European Union

Council adopts its negotiating position on the electronic e-declaration for posted workers.

Council and Parliament strike provisional deal on the compulsory licensing of patents for crisis situations.

Joint communique and Preliminary Monitoring Report following the 3rd EU-AU Ministerial Meeting, 21 May 2025.

Main agenda items, approximate timing, public sessions and press opportunities.

The President of the European Council, António Costa, will travel to Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire to receive the UNESCO Félix Houphouët-Boigny Peace Prize on 22 May 2025. In the margins of the ceremony, he will also meet the Ivorian President, Alassane Ouattara, to discuss bilateral relations, regional stability and preparations for the upcoming EU-African Union summit later this year.

The war-torn country is on its knees. Why is Brussels breaking its legs?

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The second May plenary session in 2025 opened with Nataša Pirc Musar, President of the Republic of Slovenia, addressing Parliament in a formal sitting. Following her call for European solidarity, Members then debated the EU’s response to the Israeli government’s plan to seize the Gaza Strip, the urgent need for humanitarian support and for all hostages to be freed. Members also debated the Hungarian government’s drift to Russia-style repression, including threats to freedom of expression and democratic participation, and approved new tariffs on agricultural goods from Russia and Belarus. Members also debated and voted on a report on the Committee on Petitions’ activities in 2023.

Simplifying and strengthening CBAM

Tackling climate change remains an urgent priority and the EU has set stringent rules on greenhouse gas emissions. As the rules make carbon-intensive activities more costly, this leads to a risk that some companies try to increase their profits by moving their carbon-heavy activity outside the EU. To level the playing field for businesses, the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) ensures prices fairly reflect the carbon emitted during production of imported goods such as cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers and electricity. Before it comes into full operation in 2026, the European Commission is proposing to simplify CBAM. Members debated and adopted a report from Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety that largely endorses the Commission proposal to simplify and strengthen CBAM, pending clarifications on electricity generation and embedded emissions. The report sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council on the proposal.

Single market strategy

Continued single market fragmentation constrains EU companies’ ability to compete internationally, and many of the issues remain the same as they were 20 years ago. Members debated the Commission’s newly adopted strategy to bring new impetus to the single market. While reaffirming Parliament’s role in the process, Parliament has emphasised that Member States must implement and enforce existing single market legislation. It also demanded renewed commitment from Member States and other EU institutions to strengthen and further develop the single market, particularly in the services, digital and energy sectors.

Choose Europe for science

Academic freedom is increasingly under attack in many parts of the world. Following Council and Commission statements on attracting scientists, researchers and academics to Europe, particularly to contribute to the development of new, cutting-edge technologies, Members held a debate on the Commission’s ‘Choose Europe for Science‘ initiative. Parliament already called for increased Horizon Europe funding for researchers in its resolution on the 2026 budget guidelines.

Russian energy phase-out, Nord Stream and EU energy sovereignty

Following Council and Commission statements on ending Europe’s dependency on Russian energy by phasing out imports, Members debated plans to increase the EU’s energy sovereignty. The Commission’s recent roadmap – addressing the security and economic risks of continued reliance on Russian energy – is expected to provide an answer to Parliament’s repeated calls for measures to provide alternatives to imported Russian energy, to abandon Nord Stream 1 and 2, and to secure a reliable supply of medical radioisotopes.

Improving mental health at work

Members debated EU initiatives to improve mental health at work. Mental health issues have a considerable impact on society and the economy, and Parliament strongly supports the promotion of good mental health and its inclusion in EU policymaking. Parliament has called for an EU strategy for mental health and legislation on the use of artificial intelligence at work. Parliament also urged the Commission to propose minimum requirements for telework; legislation on psychosocial risks and wellbeing at work; and a ‘long-term, comprehensive and integrated European mental health strategy’.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, was announced, from the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) on a proposal for a regulation on securities settlement in the EU and central securities depositories (CSDs): shorter settlement cycle in the Union.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – May II 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The feted EU-UK reset is more symbolism than substance. But after the performative hostility of previous British governments, it's a welcome relief.

The EU’s Omnibus initiative has sparked heated debate on achieving a sustainability - competitiveness balance. MEP Kira Marie Peter-Hansen describes its legislative process as ‘a mess’.

European stocks plunged following the announcement.

Delegations

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig.

Since April 2025, the United States (US) and Iran have been engaging in talks over a new nuclear deal. The current multilateral agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear programme is considered defunct by most analysts, after the US withdrew in 2018 and Iran started breaching its provisions as of 2019.

Background

Iran has been under multilateral sanctions for its nuclear proliferation activities since 2006. On 14 July 2015, Iran and the E3/EU+3 (or P5+1) – China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US, with the EU High Representative – concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement endorsed by the UN Security Council (UNSC), to limit Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. The JCPOA caps at 3.67 % Iran’s uranium enrichment (the weapons-grade threshold is 90 %), and at 300 kg its stockpile of enriched uranium; limits the number of Iran’s centrifuges and its nuclear R&D programme; and allows extensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran also committed never to seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons. In exchange, the UNSC gradually lifted its sanctions against Iran, while the EU and US ceased to apply some of their own. In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA, re-imposed all lifted sanctions and applied new ones, as part of a ‘maximum pressure‘ campaign against Iran. The EU remains bound by the deal, but maintains proliferation-related sanctions, alongside non-nuclear related ones. Although still party to the agreement, Iran started exceeding JCPOA limits in 2019, and fully stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments in 2021. Iran currently has a 275 kg stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 %. In October 2025, UNSC sanctions are set to expire, unless the JCPOA ‘snapback mechanism‘ to re-impose them is triggered.

Recent US-Iran diplomatic re-engagement

In a March 2025 letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader, President Trump reportedly set a two-month deadline to reach a nuclear deal, threatening Iran with (military) consequences otherwise. After an initial harsh reaction from Ayatollah Khamenei, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian left open the ‘path for indirect negotiations’. The first round of US-Iran talks took place on 12 April 2025; a fourth concluded on 11 May 2025. The Oman-mediated talks (the highest level since 2018) are indirect, although reports mention some direct exchanges between US and Iranian negotiators. The former Biden US administration sought to revive the JCPOA, but indirect talks with Iran stalled in the summer of 2022. A year later, secret indirect discussions aimed for an ‘informal’ pact to prevent further escalation between the US and Iran.

The US objectives in the talks are surrounded by some uncertainty. President Trump initially stated the objective of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. The US position then shifted, with Trump stating the goal of ‘full dismantlement’ of Iran’s nuclear programme, while likely accepting a civilian nuclear programme. The US Secretary of State has called for a complete halt to uranium enrichment (with a potential Iranian civilian programme based on imported enriched uranium), to its production of long-range missiles and to its support for terrorist groups and the Houthis. However, other administration voices suggest that the US agree to some uranium enrichment in order to get a deal and avoid a military strike that could lead to war. Iranian officials have condemned the ‘contradictory and conflicting’ US positions. Stressing its right to maintain a ‘complete nuclear fuel cycle’, as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has rejected the prospect of dismantling its nuclear programme and renouncing uranium enrichment, but would discuss concerns regarding ‘potential militarisation’. Iran has also rejected any discussion of its defence and missile capabilities, but suggested it would not build a nuclear-capable missile. At the same time, Iran has framed a deal as a win-win for both sides, inviting the US to invest in its nuclear energy programme.

Signs of progress …

Iranian officials have described as ‘very serious and productive’ the current discussions covering technical issues, such as the monitoring of Iran’s nuclear facilities and what would happen to its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. Iran aims to secure the effective lifting of sanctions and ironclad guarantees from the US that it would not renege on a potential deal. The IAEA has pressed for a role in the talks, as the agency would be required to verify implementation of any agreement. Initial reports indicated that US negotiators suggested capping Iran’s uranium enrichment at a low level needed to produce fuel for energy, as well as monitoring, just as Iranian officials indicated willingness to have a 3.67 % limit, as set by the JCPOA. A senior adviser to Khamenei stated that Iran, in exchange for lifting all sanctions, was prepared to sign a deal that allows it to enrich only to the lower levels needed for civilian uses and requires it to give up its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, with inspectors verifying compliance. Iran also reportedly floated the idea of selling enriched uranium to the US. After the fourth round of talks, the President Trump hinted that the parties were close to a deal, which would seemingly include zero uranium enrichment for up to three years to build trust, after which Iran would be allowed to enrich at civilian levels (likely the 3.67 % limit set by the JCPOA). In the meantime, Russia could provide Iran with uranium for its civil nuclear programme. Nevertheless, reports point to continued disagreements over the issue of zero uranium enrichment, and over the timing and location of the transfer of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile.

… albeit fragile

Besides their respective red lines in the talks, the high level of distrust between the US and Iran and a potential escalation in the region may prevent them reaching a deal. To build pressure on Iran, the US has increased its military deployments to the Middle East and stepped up the enforcement of sanctions. Moreover, President Trump may fail to deter, or may even consider supporting, an Israeli (or even a joint Israeli-US) strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. In turn, Iran has threatened ‘a strong reciprocal blow’ in the event of a US military attack, including against the tens of thousands of American troops stationed at bases across the region or against Israeli troops – threats reiterated recently as it unveiled a new solid-fuelled medium-range ballistic missile. Iran has also stated that the US would be held responsible for any Israeli attacks on Iranian soil, and has condemned the US for expanding its sanctions campaign against Iran’s trade partners, notably China. At the same time, Iran has continued purportedly to foment instability in the region, through support to the Houthis and backing acts of sabotage in Jordan, a steadfast US ally.

Role of regional players

Israel regards any emerging deal with strong concern, particularly if it will not fully remove Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium. Emboldened by recent military successes against Iranian proxies, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and the demise of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, Israel continues to push for targeted strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Conversely, the Gulf States, already on a course of rapprochement with Iran, are supportive of a nuclear deal, unlike in 2015. For them, a US-Iran compromise on the nuclear issue is necessary for Middle East stability and for achieving their economic visions. China and Russia have also expressed support for the talks. Moscow advocates a fair US-Iran deal, insisting on Iran’s legitimate right to develop its own civil nuclear energy programme. Russia has even offered to mediate the talks and to store Iranian enriched uranium. China, increasingly targeted by US sanctions over the purchase of Iranian crude oil, has backed Iran in the talks, also arguing in favour of respecting Iran’s right to use nuclear energy peacefully. After China-Russia-Iran trilateral discussions, the Chinese Foreign Ministry in March 2025 issued a five-point proposition on the Iranian nuclear issue, which states that the JCPOA framework should remain the basis for new consensus, and cautions against initiating the snapback mechanism.

European Union

EU-Iran relations have been at a low since 2022. However, the EU has a lot to lose from escalation in the Middle East and the collapse of nuclear diplomacy, and has called on Iran repeatedly to respect its commitments under the JCPOA. In November 2024, the E3 and the US censured Iran at the IAEA for lack of cooperation with the agency. Iran and the E3 then held several rounds of nuclear talks, most recently on 16 May 2025. While the EU is de facto excluded from current US-Iran talks, the EU High Representative hailed the talks as a ‘step in the right direction because we do not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon’, stressing the importance of a unified approach with the US on the matter. In late April, France, Germany and the UK announced they would trigger the snapback mechanism by August if talks with the US fail to reach an accord; they have rejected any military option.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Recent US-Iran talks on a new nuclear deal‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Health stakeholders insist the EU needs upscaled investment, deeper coordination and clarity across regulatory frameworks for a competitive Europe.

Two Israeli embassy staff members were shot dead outside the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington D.C. on Wednesday evening. The young couple were soon to be married. A 30-year-old man has been arrested and is expected to be charged with murder. According to police reports, he said he did it for Palestine. Commentators reflect on the causes and necessary consequences.

The right-wing populist candidate Sławomir Mentzen, who came third in the first round of the Polish presidential election, has submitted a list of demands to Karol Nawrocki and Rafał Trzaskowski, the two candidates competing in the run-off vote on 1 June, and made his support conditional on their fulfillment. Nawrocki and Mentzen have already had a meeting in which Nawrocki agreed to the conditions and even supported Mentzen's criticism of the PiS. The media takes stock.