial literacy.

The event is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance with a focus on averting financial fraud and ensuring transparency in the financial sector.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage to houses due to shelling in Holubivske and Khreshchatytske.
• The SMM saw anti-tank mines near Shchastia and Vesela Hora.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske. *

Ceasefire violations[1] 

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 281), compared with the previous reporting period (about 167 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-east of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and south-south-east of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 84), compared with the previous reporting period (about 62 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-west of Kriakivka (non-government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk).  

Damage to residential houses due to shelling in Holubivske

On 9 July, in Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), at 45 Yuvileina Street, the SMM saw an inhabited house with its roof covered with tarpaulin covering a fresh hole (60cm long and 40cm wide) on its southern corner, with around one-square-metre ceiling plaster being broken out and roof’s beam being cracked around it, assessed as caused by a projectile that had penetrated the roof. The SMM also observed eight partially destroyed window panes on all walls of the house, with shattered glass inside the rooms and outside the house, a section of the south-facing wall collapsed towards the inside of the house, as well as a fresh crater 1m north-east of the said wall, assessed as caused by a mortar round, along with a hole (2m long and 2m wide) on the wooden wall of an outdoor kitchen, connected to the west-facing side of the house, assessed as shrapnel damage. A 62-year-old resident of the house (man) told the SMM that nobody had been in the house during the shelling. The SMM also observed a crater on the shoulder of the road, 1m south-east of the house, that had been filled with stones. The SMM assessed it as fresh and caused by a mortar round.   

About 10m south-south-west of the said house, at 43 Yuvileina Street, the SMM saw that the roof of an inhabited house was covered with tarpaulin covering a hole (around 50cm x 20cm in diameter) on the west-facing part of the roof, assessed as caused by a projectile, which had penetrated the roof. The SMM also saw eight destroyed window panes throughout the house with shattered glass inside and outside the house. A 35-year-old man told the SMM that he was away while his spouse and two children (two and five years old) were inside when a projectile hit the house.

About 30m east-south-east, at 40 Yuvileina Street, on the north-east-facing side of a house, the SMM saw a fresh hole (4m in diameter) on the roof with broken wooden roof beams and roof tiles collapsing inside the house, assessed as caused by a projectile that had penetrated the roof. About 20m north-east, at 70 Yuvileina Street, the SMM saw the north-west-facing side of a roof covered with tarpaulin covering a fresh hole (4m in diameter) assessed as caused by a projectile that had penetrated the roof, along with eight holes on the north-west-facing front door located under the roof. The SMM also observed a collapsed porch roof, several destroyed window panes on the north-western side, with shattered glass inside and outside the house, and several holes on the satellite dish located 1m south of the hole on the roof. A 63-year-old resident of the house told the SMM that he was inside the house during shelling in the morning of 6 July.

Damage to a house and uninhabited areas due to shelling in Khreshchatytske

On 9 July, in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol) at 23 Komsomolska Street, the SMM saw an inhabited house with scattered wooden panels. The SMM saw a toppled left part of the west-facing brick wall and a large hole at the right side of the same wall, covered with plastic sheeting as well as a fresh crater 1m west of the west facing brick wall, assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction. At 16 Komsomolska Street, in the backyard 13m east of the house, the SMM saw a crater assessed as fresh and caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction. About 120m north-north-east, the SMM saw cracked south-facing side of concrete steps outside of the entrance door of an abandoned shop, about ten shrapnel pock-marks next to the stairs, asbestos panels and wooden planks underneath the roof on the west-facing part of the shop, and a crater 1m south of the stairs of the shop, assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction.

About 200m south-west, around a functional gas station, the SMM saw four craters on soft soil and one on hard surface, all assessed as fresh and caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a westerly direction. About 50m north-east of the gas station, the SMM saw a fresh crater on an asphalt driveway, assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction.

In an uninhabited area of the eastern part of Khreshchatytske, about 500m south-east of the gas station, the SMM saw a fresh crater on soft soil and 4m south, another fresh crater, both assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction. About 350m east of the gas station, on the main square of Khreshchatytske, the SMM saw a fresh crater on soft soil. About 1m east of the crater, the SMM saw a snapped tree with broken branches, about 25m north-west of a school at 1 Komsomolska Street assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction. About 50m east of the main square, the SMM saw a fresh crater assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction. Approximately 125m east of the main square, the SMM saw a snapped tree with broken branches and chipped bark nearby.

About 9m east of the former village council building on Komsomolska Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater. About 120m south-south-west of the building, the SMM saw another fresh crater, as well as about 95m west-south-west, the SMM saw a fresh crater on hard surface, all assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a westerly direction.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 9 July, inside the disengagement area, about 180m east of its western edge and about 250m south-west of the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four men in a blue uniform, assessed as belonging to the State Emergency Services (SES) and carrying out demining activities. At around 200m south of the said checkpoint, the SMM saw two men in military-style clothing cutting branches and trees with axes and chainsaw in the area around 50m east of the main road. 

In the late evening hours of 9 July, inside the disengagement area, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four persons walking along a footpath and entering a bunker at the former most forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the railway bridge (about 500m east-north east from of the wooden ramp at the broken part of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge) as well as one person and two cars about 100m north-north-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations just south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The UAV did not spot any weapons or hardware inside the disengagement area.

On 10 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw three Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC)[2]  walking south towards the broken ramp of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge talking to pedestrians. On the same day, outside the disengagement area, the SMM saw three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers installing shading net along a fence running at the eastern side of the pedestrian road, 25m east of the checkpoint. At the EECP north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, outside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a crane, a military truck, a truck and a welding machine and three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers building a concrete reinforcement structure.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 10 July, positioned at the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five shots of small-arm fire and one undetermined explosion assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) but within its 5km periphery.

During the day on 10 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

8 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of three multiple launch rocket systems near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 20 April 2019).  

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled area

9 July

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five tanks (types undetermined) near Chasiv Yar (62km north of Donetsk).

10 July

The SMM saw:

• 15 tanks (six T-64 and nine T-72), 15 self-propelled howitzers (types undetermined) at the railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk);
• 37 tanks (T-64) in and near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

5 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 36 tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 25 June 2019).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

9 July

The SMM saw an (IFV) (BMP variant) parked beside a residential house in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)

10 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB) and one armoured combat vehicle (ACV) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled area

10 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two ACVs near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

8 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of three ACVs near Boikivske, in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is  proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 (see above).

Anti-tank mines near Shchastia and Vesela Hora

On 10 July, about 2km north-east of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 40 anti-tank mines (TM-62), assessed as belonging to the armed formations, laid across the western lane of dual-lane road H-21 leading to the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk). The same UAV also spotted across the same road approximately 1km north-west of the aforementioned mines and about 150m south-east of the bridge in Shchastia, 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  

Non-SMM UAV seen near Zolote disengagement area and in Novoluhanske

In the morning hours of 10 July, the SMM saw a UAV flying over Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and landing 100m west of its position, outside the disengagement area. During the same day, the SMM observed an UAV near its position in Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable examination and repair of a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, repairs to greenhouses in Novokyivka (non-government-controlled, 25km east of Luhansk), repairs to electrical wires in Betmanove (non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and to a water tower near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable reportedly a transfer of funds from non-government- to government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, related to water payments.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “kinetic activity in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• An SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming,  on three occasions while flying over areas near Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), Metalist (non-government-controlled, 7km north-west of Luhansk) and Myronivskyi (government-controlled, 62km north-east of Donetsk).[6]
• SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, on two occasions while flying over Novoselivka Druha (government-controlled, 23km north of Donetsk) and on three occasions while flying over Sartana (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol).

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Svitlodarsk and Shyrokyne were non-operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position. 

LONDON, 11 July 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, expressed his concern today regarding resignations at the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation (ERT) and the Athens-Macedonian News Agency (ANA-MPA) in Greece.

On 9 July, the heads of the public broadcaster ERT and of the news agency ANA-MPA, Yannis Drosos and Michalis Psilos, respectively, submitted their resignations to the Deputy Prime Minister, Stelios Petsas. The resignations come amid the new ruling majority's pledge to reform public television in the country, following the recent parliamentary elections.

According to a new presidential decree, published on 9 July 2019, ERT and ANA-MPA will be placed under the supervision of the Prime Minister.

“Public service broadcasting plays an indispensable role in providing public interest programming and enhancing the professionalism of the media. It must contribute to diversity and pluralism and be independent from political interference," stated Désir. 

“Any cuts in public funding, as well as changes in the appointment and reporting mechanisms of the top managers and board members of the public service broadcaster and news agency need to be carefully assessed, in order to avoid impacting the work of the media. This is especially important in light of the challenging transformations ERT went through following the shutdown of the public broadcaster in 2013."

According to reports, the chairpersons will remain in their respective positions until replacements can be found and appointed. 

“It is crucial that public broadcasters remain independent, so as to continue providing unbiased and objective news to the citizens, and that effective mechanisms are put in place to ensure the proper independence and viability of the public broadcaster,” concluded Désir. 

Vienna, 11 July 2019 – “Albania will assume the 2020 OSCE Chairmanship inspired by a sense of responsibility and driven by the determination to contribute to the security and stability of our continent and to the prosperity of our people.” said the country’s Acting Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Gent Cakaj in Vienna today, as he addressed the Permanent Council on the incoming Chair’s priorities.

Expressing hope that 2020 will be a year of progress towards peace, Cakaj stressed that the Albanian Chair’s priorities run across all three dimensions of the OSCE’s comprehensive concept of security. In the first, political-military dimension, the crisis in and around Ukraine remains the most pressing challenge, but addressing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the consequences of the 2008 conflict in Georgia and the Transdniestrian Settlement Process will also feature high on its agenda.

Cakaj said: “Conflict resolution and conflict prevention efforts will be on top of the Albanian Chair’s agenda, beginning with renewed actions to contribute towards a peaceful solution of the crisis in and around Ukraine, which remains the most pressing security challenge in Europe. While we welcome recent positive developments, such as the completion of disengagement near Stanytsia Luhanska – which shows once again that progress is possible if there is political will - we remain worried by the number of ceasefire violations and by the frequency of threats against OSCE monitors. As a country hosting an OSCE field operation, Albania will strongly support the action of the OSCE on the ground, starting from the unique contribution to peace and stability made by the staff of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.”

“Particular attention will be given to the role of women in peace processes,” said the Acting Minister. “The Albanian Chairmanship will focus on the worrying reality that women continue to be disproportionally affected by conflicts in the OSCE area.  On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, Albania will work towards promoting the role of women in conflict resolution and peace processes. But the situation of women is of concern not only in conflict areas: we need to intensify our efforts to ensure a safer and prosperous future for all women and girls in our region.”

The Albanian OSCE Chair will also prioritize the revitalization of dialogue within the Organization. “Inspired by the 30th anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, in co-ordination with the Chairs of the Forum for Security Co-operation, Albania will promote existing CSBMs and arms control regimes. The Structured Dialogue remains an innovative and complementary forum for exchanges among participating States: the Albanian Chair looks forward to using its full potential to increase trust and lay the ground for further OSCE achievements,” said Cakaj.

“In addressing transnational threats, the 2020 Chair will promote reinforced efforts on countering violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism, paying particular attention to the issue of returning foreign terrorist fighters and their families. While addressing emerging challenges, such as cyber/ICT security, we will also tackle traditional ones, such as organized crime. The fight against all forms of trafficking will also be high on the 2020 agenda. Mindful of its cross dimensional nature, the incoming Chair will pay particular attention to promoting the adoption and implementation of measures to combat trafficking in human beings, with a focus on new technologies.”

In the second, economic and environmental dimension, the fight against corruption and the promotion of good governance will be prioritized. “Corruption erodes the foundations of trust between citizens and the state. It is a major obstacle to economic growth and fuels inequality, impunity, and instability,” stated the Acting Minister.

In the human dimension, the Albanian Chair will dedicate resources and efforts to promote tolerance and non-discrimination in order to foster a stronger sense of security in OSCE participating States.

Acting Minister Cakaj also highlighted the importance of the Mediterranean region in tackling many security challenges. “As recognized most recently in Milan, our security is indivisible from that of the Mediterranean region. Many of our common challenges and opportunities stem from the South. That is why a renewed, strategic partnership with our Partners for Co-operation in the Mediterranean is essential,” said Cakaj.

“To best assist participating States in meeting OSCE commitments, we will strive to be honest brokers among participating States. We will do so with a spirit of service and by strictly adhering to all norms and commitments that are binding upon the OSCE Chair,” concluded the Acting Minister.

Albania will take over the OSCE Chair from Slovakia on 1 January 2020.

VIENNA, 11 July 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today published a legal review of the draft Law on Media Services in Albania, after several consultations on the drafting process with Government representatives in recent months.

The analysis by Dr. Joan Barata Mir, an independent media freedom expert, underlines significant improvements compared to the previous versions that were also reviewed and shared with the authorities in January and June this year. 

The Representative underlined, “It is necessary that the future legislation respects the international standards and OSCE commitments on freedom of expression and that it does not impact negatively media freedom in the country”.

“My Office has been involved in a long process of consultation during the drafting of this legislation,” said Désir, “I appreciate the constructive co-operation with the authorities that led to many improvements."

“Nevertheless, further improvements to the law are still needed”, said the Representative, expressing hope that this will be done during the parliamentary process.

Désir welcomed the fact that under the draft law the electronic publications service providers are not obliged to register in order to perform their activities.

He stressed that “the Audiovisual Media Authority (AMA), the regulator of audio-visual media must not be a substitute for the independent judiciary or proper self-regulatory mechanisms on issues of freedom of expression,” adding that this also applies to the blocking of content, fines for breaches of the law and the modalities of the right to reply.

The legal analysis states that the regulation of electronic versions of written media, and more broadly of “electronic publication service providers” should not be the same as that of audiovisual media services. It is recommended to exclude the former from the scope of this draft law. 

The Representative reminded that blocking or suspending online publications is considered an extreme state measure vis-a-vis the right to freedom of expression, and therefore it is accepted by international standards only in cases of very serious violations of other human rights or democratic principles, or when other measures cannot be applied.

The Representative pointed out that the AMA’s competencies regarding “temporary blocking/limiting access to the internet” may only apply in the three clear-cut cases stated in the law: child pornography; encouraging terrorist acts; and national security breaches and where such measures are considered as necessary and proportionate, considering the existence of an imminent risk. 

The Representative also indicated that “proper appeal and review mechanisms before the judiciary need to be established as a safeguard for publishers and citizens. In other circumstances, such measures should be dealt with by the criminal justice system. The competences of the AMA should not be extended to dealing with issues such as defamation”.

Furthermore, the legal review recommends the clarification of the whole process of the AMA’s decision-making with the National Authorities for Electronic Certification and Cyber Security, NAECES, and the Electronic Communications Regulatory body, APEC.

“My Office stands ready to continue providing assistance on this important law. It is of utmost importance that the public consultation process is open and inclusive for all media professionals, journalists’ organizations and other relevant domestic and international media stakeholders,” concluded the Representative.

The full text of the legal review is available at www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/425462

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

425438 Marina Živaljević

ZAGREB, 11 July 2019 – The OSCE Mission to Montenegro organized a study visit by the Public Service Broadcaster (RTCG) to the Croatian Radio-Television (HRT) on 10 and 11 July in Zagreb, in order to share experiences about digitalization – an ongoing process in RTCG.

Four RTCG representatives participated in the visit: Budimir Raičević, Director of the Radio Montenegro, Aleksandra Pavićević, Editor-in-Chief of the First TV Programme), Dragan Tomašević, Production Manager and Igor Pejović, journalist in RTCG multimedia desk. The main topics of their discussion with their Croatian counterparts were potential obstacles in digitization, challenges and technological equipment.

“Since the Croatian Public Service Broadcaster is one of the leading broadcasters among the Western Balkan countries in terms of digitalization, and given the longstanding and good co-operation between the two media houses, the study visit helped RTCG to understand possible obstacles and challenges of investing in new digitalization equipment,” said Biljana Jovanović Albijanić, Media Programme Assistant at the OSCE Mission to Montenegro.

Zdenko Luburić, HRT Director for Technology, said that, in terms of technology, HRT is in line with the largest European media services. “We are honoured to pass on to our colleagues from RTCG all our experiences in the field of digitization and modernization of the media system, since HRT has been completely switched to digital broadcasting since 2010, and complete transition to HD format broadcasting is in progress,” said Luburić.

The instalment of the new technical equipment in RTCG has already begun and the plan of RTCG is to start broadcasting programmes from the new, digitalized system in November, when celebrating the great jubilee - 55 years of television and 75 years of radio.

Bearing in mind the important role of national public services in the media scene, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro continuously support the efforts of the Montenegrin Public Service, aiming at the constant improvement of all its functions.

VIENNA, 11 July 2019 – The 21st annual OSCE Central Asia Media Conference, focusing on media freedom and pluralism in times of digital transformation, will be held in Bishkek on 17-18 July 2019.

During the two-day event, over 100 participants from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Mongolia, representing the public authorities, media, journalists’ associations, civil society and academia, as well as several international experts will discuss a wide range of issues under the broad topic of possibilities and challenges arising in the context of new media technologies. This will include conditions for establishing an open and secure internet nationally and throughout the OSCE region, media for minorities and self-regulation. Participants will also discuss the most recent media freedom developments across the region.

The conference will be opened by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, together with the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, Ambassador Pierre von Arx, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, Chingiz Aidarbekov (TBC) and the Minister of Culture, Information and Tourism of the Kyrgyz Republic, Azamat Zhamankulov.

The main sessions, on the impact of digital development on media pluralism and online regulation, will be complemented by two workings groups that will focus on minority media in Central Asia, in particular on tackling the problem of hate speech and on self-regulation for online media as a tool for the promotion of ethical standards in the digital environment. Furthermore, the conference will include two side-events, in which participants will discuss the latest regional trends in the freedom of the media and the Charter of Rome project concerning reporting on immigration and asylum-seekers.

The working languages of the conference will be English and Russian with simultaneous interpretation.

Journalists covering the conference will have an opportunity to meet the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, at the press pool that will be held at 11:45 am on 17 July.

Journalists wishing to attend and report on the conference are required to send an e-mail to register their participation to Alexandru Zamșa of the OSCE Communication and Media Relations Section, at alexandru.zamsa@osce.org no later than 15 July. The presentation of a valid ID is required for accreditation at the venue.

Please send all requests for interviews during the event to Elena Cherniavska, Senior Adviser, at elena.cherniavska@osce.org or call +43 676 424 1502.

A detailed agenda in English and Russian can be accessed here. Biographies of speakers as well as other documents related to the conference will be uploaded later.

HELSINKI, 11 July 2019 – OSCE PA President Emeritus and Special Representative on Mediation Ilkka Kanerva attended in Moscow the second International Forum “Development of Parliamentarism.” Highlighting the OSCE’s security concept at the forum, he addressed pressing issues in international relations as well as key challenges facing European security.

Kanerva appealed to the participants to uphold dialogue in order to reach solutions on the issues shadowing European and wider international relations. He stressed that these topics are a key element of parliamentary diplomacy and that parliaments have a role to play in solving common problems, to appeal to national governments and take responsibility.

“Information war can range from pushing fake news stories and conspiracy theories to fanning the flames of existing problems — all serving to undermine public confidence in governments and institutions. The best way to respond is less by correcting the information, and more about having your own positive narrative and sticking to it,” President Emeritus Kanerva said.

At the International Forum, held 30 June to 3 July, Kanerva attended a round table discussion on information influencing and fake news. The forum was assembled on the initiative of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and included over 900 participants from 130 countries.

Kanerva also congratulated the Council of Europe on reaching a solution in the matter of Russia’s membership. He underlined that for the sake of European dialogue and human rights issues, it was crucial that regardless of the existing differences, a solution was reached.

425306 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Empowering, motivating and involving women in the homestay tourism business was the focus of a three-day training course for 15 women from remote areas of Tajikistan, which concluded on 10 July 2019 in Dushanbe.

The course, organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, supports the country’s plans for the development of rural areas, tourism and folk crafts from 2019 to 2021.

Participants learned how to open and develop a homestay business in their communities, market and promote it, work with clients, prepare meals and supplies for the guests and ensure visitors’ safety and healthcare. The interactive training sessions included group work and role plays where the participants drafted business plans for their future homestay.

“This training gave us the necessary knowledge and expertise to open our own homestay business,” said Furugh Shakarmamadova, one of the participants of the training. “It is also a very good chance for us to see how women from other regions of Tajikistan are dealing with challenges that they face in developing their homestay business”.

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe will further coach the owners of established homestay businesses on site. The main purpose of the homestay business training courses is to empower women economically, which increases their decision-making power both in their families and in the communities in which they live.

425477 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

The OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan supported a roundtable discussion on the implementation of the Aarhus Convention principles in Kazakhstan on 9 and 10 July 2019 in Nur-Sultan.

The event brought together some 60 representatives from the government, Aarhus Centres and environmental NGOs from various regions of the country, who discussed the planned amendments to Kazakhstan’s Environmental Code and ways to bridge existing gaps in implementing the Aarhus Convention, including the associated Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTR) Protocol and the Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) Amendment. They also reviewed complaints related to violations of the Aarhus Convention and exchanged views on solving the problems while conducting the public hearings on environmental matters. Prior to the roundtable, a training seminar was conducted with a focus on enhancing access to information and public participation in decision-making in environmental matters.

The 2003 Kyiv PRTR Protocol is a legally binding international instrument on pollutant release and transfer registers. It requires parties to establish publicly accessible registers containing information on pollutants. The GMO Amendment stipulates requirements for public participation in decisions concerning the deliberate release of GMOs and provides a clear regulatory framework to ensure the effective engagement of the public in decision-making.

The roundtable discussion was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in partnership with the Ecology, Geology and Natural Resources Ministry.

The event is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year activities to promote good environmental governance and to assist the host country in meeting its commitments under the Aarhus Convention.

VIENNA, 10 July 2019 - Experiences and best practices of co-operation among regional organizations, particularly how to develop and strengthen synergies between the work and activities of the OSCE, the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) and the European Union (EU) in Central Asia, were the focus of today’s meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, under the Chairmanship of Tajikistan.

The meeting provided a platform for senior officials of the three regional organizations to share their views on possibilities for candid and constructive co-operation, as well as on shared commitments to strengthen fighting transnational and emerging threats, to foster early warning, to take action, and to explore opportunities for closer co-operation on operational issues, in a demonstration of what the UN Secretary-General has termed “network multilateralism”.

SCO Secretary General Vladimir Norov highlighted the already close co-operation between his organization and the OSCE, stating that five SCO Member States are OSCE participating States. He said the organizations should work together in the field of countering new challenges, threats and sustainable development not only in Central Asia and Afghanistan, but also in the vast Eurasian space. He added that his Organization was currently working on a draft concept for the establishment of an SCO Anti-Drug Centre in Dushanbe.

“The SCO is committed to promoting co-operation in building a new type of international relations, based on the principles and norms of international law, primarily justice, equality, mutually beneficial co-operation, and a common vision of creating a community with a shared future for humankind,” he said. “The SCO, acting as a guarantor of stability in Central Asia, is ready to work together with the European Union, the OSCE and other European international organizations, based on partnership and aimed at sustainable and stable development in the region. As a responsible participant in the modern system of international relations, our Organization will continue to strengthen its engagement in efforts to ensure the prosperity of the countries of Central Asia.”

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger opened his presentation by noting that positive regional dynamics and greater openness to regional and international co-operation in Central Asia present new opportunities for engagement. Leveraging partnerships must be a centrepiece of regional organizations’ collective response to this encouraging trend, he said.

“From our side we stand ready to step up inter-institutional co-operation. I see potential in a number of areas, including countering terrorism, drugs and human trafficking, as well as promoting disaster risk reduction and economic and environmental security in Central Asia,” said Greminger. “There’s also a positive agenda we can build on. For instance, we can promote connectivity between our societies, economies and peoples. Often, we look to the United Nations to solve complex global problems and, as with the Sustainable Development Goals, the UN provides us with a useful global framework. But the truth is that regional organizations have a critical role to play in bridging global, national and local efforts.”

The EU Special Representative for Central Asia, Peter Burian of the European External Action Service (EEAS), recalled the recent 15th EU–Central Asian ministerial meeting in Bishkek, where the new EU Strategy on Central Asia was presented. The Strategy reconfirms the EU’s commitment to the security and stability of the region and its readiness to forge a stronger, modern and non-exclusive partnership with the countries of Central Asia so that the region develops as a sustainable, more resilient, secure, prosperous, and closely interconnected political and economic space, he said.

“We have fully recognized the strategic importance of Central Asia for regional and global security and stability in our new Strategy,” he said. “In implementing the Strategy, the EU will seek to work with other international organizations where such involvement would contribute to the general objectives of the EU and its Strategy. We believe that there is enough space in Central Asia for a positive co-operation of all based on internationally accepted standards and commitments, including principles of sustainable development that reflect and respect the needs and interests of our partners in Central Asia, whether it is economic viability or environmental sustainability of projects.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage to houses due to shelling in Khreshchatytske.
• The SMM saw fresh craters and recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in non-government-controlled Veselohorivka. *

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 170), compared with the previous reporting period (about 190 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west and north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), south-south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), and at south-easterly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (about 165 explosions). All ceasefire violations were recorded inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) or within 5km of its periphery.

Damage to residential houses due to shelling in Khreshchatytske

On 8 July, in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM followed up on reports of damage to houses due to shelling on the night of 7-8 July. At 9 Oktiabrska Street, the SMM saw three shattered north-facing windows and one broken west-facing window with its frame dislodged at an inhabited house. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by shelling but was unable to assess the direction of fire. The owner of the house (woman, 80-90 years old) told the SMM that she had been at home when shelling occurred in the morning of 8 July.

About 75m east, at 2 Kosmodemianskoi Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in a garden, assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction. About 2m from the crater, it saw burn marks on the façade of a house and shrapnel scars on its south-south-west facing wall, assessed as caused by the same explosion. The owner of the house (40-50 years old) said that she was at home when shelling occurred on the night of 7-8 July. The SMM had previously observed damage at this address (see SMM Daily Report 3 July 2019).

About 40m south-east, at 7 Oktiabrska Street, the SMM saw displaced corrugated asbestos panels on the north-west-facing part of the roof of an inhabited house and two shattered north-facing windows. Inside, the Mission saw a fresh hole, with a fresh crack and dislodged wall layer around it, in the inner west-facing wall of a bedroom. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by shelling but was unable to assess the direction of fire.

On the same day, the SMM saw about 60 residents (mixed ages and genders) gathered in the centre of Khreshchatytske who expressed their anger and frustration with what they said was the recurrent shelling of their settlement.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

During the day on 9 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw up to five members of the armed formations, all wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them, standing in the area between the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the former forward position of the armed formations south of the wooden ramps on the broken part of the bridge.

On 9 July, inside the disengagement area and north of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC)[2] near the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On the same day, south of the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw four members of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SES) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Kozak) assessed as belonging to the SES.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 7 July, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed about 110 fresh craters in areas north-west and north-east of the checkpoint of the armed formations on its southern edge and  in an area about 1km south of its northern edge and about 1km east of its western edge, as well as in an area west of the entry-exit checkpoint north of the northern edge (outside the disengagement area) (all not seen in imagery from 2 July 2019).

During the day on 9 July, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 2km north, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned at four different locations near the disengagement area, the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions and about 70 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

During the day on 9 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

5 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (types unknown) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk).

7 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a residential area south of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

8 July

The SMM saw a tank (T-72) on a flatbed trailer near Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

9 July

The SMM saw:

• ten tanks (T-72) in Pokrovsk (55km north-west of Donetsk) and
• four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Biletske (65km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled are\as

5 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of ten self-propelled howitzers (types unknown), 12 towed howitzers (types unknown) and ten tanks (types unknown) in a training area near Miusynsk.

8 July

The SMM saw tank (type unknown) on a flatbed trailer in Mykhailivka (31km west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

9 July

The SMM noted that a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) was present and four MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), 67 towed howitzers (12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and 55 2A65 Msta-B, 152 mm), six mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), 12 surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) and 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

9 July

The SMM noted that 49 tanks (45 T-72 and four T-64), 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and 12 mortars (six PM-38 Molot, 120mm and six M120-15 Molot, 120mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

7 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of six probable armoured combat vehicles near Zolote.

8 July

The SMM saw a mid-range UAV flying from south to north above an area near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), outside the disengagement area.

9 July

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-70) near the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska;
• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and an APC (MT-LB) near Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk);
• 11 IFVs (BMP-2) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk) and
• four IFVs (BMP-2) near Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) and four APCs (MT-LB) in a residential area north-west of Kadiivka.

8 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 11 IFVs (BMP-1) and two APCs (MT-LB) approximately 2km north-east of Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).

Fresh craters near Miusynsk and Kulykove

On 5 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed numerous fresh craters caused by undetermined weapons in a training area near Miusynsk (not seen in imagery of 16 June 2019). On the same day, aerial imagery also revealed ten craters about 3.5km south-east and about 2.5km south-south-east of Kulykove (non-government-controlled, 87km south of Donetsk), assessed as caused by undetermined weapons fired from a westerly direction.

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an assessment of land plots corresponding to a water pipeline between Petropavlivka (government-controlled, 27km north of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), as well as repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to electrical transformers in Betmanove (non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and to the water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna.

The SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint in Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “the presence of mines”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• An SMM mid-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).
• Medical staff at a hospital in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) refused to provide the SMM information about a civilian casualty without permission from those in control.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The Mission noted that four such sites continue to be abandoned.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Katya Andrusz

Following Spain’s early parliamentary elections on 28 April 2019, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has published its final conclusions. The elections were highly competitive and parties were able to present diverse political views.  However, the campaign`s tone was at times harsh and antagonistic.

Key recommendations include:

• further regulating data-driven and online electoral campaigning to ensure transparency, data protection and voters’ informed choice, as well as to safeguard public trust and a level playing field for the electoral contestants;
• reviewing legislation on media coverage of the elections to make it possible for parties not represented in the parliament to participate in the debates;
• upholding the principle of equality of the vote in accordance with the Constitution, OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards and good international practice;
• addressing the shortcomings of postal voting and taking steps to ensure that all voters benefit from equal voting opportunities to the maximum extent possible.

ODIHR deployed an Election Expert Team (EET) on 17 April 2019 to observe the early parliamentary elections. The EET focused on aspects related to the conduct of the election campaign and the role of the media in the process. All 57 countries across the OSCE region have formally committed to following up promptly on ODIHR’s election assessments and recommendations.

STRBSKE PLESO, 9 July 2019 – Coming from Luxembourg, where nearly 300 OSCE parliamentarians had just met for the 28th Annual Session, OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (Georgia) and Secretary General Roberto Montella were among the high-level participants of the OSCE Informal Ministerial meeting convened today by Slovak Foreign Minister and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Miroslav Lajcak in the High Tatras Mountains of Slovakia.

The meeting, under the theme of “From past action to future prevention: the OSCE’s niche in fostering stability in Europe and beyond,” aims to facilitate genuine political dialogue and spur a recommitment to the values and the role of the OSCE in the region.

The Parliamentary Assembly, which yesterday adopted the Luxembourg Declaration, stands ready to provide key input to the work of the organization in all fields of security, leveraging on the distinct contributions and added values of parliamentarians, said President Tsereteli in his remarks.

He stressed that the Luxembourg Declaration covers a wide range of topics that were discussed over several days and reflected in resolutions adopted, noting that the issues discussed are concerns that citizens of OSCE countries have articulated and it is their voices expressed the Parliamentary Assembly. The PA, he said, is concentrated on people and their suffering, especially in relation to conflicts. The President specifically mentioned the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine and stressed that in order to help people more relevant reactions are needed.

“I sometimes feel we are acting like doctors who in the face of a patient have the diagnosis, know about the treatment, but cannot agree on when to start the therapy while the patient is getting weaker and weaker,” President Tsereteli said. “We have to realize that without quick and effective action for the benefit of the people who are suffering from conflicts, human rights violations or else we fail to do what the OSCE has been created for. It has the toolbox, the PA is an integral part of it, and all it takes is the determination of every one of us to use it for the sake of improving the security of our citizens.”

On the margins, President Tsereteli and Secretary General Montella held bilateral exchanges with a number of foreign ministers, including those from Sweden, Spain, Luxembourg, Kazakhstan, Albania, and Armenia.

Secretary General Montella expressed gratitude to CiO Lajcak for organizing the informal gathering and stressed the key importance of holding frank talks outside the usual formats. He noted that it is essential to discuss strategic and long term approaches to respond to the many challenges the OSCE is facing, overcoming the political stalemate that too often jeopardizes its action and focusing instead on the people, end users of the OSCE product.

The Informal Ministerial gathering was also aimed at setting the scene for the 2019 Ministerial Council which will take place in Bratislava in December.

LONDON, 10 July 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, launched today the “Twentieth Anniversary Joint Declaration: Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade”, at the Global Conference for Media Freedom organized by the United Kingdom and Canada in London.

The Joint Declaration was issued by Désir, together with his counterparts from other intergovernmental organizations, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, David Kaye; the Organization of American States’ Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Edison Lanza; and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, Lawrence Mute.

“This year’s Joint Declaration highlights current and future challenges faced by the media, including those which pose a threat to media independence and diversity,” Désir said. “The protection and promotion of freedom of expression, especially but not only in the digital environment, requires digital infrastructure that is robust and universal. States need to recognize the right to access and use the Internet as a human right, as it is an essential condition for the exercise of freedom of expression.”

“In order to promote and protect the right to freedom of expression in a digital environment, we need appropriate regulation,” Désir said. “This also includes the need to address the unaccountable private domination by just a few companies, particularly social media, search platforms and other intermediaries, over communications. We also need independent and multi-stakeholder oversight, transparency and accountability mechanisms to address private content rules that may be inconsistent with international human rights.”

The Joint Declaration can be found here: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/425282

The Joint Declarations have been adopted annually by these intergovernmental mechanisms on freedom of expression since 1999 with the support of two leading non-governmental organizations in the field, ARTICLE 19 and the Centre for Law and Democracy.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

425300 Marina Živaljević

As part of ongoing activities with the country’s parliament, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro organized a two-day study visit to Slovenia on 3 and 4 July, which aimed at further supporting bilateral co-operation between the two parliaments. The main topic of the visit was performance management and sharing best practices.

The delegation from Montenegro, headed by Aleksandar Jovićević, the Secretary General of the Parliament, Marija Mirjačić, the Deputy Secretary General, and three associates, met representatives of the Slovenian National Assembly during the first day of the visit, and representatives of the Ministry of Public Administration on the second day.

Uršula Zore Tavčar, the Secretary General of the National Assembly, welcomed the delegation and expressed her satisfaction with the good relations between the parliaments. During the visit, the delegation had the opportunity to gain insight into the work of the departments of public relations, general affairs, the organization and personnel section, as well as the secretary of the commission for public office and elections. In addition, the representatives of the Slovenian Parliament presented the legislative background for specific matters in relation to the work of the parliamentary services.

On the second day of the visit, the Montenegrin delegation visited the Ministry of Public Administration. “It is important to have a public sector as modern and efficient as the private sector,” said Peter Pogačar, Director-General of the Public Administration in the Ministry. His colleagues presented the main characteristics of the civil service system in Slovenia and the common assessment framework (CAF) that is used. Topics such as strategic planning of the work of the state administration and measuring the work performance were also discussed.

The two-day study visit concluded with a meeting with Aleš Čerin, the Deputy Mayor of the Municipality of Ljubljana.

“I want to express my satisfaction with the visit and the meetings with high officials of the Republic of Slovenia and the City of Ljubljana. I would like to thank the OSCE Mission for the good organization of the visit and I am looking forward to future endeavours together with the Democratization Programme,” said Jovićević after concluding the visit.